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AN

E S S A Y

ON THE

ORIGIN *of* EVIL,

V O L. II.



C H A P. V.

Of Moral Evil.

Introduction, containing the Substance of the Chapter.

HAVING given some Account of *Natural Evils*, the *Moral* come next under consideration: we are now to trace out the Origin of these and see of what kind it is, whether they flow from the same Source with the Natural, viz. the necessary *Imperfection* of created Beings; or we are to seek for some other entirely different from it.

By *Moral Evils*, as we said before, are understood those Inconveniencies of Life and Condition which befall ourselves or others thro' wrong Elections. For it is plain that some inconveniencies happen without our knowledge, or against our Wills, by the very Order of natural Causes; whereas others come upon us knowingly, and in a manner with our Consent (when we choose either these themselves, or such as are necessarily connected with them.) The *Moral* are to be reckon'd among the latter kind of Inconveniencies; and he must be esteem'd the Cause of them, who knowingly, and of his own accord, brings them either

upon himself or others by a depraved or foolish Choice.

But, in order to make this whole Matter concerning Moral Evils more fully understood, we must consider in the

1st Place, *What the nature of Elections is.*

2dly, *That our Happiness chiefly depends upon Elections.*

3dly, *What kind of Elections may be said to be made amiss, or foolishly.*

4thly, *How we came to fall into depraved or wicked Elections.*

5thly, *How such Elections can be reconciled with the Power and Goodness of God.*

S E C T. I.

Concerning the Nature of Elections.

S U B S E C T. I.

A View of their Opinion who admit of Freedom from Compulsion only, but not from Necessity.

That it is not easy to understand or give a true representation of
I. **I**F there be any thing obscure and difficult in Philosophy, we are sure to find it in that Part which treats of Elections and Liberty. There is no point about which the Learned are less consistent

sistent with themselves, or more divided from each other. Nor is it an easy Matter to understand them, or to give a certain and true representation of their Opinions. I think they may be distinguish'd into two Sorts, both admitting of a Liberty; One of them from external *Compulsion*, and not from internal *Necessity*; but the other from both.

tation of the Opinions concerning Liberty. Some acknowledge a Liberty from Com-

pulsion only, others from Necessity

also.

II. As far as I can understand the Opinion of the former, it is this: First, they observe that there are certain *Appetites* implanted in us by Nature, which are not to be esteem'd useless, but contributing toward our Preservation, as was shewn before; and that some things are naturally agreeable, some contrary to these Appetites: that the former, when present, please and impress a delightful Sense of themselves; the latter displease and create uneasiness. These therefore are called incommodious, troublesome and Evil; and those commodious, convenient and Good.

The Authors of the former Opinion suppose Appetites implanted in us by Nature what is agreeable to these is called good; the contrary, Evil. Things are agreeable to the Appetites in a three fold respect.

III. Secondly, That Nature has given us *Reason*, a *Mind* or *Intellect*, whereby to distinguish Conveniencies from Inconveniencies, Good from Evil. And since this may be considered by the Mind in a threefold Respect, hence also arise three kinds of Good and Evil; namely, *Pleasant*, *Profitable* and *Honest*.

Hence 3 kinds of good.

IV. For if Good be considered as present with regard only to the Appetite which is delighted with the Enjoyment of it, and acquiesces in it, 'tis called *Pleasant*.

That which is actually agreeable is called Pleasant.

V. But if it be not agreeable to the Appetite of itself, but only *connected* with something else which is of itself agreeable, or produces Pleasure, and on that account only be desirable, then 'tis called *Profitable*. For tho' the Appetite cannot come at

That which is connected with some thing

which is
of itself agreeable, is
called Profitable,

That
which is
judged by
the Understanding to be
the best,
all things
consider'd,
is absolutely
good, and
called
Honest.

the immediate Enjoyment of it, yet the Mind makes use of it in order to procure those things which it can enjoy, and from thence it is esteem'd convenient, *i. e.* Good.

VI. But since that which is agreeable to one Appetite, may be repugnant or less agreeable to others; and that which pleases now, may have some things connected with it, which may be displeasing afterwards, there is need of enquiry and deliberation, in order to procure an absolute Good, *i. e.* one which, all Appetites and Times consider'd, will afford as great, as certain and durable a Pleasure or Delight as possible. For this End therefore was the Mind or Understanding given us, that we might be able to determine what appears fittest to be done upon a view of all such things as create pleasure or uneasiness for the present or the future. And what is thus judg'd by the Understanding to be the best, if there be no Error in the Case, must be look'd upon as *Honest*. For that is *Honest* which is agreeable to a rational Agent; but it is agreeable to a rational Agent, and Reason itself directs, that, all things consider'd, we should prefer that which brings the greater, the more certain and more durable Advantages.

Instances
in Health,
Medicines
and such
things as
are agree-
able to the
Rational
Appetite.

VII. The Defenders of this Opinion reckon these kinds of Good to be *Moral* so far as they respect Man, because they fall under the Government of Reason. But since all things cannot be always had together, a comparison must be made between them, and that embraced which appears to be the best. Now the kinds may be compared together, as well as the particulars of each kind. For instance, Health is a thing pleasant in itself, and desirable above all things that relate to the Body, but for the preservation of it Medicines must be sometimes taken, which of themselves are far from being agreeable to the Appetite, but as they are means to
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an End which in itself is delightful, they are said to be profitable, and on that account fit to be chosen. Now the Goods of the Mind are greater, more certain and more durable than those of the Body; if therefore they cannot be had without the loss of Health, or even Life, right Reason dictates, that Health, or even Life be despised in regard to these. For this appears to be the most convenient, all things consider'd, and on that account is *honest*: and as Goods of a different kind may be compared together, so may also particulars of the same kind, as any one will find that considers it.

VIII. As to *Liberty*, the Men of this Sect will have it to consist in this, that among all those Goods an Agent can embrace that which pleases him best, and exert those Actions which his own Reason approves: For, according to these Men, he that can follow his own *Judgment* in Matters is free. For Example, he that is sound in Body, and has his Faculties and Limbs entire, if all external Impediments be removed, is at Liberty to walk: for he can if he *will*, and nothing but his will is wanting to exert that Action.

He that can act as his own Judgment directs, is free according to these Men.

IX. But as to the Actions of the *Will* itself, namely, to *will*, or to *suspend* the Act of Volition, they think that it is determin'd to these, not by itself, for that is impossible, but from without. If you ask from whence? They answer, from the *Pleasure* or *Uneasiness* perceiv'd by the Understanding or the Senses; but rather, as they imagine, from the present or urgent *Uneasiness*: since therefore these are produced in us *ab extra*, not from the Will itself, and are not in its power, but arise from the very things; 'tis manifest, according to these Men, that we are not free (at least from *Necessity*)

But we are determin'd to choose either from the goodness or disagreeableness of objects perceiv'd by the Intellect or Senses; and therefore not free as to

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the Acts of the Will, but only of the inferior Faculties, which are subject to its determination.

to *will* or *not will*, that is with regard to the immediate Acts of the Will: Some of them therefore expressly deny that Liberty belongs to Man with regard to these Acts, or that an Election can be said to be free, or Man himself in that respect: They will have it therefore, that *Liberty* belongs to us properly with respect to the *inferior* Faculties which are subject to the Government of the Will, and discharge their Functions when the Man himself has willed: that is, a Man is free to walk who can walk if he pleases; but not to will; for he receives the Will to walk from elsewhere: nevertheless, he that can *do* what he wills, according to them, is free, even tho' he be necessarily determin'd to will. (42.)

X. If

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(42.) The most remarkable Defenders of this Opinion, among the Moderns, seem to be *Hobbs*, *Locke*, (if he be consistent with himself ||) *Leibnitz*, *Bayle*, *Norris*, the *Authors* of the *Philosophical Enquiry concerning human Liberty*, and of *Cato's Letters*. But in order to have a more distinct Notion of the different Schemes of Authors all professing to treat of *Human Liberty*, *Free-will*, &c. Let us in the first Place recite the several Powers or Modifications of the Mind, and observe to which of them Liberty is or may be apply'd. --- These are commonly distinguish'd into *Perception*, *Judgment*, *Volition* and *Action*. The two former are generally *necessary*, at least always *passive*: For I cannot help seeing a light when my Eyes are open, nor avoid judging that two and two make four, whenever I think of that Proposition; tho' I may hinder that Perception by shutting my Eyes, as well as prevent that Judgment by refusing to think of the Proposition. The Will then may properly enough be said to influence or impede these †, but this does not make them less *passive* in themselves; nay, the more it does influence them, the more evidently they are so. The third will appear to be the exercise of a *Self-moving Principle*. and as such cannot properly be moved or influenced by any thing else. The last is the Exercise of the *inferior Powers*, the actual Production of Thought

|| See Note 45.

† See Note 59.

X. If it be granted that this is the Nature of our Elections, there is no doubt but all our Actions are really and truly necessary. For as to the proper Actions of the Will, to will or suspend the Act of Volition, the Men whom we are speaking of, If this be so, all our Actions are absolutely necessary.
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Thought or Motion: this is generally directed by, and an immediate consequence of Volition, on which account several Authors have confounded them together; but tho' they be properly both Acts of the Mind, yet they are certainly distinct ones; the *Will* is an ability of choosing some particular Thoughts or Motions, *Agency* is a power of producing these Thoughts or Motions pursuant to the act of choice, or of putting that choice in execution. A careful distinction between these will help us to judge of all such Authors as have either used them promiscuously or been content to treat of the last only, as most of those Persons have that are cited in the 14th and following Pages of the *Philosophical Enquiry*.

These two last being the only *active Powers*, or rather the only *Powers* at all, are the only proper subjects of Liberty: to which again it is variously apply'd. With regard to the *Will*, some content themselves with asserting its Freedom from external *Compulsion* only, from being forced contrary to its own bent and inclination. And indeed it would be very strange to suppose it otherwise: For to say that it may be drawn a contrary way to that which the Mind prefers and directs, is to say, that it may tend two contrary ways at once, that a Man may will a thing against his Will, or be oblig'd to will what at the same time he does not will: but then such a Freedom as this equally belongs to the two former Powers, which cannot be forced to perceive or judge otherwise than they do perceive or judge, otherwise than as Objects appear, and their own Natures require; it may be apply'd to any thing the most necessary, nay the more necessary the better. Others therefore have contended for an absolute exemption of the Will from all imperceptible Biass or Physical Inclination, from all internal necessity, arising either from its own frame and constitution, the impulse of superior Beings, or the operation of Objects, Reasons, Motives, &c. which appear'd to them the very essence of human Liberty, the sole Foundation of Morality. And indeed these seem to be the only Persons that speak out, and to the Point, as shall be shewn in the following Notes.

Lastly,

give up Liberty with respect to these, while they assert that it does not belong to them. For they are of Opinion that when any thing is proposed by the Understanding to be done, we either will it, or suspend the Act of Volition concerning it, according to the prospect of Happiness or importunity of the Uneasiness which appears to the Mind, in the present State and Circumstances; by these therefore our Election, according to them, is determin'd.

XI. But

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Lastly, a great many will confine their Idea of Liberty to *Action* only, and define it to be a power of either actually taking up or laying down a Thought, of beginning Motion or stopping it according to the preference of the Mind or Will. But if this be all the Liberty we have, 'tis of small consequence, since we are conscious that in *fact* all such Actions, supposing the Organs to be rightly disposed, follow the determination of the Will; and also, that *in reason* they are no farther *moral*, nor we accountable for them than as they do so; we must therefore go up higher than this before we come at any valuable Liberty; and the main Question will be, Whether Man is free to think or resolve upon; to will or choose any thing proposed, as well as to exert his other Faculties in consequence of such Resolution, Will, or Choice. This is the only Point worth disputing, and wherein all *Moral* Liberty must consist; and indeed if it be not here 'tis no where. For if the Mind be absolutely determin'd to choose in a certain manner in any given Circumstances, its other subordinate Faculties will immediately operate, and the several Actions which depend thereon all follow by necessary consequence. Nay, upon this Hypothesis there is properly no such thing as choice or Action in Man; but all are Passions propagated in a chain of necessary Causes and Effects. And indeed all who suppose any external Determination of the Will (meaning always a necessary and irresistible one) whether they place it in the *Desire of Good*, *Anxiety* for the absence of it, or the *last Determination of the Judgment*, are involv'd in the same consequence, how many Steps soever they may take to remove the Difficulty. For it is equal to me, if what I call my Choice or Action be necessary, wherever that Necessity be placed. 'Tis the same thing whether I
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XI. But when the Election is made, if we can effect what we will, then they say we are free, in respect of such Actions, not from necessity, but only from Compulsion; for it is plain that nothing but our will is wanting to the exertion of them, and supposing us to will them, they necessarily follow. For instance, when nothing hinders a Man from walking but his own Will, supposing this Volition, it cannot be conceiv'd but that he must walk, nor can he rest while this continues. If therefore, according to them, all acts of the Will are necessary (as being determin'd from without, viz. by the convenience or inconvenience of things or circumstances) the actions of the inferior faculties will be no less necessary, for they will depend on the same circumstances and acts of the Will, which, as they are necessary, these actions will

That human Actions are free, not from Necessity, but Compulsion.

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be acted upon and over-ruled by one immediate Cause, or drawn on by several successively. Suppose, v. g. that I am necessitated to obey the last result of my own Judgment. From the Existence of things follow certain Appearances, those Appearances cause certain Perceptions, these Perceptions form a Judgment, this Judgment determines the Will, and this Will produces Action. All this is fix'd and inevitable, every Link of the Chain is equally necessary, and 'tis all one to me on which my Determinations hang: 'Tis as good to take them from the first as last, from the Existence of outward Objects as from my own Will; since the supposed choice or action is in reality as much out of my power, or as incapable of being alter'd or prevented by me, as the existence of external things. 'Tis easy to observe how destructive this and the like Schemes must prove, as well of Morality as Liberty, both which must stand and fall together, and can, I think, only be secured effectually upon the Principles laid down by our Author; of which in their proper place.

See also Mr. Chubb's Reflections on Natural Liberty. Collection of Tracts, p. 379, &c. or Notes 45, 48, 59.

will be necessary also. (43.) Tho', according to them, therefore, there be no *Compulsion* of the Will, yet there is *Necessity*, from which Necessity nothing in the World will be free; nay a great many of them openly profess to believe that this is the Case.

According to their Opinion there is no *contingency* in things, nor could any thing be done otherwise than it is.

XII. Now, from this Hypothesis, which they extend to the Divine as well as Human Will, the following Corollaries seem deducible. First, that nothing in Nature could be done otherwise than it is. For, the whole Series of things being as it were connected together by Fate, there's no Room for Chance or Liberty, properly so call'd: *Contingency* then is removed out of Nature.

XIII. Se-

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(43.) To call an Action *necessary*, is properly speaking to affirm, that it is no Action: For by the Word *Action* we mean an immediate effect of what is metaphorically stiled a *Self-moving Power*: or the exercise of an ability which a Being has to begin or determine a particular train of *Thought* or *Motion*. Now the Idea of this Power in any Being, and of such exercise of it, is directly repugnant to that of *Necessity*, which supposes the *Thought* or *Motion* to be already begun or determined, and to be obtruded on this Being by something else, and consequently implies a Negation of any such Self-moving Power in this Being, or of its exercise by this Being in the Cases above mentioned. 'To be an Agent (says Dr. Clarke,*) signifies to have a Power of beginning Motion, and Motion cannot begin necessarily, because Necessity of Motion supposes an Efficiency superior to, and irresistible by the thing moved, and consequently the beginning of Motion cannot be in that which is moved necessarily, but in the superior Cause, or in the efficiency of some other Cause still superior to that, till at length we arrive at some *Free Agent*." Where, tho' the Doctor's Definition of Agency seems to be imperfect, that Word generally including the power of beginning reflex *Thought* as well as *Motion* (which are two distinct Species of Action, and proceed from different Powers, tho' they be often confounded together and comprehended under

* *Remarks on the Philosophical Enquiry*, p. 6.

XIII. Secondly, That nothing more can be understood by wicked or wrong made Elections, than that they are prejudicial to the Elector or some others; which Sense is very remote from the vulgar one; for in that Evil Elections are blamed, not for being hurtful, but for being hurtful without Necessity, and because they are made otherwise than they ought to have been: In this Hypothesis then there is

By Evil they understand nothing more than hurtful.

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under the same general term) yet it shews us an evident contradiction in these two Words *necessary Agent*, in either Sense: Unless he uses the Word *Agent* in both Senses together, and then his Reasoning will be false, since what is acted on and determin'd by another in regard to its *Will*, or *Thought*, and in that Sense mov'd by a superior Efficiency, may yet have a power of beginning real corporeal Motion (which is a quite different sort of Action) in consequence of such pre-determin'd Will, or Thought, and in that sense be an *Agent*, tho' not a moral one. But what ever the Doctor might mean by the Word *Agent*, his Argument will hold in either of these two Senses separate, *viz.* that nothing can be said to *act* either in thinking or moving, which does not properly *begin* the train of Thought or Motion; but is put into Thought or Motion by something else, and also, that every thing cannot be so put either into Thought or Motion; and therefore that there must be some first Cause of both.

And will not the same Argument hold equally for some first Cause of *Existence*? If the Doctor can suppose a first Cause of all Thought and Motion (as he does here, and we think very reasonably) why may he not also suppose a first Cause of all *Existence*; and so entirely exclude that *antecedent Necessity* which he has often Recourse to as a kind of support of the existence of the first Cause, but is oblig'd to exclude from its Will and Actions? Is it harder to conceive how an Eternal Independent Being, or First Cause, may *exist* without any antecedent Necessity, than how it can *will* or *act* without any?

But to return to the chief Design of this Note. We see how necessary it is to fix the precise meaning of the Word *Action* in a Controversy of this kind, and if the Signification of it as laid down above be allow'd, then necessary Action is the same as passive Action, or beginning a thing and not beginning it at the same time, and in the same respect; in which terms every one perceives it to be a contradiction.

is no Election made amiss. (44.) Nor can any thing be said to be done otherwise than it ought to be: for what could not possibly be done otherwise, is certainly done as it ought; since it is done according to the exigence and necessary order of things.

Villanies
are to be
placed to
the ac-
count of
human
Misery,
and not
look'd up-
on as
Crimes,
properly
so call'd.

XIV. Thirdly, By the same Principle all Evil wou'd be in the strictest sense *Natural*, for it would derive its Origin from natural and necessary Causes. The distinction then would be lost between natural and moral Evil, as commonly understood. There would be no Moral Evil at all. For that only is reckon'd Moral by the common consent of Mankind, of which the Man himself is properly the Cause; but no body looks upon himself as properly the Cause of a thing which he could not avoid, or to which he was necessitated by natural Causes, and such as were antecedent to the Will. For every one blames himself only on this account, because he was of himself necessarily the Cause of Evil to himself or others. Those Inconveniences which come by Necessity, he looks upon as Miseries, as Misfortunes, but never as a Crime. Thefts therefore, Adulteries, Perjuries, nay the Hatred of God himself, and whatever we esteem base in Villanies (as well as the disgrace and punishment attending them) must be placed to the account of human Misery and Unhappiness, but by
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(44.) *Leibnitz* declares it to be his settled Opinion †, "That whenever we resolve or will contrary to an evident Reason, we are carried by some other Reason stronger in appearance". If this be always the Case, we certainly can never will amiss or unreasonably, since that Reason which appears to be the strongest must and ought always to determine us.

† *Remarques sur le Livre de l'Origine du Mal.* p. 483.

no means reckon'd criminal, nor any more repugnant to the Will of God, to his Justice, Purity or Goodness, than Heat or Cold.

XV. Fourthly, When therefore we blame a Thief, Adulterer, Murderer, or perjur'd Person, when these Crimes are arraign'd as scandalous; this is not done because they have deserv'd it, or because these things are in themselves really shameful or culpable; but because that Infamy may be a means of deterring the guilty Persons or others from the like Elections. And this is the only Reason why we reproach a Thief, &c. and not a sick Person, with Infamy; because Reproach may cure a Thief, &c. but can do no Good to a sick Person.

A Malefactor is reprov'd, not because he deserv'd it, but because reproof may drive him from Evil.

XVI. Fifthly, Malefactors are punish'd not because they deserve Punishment, but because it is expedient, and Laws are made use of to restrain Vices, as Medicines to expel Diseases; Men sin therefore after the same manner as they die, *viz.* because an effectual Remedy was not apply'd. And yet Laws are not entirely usefess, since they prevent some Vices, as Medicines protract the Deaths of some diseased Persons: and a Person infected with the Plague may be as justly cut off by the Law, as a Witch, when by that means there's hope of avoiding the Contagion. (†)

Punishments are apply'd as Medicines to the Sick; neither are Laws usefess, since they prevent Vice.

XVII.

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[†] All this, and a great deal more to the same purpose, is expressly asserted (as indeed 'tis a necessary consequence of their Hypothesis) by *Hobbs* || and by the Author of the *Philosophical Enquiry*, p. 91, &c. and much the same by *Bayle*, Critical Dictionary, p. 2609, &c. The bare recital of such Principles is a sufficient refutation of them.

|| See his *Treatise on Human Liberty*, or *Bp. Bramhall's Works*, p. 678.

We are oblig'd to be grateful only in prospect of a future Benefit.

XVII. Sixthly ; We are oblig'd to repay good Offices, since by being thankful we may excite the Benefactor to continue or increase his Benevolence, and also induce others to do us Service. And hence it comes to pass, that we are oblig'd to be grateful towards God and Men, but not to the Sun or a Horse, namely, because God and Men may be excited by thanks to some farther Beneficence, whereas the Sun or a Horse cannot. Thus no regard is to be had to a Benefit receiv'd, but only to one that may be receiv'd ; nor are we oblig'd to be grateful towards a most generous Benefactor for what is past, but only for the prospect of what is to come. All sense of Gratitude then, as commonly understood, is destroy'd, for the Vulgar reckon him a cunning, not a grateful Person, who returns one favour merely out of hopes of another.

According to this Opinion, human Happiness is impossible, since it depends upon things which are not in our Power.

XVIII. Seventhly, If this Opinion be true, we must despair of human Felicity, for it will not in the least be in our own Power, but entirely depend on external Objects. Our Happiness (if there be any) must, according to them, be conceiv'd to arise from the perfect fruition of those things which are agreeable to the Appetites. Where the contrary to these are present, or the agreeable ones absent, we must necessarily be uneasy, and while we struggle with Anxieties we cannot be happy. According to this Hypothesis therefore it follows, that our Happiness necessarily requires such an Enjoyment as we have spoken of, and that this is at the same time impossible. For who can hope that all external things (with which he has to do) should be so temper'd as in every respect to answer his Wishes, so as never to want what he desires, or be forced to endure any thing contrary to his natural Appetites? If Happiness arises from the Enjoyment of those things which are agreeable to the Faculties and Appetites, and which can move Desire by their innate

nate, or at least apparent Goodness; if also the Will is necessarily determin'd to these, according to the Judgment of the Understanding, or Impor-tunity of Appetites, every Man must necessarily want a great many things which he has chosen, and bear a great many which he would not, than which nothing is more inconsistent with Felicity. For we cannot possibly conceive any State of Life where-in all things answer to the natural Appetites. In vain then do we hope for Happiness, if it depend upon external Objects, (N.)

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(N.) Against the Argument here urged 'tis objected that it is lame in all its Feet; 1st, there is no consequence in it. 2dly, the Conclusion may be granted; and 3dly, the Argument may be re-torted against the Author.

To begin with the last; It is alledged that Men are never the happier, or more independent of the accidents of Fortune, by having a *power to choose without Reason*.

To which I reply, that the Author has no occasion to assert any such power; all that he pleads for is that the will ought not to be determin'd by the Judgment of the Understanding concerning things antecedently agreeable or disagreeable to our natural Appetites, because all the good of a Man does not lie in them: If it did, here would be no need of a will at all, but we ought to be absolutely determin'd by them. But the will is a faculty that by choosing a thing can make it agreeable, tho' it had no Agreement with any natural Appetite, nay, were contrary to them all; and for the will to choose a thing in order to please itself in the choice, is no more to choose without reason, than to build a House in order to preserve one from the inclemency of the Weather, is to act without reason.

But 2dly, 'Tis ask'd, will Men be any happier, or less dependent on the accidents of Fortune by having such a Faculty? Yes, sure a great deal; for no accident of Fortune can take this Liberty from them, or hinder their being pleased with their choice, and in the midst of sickness, pain and torment, if they have this faculty, they will find pleasure and satisfaction in it, and make the most adverse Fortune easy to them, as we see wise men frequently do, at least, more easy than such circumstances would be without it.

3dly,

Its conse-
quences
hard, and
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Argument
prejudice
if they be

XIX. This, and a great deal more that might be added, must seem hard and repugnant to the common

from consequences be generally a bad one, yet these bring some against an Opinion which seems attended with them, especially if they be acknowledged.

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3dly, 'Tis objected, that it must be impossible to give agreeableness to a thing which has none antecedently to the Will. For to do so we must have a power either to change our taste of things, or the things themselves; but that wou'd almost be the same as to say to a piece of Lead be thou Gold, or to a Flint be thou a Diamond, or at least produce the same effect on me. To which the answer is easy; Good is not an *absolute* thing, but *relative*, and consists in the agreeableness of one thing to another, as suppose between the Appetite and Object; if then these be disagreeable to one another, the one is Evil to the other, and to make them agreeable, one of them must of necessity be changed, and the change of either will cause it. Altho' therefore I cannot change Lead into Gold by any act of my Free-will, yet I can contemn Gold as much as if it were Lead, and be as well content with a leaden Cup as if it were Gold. Thousands makes this use of Free-will, and arise to this pitch of Happiness by the help of it: It is an old Rule *Si res haberi non potest deme aliquid de cupiditatibus*. If you can't have Wealth or Honour resolve, that is *choose*, to be satisfied without it, and experience will teach you that such a Choice is much to your Ease and Happiness. To say that this is impossible, is to give the Lie to all who treat of Morals and Divinity: Of so great moment is such a power of making things good by choice, that in truth all moral Advices suppose us to have it, or else they are not sense.

But 4thly, 'Tis objected, That if the will can make a thing agreeable by choosing, such a power wou'd be *infinite*, and might make a Man happy in all circumstances, even in *Hell*. For if it can give six degrees of Pleasure to an Object, it may as well give infinite, since it is without reason that it gives these Six. I answer, all created Powers and Pleasures are limited, and no subject is capable of more than such a certain Degree, therefore there is likewise a limitation of the pleasure arising from the use of Free-will, as well as from the use of seeing or hearing, or any other Faculty or Appetite, and as the Will is an Appetite, so the Pleasure of it bears some proportion to the Pleasure arising from the satisfaction of other Appetites, but in what degree we cannot precisely determine, any more than

common Notions of Men, and cannot be believ'd without extraordinary Prejudice to Mankind. I confess indeed, that, for the most part, one cannot argue well against an Opinion from its consequences,
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than we can settle the proportion between the Pleasures of seeing and hearing; which yet we know are neither of them infinite. Tho' therefore we cannot precisely determine the Proportion, yet we are certain that we frequently cross all our natural Appetites to maintain our choice, and by means of it bear up against the strokes of adverse Fortune, and a flood of natural Evils.

But 5thly, 'Tis objected, that if we had this power of making things agreeable or disagreeable by choice, we need not trouble our selves how our other Appetites were satisfied, for we might be absolutely happy in spite of all the accidents of Fortune.

He that objects this, assuredly did not consider the description given by the Author of this Faculty, nor that the having it doth not destroy our other Appetites, and that when it chooses things contrary to them, it necessarily creates a great deal of pain, uneasiness and torment, which abates *so far* the pleasure we take in our Elections, that the pleasure we obtain by such a choice is little or nothing in respect of what it might be if we did not choose amiss. These things are so plainly and frequently repeated in the Book, that it seems strange how any one could imagine that because we have a Faculty to please our selves by choosing, that therefore we may be absolutely happy in spite of all the Accidents of Fortune.

If by Happiness be meant a state more eligible than nothing, I believe by means of this Faculty we may generally speaking be so far happy, and that is sufficient to justify God's putting us into our present Circumstances. But if by Happiness be meant, as ought to be, a state wherein we have a full and free exercise of all our Faculties, then in as much as our power of choosing is but one Faculty, tho' superior to all the rest, the exercise of it alone can never make us absolutely and compleatly happy, tho' it may in such a degree as is very desirable.

6thly, The Conclusion of the Argument is granted, and it is look'd on as no inconvenience that our Happiness should in some cases depend on things without us, and not in our own Power. But the conclusion is quite another thing. The words are, *If this Opinion be true, we must despair of human Happiness,*
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XIX. This, and a great deal more that might be added, must seem hard and repugnant to the common

Argument from consequences be generally a bad one, yet these bring some against an Opinion which seems attended with them, especially if they be acknowledged.

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3dly, 'Tis objected, that it must be impossible to give agreeableness to a thing which has none antecedently to the Will. For to do so we must have a power either to change our taste of things, or the things themselves; but that wou'd almost be the same as to say to a piece of Lead be thou Gold, or to a Flint be thou a Diamond, or at least produce the same effect on me. To which the answer is easy; Good is not an *absolute* thing, but *relative*, and consists in the agreeableness of one thing to another, as suppose between the Appetite and Object; if then these be disagreeable to one another, the one is Evil to the other, and to make them agreeable, one of them must of necessity be changed, and the change of either will cause it. Altho' therefore I cannot change Lead into Gold by any act of my Free-will, yet I can contemn Gold as much as if it were Lead, and be as well content with a leaden Cup as if it were Gold. Thousands makes this use of Free-will, and arise to this pitch of Happiness by the help of it: It is an old Rule *Si res haberi non potest deme aliquid de cupiditatibus*. If you can't have Wealth or Honour resolve, that is *choose*, to be satisfied without it, and experience will teach you that such a Choice is much to your Ease and Happiness. To say that this is impossible, is to give the Lie to all who treat of Morals and Divinity: Of so great moment is such a power of making things good by choice, that in truth all moral Advices suppose us to have it, or else they are not sense.

But 4thly, 'Tis objected, That if the will can make a thing agreeable by choosing, such a power wou'd be *infinite*, and might make a Man happy in all circumstances, even in *Hell*. For if it can give six degrees of Pleasure to an Object, it may as well give infinite, since it is without reason that it gives these Six. I answer, all created Powers and Pleasures are limited, and no subject is capable of more than such a certain Degree, therefore there is likewise a limitation of the pleasure arising from the use of Free-will, as well as from the use of seeing or hearing, or any other Faculty or Appetite, and as the Will is an Appetite, so the Pleasure of it bears some proportion to the Pleasure arising from the satisfaction of other Appetites, but in what degree we cannot precisely determine, any more than

common Notions of Men, and cannot be believ'd without extraordinary Prejudice to Mankind. I confess indeed, that, for the most part, one cannot argue well against an Opinion from its consequences, since

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than we can settle the proportion between the Pleasures of seeing and hearing; which yet we know are neither of them infinite. Tho' therefore we cannot precisely determine the Proportion, yet we are certain that we frequently cross all our natural Appetites to maintain our choice, and by means of it bear up against the strokes of adverse Fortune, and a flood of natural Evils.

But 5thly, 'Tis objected, that if we had this power of making things agreeable or disagreeable by choice, we need not trouble our selves how our other Appetites were satisfied, for we might be absolutely happy in spite of all the accidents of Fortune.

He that objects this, assuredly did not consider the description given by the Author of this Faculty, nor that the having it doth not destroy our other Appetites, and that when it chooses things contrary to them, it necessarily creates a great deal of pain, uneasiness and torment, which abates *so far* the pleasure we take in our Elections, that the pleasure we obtain by such a choice is little or nothing in respect of what it might be if we did not choose amiss. These things are so plainly and frequently repeated in the Book, that it seems strange how any one could imagine that because we have a Faculty to please our selves by choosing, that therefore we may be absolutely happy in spite of all the Accidents of Fortune.

If by Happiness be meant a state more eligible than nothing, I believe by means of this Faculty we may generally speaking be so far happy, and that is sufficient to justify God's putting us into our present Circumstances. But if by Happiness be meant, as ought to be, a state wherein we have a full and free exercise of all our Faculties, then in as much as our power of choosing is but one Faculty, tho' superior to all the rest, the exercise of it alone can never make us absolutely and compleatly happy, tho' it may in such a degree as is very desirable.

6thly, The Conclusion of the Argument is granted, and it is look'd on as no inconvenience that our Happiness should in some cases depend on things without us, and not in our own Power. But the conclusion is quite another thing. The words are, *If this Opinion be true, we must despair of human Happiness,* for

since a great many things are true which have consequences hard enough : not to mention how easily we mistake in deducing consequences. But yet when these are acknowledged by the Authors themselves ; and, if believ'd, would prove detrimental to

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for it will not be in the least in our own power, but entirely depend upon external Objects.

The accidents of Fortune, such as an Earthquake may sink a Man and all his concerns, and tho' in that extraordinary case, as it is put, my choice be not able to prevent my death, yet my Happiness in the general management of Life may be very much in my own power, and not altogether in the power of foreign Accidents. And even in the case of an Earthquake a good Man that had fixed his Election to submit to such a death and circumstances as it should please Providence to assign him, wou'd not be without some pleasure, even in such an accident, at least not so unhappy as another that had made no such Resolution or Election. But if such an Election can make him no easier or do him no good, it were to no purpose to make it. He can have no prospect or design in making it, if the Good or Evil resulting from the Agreement or Disagreement of what happens to his natural Appetites be the only Considerations that can determine his will. It is plain that in such a case he must be miserable, if outward things happen cross to his Appetites ; whereas if he can make them agreeable or disagreeable in any measure by his own choice, he is still master of his Happiness, and the consideration that he can make them so is a good reason for choosing. So far is he from choosing without Reason, as is falsely objected.

But 7thly, 'Tis urg'd, that if the will were not moved but by the Representation of antecedent Good and Evil in the things that happen, it would not indeed be in our power to be happy, supposing there were no God, and that all things were govern'd by Matter and Motion. But God has so order'd it, that to be virtuous is sufficient to make a Man happy. If therefore the Soul follows Reason and the Orders God has given her, she is sure to be happy, altho' she cannot find enough to make her so in this Life.

To which I answer, 1st, That this is giving up the Happiness of this Life, and acknowledging that God has not provided any Natural means to make us happy here, which is a Confession

to Morality, they bring no small prejudice against an Opinion which is attended with them, and recommend us to some other as more probable, tho' it be not supported by any stronger Reasons.

XX. 'Tis to be observed also, that among the foregoing Authors I reckon those who declare that the Will is determin'd by the last Judgment of the Understanding †, which has taken with a great many Philosophers; and, in short, all who maintain that the Will is *passive* in Elections. For these must be esteem'd to have the same Sentiments of

All those who declare that the Will is passive in its Operations must be of the same Opinion with the

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Liberty

former, and press'd with the same consequences.

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fession that one who is zealous to defend the Wisdom and Goodness of God will not easily grant.

2dly, I have no other Notion of *Virtue* than that of an Election within the limits prescribed by God and Nature; I think the definition of it is *Habitus cum ratione electivus in mediocritate consistens*; if then to be virtuous is enough to make us happy, it is plain that our Happiness consists in our *Election*, which is the very thing I plead for: but if our Election make the things elected neither better nor worse, neither more nor less agreeable, it is inconceivable how our Happiness should consist at all in Virtue. If the meaning be that God will reward us hereafter, that is to confess we are miserable for the present, but shall be happy some other time. I own indeed that *Hope* is a great cause of Pleasure, but except we *choose* the crossing our natural Appetites for the present out of prospect to the future, it will no ways render our present suffering tolerable. Nor will such a prospect, how clearly soever offer'd by our Understanding, yield us this Pleasure, except the will consent. For then it would do so to all to whom the offer is made; whereas we see one perseveres by means of it, and another in much more advantageous Circumstances yields to the present Temptation, and knowingly loses the Reward.

† *Against this Notion see Sect. 5. Subject. 2. par. 13.*

Liberty with the former, which way soever they explain their Opinion; as may appear from hence, that most of them expressly deny that *Indifference* belongs to the Nature of the Will; their Opinion therefore is attended with the same consequences as the former, (45.)

SUBJECT.

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(45.) As Mr. *Locke* has particularly labour'd the point before us, and seems to defend by turns the several Principles which our Author attacks here and in the following Section, we shall examine a little into his Method of treating the Subject. Having first of all defin'd Liberty to be 'A power in any Agent to do or forbear any particular Action, according to the Determination or Thought of the Mind, whereby either of them is preferr'd to the other *.' He takes a great deal of pains to prove that such Liberty does not belong to the Will: which is very certain, granting his sense of Liberty to be the only one, since by his Definition it is evidently subsequent to the choice or preference of the Mind, and only relates to the execution of such choice by an inferior faculty †. But then, beside this Idea of Liberty, which is nothing to the present Question, there is another previous and equally proper one, which regards the very determination, preference or direction of the Mind itself; and may be called its Power of *determining* to do or forbear any particular Action, or of *preferring* one to another; and if Freedom can with any propriety of Speech be attributed to one of these Powers *† as he has constantly attributed it, why may it not with equal propriety be applied to the other? He proceeds therefore to state the Question concerning the latter, which he would not have put, whether the Will be free? but whether the Mind or Man be free to will? both which I think amount to the same thing with common Understandings, since in the first place we only ask, Whether this Will be properly an *active* power of the Mind (i. e. as oppos'd by Mr. *Locke's* *passive* Power) and in the second, Whether the Mind be *active* or indifferent in exerting this Power call'd Will? and both which will be equally improper Questions with regard to his former sense of the Word *Free*, i. e. as only applicable to the *Actions* subsequent on Volition; However, he goes on in the second

* C. Of Power, § 8.

† See Note 42.

*† §. 16.

SUBSECT. II.

An Opinion is proposed in general, asserting a Freedom from Necessity as well as Compulsion.

- I. **T**HIS Opinion determines almost the same with the former concerning the Goodness or Agreeableness of Objects to the Appetites, nor is there much difference in what relates to the distinction
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- relating to the Appetites, to Good, Pleasant, Profitable and Honest; but makes this to be the difference between a Man and Brute, viz. that the one is determin'd by its bodily Appetite, the other by himself.

This agrees with the former in most cases, especially in those

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second place to enquire, whether in general a Man be free 'To Will or not to Will, when any Action is once proposed to his Thoughts, as presently to be done'. In which respect he determines that a Man is not at liberty, because he cannot forbear Willing or *preferring* the one to the other; [a] which tho' it be scarce consistent with his other Notion of *Suspension*, whereby a Man either avoids a particular determination in the case, and continues in the same state he is in [not by virtue of a present Determination of his Will, but of some precedent one] or else wills something different from either the existence or non-existence of the Action proposed, [b.] and tho' it should comprehend, as he says it does, most cases in Life, yet still it is not of the least Importance. For what does it signify to me that I must necessarily take one side or the other, right or wrong, so long as I can choose either of them indifferently? If I can will or choose *either of the two*, here's full room for the exercise of Liberty; and whether I can or no, ought to have been Mr. Locke's next Question. The Answer to which seems pretty

[a] §. 23, 24.

[b.] See n. 48.

stinction of Good into Pleasant, Profitable, and Honest: Except that it refers Honest to the Duty which a Man owes to God, himself, and other Men, as a Member of Intellectual Society, rather than to the natural Appetites; and thinks that we are

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pretty easy, tho' perhaps not so reconcilable with his Hypothesis. However, instead of meddling with it, he slips this absurd Query into its Room, *viz.* Whether a Man be at Liberty to will *which of the two he pleases?* or which is the same, Whether he can Will what Wills? Sect. 25. [c.] and then, instead of shewing whether the will be naturally determin'd to one side, in any or all cases, or whether the Man be always free to will this way or that; (as might have been expected) he tells us something very different, *viz.* that we can't always *act* in that Manner, or that Liberty of *acting* does not require that a Man shou'd be able to do any Action or its contrary: then he goes on to give us another Explanation of the word Liberty, which is still confined to Action, and consequently foreign to the present Question.

In the next place he defines the Will over again [d.]. 'Which' (says he) is nothing but a power in the Mind to direct the operative Faculties of a Man to Motion or Rest, as far as they depend on such direction'. By which Words if he mean, that this power of directing the operative Faculties, is properly *active* (in the sense above mention'd) or Physically *indifferent* to any particular manner of directing them, *i. e.* is an ability to direct them either to Motion or Rest, without any natural Byass to determine it (or to determine the mind to determine it) toward one side always rather than the other: If, I say, he intends to imply thus much in this definition of Will, then may Freedom be justly predicated of that same Will, (or of the Mind in the exercise of it,) not indeed his kind of Freedom, *i. e.* that of *acting*, which belongs to another Faculty; but Freedom in our sense of the Word, *i. e.* a certain physical Indifference, or Indeterminateness in its own exercise; which is what most Men understand by *Liberum Arbitrium*; and whether there be such a Liberty as this in human Nature, would here have been a very proper Question. For if there be, then we

[c] See Mr. Strutt's Remarks on Locke's Chapter of Power, p. 38, &c.

[d] §. 29.

are to judge of the Agreeableness of things from that, rather than from these. As to the Election which the Will makes on account of these, it asserts that this proceeds from the Will itself, and that a free Agent cannot be determin'd like natural Bodies

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we have got an absolutely self-moving Principle, which does not want any thing out of itself to determine it, which has no physical connection with, and of consequence, no necessary occasion for that grand Determiner *Anxiety*, which he has afterwards taken so much pains to settle and explain, and which shall be consider'd by and by. But here he flies off again, and instead of determining this, which is the main point of the controversy, and wherein Liberty must be found or no where, as we observ'd in Note 42. I say, instead of stating and determining this great Question, Whether the Will or Mind be absolutely independent upon, and physically indifferent to all particular Acts, Objects, Motions, &c. or necessarily require some foreign Mover; he seems to take the latter for granted, and immediately proceeds to the following Question, *What determines the Will?* The Meaning of which, says he [e], is this, 'What moves the Mind in every particular instance to determine its general power of directing to this or that particular Motion or Rest?' This Mr. Locke calls, for shortness sake, *determining the Will*; and declares, that what thus determines it either first to continue in the same state or action, is only the present *Satisfaction* in it: or secondly to change, is always some *Uneasiness* [f]. By which Words if he only meant that these Perceptions are the common *Motives*, *Inducements*, or *Occasions* whereupon the Mind in fact exerts its power of willing in this or that particular Manner; tho' in reality it always can, and often does the contrary (as he seems to intimate by speaking of a *Will* contrary to Desire [g.] of raising Desires by due Consideration [b.] and forming Appetites [i.] of a Power to *suspend* any Desires, to moderate and restrain the Passions, and hinder either of them from determining the Will and engaging us in Action: [k.] Then, as we said before, he is only talking of another Question, and what he has advanc'd on this head may readily be granted, at least without any prejudice to human Liberty. For in this sense to affirm that the Will or Mind is determin'd by something

[e.] §. 29.

[f.] *Ibid.*

[g.] §. 30.

[b.] §. 46.

[i.] §. 53.

[k.] Sect. 47: 50. 53.

Bodies by external Impulses, or like Brutes by Objects. For this is the very difference betwixt Man and the Brutes, that these are determin'd according to their bodily Appetites, from whence all their Actions become necessary, but Man has a different

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thing without it, is only saying, that it generally has some *Motives* from without, according to which it determines the above mention'd Powers, which no Man in his Senses can dispute.

But if he intended that these Motives should be understood to rule and direct the Will absolutely and irresistibly in certain Cases: That they have such a necessary influence on the Mind, that it can never be determin'd without or against them: in short, that the Soul of Man has not a physical Power of willing independent of, and consequently indifferent to all Perceptions, Reasons and Motives whatsoever; which the general drift of his Discourse seems to assert, particularly §. 47, 48, 49, 50. where he confounds the Determination of the Judgment with the exertion of the self-moving Power throughout. As also §. 52. where he asserts, That all the Liberty we have or are capable of lies in this, 'that we can *suspend* our Desires, and 'hold our Wills undetermin'd, 'till we have examin'd the 'Good and Evil of what we desire; what follows after that follows in a Chain of Consequences link'd one to another, all depending on the last Determination of the Judgment'. And when he speaks of Causes not in our Power, operating for the most part *forcibly* on the Will, §. 57, &c.

If from these and the like Expressions, I say, we may conclude this to have been his Opinion, *viz.* that all the Liberty of the Mind consists solely in directing the Determination of the Judgment, (tho' if the Mind be always determin'd from without we must have a *Motive* also for this *direction*, and consequently shall find no more freedom here than any where else) after which Determination all our Actions (if they can be called such [1.]) follow necessarily: then I believe it will appear, that at the same time that he opposed the true Notion of Free-Will, he contradicted common Sense and Experience as well as himself. For in the first place, is it not self-evident, that we often do not follow our own present Judgment, but run counter to the clear conviction of our Understandings, which Actions accordingly appear

[1.] See Note 43.

different Principle in him, and determines himself to Action.

II. This Principle whereby Man excells the Brutes is thus explain'd by the Defenders of the following Opinion, if I take their Meaning right: In the first place, they declare that there is some Chief Good, but others are not, because they may be represented by the Understanding in different respects.

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appear vicious, and fill us immediately with regret and the stings of Conscience? This he allows, §. 35, 38, &c. to make Room for his *Anxiety*. But, upon the foregoing Hypothesis, How can any Action appear to be irregular? How can any thing that is consequent upon the final Result of *Judgment*, (if this Word be used in its proper Sense) be against Conscience, which is nothing else but that final Judgment [*m.*]? Nay, upon the supposition of our being inviolably determin'd in willing by our Judgment (and, according to Mr. Locke, our Constitution puts us under a necessity of being so, §. 48.) it would be really impossible for us to will amiss or immorally, let our Judgments be ever so erroneous, 'The Causes of which (as he also observes, §. 64.) proceed from the weak and narrow constitution of our Minds, and are most of them out of our Power'. Either therefore we can will without and against a present Judgment, and therefore are not necessarily (*i.e.* physically) determin'd by it, or we cannot be guilty of a wrong Volition: whatever proves the one by necessary consequence establishes the other. Farther, there are innumerable *indifferent* Actions which occur daily, both with respect to absolute choosing or refusing, or to choosing among things absolutely equal, equal both in themselves and to the Mind, on which we evidently pass no manner of Judgment, and consequently cannot be said to follow its Determination in them. To will the eating or not eating of an Egg is a Proof of the former; to choose one out of two or more Eggs apparently alike is a proverbial Instance of the latter: both which are demonstrations of an active or self-moving Power; either way we determine and act when the Motives are entirely equal, which is the same as to

[*m.*] See Limborch *Theol. Christ.* L. 2. C. 23. Sect. 16. and for an Answer to the latter part of Locke's 48th Sect. see the same Chap. Sect. the last.

Chief Good, the Enjoyment of which would make a Man completely happy; this he naturally and necessarily desires, and cannot reject it when duly represented by the Understanding. That other things which offer themselves have a Relation to this Good, or some Connection with it, and are to be esteem'd Good or Evil, so far as they contribute to, or hinder our obtaining it; and since there is nothing in Nature but what in some respect or other, either promotes this End, or prevents it; from

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to act without any Motive at all. In the former Case I perceive no previous Inclination to direct my Will in general, in the latter no Motive to influence its Determination in particular; and in the present Case, not to perceive a Motive is to have none; (except we could be said to have an Idea without being conscious of it, to be anxious and yet insensible of that Anxiety, or sway'd by a Reason which we do not at all apprehend.) Neither is it necessary to a true Equality or Indifference here, that I be supposed to have no Will to use *any Eggs at all* (as the Author of the *Philosophical Enquiry* absurdly puts the Case) for granting in the first Place, that I have not a will to use any Eggs at all, 'tis indeed non-sense to suppose afterwards that I should choose any one; but let me have never so great an Inclination to eat Eggs in general, yet that general Inclination will not in the least oblige me to choose or prefer one Egg in particular, [u.] which is the only point in Question. Numberless Instances might easily be given, [o.] where we often approve, prefer, desire and choose, and all we know not why: where we either choose such things as have no manner of Good or Evil in them, excepting what arises purely from that Choice; or prefer some to others, when both are equal Means to the same End: in which Cases the Judgment is not in the least concern'd, and he that undertakes to oppose the Principle by which our Author accounts for them, must either deny all such Equality and Indifference, or grant Question. Not that this Principle is confined to such Cases as these: nor are they produced as the most important, but as the most evident Instances of its exertion; where no Motives can be supposed to determine the Will, because there are none: To urge, that such Elections as these are made on purpose to try my Liberty, which End, say some, becomes the Motive, is in effect granting

[u.] See Leibnitz's fifth Paper to Dr. Clarke, N^o 17. and 66.

[o.] See Dr. Cheyne's *Phil. Principles*, Chap. 2. Sect. 13.

from this Indifference they declare, that we have an Opportunity of rejecting or embracing any thing. For tho' we can choose nothing but under the Appearance of Good, i. e. unless it be in some manner connected with the Chief Good, as a Medium or Appendant; yet this does not determine the Choice, because every Object may be varied, and represented by the Understanding under very different Appearances.

III. Secondly,

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granting the very thing we contend for, viz. that the Pleasure attending the exercise of the Will is often the sole reason of Volition. Besides, that Motive is one of the Mind's own making; and to be able to produce the Motive for Action, is the same thing, with regard to Liberty, as to be able to act without one. If by *trying* our Liberty be meant an Experiment to assure us that we have really such a Power; we answer, that there can be no reason for trying it in this sense, because we are sufficiently conscious of it before any such Trial.

The Mind (says the Author of the *Essay on Consciousness*, p. 208.) before ever it exerts its Will or Power of choosing, is conscious, and knows within itself, that it hath a Power of Choice or Preference, and this is a necessary Condition of willing at all, inasmuch that the very first time I had occasion to exert my Will, or make use of my elective Power, I could not possibly exercise it, or do any voluntary Act, without knowing and being conscious to myself [before hand] that I have such a Faculty or Power in myself. A thing that seems at first sight very strange and wonderful; to know I have a power of acting before ever I have acted, or had any trial or experience of it: But a little Reflection will quickly satisfy any one that in the nature of the thing it must be so, and cannot possibly be otherwise; and which is peculiar to this Faculty: For we know nothing of our Powers of Perceiving, Understanding, Remembering, &c. but by experimenting their Acts, it being necessary first to perceive or think, before we can know that we have a Power of perceiving or thinking. The Author proceeds to shew, that this *Pre-consciousness* of a power of *willing* or choosing does most clearly demonstrate that the Mind in all its Volitions *begins* the Motion, or acteth *from itself*†.

To

† *Essay on Consciousness*, p. 209. 210.

Though therefore the Will follows some Judgment of the Understanding, yet it is not necessarily determin'd by it.

III. Secondly, When therefore any Good is proposed which is not the Chief, the Will can *suspend*† the Action, and command the Understanding to propose some other thing, or the same under some other Appearance: which may be always done, since every thing except the chief Good is of such a Nature, that the understanding may apprehend some respect or relation wherein it is incommodious. Notwithstanding therefore that the Will always does follow some Judgment of the Understanding, which is made about the subsequent Actions, yet it is not necessarily determin'd by any, for it can suspend its Action and order some other Judgment, which it may follow. Since therefore it can either

exert

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To argue still that some *minute* imperceptible Causes, some particular Circumstances in our own Bodies, or those about us, must determine even these seemingly indifferent Actions, is either running into the former absurdity of making us act upon Motives which we don't apprehend; or saying, that we act mechanically, *i. e.* do not act at all: and in the last place, to say that we are determin'd to choose any of these trifles just as we happen to fix our Thoughts upon it in particular, at the very instant of Action, is either attributing all to the self-moving Power of the Mind, which is granting the Question; or else referring us to the minute and imperceptible Causes above mention'd; or else obtruding upon us that idle unmeaning Word *Chance* instead of a Physical Cause, which is saying nothing at all. How hard must Men be press'd under an Hypothesis when they fly to such evasive shifts as these! How much easier and better would be to give up all such blind, unknown, and unaccountable Impulses, and own what common Sense and Experience dictate, an Independent, Free, Self-moving Principle, the true, the obvious, and only source of both Volition and Action?

With regard to Mr. Locke's Inconsistencies, I shall only add one Observation more, *viz.* that he seems to place the Cause (Motive, or whatever he means by it) of his Determination of the

† See Note 48.

exert or suspend its Act, it is not only free from Compulsion, but also indifferent in itself, with regard to its Actions, and determines itself without necessity.

IV. It must be confess'd, that this opinion establishes Liberty, and on that account is more agreeable to reason, experience, and the common sense of Mankind, yet some things in it seem to be presum'd upon and not sufficiently explain'd.

V. For in the first place, 'tis said that the Will *determines itself*, but we are not informed how that is possible, nor what use such a Power would be of, were it admitted: nay, it seems rather prejudicial than beneficial to Man. For that Goodness which it is supposed to pursue, is in the things themselves, and arises from their connection with the chief Good; it is not therefore to be form'd, but discovered by the Understanding. If then the Understanding performs its Duty right, it will discover what is best: but it is our Advantage to be determined to that which is best; it had therefore been better for Man if Nature had given him up absolutely to the determination of his own Judgment and

This Opinion establishes Liberty, but yet there are some things not sufficiently explain'd in it.

Such a Liberty as this seems to be of more prejudicial benefit to Mankind.

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the Will after the Effect. The Cause of that Determination is, according to him, *Anxiety*; this he sometimes makes concomitant, sometimes consequent upon Desire; and Sect. 31. he says the one is scarce distinguishable from the other.

But this same Desire appears to me to be the very Determination of the Will itself; what we absolutely desire we always will, and *vice versa*, whether it be in our Power to pursue that Will, and produce it into Act, or not; and indeed Desire seems to be no otherwise distinguishable from Volition, than as the latter is generally attended with the Power of Action, which the former is consider'd without. This I think is all the Distinction that they are capable of, which yet is only nominal; Nor do his Instances in §. 30. prove that there is any real Difference between 'em. Thus when I am oblig'd to use persuasions

and Understanding, and not allow'd that Judgment to be suspended by the power of the Will. For by that means he would have obtain'd his End with greater certainty and ease. I grant, that if a Man were absolutely determin'd in his Actions to the best, there would be no room for virtue, properly so call'd; for virtue, as it is commonly understood, requires a free Act, and this Liberty is the very thing that is valuable in virtue; and with good reason, if a free Choice be the very thing which pleases; (For thus it would be impossible to attain the end of choosing, *i. e.* to please ourselves, without Liberty, since that very thing which pleases in Actions, *viz.* Liberty, would be wanting.) But yet, if any thing which the Understanding can discover, be the very best before or independent of our Choice it were proper for us to be necessarily determin'd to it; for the fruition of it, howsoever obtain'd, would make us happy, and be so much the more valuable, as it would be certain, and not depend upon *Chance*, as all the Actions of Free-will are in a manner supposed to do: nor need we much regard the *Glory* arising from a well made Choice; since

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sions with another, which I wish may not prevail upon him, or suffer one Pain to prevent a greater, here are two opposite Wills, or a weak imperfect Volition conquer'd by, and giving way to a stronger: and we might as well say Desire is opposite to Desire as to Volition. I will or desire that this Man may not be prevail'd upon, but yet I will or desire more powerfully and effectually to use these persuasions with him: Or rather, here is but one actual Desire or Will in the Case, and the other is only Hypothetical. Thus I should will to be cured of the Gout, if the cure would not throw me into greater Pain: but in the present circumstances I do not really will it, nor exert any one act which may serve to remove it: nay, in this Case, I will or desire to bear the Gout rather than a worse Evil that would attend the removal of it. His Axiom therefore, that
wherever

since the fruition of the greatest Good would give us Happiness without it; nay such Glory would be vain and despicable in competition with the greatest Good. Hence it appears, that Free-will, according to this Hypothesis, cannot be reckon'd any Advantage.

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wherever there is pain, there is a desire to be rid of it, is not absolutely true.

Again, I should refuse a painful Remedy or disagreeable Position, if I could enjoy perfect Health without them; but as I manifestly cannot, I choose the less Evil of the two. Nor can I indeed be properly said to choose or desire both in the present Circumstances, or to will one and desire the contrary, since I know that only one of them is possible, which therefore I now certainly will or desire, tho' I should as certainly have will'd the contrary had it been equally possible. These then and the like Instances are not sufficient to prove any opposition between Will and Desire, except the latter be only taken for a mere passive Appetite; in which sense the Words *choose*, *prefer*, &c. must then be very improperly apply'd to it. But, in reality, I believe Mr. Locke here sets the Word *Desire* to signify what we commonly mean by *Will*, as he does in Sect. 48. where 'tis call'd *the Power of preferring*: and puts Volition into the place of *Action*; as seems probable from his description of *Willing* in the 16th, 28th, and 30th Sect. as also, C. 23. Sect. 18. where he defines the Will to be a *Power of putting Body into Motion by Thought*. And the same Notion, I think, runs thro' all his Letters to Limburch.

Upon a review of this Chapter of Mr. Locke's Essay, and comparing the first Edition of it with the rest, I find a remarkable Passage omitted in all the following ones, which may serve to shew us upon what Ground he at first supposed the Will to be determin'd from *without*, and why upon altering part of his Scheme and leaving the rest, he was obliged to take it for granted, and let his former supposition stand without its Reason. It begins at Sect. 28. "We must remember that *Volition* or *Willing*, regarding only what is in our power, is nothing but *preferring* the doing of any thing to the not doing of it, Action to rest, and *contra*. Well, but what is this preferring? It is nothing but the *being pleased more with one thing than another*. Is then a Man indifferent to be pleased or not pleased more with one thing than another?"

It only takes place in doubtful matters, and then 'tis of no use or importance.

VI. Secondly, If it be said, that the Understanding is dubious in many Cases, and ignorant of what is the best, and in these Liberty takes place; neither does this clear the Matter. For if the things to be done be Good or Evil in themselves, but unknown to the Intellect, there's no help in the Will; nor

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"ther? Is it in his Choice, whether he will or will not be better pleased with one thing than another?

"And to this I think every one's Experience is ready to make answer, No. From whence it follows, that the Will or Preference is determin'd by something without itself; let us see then what it is determin'd by. If willing be but the being better pleased, as has been shewn, it is easy to know what 'tis determines the Will, what 'tis pleases best; every one knows 'tis Happiness, or that which makes any part of Happiness, or contributes to it, and that is it we call Good, ---- Good then, the greater Good is that alone which determines the Will".

From hence we may observe that as he here makes the Will a mere *passive Affection* of the Mind, a power of being pleased with some things more than others, (which Definition will with equal propriety take in all the *Senses*) he was naturally led to enquire after the Ground of these its different Pleasures, which could only be the different Natures of external Objects acting differently upon it; (as they do also on the Senses) For what is only acted on, must have something *without* itself to act upon it; and to be pleased in a different manner by the Action of different Objects is only, in other Words, to receive different Degrees of Happiness from them. Upon this Scheme we must always be unavoidably determin'd by the greatest apparent Good, or necessarily prefer what seems productive of the highest Degree of Happiness; which is indeed sufficiently intelligible, and he pursued it thro'out consistently. But upon second Thoughts, finding this not very reconcilable with matter of Fact, (as he observ'd in Sect. 35. 38. 43. 44. 69, &c. of the following Editions, where he has fully shewn that we do not always prefer or choose the greater apparent Good) and still supposing the Will to be *passive* or determin'd from *without*, he alters his former Hypothesis so far as to make it be determin'd, not by the greater Good immediately, but by that *Un-satisfisfingness*, which is founded in the *Desire* which arises from the prospect

nor does its Liberty assist us in discovering or obtaining the better Side; if they be indifferent, it is no matter what we do, since the Conveniencies and Inconveniencies are equal on both Sides. If then we admit of Liberty in these Cases, it will be of no use or importance to Life or Happiness:

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prospect of some *Good*. But it being likewise evident that all things do not raise our Desire in proportion to their apparent Goodness: He endeavours to account for this, by saying that, "We do not look on them to make a part of that Happiness wherewith we in our present Thoughts can satisfy ourselves," Sect. 43". *i. e.* We can be *content* without them, or in our Author's Language, they do not absolutely please us, because we do not *will* them. He proceeds therefore to mend his Hypothesis farther by making the Mind in some sort *active* in *contemplating*, in embracing or rejecting any kinds of apparent Good by giving it a power of *raising*, improving or *suspending* any of its *Desires*, of governing and moderating the Passions, and forming to itself an *Appetite* or *Relish* of things; Sect. 45. and 53. All which is exactly agreeable to our Author's Principles, as well as Truth, and 'tis a wonder one that so attentively consider'd the Operations of the Mind should not be led on to that other part of its Liberty which is equally confirm'd by Experience, *viz.* of choosing arbitrarily among different kinds and degrees of Pain, of over-ruling any ordinary Desire of obtaining Good, or avoiding Evil, and by consequence of its Will, being properly *active* or *physically indifferent* with regard to either. But tho' he has inserted several Passages in the subsequent Editions, which come near to Liberty, yet he takes in the greatest part of his first passive Scheme, and generally mixes both together. This has occasioned that great confusion in the Chapter above-mention'd, which cannot but be observ'd by every Reader.

Dr. Clarke's Argument for absolute Freedom, because all Motives or Sensations are mere abstract Notions, and have no physical power [p.] seems not conclusive, or at least not clear. For who knows, say the Fatalists, how far reasons, motives, &c. may affect a Spirit? Why may not one immaterial Substance determine another by means of *Thought* as well as a material

Nay, it must be esteem'd an Imperfection, as deriving its Origin from the Imperfection of the Understanding. For if the Understanding could certainly determine what were best to be done, there would be no room for Liberty. (46.)

VII, Thirdly,

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terial one can move another by means of *Impulse*? Nay, his adherent Mr. *Jackson* grants [9] "That abstract Notions will, "by a forcible and irresistible impulse, compel the Mind to "move the Body whether it will or no". Which impulse if it were constant, would sufficiently acquit the Maintainers of Necessity: But that there can be no such forcible impulse, will, I hope, appear below, where it will be shewn to be both agreeable to reason to suppose that there are active or Self-moving Beings, which, as such, must have a physical power of resisting what we call the most cogent Motives: and to be confirm'd by Experience, that our own Minds exert such a Power; which is sufficient for our purpose. For an Explanation of the true Notion of Liberty, see the following Subsections of this Chapter, and Note 59.

(46.) These with some of the following consequences attending such a confused Hypothesis of Liberty, are well urg'd by Mr. *Locke* (tho' I think they return upon himself) in his *Chapter of Power*, Sect. 48, 49, 50. and in the *Philosoph. Enquiry*, p. 63, &c. and seem to be unavoidable in any other Scheme but that of our Author; who supposes that in most Cases the Goodness of an Act or Object entirely depends upon, and is produced merely by our choosing it; and of consequence Liberty, or a power of choosing, is according to his Principles, so far from being unnecessary, or an Imperfection, that it is our noblest Perfection, and constitutes the greatest part of our Happiness: For an Explanation of this, see Sect. 2. of this Chapter.

[9] *Defence of human Liberty*, p. 198.

Sect. 1. Sub. 2. *Of Moral Evil.*

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VII. Thirdly, They are not well agreed what this *Chief Good* is, from the connection with which the Understanding must judge of the Goodness of other things, as may appear from the various and contradictory Opinions about it. (47.) We must necessarily therefore fluctuate, and be solicitous, and rebel against Nature itself, which has neither granted us a certain End, nor certain Means there-to, but left us in anxiety and doubt about the way which leads to Happiness; neither is there any help here in our Liberty, since it is blind, and can do nothing towards bringing us back into the right path.

We are left in doubt concerning the Way to Happiness, and can have no help from Liberty.

VIII. Fourthly, 'Tis confess'd by all, that Good in general is what agrees with every one, and what all things desire. Every Good then answers to some Appetite, and according to these Authors, Objects

Since that is good which is agreeable, and this is to be judged of by not free, if be with-

the Understanding, if the Will follow this Judgment, it is it does not, it acts against reason. We had better therefore out such Liberty.

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(47.) This uncertainty about the *Summum Bonum* is own'd and well accounted for by Mr. Locke, B. 2. C. 21. Sect. 55. "Hence it was that the Philosophers of old did in vain enquire whether *Summum Bonum* consisted in Riches or Bodily Delights, or Virtue, or Contemplation? And they might have as reasonably disputed whether the best relish were to be found in Apples, Plumbs, or Nutts, and have divided themselves into Sects upon it. For as pleasant Tastes depend not on the things themselves, but their agreeableness to this or that particular *Palate*, wherein there is great variety; so the greatest happiness consists in the having those things which produce the greatest Pleasure, and in the absence of those which cause any disturbance, any pain. Now these to different Men are very different things". To the same purpose are the 3d and 4th observations in the *Religion of Nature delineated*, p. 33. which may serve to confirm the Notion which our Author proposes in the next Subsection, viz. that most of the Good or Agreeableness in things arises not from their own *Natures*, but our choice of them; or that Objects are not chosen because they are good, but are generally good only because chosen.

Objects are good on account of a natural and necessary conformity which they have to our Appetites. The Understanding therefore does not make good, but finds it in the things themselves: and when it judges any thing in Nature to be agreeable, that, according to them, must necessarily be in respect of some natural Appetite. All the Good then which is in things will be the Object of some Faculty or Appetite, *i. e.* of the Understanding, Sense, &c. But all these are determin'd by Nature in regard to the Appetite or Faculty to which they relate, *i. e.* in regard to their *Pleasantness*, or Agreeableness; and as to the relation which they bear to each other, *i. e.* as to their *Profitableness* and *Honesty*, they are to be judg'd of by the Understanding, and directed when and in what manner they must give place to each other, or afford their mutual Assistance. Free-will then appears to be of no manner of use; for if it certainly follow the decree of reason it is not free, at least from necessity, since that very reason which it follows is not free: if it does not necessarily follow that, we had better be without it, for it perverts every thing, and disturbs the Order of Nature, which is the very best and fittest to be follow'd; such a Liberty as this would therefore be prejudicial to Mankind; it would make them liable to do amiss, and produce no kind of Good to compensate for so great an Evil.

If the Will could suspend its act contrary to the Judgment of the Understanding,

IX. Fifthly, It is supposed that the Judgment of the Understanding concerning the Goodness of any thing, is a condition without which the Will is not directed to the Object, but yet that it can either exert or suspend its act about any Good whatsoever. Let

it would run directly into Evil; it seems therefore necessary for it to act at the time and in the manner which the Understanding directs.

Let us suppose then that the Understanding has determin'd it to be good to exert some certain Action and evil to suspend it; while this Judgment continues, if the Will can suspend its Act, it chooses Evil; if it cannot, it is not free. You'll say, it can command the Understanding to change its Judgment; let it be so. But it is evident, that the Man suspends his Action before he can command the Understanding to change its Judgment, *i. e.* he suspends the Action while the Judgment determines that it is Evil to suspend; and of consequence chooses that directly which his Reason judges to be Evil; which seems to overthrow their whole Hypothesis. (48.)

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X. I

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(48.) Farther, if the Mind can suspend the Satisfaction of any urgent desire (which Mr. Locke allows [*r.*] and therein places all its Liberty) then it can as easily quite stop, or run counter to any natural Appetite, since no greater Power seems to be requisite for the one than for the other. If we can hinder the Will from being determin'd by any desire of absent Good without any appearance of greater Good on the other Side, which might raise an opposite desireable to counterballance it, as our Author has shewn that we can; then we shall be equally able to prevent its following the ultimate determination of the Judgment, even without any reason for so doing; after any Determination of the Judgment, it will be still as undetermin'd, and indifferent towards *Volition*, as Mr. Locke supposes the operative Powers to be in regard to *Action*. [*l.*] and consequently good, whether absolute or comparative, is neither the adequate efficient Cause, nor a necessary Means to the determination of the Will. This act of *Suspension* therefore must either be solely founded in the self-moving Power of the Mind, and of consequence be naturally independent on all Motives, Reasons, &c. and an instance of the Mind's absolute Freedom from any external Determination; which is a contradiction to Mr. Locke's general Hypothesis; or else itself must be determin'd

[*r.*] Book 2. C. 21. Sect. 47, and 50.

[*l.*] See Note 49.

There are
Answers
offer'd to
these dif-
ficulties,
but they
are far
from be-
ing clear.

X. I confess, they offer some Solutions here, but such as are so subtle, so obscure, and so much above the comprehensions of the Vulgar, that most Persons have taken a distaste to them, given up the cause of Liberty as desperate, and gone over to the former Sect: but if any one will undertake either to
On this account many have gone over to the former Opinion.

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min'd by some Motive or external Cause, and then it will be difficult to make it free in any sense. Let us observe how Mr. Locke endeavours to reconcile these two Notions together. Our Liberty, according to him, is founded in a general absolute Inclination of the Mind to Happiness, which obliges us to suspend the Gratification of our Desire in particular cases, till we see whether it be not inconsistent with the general Good. "The stronger Ties, says he, Sect. 51. we have to an unalterable pursuit of Happiness in general, which is our greatest Good, and which, as such, our Desires always follow, the more are we free from any necessary determination of our Will to any particular Action, and from a necessary compliance with our Desire set upon any particular, and then appearing preferable good, till we have duly examin'd whether it has a tendency to, or be inconsistent with our real Happiness". And again, Sect. 52. "Whatever Necessity determines to the pursuit of real Bliss, the same necessity, with the same force, establishes Suspense, Deliberation and Scrutiny of each successive desire, whether the satisfaction of it does not interfere with our true Happiness, and mislead us from it". If by the Word *Necessity* he means absolute *physical Necessity* (which it must be, if it be any thing to the present purpose) he has discover'd a pretty odd foundation for his Liberty. Nay, if this force which draws us towards Happiness in general, be absolute and irresistible, as his Words import, it will draw us equally towards all particular appearances of it, and consequently prove as bad a ground for *Suspension* as for Liberty. But in truth this Suspension is neither founded in any Necessity of pursuing Happiness in general, nor is itself an original Power of the Mind distinct from that of Volition, but only one particular exercise or Modification of it. "Tis willing (as the Author of the *Philosophical Enquiry* rightly observes)

to give a more clear and full Explication of the common Opinion, or bring Solutions of those Difficulties which occur in it, he will find me so far from being his Adversary, that he may expect my assent, encouragement and assistance. This indeed were very much to be wish'd, but in the mean time I shall endeavour to see whether these things cannot be explain'd more clearly in another manner.

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" observes) to defer willing about the matter proposed", and is no way different from the common cases of willing and choosing except that it is the most evident demonstration of the Mind's perfect Liberty in willing, and so obvious that Mr. Locke could not get over it, and therefore styles it the source of all our Liberty, and that wherein consists *Free-will*. Sect. 47. Tho' he soon explains it away again, by endeavouring to force it into his System. That this Power of *Suspension* is not sufficient to denominate a Man *Free* See *Impartial Enquiry*, p. 44.

SUBJECT.

S U B S E C T. III.

Another Notion of Liberty and Election proposed.

The Appetites and Powers attain their proper End, by exercise, which is the greatest perfection of them, and their best Estate.

I. **I**N order to make my meaning better understood, we must observe, in the first place, that there are certain Powers, Faculties and Appetites implanted in us by Nature, which are designed for Action; and when these exert their proper Actions about Objects they produce a grateful and pleasant Sensation in us. The exercise of them therefore pleases us; and from hence probably all our Pleasure and Delight arises; consequently our Happiness, if we have any, seems to consist in the proper exercise of those Powers and Faculties which Nature has bestow'd upon us: for they appear to be implanted in us for no other end, but that by the use and exercise of them those things may be effected which are agreeable. Nor can they be at rest, or enjoy themselves any otherwise than as those things are produced by, or in them, for the production or reception of which they are design'd by Nature. Now every Power or Faculty is directed to the prosecution of its proper Acts. They attain their End therefore by Exercise, which must be esteem'd the greatest Perfection, and most happy State of any Being.* For that is a State of Happiness, if any such can be conceiv'd, wherein every thing is done which pleases, and every thing absent which displeases; neither does it seem possible to imagine a more happy one.

II. Secondly,

* See *Scott's Christian Life*, Vol. 1. pag. 8, 9.

II. Secondly, It is to be observ'd, that among our Appetites, Faculties and Powers, some are determin'd to their Operations by Objects peculiar to them. For upon the presence of their Objects they necessarily exert their Actions, if rightly dispos'd, and cease from Operation upon their absence, and have no tendency towards any other Objects but their own. Thus the Sight perceives nothing but Light, Colours, &c. and, upon the Removal of these, its Action †. ceases. The Understanding itself distinguishes those Objects which are communicated to it by the Senses, or perceiv'd by reflection from one another, disposes and reposes them in the Memory; but yet has certain bounds which it cannot exceed: and so of the rest. There is therefore a certain natural Fitness, a fixt conformity between these Powers and their Objects, on which account they exert their Actions upon the presence of the Objects, and delight themselves in Exercise: but are uneasy at the presence of those things which hinder it. If then there be any natural force in any Object to promote or hinder the exercise of any Power or Faculty, that Object in regard to it is to be esteem'd Good or Evil.

III. Those Objects which thus promote or impede the Action, are sufficiently distinguish'd from each other by the Power or Faculty itself; those that are absent or future, are judg'd of by the Understanding, and what the Mind determines to be the best in them, that we are oblig'd to pursue. He that

There is a certain agreement fixt by Nature between some Appetites, &c. and their Objects, whereby they act upon the presence of them, and cease from Action upon their Removal

Liberty would be of disservice to an Agent endow'd with such Appetites, &c. as these only.

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(†) It may be observ'd here once for all, that our Author seldom uses this Word *Action* in a strict Philosophical Sense (according to which these should rather be call'd *Passions*) but generally takes the vulgar expressions, when they will serve to explain his meaning.

that does otherwise disobeys the Law of Reason. If therefore all our Powers and Faculties were thus determin'd to their proper Objects, it would seem an Imperfection for Man to be free, and he would have been much more happy without such a Liberty: for he receives no Benefit from it, but one of the greatest Evils, *viz.* a Power of doing amiss.

We may conceive a Power between which and any particular Object there is naturally no other agreeableness but what may arise from the Determination of the Power itself.

IV. It seems not impossible to conceive a Power of a quite different Nature from these, which may be more indifferent in respect of the Objects about which it exerts itself (*t.*) To which no one thing is naturally more agreeable than another, but that will be the fittest to which it shall happen (*u.*) to be apply'd: Between which and the Object, to which it is determin'd, whether by it self or by something else, there is naturally no more suitableness or connection than between it and any other thing; but all the *Suitableness* there is, arises from the *Application* or *Determination* itself. For as the Earth is no Man's Right by nature, but belongs to the prime Occupant, and the Right arises from that very Occupation; so there may possibly be a Power to which no Object is by Nature peculiarly adapted, but any thing may become suitable to it, if it happen to be apply'd; for its *Suitableness* proceeds from the *Application*, as we said before. Now it does not seem any more absurd for a Power to create an *Agreeableness* between itself and an Object, by applying itself to that Object, or that to itself, than for a Man to acquire a Right to a thing by occupying it. For, as in Civil Laws, some things are forbidden because they are inconvenient, others are inconvenient and Evil because forbidden; so it may be in Powers, Faculties and

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(*t.*) See Sect. 5. Subsect. 2. par. 12 and 15.

(*u.*) That this Word is not intended to imply what we commonly mean by Chance, see par. 18.

Appetites; viz. some may be determin'd by the natural Suitableness of the Objects, and in others, the Suitableness to the Objects may arise from the Determination. For this Faculty may be naturally inclin'd to exercise, and one Exercise be more agreeable than another, not from any natural fitness of one rather than the other, but from the Application of the Faculty itself: for another would often be no less agreeable, if it had happen'd to be determin'd to that. Nothing hinders then but that there may be such a Power or Faculty as this, at least with respect to very many Objects. (49.)

V. Fourthly,

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(49.) Our Author's Notion of *Indifference* has been grossly misunderstood by all his Adversaries, who have accordingly rais'd terrible Outcries against it, as destroying the essential, and immutable distinction between Good and Evil; subverting Appetites, making Reason and Judgment useless, and confounding every thing. We shall just observe here, that it cannot be apply'd to the *whole Man*, nor was design'd by our Author to include all manner of external Objects, Actions, and Relations of things, as they seem to have understood it. For every Man in his Wits must be sufficiently sensible that all things don't affect him in the same manner, even before he has will'd any of them. I cannot be indifferent to Meat, or Drink, or Rest, when I am Hungry, Thirsty, or Weary. Some natural Objects are agreeable, and produce pleasure in me, and others the contrary, whether I will or no; and the same may be said of the *moral Sense*. Nay our Author every where allows their full force to what he calls the *Appetites*; and asserts that whatever contradicts them must be attended with Uneasiness. 'Tis not an absolute indifference therefore of the *Man* or *Mind* in general, nor of the *Senses*, Perception or Judgment, which he contends for; but it relates wholly to that *particular Power* of the Mind which we call *Willing*, and which will appear to be in its own Nature, or *Physically indifferent* to acting or not acting, or to acting in any particular manner, notwithstanding all these different Affections or Passions of the Mind rais'd by the different Objects. Let a thing seem never so pleasant and agreeable, never so reasonable, fit and eligible to us, yet there is still a natural possibility for us to will the contrary, and consequently the bare *Power of willing* is in

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V. Fourthly, If then we suppose such a Power as this, 'tis plain, that the Agent endow'd with it cannot be determin'd in its Operations by any pre-existent

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in itself indifferent to either Side; which is all the indifference that our Author contends for. Now such an Indifference as this Mr. *Locke* allows to be in the operative Powers of Man, tho' he confines it, I think, improperly to them alone [x.] "I have the ability, says he, to move my hand, or "to let it rest, that operative Power is indifferent to move or "not to move my hand: I am then in that respect perfectly "free. My Will determines that operative Power to rest, I "am yet free, because the Indifferency of that my operative "Power to act or not to act still remains; the Power of moving my hand is not at all impair'd by the Determination of "my Will, which at present orders rest, the Indifferency of "that Power to act is just as it was before, as will appear, if "the Will puts it to the trial, by ordering the contrary". The same, I think, may be apply'd to the *Will* itself in regard to Motives, &c. with much more Justice than to these operative Powers. Nay these can scarce be call'd indifferent to Action after the determination of the Will; but follow instantly (as we observ'd in Note 42.) in most Cases when they are in their right State. What I Will or Resolve to do, that I certainly effect if I have Power to do it, and continue in the same Will or Resolution. However, this Indifference of the operative Powers is what can never constitute Morality (as was observ'd in the same place) since their Operations are no farther moral than as they are consequent upon, and under the direction of the Will.

There must then be another Indifference prior to them, in order to make the exertion of them free in any tolerable sense. Concerning this antecedent indifference Mr. *Locke* enquires whether it be antecedent to the Thought and Judgment of the *Understanding* as well as to the Decree of the *Will*? [y.] We answer 'tis antecedent to and independent on any particular Thought or Judgment, and continues equally independent af-
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[x.] B. 2. C. 21. Sect. 71.

[y.] *Ibid.*

existent Goodness in the Object; for since the agreeableness between it and the Objects, at least in most of them, is supposed to arise from the Determination, the agreeableness cannot possibly be the Cause of that Determination on which itself depends. But the congruity of the Object with the Faculty is all the Goodness in it, therefore there is nothing Good in regard to this Power, at least in those Objects to which it is indifferent, till it has embrac'd it, nor Evil till it has rejected it: Since then the Determination of the Power to the Object is prior to the Goodness and the Cause of it, this Power cannot be determin'd by that Goodness in its Operations.

VI. Fifthly, Such a Power as this, if it be granted to exist, cannot be determin'd by any *Uneasiness* arising from the things about which it is conversant. For it is supposed to be indifferent, not only in respect of external Objects, but also of its own Operations, and will please itself, whether it

Nor by
any *Uneasiness*.

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ter them; it remains after the Determination of the Judgment in the very same state as he supposes that of the operative Powers to be after the Determination of the Will. Its Liberty is placed, as he says, in a *State of Darkness*; and so is that of the operative Powers, which he allows: 'Tis indeed in itself (as it is commonly stiled) a *blind Principle*, and so is every Principle in Nature but the *Understanding*: and tho' the Exercise of the *Will*, as well as of the *operative Powers*, be generally accompanied with *Intelligence*, without which there can be no *Moral Liberty*; yet these are, I think very different Faculties and often exercised separately, and therefore should always be considered distinctly; *Freedom* is one thing, *Intelligence* another, a *Moral*, or accountable Being consists of both.

For a more complete View of this Question, see *Episcop. Instit. Theol. L. 4. C. 6.* and *Tract. de Libero Arbitrio*. There's also a good defence of our Author's Notion of Indifference in *Limborch, Theol. Christ. L. 2. C. 23. Sect. 20, &c.*

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V. Fourthly, If then we suppose such a Power as this, 'tis plain, that the Agent endow'd with it cannot be determin'd in its Operations by any pre-existent

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in itself indifferent to either Side; which is all the indifference that our Author contends for. Now such an Indifference as this Mr. Locke allows to be in the operative Powers of Man, tho' he confines it, I think, improperly to them alone [x.] "I have the ability, says he, to move my hand, or "to let it rest, that operative Power is indifferent to move or "not to move my hand: I am then in that respect perfectly "free. My Will determines that operative Power to rest, I "am yet free, because the Indifferency of that my operative "Power to act or not to act still remains; the Power of moving my hand is not at all impair'd by the Determination of "my Will, which at present orders rest, the Indifferency of "that Power to act is just as it was before, as will appear, if "the Will puts it to the trial, by ordering the contrary". The same, I think, may be apply'd to the Will itself in regard to Motives, &c. with much more Justice than to these operative Powers. Nay these can scarce be call'd indifferent to Action after the determination of the Will; but follow instantly (as we observ'd in Note 42.) in most Cases when they are in their right State. What I Will or Resolve to do, that I certainly effect if I have Power to do it, and continue in the same Will or Resolution. However, this Indifference of the operative Powers is what can never constitute Morality (as was observ'd in the same place) since their Operations are no farther moral than as they are consequent upon, and under the direction of the Will.

There must then be another Indifference prior to them, in order to make the exertion of them free in any tolerable sense. Concerning this antecedent indifference Mr. Locke enquires whether it be antecedent to the Thought and Judgment of the Understanding as well as to the Decree of the Will [y.] We answer 'tis antecedent to and independent on any particular Thought or Judgment, and continues equally independent after

[x.] B. 2. C. 21. Sect. 71.

[y.] Ibid.

existent Goodness in the Object; for since the agreeableness between it and the Objects, at least in most of them, is supposed to arise from the Determination, the agreeableness cannot possibly be the Cause of that Determination on which itself depends. But the congruity of the Object with the Faculty is all the Goodness in it, therefore there is nothing Good in regard to this Power, at least in those Objects to which it is indifferent, till it has embrac'd it, nor Evil till it has rejected it: Since then the Determination of the Power to the Object is prior to the Goodness and the Cause of it, this Power cannot be determin'd by that Goodness in its Operations.

VI. Fifthly, Such a Power as this, if it be granted to exist, cannot be determin'd by any *Uneasiness* arising from the things about which it is conversant. For it is supposed to be indifferent, not only in respect of external Objects, but also of its own Operations, and will please itself, whether it accepts

Nor by
any *Uneasiness*.

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ter them; it remains after the Determination of the Judgment in the very same state as he supposes that of the operative Powers to be after the Determination of the Will. Its Liberty is placed, as he says, in a *State of Darkness*; and so is that of the operative Powers, which he allows: 'Tis indeed in itself (as it is commonly stiled) a *blind Principle*, and so is every Principle in Nature but the *Understanding*: and tho' the Exercise of the *Will*, as well as of the *operative Powers*, be generally accompanied with *Intelligence*, without which there can be no *Moral Liberty*; yet these are, I think very different Faculties and often exercised separately, and therefore should always be considered distinctly; *Freedom* is one thing. *Intelligence* another, a *Moral* or accountable Being consists of both.

For a more complete View of this Question, see *Episcop. Instit. Theol.* L. 4. C. 6. and *Tract. de Libero Arbitrio*. There's also a good defence of our Author's Notion of Indifference in *Limborch, Theol. Christ.* L. 2. C. 23. Sect. 20, &c.

accepts the thing or rejects it; whether it exerts this Act or another. These Objects then will neither please nor displease till this Indifference be removed, but it is suppos'd to be removed by the Application or Determination of the Power itself; therefore Anxiety does not produce but pre-suppose its Determination. Let us suppose this Power to be already determin'd (it matters not how) to embrace a certain Object, or to exert the proper Actions relating to it, *Desire* manifestly follows this Determination, and *Desire* is follow'd by an Endeavour to obtain and enjoy the Object pursuant to the Application of the Power. But if any thing should hinder or stop this Endeavour, and prevent the Power from exerting those Operations which it undertook to discharge in relation to the Object, then indeed Uneasiness would arise from the hindrance of the Power. *Anxiety* would therefore be the *Effect* of the Determination of this Power, but by no means the *Cause* of it. [*.]

Nor by
the Under-
standing.

VII. Sixthly, Supposing such an Agent as this to be endow'd also with Understanding, he might make use of it to propose Matters fit to be done, but not to determine whether he should do them or not. For the Understanding or Reason, if it speak Truth, represents what is in the Objects, and does not

NOTES.

[*.] Observe what follows from Mr. Locke, "There is a Case wherein a Man is at Liberty in respect of *willing*, and that is the chusing a remote Good as an End to be pursued. Here a Man may *suspend* the act of his Choice from being determin'd for or against the thing propos'd, 'till he has examin'd whether it be really of a Nature in itself, and Consequences to make him happy or no. For when he has once chosen it, and thereby it is become a part of his Happiness, it raises *Desire*, and that proportionably gives him *Uneasiness*, which determines his Will, and sets him at work in pursuit of his Choice on all Occasions that offer. B. 2. C. 21. Sect. 56.

not counterfeit what it finds not in them: Since therefore, before the Determination of this Power, things are supposed to be indifferent to it, and no one better or worse than another; the Understanding if it performs its Duty right, will represent this Indifference, and not pronounce one to be more eligible than another; For the Understanding directs a thing to be done no otherwise than by determining that it is better; as therefore the Goodness of things, with respect to this Power, depends upon its Determination, and they are for the most part good if it embraces, evil, if it rejects them, 'tis manifest that the Judgment of the Understanding concerning things depends upon the same, and that it cannot pronounce upon the Goodness or Badness of them, till it perceives whether the Power has embraced or rejected them. The Understanding therefore must wait for the Determination of this Power, before it can pass a Judgment, instead of the Power's waiting for the Judgment of that Understanding before it can be determin'd.

VIII. Seventhly, But tho' this Power cannot be determin'd in its Operations by any Judgment of the Understanding, yet the Understanding is necessary, in order to propose Matters of Action, and to distinguish possible ones from those that are impossible. For tho' the Goodness of things with respect to the Agent, proceeds from his Determination, yet the Possibility and Impossibility is in the things themselves, and this Agent stands in need of the Understanding to distinguish between Objects, lest it light upon Absurdities, and so create itself Uneasiness. Not that an Object is therefore Good because 'tis possible; for if it be rejected it will be Evil; nor will it be immediately disagreeable because impossible, for attempting an Impossibility may be pleasing to us, (for we may prefer the exercise of this Power, which is the thing that pleases

Yet such an Agent has need of understanding in order to distinguish possible things from impossible.

us, as we said before) but he that makes this Attempt, must necessarily be unhappy in the Event; for since the thing which the Power undertakes is impossible to be done, Uneasiness must necessarily follow the hindrance of its Exercise, and the final Disappointment of its End.

If the Agent be of infinite Power, he needs no other Limitation.

IX. This then must be assign'd as the *first Limitation* of such a Power, viz. that it confine itself to Possibilities, and there needs no other, if the Agent be of infinite Power, in order to the obtaining of its End.

But an Agent of finite power must also consult his Abilities.

X. Eighthly, But if the Agent's Power be finite, it has need also to consult its Abilities, and not determine itself to any thing which may exceed them, otherwise it will be as much disappointed in its Endeavour as if it had attempted absolute Impossibilities. And this is the *second Limitation* of this Power. It is impossible, you'll say, for an Appetite to pursue such things as the Understanding evidently declares not to be in the Power of the Agent. I answer, the Senses and natural Appetites are gratify'd with their Objects, and please themselves, tho' Reason remonstrate against them, and condemn that pleasure as pernicious. How much more easily then may this *seditious Appetite*, which arises in the Agent from Application only, be conceiv'd to delight in its Good, tho' the Understanding oppose it, and condemn that Delight as foolish and of short Duration. Why Nature granted such a Liberty to this Power, and how it conduces to the Good of the whole, will be shewn afterwards.

Such an Agent cannot be determin'd by his other Appetites.

XI. Hitherto we have either consider'd this Power alone in the Agent, or as join'd with the Understanding. But the Agent endow'd with it, may also have other Powers and Appetites which are determin'd to their Objects by a natural Congruity; yet neither can it be determin'd in its Operations by them. We must distinguish between the Opera-

tions

tions of these Appetites, and the *Pleasure* which arises from the Exercise of them. These, when rightly dispos'd, must necessarily exert their Operations upon the presence of their Objects; but it is not at all necessary that they should delight and please themselves in these Operations. For instance, a bitter and nauseous savour is disagreeable to the Taste: but tho' this be felt, yet urgent Hunger makes it pleasant, Importunity of Appetite overcoming the Disagreeableness of the Savour. This Pleasure indeed is not pure, but mix'd and diluted proportionably to the Excess of the prevailing Appetite. For, suppose that there are three Degrees of Uneasiness from the Hunger, and two from the Bitterness, the Agent, to avoid three, must necessarily bear two, which being deducted, there remains only one Degree of solid Pleasure; whereas if he had met with suitable and sweet Food, there would have been three.

XII. Since therefore the Pleasure which arises from the Satisfaction of these natural Appetites may be overcome by a stronger Appetite, there's no Reason to doubt but this Power which is indifferent to Objects may overcome all the other Powers and Appetites. For all these are limited by their Objects, and therefore have certain Bounds, but this Power has no Bounds †, nor is there any thing wherein it cannot please itself, if it does but happen to be determin'd to it. Now since the natural Appetites themselves may be contrary to each other (as we have shewn) and one of them be overcome by the Excess of another, how much more easily may this Power be conceiv'd to go against these Appetites, and since it is of a very different and superior kind, 'tis probable that it can conquer all others, and be itself subdued by none.

T 2

XIII

† i. e. in its Objects, see the next Note;

This Power is superior to all the Appetites, and subdued by none.

It seems to be given for this End, that the Agent might have something to delight in when the natural Appetites must necessarily be frustrated.

XIII. Nay we may imagine it to be given for this very End, that the Agent might have wherein to please itself, when those things which are agreeable to the natural Appetites cannot be had, as it very often happens. As the natural Powers and Appetites receive Pleasure and Pain from Objects, they must necessarily be deprived of Pleasure and undergo Pain, according to the Laws of Motion, and the order of external things. Since then they are often frustrated, they must render the Agents possess'd of them liable to Misery, as well as make them capable of Happiness: But the Agent can have this always to delight itself in; and 'tis an advantage to it to be able to quit the other Appetites, and please itself in restraining them, or acting contrary to them. For since every Faculty is satisfied in its exercise, the Strength of this cannot be more signally display'd in any thing, than in running counter sometimes to all the Appetites. For this must either be sometimes done, or the Agent must be destitute of all manner of Good, and remain entirely miserable; namely when, according to the Laws of Nature, such things must be endured as are quite contrary to the Appetites †.

This Power, by its accession, encreases the pleasure of the other Appetites; by opposition removes, or at least alleviates the pain.

XIV. And from hence it is very evident how desirable such a Power as this would be: for if it happen to be determin'd to such things as are agreeable to the Appetites, it augments, it multiplies the Enjoyment; but if it should be determin'd to undergo those things which are repugnant to the Appetites, and which must necessarily be born sometimes, it might diminish, nay quite re-

move

† viz. in painful Remedies, disagreeable Potions, &c. see Subsect. 5. par. 9.

move the Uneasiness, or convert it into Pleasure.

(50.)

XV. It must be confess'd that some kind of struggle will be hereby excited in this Agent; but a struggle attended with some Pleasure, tho' it be qualify'd and not perfectly pure, is better than to be under absolute Misery. Nay, the consciousness of a Power to please itself against the bent and Inclination of the natural Appetites, may excite a greater Pleasure than could arise from the fruition of those things which would, if present, gratify

The rest of the Appetites are not to be balked unnecessarily.

T 3

these

NOTES.

(50.) This is not much more than what Mr. Locke asserts [u.] in answer to the Enquiry, "Whether it be in a Man's power to change the Pleasantness and Uneasiness that accompanies any sort of Action? And to that, says he, 'tis plain in many cases he can. Men may and should correct their Palates, and give a relish to what either has, or they suppose has none. The relish of the Mind is as various as that of the Body; and like that too may be alter'd; and 'tis a mistake to think that Men cannot change the displeasingness or indifference that is in Actions into Pleasure and Desire, if they will but do what is in their Power". But it is objected by Leibnitz, against our Author's Notion, that if it could create Pleasure by an arbitrary Determination and bare Election, it might for the same reason produce Happiness *in infinitum* [x] and then how could we be ever miserable except we chose to be so? Which Argument seems to be founded on a mistake of our Author's meaning, as if he had intended to assert, that all the good and agreeableness in every thing or action, proceeds absolutely and entirely from our Will: and also, that this will is as unlimited in its Exercise as in its Objects, and consequently that we might have any way, and at any time, as much Happiness as we pleased, purely by willing it; all which Propositions are as false as they are foreign to the Intention of our Author, who insists only upon this, that the act of willing, like the exercise of all our other Faculties, is in itself delightful to a certain Degree: This, when apply'd to an Object which is itself agree-

[u.] B. 2. C. 21. Se^ct. 69.

[x.] *Essais de Theodicee*, p. 466, 467.

these Appetites. Yet this Agent is oblig'd to have some regard to the Appetites, and not to disturb them unnecessarily, nor restrain them from a due enjoyment of their proper Objects. He that does this will bring upon himself uneasiness, and a needless contest. Tho' therefore it be not at all proper that such a Power should be absolutely determin'd by the natural Appetites, yet it is fit that they should persuade it, and that some regard be had to them in its Determinations. And this may be reckon'd its *third Limitation*.

Such an Agent as this is Self-active.

XVI. Ninthly, An Agent possess'd of such a Principle as this would be *Self-active*, and capable of being determin'd in its Operations by itself alone. Now there is sometimes an absolute necessity for it to be determin'd; for when any thing is proposed to

NOTES.

able, must add to the Pleasure arising from it; when determin'd to a contrary one (both which kinds of Objects he always supposes) must deduct from the Pain; when to an indifferent one, it must make that positively agreeable, by conferring so much absolute and solid Happiness.

But still this exercise of the Will, and of consequence the Pleasure attending it, must in all finite Creatures be essentially and necessarily *finite*, as well as the exercise of all their other Powers: and tho' it has no bounds as to the number and kind of its Objects, yet it must be limited as to its own Nature and the degree of its exercise. This appears to me easily conceivable, and Matter of experience. We find ourselves generally able to turn our Thoughts to any Object indifferently, but does any Person from hence imagine that he can fix his thoughts upon any particular Object, with an unlimited Intensity, or think *infinitely*? granting the Words Intensity to be applicable here in any tolerable sense; which will perhaps, upon Examination, appear very doubtful. However, it is evidently no good consequence to infer, that because I can will or choose a thing absolutely and *freely*, therefore I can will it in *infinitum*. May I not as justly be said to perceive or understand a thing in *infinitum*, because I perceive or understand it at all? See Note N.

to be done immediately, it must necessarily either act or suspend its action, one of them must necessarily be; but when either of them is done, the Power is determin'd by that very act; and no less force is requisite to suspend than to exert the act, as common Sense and Experience may inform any one †. A determination then about a thing once propos'd to be done, is unavoidable; and since it can neither be determin'd by any Good or Evil pre-existent in the Objects, nor by the natural Powers or Appetites, nor by their Objects; it must of necessity either continue undetermined, or else determine itself. But tho' it be naturally free from any determination, yet the Nature of the thing requires that it should be determin'd on every particular occasion; and since there is nothing external to do this, it remains that it determine itself. We shall call this Determination an *Election*; for as it is naturally indifferent to many things, it will please itself in electing one before another.

XVII. Nor is it a proper Question to ask, What determines it to an Election? For if any such thing were suppos'd, it would not be indifferent, *i. e.* 'tis contrary to the Nature of this Agent that there should be any thing at all to determine it. In relation to a *passive Power* ††, which has a natural and necessary connection with the Object, the presence of which determines it to an act, we may reasonably enquire what that Good is which may determine it to exert any particular action; but it is not so in an *active Power*, the very Nature of which is to *make* an Object agreeable to itself, *i. e.* good, by its own proper act. For here the Goodness of the Object does not precede the act of Election, so as to excite it, but Election makes the

Is determin'd by himself, and things are not chosen because they please him but please him because they are chosen.

† See Note 48.

†† See Locke, Ch. 21. Sect. 2:

Goodness in the Object ; that is, the thing is agreeable because chosen, and not chosen because agreeable: We cannot therefore justly enquire after any other cause of Election than the Power itself.

Yet he is
not determin'd by
Chance.

XVIII: If these things be true, you'll say, this Agent will be determin'd by *Chance*, and not by *Reason* ; but in reality here's no room for Chance, if by Chance be understood that which happens beside the Intention of the Agent ; for this very Election is the Intention of the Agent, and it is impossible that a Man should intend beside his Intention. As for *Reason*, he that prefers a less Good to a greater, must be judg'd to act unreasonably ; but he that makes that a greater Good by choosing it, which before his choice had either no Good at all in it, or a less, he certainly chooses with reason. You may urge that *Contingency* at least is to be admitted ; if by this you mean that this Agent does some things which are not at all necessary, I readily own a Contingency, for that is the very Liberty I would establish.

Is the true
Cause of
his Actions.

XIX. Tenthly, 'Tis evident that such an Agent as this, if it be allow'd that there is such an one, is the true *Cause* of his Actions, and that whatever he does may justly be imputed to him. A Power which is not Master of itself, but determin'd to act by some other, is in reality not the *efficient* Cause of its actions, but only the *instrumental* or *occasional*, (if we may use the term of some Philosophers) for it may be said that the thing is done in it, or by it, rather than that it does the thing itself. No Person therefore imputes to himself, or esteems himself the Cause of those actions to which he believes himself to be necessarily determin'd: If then any inconvenience arise from them, he will look upon it as a Misfortune, but not as a Crime ; and whatever it be, he will refer it to the Determiner. Nor will he be angry with himself, unless

less he be conscious that it was in his power not to have done them: but he cannot be conscious of this (except thro' ignorance and error) who is determin'd by another. For no others ought to be look'd upon as true Causes, but such as are *free*. Those that operate necessarily, are to be conceiv'd as *passive*, and we must recur to some other which imposes that necessity on them, till we arrive at one that is free, where we may stop. Since then the Agent endow'd with this Power, is determin'd by himself and no other, and is free in his Operations, we must acquiesce in him as a real Cause, and he ought to be esteem'd the Author of whatever he does, either well or ill. (O.)

XX.

NOTES.

(O.) Against this 'tis objected that the quite contrary follows. For to fall on a good action by a Motion absolutely indifferent and not in consequence of some antecedent Good or Evil Qualities in the Agent is to fall on it blindly, by mere *Chance*, and so Fortune not the Agent is to be thanked or blamed. He rather is to be blamed or praised that owes his good or ill Actions to his antecedent good or ill Qualities.

To which I answer, that this is to deny and dispute against the Conclusion, without answering one word of the Premises, which are so plain and evident that I can't reckon the Argument other than a Demonstration; whereas that which is opposed to it is against the common Sense of Mankind.

For those good or bad Qualities that oblige him to do a good or bad Action are either from himself, that is his choice, or proceed from outward Agents that produced them in him: if from his own Choice, then it agrees with the Author's Opinion; but if from some outward Agent, then it is plain the good or Evil is to be imputed to that Agent only. *Quod est causa Causæ est etiam Causa Causati.*

I can't better explain this than by an Example. Suppose I am in distress, and there is one Man that by the Commands of his Prince, by his own Interest, and Politic Considerations is obliged to relieve me, and is in such Circumstances that he cannot possibly avoid doing it; the other is under no manner of Obligation, may do it or let it alone, yet seeing my Misfortune

Is capable
of Happi-
ness.

XX. Eleventhly, 'Tis manifest that such an Agent as this is capable of *Happiness*. For that Person must be happy who can always please himself, but this Agent can evidently do so. For since things are suppos'd to please him, not by any necessity of Nature, but by mere Election, and there is nothing which can compel him to choose this rather than another; 'tis plain that the Agent endow'd with this Power may always choose such things as it can enjoy, and refuse, *i. e.* not desire, or not choose those things which are impossible to be had. And from hence it appears of how great Importance it is, whether that whereby things become agreeable to the Appetites, be established by Nature, or effected by the Agent himself. For if Good and Evil proceed from Nature and

NOTES.

fortune he chooses and pleases himself in doing me a good Office. Let any one of Sense judge to which of these I owe the greatest Obligation, or if the World wou'd with Patience hear me excuse my Ingratitude by saying, Sir there was no Obligation on you to help me, you might have done it, or let it alone, therefore it was mere *Chance*, that determin'd you. Would not the Reply be naturally, the less Obligation was on him that relieved you, the greater your Obligation is to him for his kindness. If it be said that the Relief proceeded from Compassion and good Nature, which were antecedently in the Benefactor, and therefore it was valuable: suppose the Person that did this Office had always before been remarkable for cruelty and ill nature, ought the obliged Person to value the Kindness less for that? Quite contrary; it was rather a greater Favour to him that it was singular. But suppose it proceeded from a general Compassion and good Nature, that had nothing of *Choice* in them, so that the Person cou'd not help doing it, ought I not to thank him for it, and give him the Praises due to the Action? I ought to praise and commend him for his useful Qualities, as I do the Sun: but if I were sure that there was nothing of choice in them, I had no more reason to thank him than the Tyrant whose imposthume was cured by the Wound designed to kill him, had reason to thank the Assailant.

And be inherent in Objects, so as to render them agreeable or disagreeable, antecedent to the Election, the Happiness of this Agent will also depend upon them; and unless the whole Series of things be so order'd, that nothing can happen contrary to his Appetites, he must fall short of Happiness. For his Appetites will be disappointed, which is the very thing that we call Unhappiness. But if Objects derive their agreeableness or disagreeableness from the Choice, 'tis clear that he who has his Choice may always enjoy the thing chosen, (unless he choose Impossibilities, &c.) and never have his Appetite frustrated, *i. e.* be always happy. Not that *all* things are indifferent with respect to this Power, for it admits of some Limitations, as was observ'd, by choosing beyond which it must necessarily fail of Happiness.

XXI. Twelfthly, It is to be observ'd that Agents, whose Felicity depends upon the agreement of external Objects to their Appetites, stand in need of a perfect and almost infinite Knowledge to comprehend distinctly all the relations, habitudes, natures and consequences of things; if they come short of it, it is impossible but that they must often fall into pernicious Errors, and be disappointed of their Desires, that is be often miserable: Hence anxiety and disquiet of Mind must necessarily arise, and they would be agitated with continual doubts and uncertainty, lest what they choose should not prove the best. These Agents then were either to be created without a prospect of Futurity, or to be endow'd with a perfect Understanding; if neither were done, they must of necessity be very miserable; for we can scarce conceive a greater Misery than to be held in suspense about Happiness, and compell'd to choose among Objects not sufficiently known, in which nevertheless

An imperfect understanding is sufficient for his happiness, if he do but distinguish between possibilities, and impossibilities, things agreeable and disagreeable to the senses, and consult his Abilities.

a Mistake would be attended with unavoidable Misery. There's none but is sufficiently apprehensive how anxious, how solicitous, how miserable it must be to hang in such a doubt as this; but if the agreeableness of things be supposed to depend upon *Election*, a very imperfect understanding will serve to direct this Agent, nor need he to comprehend all the natures and habitudes of things: for if he do but distinguish possible things from impossible, those things which are pleasant to the Senses from them that are unpleasant, that which is agreeable to the Faculties from what is disagreeable, and consult his own Abilities, viz. how far his Power reaches; (all which are easily discover'd) he will know enough to make him happy. Nor is there need of long deliberation, whether any thing to be done be the very best; for if the Election be but made within these bounds, that will become the best which is chosen.

XXII. He that enjoys the Principle of pleasing himself in his Choice cannot reasonably complain of Nature, tho' he have but a very imperfect Understanding; for there will always be Objects enough ready to offer themselves within these bounds, upon which he may exercise his choice, and please himself: that is, he may always enjoy Happiness. Tho' Free-will then be of no use, as was said before, to an Agent capable of being determin'd only by the convenience of external things, nay, tho' it be pernicious, as only tending to pervert Reason and produce Sin; yet to an Agent whose convenience does not depend upon the things, but the choice, it is of the greatest Importance, and as we have seen, the sure and only Foundation of Felicity. And from hence it appears how valuable and how desirable such an active Principle as this would be.

Tho' Liberty would be a prejudice to other Agents, yet it is a sure foundation of Happiness to this, whose convenience depends not on Objects, but Election.

XXIII.

XXIII. All this seems to be coherent enough, clear enough, and easy to be understood, tho' some may look upon it as a little too subtle. It remains that we enquire whether this be a mere Hypothesis without any Foundation in fact, or there be really such a Principle to be found in Nature. (51.)

These things are clear enough, tho' they may appear to be a little too subtle.

SUBJECT.

NOTES.

(51.) For an Explanation of our Author's Principle of Indifference, above what has been said in Note 49. and will be enlarged on in Note 59. we shall only observe here, that most of the objections brought by the Author of the *Philosophical Enquiry*, p. 69, &c. are built upon the old blunder of confounding this Indifference as apply'd to the Mind, in respect of its Self-determining Powers of *willing* or *acting*, with another, which is falsely referr'd to the passive Powers of *Perception* and *Judgment*. With respect to the former Faculties all things are physically indifferent or alike, that is, no one can properly affect, incline or move them more than another; with regard to the latter, most things are not indifferent, but necessarily produce Pleasure or Pain, are agreeable or disagreeable, whether we choose them or not: Our Author is to be understood only in relation to the former, in this and the following Sections, tho' he often uses general terms.

Nothing is either Good or Bad to him before his Election. He has no Appetite to gratify with the movement of things without him. He is therefore absolutely indifferent to all external things, and cannot receive benefit nor harm from any of them. What then should determine his Will to act? Certainly nothing without him: therefore he determines himself, and creates to himself a kind of Appetite by choosing. For when the Choice is made, he will have as great attention and regard to the effectual procuring of that which he has chosen.

S U B S E C T. IV.

*That there is an Agent who is pleas'd
with Objects only because he chooses
them.*

God is such
an Agent
as this.

I. **W**E have seen in the former Subsection, that some things are adapted to the Appetites by the constitution of Nature itself, and on that account are good and agreeable to them; but that we may conceive a Power which can produce Goodness or Agreeableness in the things, by conforming itself to them, or adapting them to it: hence things please this Agent, not because they are good in themselves, but become good because they are chosen. We have demonstrated before, how great a Perfection, and of what use such a Power would be, and that there is such a Power in Nature appears from hence, viz. we must necessarily believe that *God* is invested with it.

Because
nothing
external is
either
good or
bad to him
before
Election.

II. For in the first place, nothing in the Creation is either Good or Bad to him before his Election, he has no Appetite to gratify with the Enjoyment of things without him. He is therefore absolutely *indifferent* to all external things, and can neither receive benefit nor harm from any of them. What then should determine his Will to act? Certainly nothing *without* him; therefore he determines himself, and creates to himself a kind of Appetite by choosing. For when the Choice is made, he will have as great attention and regard to the effectual procuring of that which he has chosen,

chosen, as if he was excited, to this Endeavour by a natural and necessary Appetite. And he will esteem such things as tend to accomplish these Elections, Good ; such as obstruct them, Evil.

III. Secondly, the Divine Will is the Cause of Good in the Creatures, and upon it they depend, as almost every one acknowledges. For created Beings have all that they have from the Will of God ; nor can they be any thing else than what he willed. 'Tis plain then that all these are conformable and consonant to his Will, either efficient or permissive, and that their original Goodness is founded in this Consonancy. And since all things proceed from one and the same Will, which cannot be contrary to itself, as it is restrain'd within its proper bounds by infinite Wisdom, 'tis also certain that all things are consistent with each other, that every thing contributes as much as possible to the preservation of itself and the whole System ; which we must reckon their *secondary Goodness*. All the Goodness then of the Creatures is owing to the Divine Will, and dependent on it, for we cannot apprehend how they could be either Good or Evil in themselves, since they were nothing at all antecedent to the act of the Divine Will : and they were as far from being good with regard to God himself, till upon willing their Existence he by that act of Election both constituted them Good in relation to him ; and by an unity of Will made them agreeable to one another. 'Tis evident that the Divine Will was accompanied in this, as in all other Cases, by his Goodness and Wisdom ; but it proceeds immediately from his Will that things please God, *i. e.* are *Good*. For many things are not agreeable to his Goodness and Wisdom purely because he did not will them, and while he does not will any thing, it cannot be good.

From

From whence it appears undeniably that his Will could not be determin'd to Election by any Goodness in the Creatures. For before that Election, which is declared to be the Cause of Goodness in created Beings, nothing could be either Good or Bad; but when the Election is made, that only is Evil which obstructs the execution of it, and that Good which promotes it. The Goodness of things is therefore to be determin'd by their agreeableness to the Divine Will, and not that by the agreeableness or goodness of things. (P.)

VI. Thirdly,

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(P.) The Objections here are 1st, that if this be true, before God determin'd to create the World he cou'd see nothing better in Virtue than in Vice.

It were a sufficient answer to this Objection to say there is no harm in it, if it were true; for we must consider that God from all Eternity determin'd to create the World, and therefore there neither was any thing, nor can any thing be conceived before that Determination; and therefore he might always see something better in Virtue than Vice.

But 2dly, We ought to remember that Virtue and Vice arise from the Congruity of Things created by God, what is agreeable to a reasonable Nature is Virtue, what is contrary Vice, and that there is no other Cause why one Nature is reasonable and another without Reason; but the Will of God, and therefore Vice and Virtue must entirely depend on that Will. The plain Reason of Mens mistake in the Case is this: They first suppose God has willed that a Nature should be reasonable, and then forgetting that this depends entirely on his Will, they suppose this Nature to be of itself, and then argue that the Congruity or Incongruity of things to it, cannot depend on the Will of God, because he can't make what is congruous to it incongruous; that is in reality his Will can't be contrary to itself.

But 2dly, 'Tis objected, that this Opinion leaves no difference between natural and positive Laws: for a positive Law is what depends on the Will of God; and according to this position Natural Laws depend on the same, and so the distinction between them is taken away.

But the answer to this is so easy, that 'tis a wonder any shou'd stumble at it. For it is plain that the Natures of things have their

IV. Thirdly, We must not therefore attend to such as declare that God chooses things because
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They are not to be minded who declare that

this Goodness determines the Will of God.

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their being from the Will of God, and whilst that Will continues none can destroy them, and the Congruity of things to these Natures results from the Natures themselves, and is included in the same act of Will, that gave the things a Being: so that as long as it pleases God to continue their Beings such as he has made them, the Congruity and Incongruity of things necessarily remain and result from that act of Will, which made them what they are, insomuch that the Divine Will must be contrary to itself, if it went about to separate them (*i. e.* the Nature from the Congruity) and therefore these are join'd together by a *Natural Law*. But when God by a new act of Will subsequent to the Being of any thing requires something to be done by it which was not included in that first act of Will which gave it a Being, then that is said to be enjoin'd by a *positive Law*, and as this was required by an act subsequent to the Being, so it may be again removed by another without destroying the Being itself on which it is imposed, or without any contrariety in God's Will. Hence Natural Laws are indispensable, and can't be abrogated, whilst the Natures to which they belong continue, whereas the positive Laws are dispensible and may be repealed.

But 3dly, 'Tis urg'd that this opinion leads us straight to *Pyrrhonism*, and makes God not only free as to Virtue, so that he may make it either good or bad: but likewise to the truth or falshood of Things, so that he may change their Nature and make 3 and 3 not to be 6.

'Twere a sufficient answer to this, to say the Case is not parallel; for the Goodness of Things is supposed to arise from the Will of God, which is free; but the truth of them from his Intellect, which is a necessary Faculty, and therefore tho' the one might be arbitrary, yet the other cannot. But the Truth is Goodness is a conformity to the Will of God, and the reason that God can't will Evil is because it is always contrary to some other act of his Will, and his Will can't be contrary to itself: and at the same rate Truth is a conformity to his Intellect and the Reason that a Proposition is true, is because it is so conformable; and since it is so, to suppose it not conformable is to suppose a contradiction. God in making or conceiving

they are Good, as if Goodness and the greater Good which he perceives in Objects, could determine

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ceiving six, made and conceived 3 and 3; and therefore to suppose that 3 and 3 do not make six, is to suppose a Contradiction. In effect it is to say God conceives it wrong, and to say that his Power can make it otherwise, is to say that his Power can falsify his Understanding.

These things are so easy that there can be no doubt about them, if Men will not be perverse.

But 4thly, Is not this to make the *Essence* of things arbitrary, and so fall in with some *Cartesians*? I answer the Author is not concern'd with the opinions of *Cartesians*, or any other, farther then he thinks them true; if by making the *Essence* of things arbitrary, be meant that God instead of making a Man, might have made a Stone, or planted the World with Mushrooms instead of Herbs and Trees; he verily believes he might. If you mean that when God has made a Man and planted the World with variety of vegetables, that the Man continuing what he is shou'd yet be a Stone, or the several Plants continuing in their variety shou'd all be Mushrooms, this he thinks impossible. For a Man is a Creature that is not a Stone, and therefore to say he is a Stone, or to make him one, is to make him no Man. Six is a Number consisting of 3 and 3, and to say that a Number doth not consist of 3 and 3 is to say that it is not six. Man is a Creature obliged to be just, &c. by the very Constitution of his Nature, and to say that he is not obliged to be so, is to say that he is not a Man. If it be ask'd, can't God will him to do such things as we reckon unjust, &c. I answer he may, but it must be by making him something else, by causing him to cease to be a Man; in short by taking away his Nature from him, and then neither the notion of Manhood, nor Injustice will belong to him. The material acts that we call unjust might still be perform'd by him, but the formal Reason of injustice would cease, because that arises from the acts, not as consider'd in themselves, but as they proceed from a Nature to which they are unsuitable.

Thus a Man that owes me no Money may give me 1000 *l.* but can't be said to pay me a Debt, because the paying a Debt supposes that he owes it; and therefore tho' a Debtor, and one that owes nothing may each give me 1000 *l.* yet they differ in this, that the one is Payment of a Debt, the other a free Gift. And so it is in all those Actions that we call unjust, &c. when they

mine his Will. † If the Matter had stood thus, it does not seem possible for the World to have been

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they are done by a Man, they are Crimes, because against his Nature; but when another Creature that has not Reason does them, they can't be call'd unjust, &c. For Example, if a Man kills one that no ways injures him, and robs and eats him, he commits Murder, and is guilty of an horrid Immorality; but if a Lyon unprovoked kill and eat a Man it is no Crime or Wickedness in him. But in as much as Men in their way of thinking represent to themselves a Nature with all its Parts and Properties, and find that they can't remove any of them from that Nature, they conclude that the Natures of created Beings are what they are independently on the Will of God; forgetting in the mean time that it is only the Divine Will that gave or can give a Being to any Creature with certain Parts and Properties, and that instead of that Creature he could make another without them all, that should have quite different parts and attributes. 'Tis therefore merely from his Will that Creatures are what they are; but this Will having given them a Being, or being conceived to have given it, no part or property belonging to them can even in thought be taken from them: and this seems to me a full account of the certainty of those things we call *Eternal Truths* ||.

I have insisted the longer on this Point because I see some indifferent Persons as to the main Dispute have thought the Author mistaken in his asserting the Goodness of things to depend immediately on the Will of God. Let me add farther, that the Author does not say that the Goodness of Things depends *solely* on God's Will; but that his Wisdom and Power are likewise concern'd in them: we must not separate God's Will from these attributes; on the contrary his Will is limited by the one and executed by the other.

But

† This Notion is advanc'd by Dr. Clarke in his *Demonstration of the Divine Attributes*, Prop. 12. and afterwards explained, as far as it seems capable of Explanation, in his *Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion*, Prop. 1. The same is insisted on by Leibnitz, Grotius, Ruff, Mr. Chubb, and many others. We have enquir'd a little into it already in R. 1. See more in Note 52.

|| See the Impartial Enquiry, pag. 50, 51.

been made at all. For they who acknowledge God to be the Author of it, confess also, that he is absolutely

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But lastly it is urged that according to these Principles Virtues are not good antecedently to God's Choice, and would not be good if God did not choose them, nay if he chose Vices in their stead, they would be good both morally and physically. For Obedience to God is Good, and if God had commanded Vice it would have been Man's Duty to obey him, and perhaps Goodness might this way have been as effectually brought into the World, as by those Virtues that arise from the exigence of our Nature, as God has now framed it. And from hence they infer that God is as free to make his *second* Choice, as we conceive him to be in making his *first*.

But to all this I answer, 1st, I acknowledge that antecedently to God's Choice there can be nothing good or bad, because there can't be any thing at all: the very moment we conceive a thing to be, we must conceive and suppose that God wills it to be what it is, and that he wills it should by its Nature and Constitution have certain parts and properties, and that as long as the thing continues what it is, God's Will continues also to preserve it so: to suppose therefore that he Wills at the same time it shou'd be without those parts and properties is plainly to suppose two contradictory Wills in God. Now an Obligation to Virtue is a Property necessarily resulting from the Nature of Man, and therefore to suppose God to command him not to be virtuous when he has given him such a Nature, is a Contradiction:

If any would in earnest shew that the Goodness of Things doth not depend upon the Will of God, the true way of doing it is to give an instance of something that is good, which doth not suppose an act of God's Will, or an Example of something Evil, that is not manifestly contrary to some act of it.

In short, the Congruity of things is their Goodness, and that Congruity arises from their Natures, and they have those Natures from the Will of God, and those Natures must have a Congruity because they proceed from one Will, which cannot be contrary to itself, because it is conducted by infinite Wisdom. All this is sufficiently laid down in the Book, and for any one to urge these Consequences, and take no Notice of the Solutions given them must either proceed from not having read the Book, or a worse Reason, which I am unwilling to believe.

absolutely and completely happy in himself, and does not stand in the least need of other things. Now it is inconceivable how external things can be of use to God, who comprehends in himself all things which tend to perfect Happiness. He must of necessity therefore be indifferent to all external Objects, nor can any reason be assign'd, with regard to the things themselves, why he should prefer one to another. 'Tis plain that things are made by God with Goodness, that is, with a certain congruity to his own Nature; but they are so far from being made on account of any agreeableness antecedent to the Divine Will, that, on the contrary, they are necessarily agreeable and pleasant because they are made by his free Choice. For since they are nothing in themselves, they must of necessity have both their Existence and their agreeableness from that Will, from which they solely proceed; and it is impossible but that they should be conformable to the Will which effected them: For God, by willing, makes those things pleasing to him which were before indifferent.

V. Unless therefore we attribute to him such a Power as has been described (namely, an ability to please himself, by determining himself to action, without any other regard had to the Quality of the Object, than that it is possible) it seems impossible that ever he should begin to effect any thing without himself. For, as far 'as we can apprehend there can be no reason assign'd why he should create any thing at all †, why a World, why the present, why at that particular time when it was created, why not before or after, why in this and no other Form: he receiv'd no advantage.

If he had not a power of pleasing himself in Election, he could never have made any thing.

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† i. e. no reason drawn from the Nature of the thing to be created. See the two following Notes.

tage or disadvantage from these, no benefit or harm; in short, nothing that could move him to choose one before another. Except therefore we attribute to God an active power of determining himself in indifferent Matters, upon every particular Occasion; and of pleasing himself in that Determination according to his Choice; he would do nothing at all; he would be for ever indolent in regard to all external things, and the World could not possibly have been made, since no reason could be imagin'd, why a God absolutely perfect in himself, and absolutely happy, should create any thing without him. (2.)

VI. Fourthly,

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(2.) To this it is objected, that the Understanding of God contains Ideas of all Things possible; by means whereof all Things are eminently in him. That these Ideas represent all the Good and Evil, the Perfections, Imperfections, Order and Disorder, the Agreements and Disagreements that are possible; and his superabundant Goodness makes him choose the most advantageous: Now these Ideas are independent of the Will of God, and therefore the Perfection or Imperfection that they represent in Things is antecedent to any act of his Will, at least in *Ordina Nature*, tho' not of time: v. g. Is it not rather from the Nature of Numbers than the Will of God, that one Number is capable of receiving more Divisions than another? And can any think that the Pains and Inconveniencies that attend sensitive Creatures, especially the Happiness or Misery of intelligent Beings are indifferent to God? And yet 'tis pretended that the Hypothesis of God's Will being the cause of Goodness in the Creature must infer all these Absurdities.

2dly, 'Tis urged that God acts for an end, that it is true, he has no need of the Creatures, but yet his Goodness induced him to create them, and therefore there was a reason prior to his Will: that it is neither by accident nor without a cause that he produced them, nor was it of necessity, but he was induced to it by Inclination, and his Inclination always leads him to the best. He was not indifferent therefore to create or not create the World, and yet Creation is a free act.

Lastly

Sect. 1. Sub. 4. *Of Moral Evil.*

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VI. Fourthly, If we suppose that there was a reason, and that God was moved by it to produce

If he were moved by the Goodness of things to

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external

create the World, he would be a necessary Agent.

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Lastly that God is infinitely wise, good and powerful, and as his Wisdom shewed him what was best, so his Goodness obliged him to choose, and his Power enabled him to execute his Will: and in as much as infinite Worlds are possible, amongst all these his Wisdom discovered to him which was best, and his Goodness must oblige him to will it.

These are the Objections that seem of greatest force, and I have given them all the Advantage with which I find them proposed. In answer to them I observe 1st, as to what is said of the Understanding of God, that the Ideas of all things possible are in it, 't's plain that all Arguments drawn from the *Manner* of God's Understanding things must be inconclusive, because we are utterly ignorant whether he Understands by *Ideas* or not. 2dly, because our conceiving God to act this way is only taken from our way of acting, which we ascribe to the Deity by *Analogy* and Proportion, as we do our Virtues and Passions, because we have no better way of conceiving the Principles of his acting: which method nevertheless will run us into many Difficulties and Mistakes. But of this I have spoke more fully in the Sermon annex'd.

2dly, the whole strength of the Argument depends on this that God's Understanding represents to him among infinite ways in which things may be done, which is the best, and his Goodness obliges him to what is so. Now if this reasoning hold, and amongst infinite Schemes there is only one best, I do not see how it is possible to avoid making God a necessary Agent. For in a chain of Causes, where every Link is necessarily and infallibly connected, the whole must likewise be necessary. If then there be but one best in Nature, and if God necessarily and infallibly knows that best, and his goodness obliges him necessarily to choose it, I think the Case is plain, all his Actions are link'd and tyed together by a fatal and infallible necessity.

Against this therefore I lay down the following Positions, 1st, That there is no Creature or System of Creatures so good but a better is possible, and consequently there is none absolutely best. There is indeed a best of Beings, viz. God: but there can be no best of Creatures. To prove this, we need only

only

external things, 'tis manifest, that according to this all things will proceed from him necessarily.

For

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only consider that there is an infinite distance between God and his Creatures, and how perfect soever we conceive any Creature or System of Creatures, yet the distance between that and God is not lessen'd, but still continues infinite, and therefore except we can imagine a last in infinity, there neither is nor can be any stop. Hence it follows that the Nature of God and his Omnipotence is such that what ever Number of Creatures he has made he may still make more, and howsoever good or perfect, he may still make better and more perfect. And since in this Case whatever he was pleas'd to create was still infinitely short in goodness and perfection of what he could create, 'tis plain his Understanding cou'd put no limits to his Power, nor direct him whether he should create this System or another, whatever he chose being infinitely short of what he might have done; he cou'd never have pleas'd himself in this method, or determin'd what World he should have made, and consequently there cou'd never have been any World at all. For if only the best determine him, and there be no best, as appears; then 'tis impossible he should ever be determin'd.

This was in effect the Argument made use of in the Book (C. 3. par. 3.) to prove that there was properly Free-will in God, that is a Power to please himself by choosing one thing before another, where the things were perfectly indifferent to him. According to which Principle, if it be allow'd, tho' there be no best in Nature antecedent to the Will of God, yet by choosing one thing before another he will make that best to him, because his own choice will please him best.

But here I must observe that most of this Dispute, and the Embarrassment of Men's Understandings about it seems to proceed from their taking these words, *good*, *better* and *best* for absolute Qualities inherent in the nature of Things, whereas in Truth they are only Relations arising from certain Appetites. They have indeed a foundation, as all Relations have, in something absolute, and denote the thing in which they are founded; but yet they themselves imply nothing more than a Relation of Congruity between some Appetite and its Objects, as appears from hence, that the same Object when applied to an Appetite to which it has a Congruity is good, and *Vice versa*, bad. The Earth and Air to terrestrial Animals are good Elements, and necessary to their Preservation; the Water is bad, which

For he that is determin'd *ab extra* to do any thing, acts by necessity, he is passive, and must necessarily

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which yet affords the best receptacle for Fishes. The nature of the Earth, Air and Water continue the same; and shall God be said to have made something ill, when he made the Water pernicious to Men, the Air to Fishes? And this also shews the natural and unavoidable necessity of Evil in the World, because all Creatures being imperfect and limited, they must likewise have limited and different Appetites, and consequently proper and peculiar Objects suited to their several Appetites; when therefore the Object proper to one Appetite happens to be apply'd to the contrary, It is impossible but it should be incongruous to it, that is Evil. Nor is it possible in a World, where all Things are and must necessarily be in a continual flux, and every Animal changing its Situation as it is in the material World, but such misapplication of Objects to Appetites should happen, and therefore Evils are necessary in it, and either God must have made no such World, or permitted some such Evils in it. There is no way of conceiving how the present World cou'd have been better'd, but either by making more Creatures, or 2dly, more variety, or 3dly, giving the Creatures that are made more and stronger Appetites: for the good and satisfaction of a Creature is always proportionable to the strength of the Appetite, with which it enjoys its Object. But it plainly appears that in any of these three Ways as there may be more good, so there will be more Evil in the World: For Creatures being multiplied, the necessity of clashing of Appetites, and the hazard of Misapplication of Objects will be the greater, and the greater variety, still the greater Danger and Difficulty to avoid disagreeable Objects, and the harder always to find agreeable: as the greater the Crowd, the harder to meet one's Friends: And lastly, the encreasing the Appetites cou'd no ways contribute to the sure discovery of proper Objects; the Disappointment would be the more intolerable, the more vigorous we conceive the Appetite, and the greater number of Appetites, the more liable would they be to continual Disappointment. But to return, As there is no *best* in Nature, or in the Divine Intellect antecedent to the Divine Will, which can be supposed to determine that Will to create one World rather than another: so in the second Place there is no World so good, but infinite Worlds may be conceived possible in all respects as good as it. Good then being

rily both do and suffer, not what he himself, but what the determining Cause has effected in him :
But

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being relative to Appetite that is to be reckon'd the best Creature by us, which has the strongest Appetites and the surest means of satisfying them. And tho' the substance in Creatures is chiefly to be regarded as contributing to their Perfection, yet we have no way of measuring the Perfection of the several Substances but by their Qualities, that is by their Appetites, whereby they become sensible of Good and Evil, and by their Powers, whereby they are able to procure those Objects whence they receive that Sense of things which makes them happy.

'Tis plain therefore that whatever System we suppose in Nature, God might have made another equal to it, his infinite Wisdom and Power being able to make other Creatures equal in every respect to any we know, and to give them equal or stronger Appetites, and as certain or more certain ways of satisfying them. We see in many Cases that very different means will answer the same End. For Example, a certain Number of regular Pyramids will fill a Space, and yet irregular ones will do it as well, if what we take from the one be added to another : and the same thing may be done by Bodies of the most irregular and different Figures in the same manner: and therefore we may very well conceive that the answering of Appetites, which is all the natural Good that is in the World, may as well be obtained in another System as in this, if we suppose that where the Appetites are chang'd, the Objects are also suited to them, and an equal Agreeableness among the Parts of the whole introduced ; and in an infinite Number of possible Worlds I do not see why this may not be done in infinite Ways by infinite Power and Wisdom.

If then it be acknowledged that there might have been infinite other Worlds, or even but one, equal to this in all respects as to goodness, there cou'd be no Obligation in Nature on God to create one rather than the other, and therefore nothing cou'd make one more agreeable to him, that is better, than another but his Choice. We must either own that there cou'd be no such World at all, or that God must for ever deliberate which of the possible Worlds he should choose, or else his Determination must proceed from his own arbitrary choice, and he must be allow'd the Liberty to please himself by choosing.

In short it is easy to see that Men who propose such Schemes wou'd drive all Liberty out of the World, and pin down God

But this Goodness (which is supposed to be in things antecedent to the Divine Election, and to determine

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in all his Actions to a fatal necessity. They allow no Cause but what is necessarily either Agent or Patient, which if it be to allow a God, 'tis such an one as is a mere Machine, and can neither help himself nor his Adorers. 'Tis plain if this were so there could be no such thing as moral Good or Evil in the World, the very Essence and Idea of it is lost, and we should be no more obliged to a God that acts necessarily for the good we receive from him, than we are to the Sun for the benefit of its Light and Heat.

I know 'tis urged that where there is no external motive to determine the Will, there only *Chance* must do it, which is to admit an effect without a Cause. I answer that it is the Nature of a free Agent to be the Cause of its own Actions, without being impell'd by any thing without itself. The choosing a thing gives it the goodness to this Being, and it chooses a thing, not because it was antecedently an Object apt to please it, but because it intends to *make* it so. When it is objected that such an Agent chooses without reason, I answer, itself is the reason to itself of its acting, that is it acts to exercise its Faculties, the exercise of which causes the sense of Pleasure; and where there are several ways of exercising its Faculties and all indifferent, to show the Dominion over its own Actions, that is its Liberty, it takes the way it chooses; nor is it reasonable to expect it should lie idle till it find a Reason why it should act one way rather than another, when in truth there is no such Reason, the Objects being to the Agent absolutely indifferent, and therefore amongst infinite possible Worlds, there was no Reason possible or imaginable to determine God to make this rather than any other beside his Will; he chose it, and therefore it pleases him, and he may destroy it when he will, and that will likewise please him.

If it be ask'd is there then nothing Good or Evil in respect of God? I answer there is, *viz.* the acts of his own Will; they please him, and whilst that Will continues, every thing which crosses it, or tends that way, is Evil or displeasing to him. Thus it is his Will that we should have freedom of choice in many things; and he has set certain limits to our Choice to prevent our hurting ourselves or others by choosing amiss. Therefore it would be contrary to our Nature to take away the use of Free-will from us, and since it is his will to

determine it) is somewhat External, with regard to the Will of God; if therefore that be the Cause which determines the Election, it follows that the act of Election and every thing that depends upon it is necessary.

But if things are good because he has chosen to make them, his whole Work will be free.

VII. But if things be good and agreeable to God for this only reason because he has chosen to make them so, he himself will be at liberty, his whole Work will be free. The World will be produced, not by necessity, but choice; neither will it be impossible to be effected, tho' it be in itself unprofitable to the Deity, for he will have a complacency in his own Choice. And from hence it sufficiently appears of how great Importance it is, that all the Goodness of the Creatures should depend on the Divine Election, and not that upon the Goodness of them, for we see that by this means Fate is destroy'd and Liberty establish'd.

External things are in themselves absolutely indifferent to God, but

VIII. Fifthly, If he expected no advantage, you'll say, from the Objects of his Choice, why should he choose them? Is it not more probable that he should do nothing at all, than busy himself in things that are like to be of no benefit? I answer, he has a complacency in his Choice.

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give us such a Nature, 'tis likewise his will to continue the use of our Freedom: It would likewise be contrary to the Will of God for us to use our Freedom to mischief our selves or others, and therefore we conceive that every one who thus misuses his Freedom incurs the displeasure of God.

But then 'tis plain that in all acts which we conceive pleasing or displeasing to the Deity, we derive the Reason of their being so from the Consideration of their agreeableness or opposition to his Will: and we derive the Knowledge of that will from nothing but the Manifestation God has made of it, either by the Nature that he has been pleased to give the Creatures, or else by Revelation. So that after all we have no measure of Good or Evil, but the Will of God.

I answer, That it is no more trouble to him to will things than not to will them; and hence it comes to pass that when he wills them, they exist; when he retracts that Will, they drop into nothing. Which reason, as it supposes an indifference of things in respect of God, so it asserts his Liberty to produce or not produce them, and proves that that will be agreeable to him which he shall choose. But we have a better yet at hand, *viz.* that God chose to create external things that there might be something for him to delight in without himself. For every one receives Satisfaction from the Exercise of his Powers and Faculties. (53.) Now God

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(53.) This reason is very consistent with what our Author had deliver'd in C. 1. §. 3. par. 9, 10. where he asserted, that the end and intent of God in creating the World, was to exercise his several Attributes, or (which is the same thing) to communicate his Perfections to some other Beings: which Exercise or Communication could proceed from no other Cause beside his own free Choice; and therefore he must be absolutely and physically indifferent to it, in the same respect as Man was shewn to be indifferent towards any Action [a.] only with this disparity, that Man, as a weak imperfect Agent, may easily be imagin'd to will Absurdities or Contradictions, but God cannot be supposed to will or act either inconsistently with his Nature and Perfections, or with any former Volition (as our Author observes in the 12th and following Paragraphs) and consequently cannot be said to be indifferent to such things (as some have misunderstood our Author) any more than he is indifferent towards being what he is. *Leibnitz* urges farther [b.] that it could not be in any sense indifferent to God whether he created external things or not, since his *Goodness* was the Cause (according to our Author himself in the place above cited) which determin'd him to the Creation. But what do we mean by his *Goodness* here? Is it any thing more than an intent to exercise his Attributes, or an Inclination to communicate his Happiness.

[a.] See Note 45, and 49, and *Ode Theol. Nat.* p. 246.

[b.] *Remarques*, p. 473.

God is invested with infinite Power, which he can exercise innumerable Ways, not all at once indeed for

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Happiness or Perfection? And is not this the very Determination or Election we are speaking of? To say then that God is determin'd by his Goodness, is saying that he determines himself; that he does a thing because he is inclined to do it; 'tis assigning his bare Will and Inclination for a Cause of his Action; which is no more than we contend for. Whereas they that would oppose us should assign a Cause for that Will or Inclination itself, and shew a natural necessity for the operation of the Divine Attributes (for a moral one is nothing to the present Question) a strict physical connection between the Existence of certain natural Perfections in the Deity and their Exercise on outward Objects. But if God had no other reason for the creation of any thing beside his own Goodness, he was perfectly free and naturally indifferent, to create or not create that thing; and if he will'd, or was inclin'd to exert his Perfections thus freely, he must be as free and indifferent still in the actual Exercise of them. Nor will it from hence follow, as *Leibnitz* objects, that there is such an absolute Indifference in the Deity as must make him regardless whether the World were well or ill made; Mankind Happy or Miserable, &c. For if the Communication of Happiness be the sole end of his acting whenever he does act he must propose that End, and the Exercise of his several Attributes will lead directly to it. Knowledge, Power and Freedom are *Perfections*, i. e. the Foundation of Happiness to the Being possess'd of them; and therefore when communicated to other Beings they must produce that Happiness, which is founded in and naturally results from them: to suppose the contrary is the same absurdity as to suppose that Knowledge may produce Ignorance, Power, Weakness or Freedom, Necessity. ----- The Communication of these Attributes then, or the Exercise of these Perfections united, will constitute a wise, good and holy Providence pursuing a good end by fit and proper Means. All which is included (as our Author says) in the very *first Act* of the Deity, or rather in his Will to act at all, and to suppose him to will or act in any respect contrary to this, is supposing him to will and act against his own Nature, and in contradiction to himself; or, which is the same, imagining an Effect to be quite different from, or contrary to its Cause. The Moral Perfections of the Deity are therefore immediate consequences, or rather the genuine Exercise,

(for all are not consistent with each other) but such as are consistent are for the most part indifferent

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Exercise, of his natural ones. And thus, I think, it may be shewn how all the Actions of the Deity must certainly be Good, Wise, &c. without recurring to any such *Fitnesses* or *Relations* of things as are by some unaccountably supposed to be antecedent and absolutely necessary to the determination of the Will of God himself.

But don't we, when we speak of God's choosing fit and proper means, evidently suppose that some things are in themselves good and eligible, and *vice versa*, even before any determination of the Deity about them? Where is the room for Wisdom and Preference in God, if all things be alike and indifferent to him? I answer, first, If by things being in themselves Evil, &c. be only meant, that some particular ways of acting may be conceiv'd, which would, if the Deity could be supposed to will them, be necessarily and essentially opposite, and have a tendency directly contrary to his present method of acting: we grant that some such things may be imagin'd, but then it will be an absurd and impossible supposition that God should ever will them; as he has already will'd the contrary; and therefore, in regard to him, they must still be only imaginary. Nay, they would be so far from being independent of, or antecedent to the Will of God in any sense, that the very Essence and Idea of them would proceed entirely from, and pre-suppose its Determination; since we can only conceive any Relations or Consequences of things to be Good or Evil, so far as they are consistent with, or contrary to the present System pre-establish'd by the Will of God. I answer in the second place, that the primary Intent of the Creator being, as was shewn above, to communicate his Perfections to various Creatures (to which communication he was nevertheless absolutely free and indifferent, and therefore could be determin'd to it by no external Cause) while that Intent continues, the necessary consequence of it is, that Creatures be so made and constituted as to attain that End, and endow'd with such Powers as will make them resemble him as much as possible in their several States and Orders. All this is only prosecuting the same Volition, or continuing to communicate *himself*; and what we mean by choosing *fit and proper means* for this, is only, that he is not a blind and unintelligent Agent, but conscious of his own Nature and Operations, and therefore able to act in

rent, nor is there any reason why he should prefer one before another ††, it must therefore be his own

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a certain *determinate manner*. Now such determinate Action must produce a regular System, the several Parts whereof will be related to and connected with each other, and by a mutual dependency render'd subservient to the Good and Perfection of the whole. Tho' this whole System might at first perhaps be indifferent to the Agent in regard to several other Systems equally possible, and which might have been made equally perfect in its stead [c.] It is not then as *Leibnitz* argues [d.] the natural and necessary goodness of some particular things represented by the Divine Ideas which determines God to prefer them to all others, if understood of his first act of producing them; but 'tis his own free arbitrary Choice which, among many equal possibilities, makes some things *actually good*, and determines them into Existence. When these are once supposed to exist, every thing or action becomes *good* which tends to their Happiness and Preservation. Hence also in respect to us certain consequences and relations arise, which, by the very frame of our Nature and Constitution, we are directed to approve, and obliged to pursue, if we expect to be happy. And thus all *moral Obligation* is ultimately referr'd to the Will of God, which seems to be the only sure and adequate foundation of it, and from which I think it may be deduced with much more clearness and consistency than from that *Hypothetical Necessity* of the Relations of things, which evidently pre-supposes, as was observ'd before, and is itself only founded on the Will of God [e.]

Give me leave to add here, that their Argument seems to be of very little force against our Author, who urge, that if all Good and Evil depending upon the *Arbitrary Will* of God, then it would not be impossible for God to will that Vice be Virtue, that two and two make five, &c. For allowing that God at first made all things what they are, and still continues to them the same Existence, (tho' perhaps no reason *a priori* can

†† Instances of this Indifference may be seen in our Author's Note E, and the 5th precedent Paragraph.

[c.] See Note 2.

[d.] *Remarques*, p. 447.

[e.] See *Preliminary Dissertation*, and R. i. or Puffendorf of the Law of Nature and Nations; B. 1. C. 1. §. 4. Note 7. and B. 2. C. 3. §. 20.

own Choice which makes one more agreeable than another; nor is it otherwise conceivable how a

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can be assign'd why he made them at all or in this rather than some other manner) Vice, must be Vice, &c. that is, while things are as they are, the same Consequences and Relations will result from them; and to suppose the contrary, is to suppose that things may be different, or have different consequences, while they continue the same; or that they may be what they are and what they are not at the same time. Thus all the present *Relations* are evidently *subsequent* to the present Order of Nature, and must continue with it; and this consequential Necessity is all the *Fitness* that I know of.

To stile this *Eternal* and *Immutable* can therefore only mean thus much, *viz.* suppose things to be at any time what they now are, and at the sametime the very same consequences would flow from them which we now find. Suppose a Set of Beings constituted like ourselves, and framed with the like Capacities for Happiness, and the same relative Duties must be incumbent on them in order to attain that Happiness. If they be imperfect dependent Creatures, and perpetually standing in need of each others assistance; if also they have such Passions, Instincts and Inclinations as tend to unite them to each other, and oblige them to act in concert: if they be thus framed, I say, they will of consequence be thus related, and subject to all the moral Obligations Which we now are. But still this necessity is only Hypothetical, and like the necessity of any certain Consequence resulting from certain Premises; which Premises being alter'd, a different, a quite contrary one will be equally necessary. Thus in the former Instance, if any rational Creatures be constituted social Beings, they will indeed be obliged to act as such; but let some be made independent of each other, and unsociable, endowed with, or so made as necessarily to *acquire*, Passions, Instincts and Inclinations quite opposite to the former, and their Duties will be quite the reverse. The great Virtue of *Selfishness* will then occupy the place of *Universal Benevolence*, and that Method of Life perhaps produce the greatest Sum of Happiness to each individual, and consequently be the most eligible to every one, which has now the direct contrary Effect. If such a supposition be conceivable, 'tis sufficient to shew that these Relations are not *absolutely necessary in themselves*, but

thing that is in itself indifferent to the Elector, should prove more pleasing than any thing else.

IX. Neither

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but only conditionally and consequentially to the present Order of the Creation. [f]

Upon a farther enquiry into the Doctrine of *abstract Finesses* and *eternal Reasons* of things, I find a great many Persons very much perplex'd about them, who cannot apprehend but that they must necessarily determine the Deity in all Cases, as well as absolutely oblige Mankind, nay are the only ground of moral Obligation. I shall therefore endeavour to explain myself more fully on this Subject, which appears to me in the following Light.

From all Eternity God had in his Mind the Ideas of all things, which cou'd possibly exist either separately or all together. He saw that several Systems of Beings might be created, the result of which wou'd be several Kinds and Degrees of Happiness or Misery to these Beings (tho' 'tis impossible to suppose any absolutely highest degree, since that would be a Limitation of infinite Power.) As these various possible Systems were at once present to his view, he saw the several *Relations*, which the Beings in them wou'd have to each other, or to themselves in different Circumstances, supposing them to be form'd in any given manner; he knew also how to suit the Condition of these Beings to their Relations, so as to produce a certain sum of Happiness or Misery from the Composition. If we enquire whether of these two kinds of Creatures he shall choose, we can find no natural necessity to determine him, since he is absolutely independent and completely happy in himself without any Creation at all, nor can his Happiness be increas'd or impair'd by the Happiness or Misery of his Creatures. We must therefore have recourse to his own free Pleasure, directed by his other Attributes for the only cause, ground, or reason of his Works. If he be a benevolent Being, and have perfect Knowledge and Power, he will frame the World in such a manner and suit every Circumstance to each Condition so as to produce universal Good; if malevolent, the contrary.

But from a view of the present System we find that Happiness, Beauty, Order are prepollent, and that no good has been omitted

[f] See *Puffendorf*, B. 1. C. 2. §. 6. and the Note 2. p. 20. or B. 2. C. 3. §. 4. 5. and the Notes 2. R. See also Dr. *Falton's* Preface to his *L. Moyer's* Lecture, p. 18. and p. 34. — 51, 52.

IX. Neither ought we to enquire for any reason of the Election, *i. e.* why he chooses this rather than

And determines himself to Action.

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omitted, which cou'd have been bestow'd consistent with the Happiness of the the whole. Hence we gather that he must be absolutely good, or that he will act upon such Reasons, and produce Beings which have such Relations to each other, that the result of all shall be Happiness in the main. These Reasons and Relations we call good, which have this beneficial tendency to the whole System, and what we mean by his being determin'd by them, is that his Goodness always inclines him to promote the Happiness of his Creatures, and his Knowledge represents to him the most proper means of effecting it. Why he is good, or inclined to act in this manner, we know not, any more than why he is intelligent, nor do we think a reason *a priori* can be given, or ought to be expected for either of these Attributes.

But thus much seems evident, that unless he was previously so inclined, a prospect of these Reasons and Relations could never determine him, since, as was observ'd above, he is absolutely independent, and incapable of being affected by them; all the Goodness which results from them can be no good or benefit to him, and consequently he cannot be obliged to pursue them by any other necessity than a *Moral* or *Hypothetical* one, *i. e.* one that is founded on the previous supposition of what we call his *Goodness*. It is their being agreeable to this Divine Attribute, or rather the ways in which it is exerted, their being the most proper means to the best end, or productive of the greatest universal Happiness, which denominates them *fit right*, &c. and what we must either mean by these Words, or we can, I think, have no distinct Ideas to them.

Thus much concerning these Relations with regard to the Deity. But tho' we may not comprehend the Nature of a self-existent Being, or the manner of his acting, nor see in what sense he is determin'd, obliged, or under a necessity to act agreeably to all such *Relations* as a System of things will have to one another's Happiness (nor indeed is it of any use, nor can it have any meaning, farther than knowing that he is permanently good) yet with respect to their constituting a *Law of Nature*, and our deducing *moral* Obligation from them, I think the Case is very clear. As we are made sensible Beings, or capable of Happiness and Misery, nothing can be a Law to our Nature but what produces the one and prevents the other; and

than that; for upon supposition that there is a reason the indifference would be destroy'd, and the Election

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and as we are endow'd with freedom of Will we can never be under any other sort of *Obligation*. To find out the tendency of things to this great End, is the Province of *Reason*, and all that we can mean by terming one thing more *reasonable* than another is its superior tendency to *Happiness* on the whole, which is, and ought to be, the ultimate end of all truly rational dependent Beings.

Can *Man*, for Instance, have any reason to pursue that which does not at all relate to him? and does any thing relate to him or concern him, which has no Relation to his Happiness? As therefore we have our Happiness to seek in a great Measure from without, and have no innate Instinct or implanted Appetite, to direct us in the search; no truly natural Passion or Affection in which it consists (as may be easily gather'd from Mr. *Locke's* excellent History of the human Mind) it will be the part of pure Reason to discover the means of obtaining it, and these means will be the doing such Actions, and acquiring such Habits of mind as are suitable to our dependent State, i.e. such as tend to oblige all those other rational Beings on whom we are dependent, such as engage the good Will and Affections of all those who have it in their power to promote or impede our Happiness, and more especially that Being on whom we depend absolutely, and who is able to make us happy or miserable to all Eternity. And as the only means of engaging the good will of all our fellow Creatures with whom we are or may be concern'd, is the manifesting a Disposition to promote their Happiness; which is at the same time complying with the Will of our Creator, who intends nothing but the common good of us all, and requires that we shou'd co-operate with him by our joint endeavours to promote it: so 'tis evident that all such Actions and Dispositions of Mind as have this tendency and direction are Duties to us, the Discharge of which will either be attended with Happiness by natural Consequence in this Life, or by the positive Reward of God in another. — From this sense of the Reason or Relation of things (which as was observ'd before, is all that can give them any Relation to us, or afford any Reason for our observing them) we may easily deduce a compleat Scheme of Duty which must be *always* obligatory; and will appear so to all Beings of the like Nature with ourselves. This if we please may be term'd absolutely *fit*, *right*

Election would not be free. For if we suppose that there is such a thing as better and worse in
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right and reasonable; provided that we keep the true Reason and End of all in view, *viz.* our own *Happiness*; and do it in *Obedience* to the *Deity*, who alone can secure this main End to us, and who can only be engaged to this by our performing every thing on his Account. If on the other hand we follow *Virtue* for its own sake, its native Beauty or intrinsic Goodness, we lose the true Idea of it, we mistake the means for the End; and tho' we may indeed *qualifie* ourselves for an extraordinary Reward from God for such a state of Mind, yet we do really nothing to *entitle* ourselves to it; if we attain the good Effects of every *Virtue* in this Life, we *have our Reward*; if we do not, what claim have we to any amends from God, whom we have never thought of in it, and consequently whose *Servants* we cannot be said to be? The only Principle which can in Reason recommend us to his Favour, must be the *doing all things to his Glory*, in Obedience to his Will, or in order to please him. Obedience to God is the *Principle*, the good of Mankind the *Matter*, our own Happiness the *End*, of all that is properly term'd *Moral Virtue*.

Since the Conclusion of this I have met with a Pamphlet entitled *Calumny no Conviction, &c.* which contains some Arguments against our Author's Doctrine, and also does me the honour to take notice of what I had advanced in favour of it. Tho' I cannot but think most of this celebrated Writer's Remarks already obviated in the Additional Part of the foregoing Note, and those of our Author, yet I will incur the Censure of being tedious rather than wholly omit them. He begins with an Exception against the Fourth Paragraph; the Design of which was to shew that God was perfectly *free* in creating the World, and cou'd not be determin'd by any thing external. First, Because he could receive no benefit from any thing without him. 2dly, Because he cou'd have no Reason to prefer one thing to another in every respect equal, as the Author explains himself in the following Paragraph.

He concludes that when things are made they must be made in conformity to the Divine Nature; but as there are several possible ways of making them, in which there will be the same conformity, nothing cou'd render one way more agreeable to the Deity than another, but his free Choice; this Agreeableness therefore of any one before another is not *antecedent*.

the Objects themselves, who would affirm that the Goodness and Wisdom of God will not necessarily determine

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dent, but *consequent* to such free Choice. In support of this Notion I asserted that notwithstanding this twofold Indifference, *viz.* both to acting in general or not acting, and to any particular manner of acting among equals, yet still it might be shewn that whenever he does act all his Works will be *wise, good, &c.* The Reason given for it was to this purpose, *viz.* that the sole End of his acting being to communicate his Happiness, and every one of his Perfections being naturally productive of Happiness, it follows that he is both willing and able to produce it, and consequently must produce it whenever he produces any thing. Now the voluntary communication or production of Happiness seems to comprehend all moral *Goodness, &c.* but this voluntary Communication is nothing more than the exercise of his natural Perfections as above; it follows that the Exercise of his natural Perfections must constitute the *Moral ones*, or that these Moral Qualities in God which we stile Good, Wise, Just, &c. are only Consequences of the Exertion of his several natural Perfections of Knowledge, Power, Freedom, in pursuance of the abovementioned End.

This brief state of the Question may be in a good measure sufficient to direct the Reader in forming a Judgment of what this Writer has objected. First, He says, *the Archbishop ought to have concluded that the Congruity of Things to the Rectitude or Perfection of the Divine Nature was the Ground (and not the mere Will of God) of their being good or Perfect in their kind, viz. by this resemblance of them to it, p. 73.* Answer, 'Tis allow'd that where one way of acting is more congruous to the Divine Nature than another, that congruity is a sufficient Reason for its being preferr'd by the Deity, but that Reason will never hold where many ways are equally congruous, which is the Case the Archbishop argues upon; in which Case there is no room for any thing but mere Will to determine, and in which Case alone the Will of God is consider'd separately from his other Attributes. Wherever the nature of the thing allows superior Wisdom and Goodness, there the Archbishop supposes the Divine Will to be always accompanied with them, as he has told us twice in his third Paragraph. I should be glad to know the precise meaning of the Words *Rectitude* and *Perfection*, which this Author makes the Ground of the Divine Acts; if they signify no more than *Goodness*, as I think they hardly can if they

determine him to choose the better? For who can honestly postpone the better and prefer the worse?

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are to be rank'd among his moral Qualities; they coincide with our Notion of mere Will, since we can never show why he is good, or assign a Cause for that particular Determination of his Will, which we stile Goodness, as was observ'd in the beginning of this Note. If they include only his natural Perfections, and imply that *all sufficiency* which results from the Union of them, I fear there will be no more connection between this and *moral* Perfection, than between that and free Choice, p. 75. *i. e.* no Reason can be given why an all sufficient Being should communicate his Happiness rather than not, (except we knew more fully wherein that Happiness consists,) or immediate connection shewn between the Existence of perfect Knowledge and Power in God, and their being exerted in the Production of any thing without him. But when such a Being is determin'd to make any thing, it is reasonable to suppose that he will make it like himself rather than the contrary; that one perfectly happy will communicate his Happiness rather than produce Misery, as was said above.

This is all the account that I can give of the Moral Perfections of the Deity, or why he should propose that end in all his Works, which we attribute to him when we stile him Good. But this goes no farther than probability: and I should be obliged to this Author for a strict Proof of the moral Attributes of God from any property in the Divine Nature, which is itself previously demonstrable. To return, 'Tis not therefore the bare exercise of his *Knowledge* and *Power* which by *necessity* (*i. e.* a *Physical* one) constitutes his Moral Qualities; but the voluntary Exercise of them (or the disposition to exercise them) in pursuance of this *End*, which must necessarily (meaning a *Moral* Necessity, or supposing this *End*) include all moral Perfection, tho' there be several ways that equally lead to it. In this sense only, and with this restriction, I wou'd be understood whenever I assert that perfect Knowledge and Power can produce nothing but what is wise and just; tho' it may not have been always mention'd.

This I apprehend to be far from subverting the ground of Morality, or making it ever equally agreeable to the Deity to have acted for no End at all, or for a bad one, p. 76. since it supposes that he was always determin'd to pursue the very best End, and by the best means; (wherever there was room for bet-

As then in indifferent Matters there can be no reason why one is chosen before another, so there is

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ter and worse) tho' *why* he was so determin'd I cannot pretend to shew; and in what sense this was *better* and *fitter* for him [g.] who cou'd receive no addition of Happiness from it, I must confess I do not understand. I think the Archbishop was not so weak as to be deceiv'd by that *erroneous Inference* which this Author charges him with, p. 77. *viz. that God's Will cou'd not be determin'd by the greater good in Objects, because these Objects were not actually produc'd* — but rather argued from the equality and indifference in Objects, which must appear to the Divine Mind before his determining to create them (as he shews in his Note 2.) that his Will could not be determin'd by them to produce one System rather than another: which is the best proof of his perfect Liberty in producing them, to establish which was the Design of the Archbishop in this place. I readily own that God who sees all Possibilities must have a previous Representation of things in his Mind, which things therefore are hypothetically antecedent to the determination of his Will. To assert thus much is only saying that he knew what he was about when he made the World, which none I hope will doubt: But this Representation will never come up to what is affirm'd of these *Relations* absolutely, and at all times, determining him to one particular, except there always were one absolutely best, which I think deserves to be a little consider'd. That he should produce Happiness in general rather than Misery, seems to me very agreeable to his Nature, who is perfectly Happy; but what particular sort or degree of it he shall choose, is perhaps not very easily determin'd, except by such as will with *Leibnitz* deny any perfect equality or indifference in nature, and imagine they can always find a *best*, to whom I would recommend our Author's Note above mention'd.

By this time 'tis hoped, I have explain'd myself sufficiently, I shall dispatch the rest of the *Appendix* in as few Words as possible.

From what has been said it appears that I don't maintain that the Moral Attributes of God proceed from the *mere* exercise of his natural ones, without any *end* or aim, much less that these were exerted necessarily; as this Author seems to understand me, p. 78. but only that the *voluntary* Communication of the Divine Happiness by the free exercise of every such Perfection

is no need of any : for since the Divine Will is self-active, and must necessarily be determin'd to

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fection as is productive of it, will constitute all those which we call moral Attributes: a voluntary, designed Production of Happiness or Misery being all that to me seems requisite to make any action *Moral* in God or Man. And that an absolutely powerful, intelligent, free and happy Being, intending to communicate some degree of these Perfections, needs no other *Objective Rule* than what is contain'd in these Perfections themselves; that so long as he is pleased to exercise them in pursuance of this general intent, he can never do amiss or go wrong in the exercise of them, tho' there be ten thousand equal ways of exercising them, and consequently no objective Rule to direct which he shall actually choose: Because perfect Knowledge, Power and Happiness *can never produce any thing in the main repugnant to Knowledge, Power and Happiness*, i. e. to themselves.

To this purpose [b.] was the foregoing Observation made, which I find to be much the same with that of Dr. Clarke, *Demonstr. Prop. 12 Par. 1.* how confusedly soever it might be express'd. I meant therefore *Power and Knowledge exercised voluntarily in congruity to the Rectitude of the Divine Nature*, p. 79. in one sense of these Words, i. e. in conformity to his general intent of communicating *Happiness* (and it that be all the meaning of *Rectitude*, I readily admit it) but not in so large a sense as to make the present method of communicating it, the only right, fit, and reasonable one, and immutably preferable to all other Methods conceivable; since many others may be supposed, any of which would have led to the same End, and as such been equally agreeable to the Deity if he had chosen it. This Author seems afraid of our placing the *Obligation* to Virtue on the mere Will of God; as if his Will were separated from his other Attributes: which would indeed of itself be no ground of Obligation at all, since upon such a blind Principle we could never be secure of Happiness from any Being how faithfully soever we obey'd him, or how much soever we resembled him in Perfection. This Notion therefore of mere arbitrary Will we must exclude from both our Schemes of Morality in every case but that of *indifference* so often mentioned above.

I grant

one of the indifferent things, it is its own reason of Action, and determines itself freely. Nay so great is the Power of God, that whatever he shall choose out of infinite Possibilities, that will be the best, it matters not therefore which he prefers.

The difficulty of conceiving how a power can determine itself to action ought not to hinder our assent to the truth of the proposition.

X. Sixthly, But you urge that you are still unsatisfy'd how a Power can *determine itself*; i. e. you are ignorant of the *Modus*; but a thing must not be deny'd because we do not know the manner how it is done, we are entirely ignorant how the Rays of the Sun produce the Idea of Light in the Mind by moving the optic Nerves; nor is it better understood how the Members of the Body can be moved by a Thought of the Mind, and at the Direction

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I grant *the natural Consequence of Virtue is Happiness* p. 81. (at least would be so, if universally practis'd) and as such it carries a partial Obligation in itself, or is so far its own Reward; but what will become of the Obligation (according to my sense of that Word) when this Consequence does not follow? As this Author very reasonably grants it *cannot* in the present state, p. 82. To deduce one from the prospect of Reward in a future state (tho' I think the certainty of it equal on either of the two Schemes) is having recourse to the *Will* of God to supply defects and compleat the Obligation, instead of founding it on these *Relations as such, as absolutely fit and right*, and to be follow'd for *their own sakes* without regard to any further End. 'Tis owning that the Obligation suppos'd to arise from them is not in itself adequate and indispensable, and seems to be quite giving up that *full obligatory Power* of theirs antecedent to any Reward or Punishment annex'd either by natural consequence or positive Appointment to the Observance or neglect of them [i.] which the Authors of that Language have so eagerly contended for, and to oppose the ill Consequences of which is the only Design of all that has been advanc'd on this Head. If any Mistakes appear in it (as probably there may) I shall be oblig'd to this judicious Author for pointing them out and promise freely to give up them or any others in the Book as soon as ever I can be made sensible of them.

[i.] Evidences of Nat. and Rev. Rel. p. 218. 5th Edition.

Direction of the Will. Yet no body denies these things, because he knows not the manner in which they are perform'd. If therefore it be manifest that the Divine Will does determine itself, we shall not trouble ourselves much in enquiring how it can be.

XI. But to confess the truth, 'tis no less difficult to conceive a thing to be moved or determined by another than by itself; but as we are accusom'd to material Agents, all which are passive in their Operations, we are certain of the Fact, and not at all solicitous about the manner of it: whereas if we consider the thing thoroughly, we shall find ourselves as far from apprehending how Motion is communicated from one Body to another, as how the Will can move itself: but there seems to be nothing wonderful in the one, because it is observ'd to happen at all times, and in every Action, whereas the other is look'd upon as incredible, since it is seldom perform'd, viz. by the Will alone. And tho' both Reason and Experience prove that it is done, yet we suspect ourselves to be impos'd upon, because we know not the manner of it. The ground of the mistake is this, that since the Will is the only active Power which we are acquainted with, the rest being all passive, we are not easily induced to believe it to be really such, but form our Judgment of it from a Comparison with other Agents, which since they don't move but as they are moved, we require a Mover also in the Will of God: which is very absurd; since it is evident that if there were no active Power in Nature, there could not be a passive one; and if nothing could move without a Mover, there would have been no Motion or Action.

'Tis as difficult to conceive how a thing can be moved by another, as by itself: we are prejudiced by being accustomed to material, i. e. passive Agents.

* See Note 43.

tion at all †. For we cannot conceive how it should begin. Now it is much harder to conceive how Motion can be without a Beginning, than how an Agent can move itself. Since then here are Difficulties on both Sides, neither ought to be deny'd because the manner of it is above human Understanding.

What is said about Indifference, with respect to the Will of God, takes place in his primary Elections.

XII. It is to be observ'd, that what we have said concerning this Indifference of things in regard to the Divine Will, takes place chiefly in those Elections which we apprehend to be the *Primary*, but not always in the subsequent ones. For supposing God to will any thing, while that Election continues, he cannot reject either the same or any thing necessarily connected with it, for that would be to contradict himself. In order to apprehend my Meaning the better, we must remember that the Divine Power can effect innumerable things equal in Nature and Perfections. For instance, we may conceive numberless Men equal to one another in all respects; and also numberless Species of rational Beings equally perfect: nothing but the Will of God could determine which of these he should create first. But when it was determin'd to create Man such as he now is, *i. e.* with the Faculties, Appetites and integral Parts which he consists of at present, it is impossible that God should will or choose any thing repugnant to human Nature, while that Election continues.

God may have all things at once in his view

which are connected with the thing chosen, and either will or refuse them by one simple Act.

† See Dr Clarke's *Demonstrat. of the D. Attributes*, p. 82, 87, &c. or S. Fancourt's *Essay concerning Liberty*, &c. p. 28, 29, or Note 43.

he must also necessarily have under his Eye, as it were at the same Glance, all those things that are necessarily connected with it, or consequent thereupon to all Eternity; and must will or reject them all by one simple Act. If therefore he determin'd to create Man, he must also be supposed to will that he should consist of a Soul and Body, that he should be furnish'd with Reason and Senses, and that his Body should be subject to the general Laws of Matter: for all these things are evidently included in the Choice to create Man.

XIV. Nay this primary Act of Volition must be supposed to contain not only those things which have a necessary connection with what is chosen, but such things also as tend to promote its benefit and happiness, as far as they can be made consistent with the benefit of the whole. For since God is infinitely Good, 'tis certain that he wills that his Creatures should exist commodiously as much as that they should exist at all. He therefore will'd such things as are agreeable to the Natures, and tend to preserve the Constitutions of his Creatures in the same Election whereby he determin'd to create them.

XV. We have said before, that there is a double Goodness in things, the first and principal is that which renders them well-pleasing to God, as they are conformable to his Will: the other is that whereby they agree with one another, whereby they afford each other mutual Assistance, whereby they promote the Convenience, Preservation and Perfection of the whole: but both these proceed from the Choice and Will of God. For when the Deity had once determin'd to please himself in the Creation and Preservation of the World, he must be supposed at the same time to have willed all such things as contribute to the Benefit

As he is of infinite Goodness; he also wills the good of all things which he has determin'd to create, as far as possible.

When the World therefore is once made, it is impossible that those things should please him which tend to the confusion, &c. of his Work.

Benefit and Perfection of his Work, otherwise he would have contradicted himself, and thereby been the Cause of frustrating his own Election. For he is now supposed to have chosen that there should be a World, that it should continue as long as he himself had determin'd, that every Being should attain the End assign'd to it, and all things act according to the Nature he had given them, and conspire together to preserve and perfect the whole. It is impossible therefore that he should will the reverse of all this, or that such things should please him as tend to the confusion, mutilation, or detriment of his Work. For 'tis impossible to conceive that he should choose the Existence of things, and yet refuse the Means necessary thereto.

When Man is made of such a nature as requires him to be just, sober, &c. God is not at Liberty not to will these things.

XVI. When therefore Man was made what he is, by that very Act of constituting him of such a Nature and Condition, 'tis plain, that God also willed that he should be pious, sober, just and chaste. (R.) These and the like Laws of Nature then

NOTES.

(R.) Against this 'tis objected, First, That it makes God require those Virtues from Men, not because they are morally good, but because of the Advantages which they bring by preventing such things as may trouble civil Society or hurt a Man's self. To this I answer that the Author has shew'd in his Book that Moral Evil is founded on Natural, and that in the state of Nature before Revelation Men had no way to know what free acts were good or pleasing to God, but by observing what was advantageous to particular Men, or to Society. Observe all the Laws of Nature, and you will find them discover'd and proved from this sole Principle. As is manifest from all the Books that treat of them. To pretend therefore that the natural Mischiefs arising from Vice do not prove them to be morally Evil, is an uncommon way of thinking; since the very Argument whereby we prove them morally Evil is because they are pernicious.

But

then are immutable, viz. conformable to the Will of God, and contain'd in the very first Act of Election

NOTES.

But 2dly, From hence, say some, it follows that the Turpitude of Vices is not to be estimated from their own Nature, but from the Evils which attend them: as if effects did not flow from their Cause, and those things which lead us into such Evils as might have been avoided by abstaining from them were not properly Evil; or that we ought to judge of the nature of any thing otherwise then from the Properties and operations that necessarily attend it.

As to the *Turpitude* of things, we give that Appellation to such as seem contrary to the Dignity and Honour of a rational Nature, which cannot be seen or heard without some nauseous abhorrence and reluctance of the Senses.

We attribute it to Vices by a kind of *Analogy*, since they proceed from such Principles as are unworthy of human Nature, as lessen the value and esteem of him who has imbibed them, and make him as it were unclean and sordid, and the aversion of all good and modest Persons.

But such Turpitude as this does not arise from the Nature of the Things themselves, but from some sordid Qualities that adhere to them and offend the Senses. In like manner the Turpitude of Vices does not arise from the simple Nature of Actions, but from some adventitious Circumstances, which bring Evil on them, and as they are undue and heterogeneous, they as it were defile those Actions to which they adhere.

'Tis to be observ'd farther, that God can dispense with some Actions which seem contrary to the Law of Nature, but not with others.

For Instance, he commands *Abraham* to kill his innocent Son, who prepares to obey, and if he had executed the Divine Command he had done nothing amiss. And yet it seems contrary to the Law of Nature for a Father to kill his innocent Son. But as God is the Giver and Lord of Life, Reason tells us, that he may take it away by whom he pleases.

But no Man in his Wits can believe that God may require any reasonable Creature to hate him or disobey his Commands, to be rebellious or perjur'd, or that any one should take these for Duties owing to God, tho' an Angel from Heaven should declare them to be so. What is the Reason therefore why God commanded the 1st of these, and the Father of the Faithful was obedient; when we believe that neither God can command the latter,

Election wherein he determin'd to create Man.
Nor is God at liberty not to will these during his
purpose

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latter, nor we be obliged to pay Obedience to any who shall pretend such a Command?

I think no other account is to be given of this difference than that the slaying a Son is of such a Nature as may be separated from all those Evil Consequences that attend wilful Murder, whereas Hatred of God, &c. are such as cannot; But naturally and necessarily lead those who are guilty of them into Natural Evils, and are prejudicial both to the Authors themselves and others: They undermine the Principles of all Goodness, and dissolve the Union between God and human Society, which from the very Nature he has given Mankind is necessary to human Happiness: nor need we mention other Natural Evils, which would flow as certainly from the Allowance or Commission of the like Crimes by natural Consequence.

But 3dly, 'tis urg'd that this is to confound natural and moral Evils, which all Divines have hitherto distinguish'd. Answ. If the Objector had but observed the Distinction which the Author gives of Moral Evil, Chap. 5. Introduction; he might have found a full Answer to this Objection. There he might see that all Evil is inconveniency, but that some inconveniencies arise from the series of natural Causes without our Consent and sometimes our Knowledge: these we call natural Evils; but others happen from the abuse of Elections, when an undue Choice occasions them, and in this case besides the Natural Evil that arises from them, there is likewise an Obligation on the Person that makes the Choice to answer for the hurt he has done by it. Now these Choices that bring inconveniencies, are called moral Evils, and the difference between natural and moral Evil is not but that they both bring inconveniencies, and hurt ourselves or others (for therein consists the nature of their Evil) but that the ill Effects of the one proceed from the Choice, those of the other from natural Causes, and hence the Author of that Choice is answerable for the one, but no body for the other. Moral Evil therefore is Natural Evil with Choice superadded.

But 4thly, It is alledged that Moral Evil is predominant in the World, and yet the Work of God is not disturb'd by it; Vice has quite overwhelm'd Mankind, and yet they still subsist; which shews that God may very well command Men to be impious, debauch'd, unjust, &c. without destroying the World.

and

purpose to continue Man such as he is : For by this means the same thing would please him, as

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being

NOTES.

and therefore the Author ought to hold that God is free as to his second Elections as well as to the first.

If this Objection prove any thing it proves that before Revelation what we now call vices were not so, since at that time there was no way to distinguish vicious from virtuous Actions, but by observing which hurt or help'd Mankind, one of which Nature taught them to cultivate, and to avoid the other. But if the Actions we call vicious (such as murder, lust, injustice, contempt of God and Irreligion) did no hurt, there was no reason Men should be debarr'd from them or God be imagin'd to forbid them, before he declar'd his Will to that purpose. But 2dly, it is a plain case that these and all other wicked and irreligious Actions do mischief to mankind, and have a destructive influence according to their number, and if all Men should give themselves up to them without restraint, Mankind could not subsist. If self-murder were universal, there were an end of human race : If none would take care of Children, one Age would put a period to the Species. If all were false, treacherous and cruel, Life would be short and comfortless ; if there were no amity, society and justice, it would have the same Effect. If Lust and unnatural Mixtures were practis'd as oft as Opportunity offer'd ; if drunkenness, intemperance and excess were indulg'd to the utmost, most would starve, and the rest live a short and uneasy Life. This plainly shews that these Vices are contrary to the Nature of Mankind, and therefore God who gave that Nature has clearly enough signified that they are contrary to his Will. It must be confess'd indeed that there is much vice and wickedness in the World, and it is proportionably miserable ; but yet take the Actions of the worst of Men, and you will find ten innocent, for one that is criminal or mischievous. For the truth of this I appeal to common Experience. Let any reckon the Acts of any one Man from Morning to Night, and he will find the Proportion hold ; and this is much more observable if we take the whole Life of a Man together, the proportion of innocent acts to the vicious will appear much greater ; Childhood and old Age being much freer from mischievous acts than the middle part of Life.

But

being agreeable to his first Choice of creating Man, which is supposed to stand yet, and displease him, as being repugnant to another, which rejects the very same things that are contain'd in the first ; that is, he would at the same time will and not will the same thing, which cannot be attributed to God.

This is no
bar to the
Divine
Liberty.

XVII. Yet he is never the less free, because he cannot will that a Man be perjur'd, a Murtherer, &c. for he is no otherwise determin'd than by his own Choice ; nor does a thing please or displease him on any other account than because it is agreeable or contrary to his Will. For while that Election of the Deity which constitutes me a Man, (*i. e.* an Animal that is obliged to be pious, just and sober) remains, 'tis impossible that he should will me to be perjur'd, or a Murtherer ; nor can the latter Choice take place in God so long as the former stands, since it is repugnant to the former. When therefore we acknowledge that things are good, and assert that some Actions are grateful to God, and others odious ; this is not because we believe the Divine Elections to be determined by

NOTES.

But lastly, It is urg'd that if these things be contrary to the Will of God, he ought not only to have forbid them, but taken effectual Care that they should not be practis'd.

I answer, God has taken effectual Care to preserve Men from these in such a Degree, that our Lives are secured as far as is expedient for the good of the whole. The Frame of our Natures is such, and the Laws of God have so great Effect upon us, that as I have already shew'd, a thousand acts of Justice, Temperance, Truth, Charity and Piety are done for one of the contrary Vices. 'Tis the practise of these Virtues that supports the World, and tho' many Vices are permitted, yet, as shall be shewn in due time, there is none that could be prevented even by Omnipotence without greater Inconvenience.

by them, but because we suppose them to be comprehended in the very first Act of his Will of creating things, and to be pleasing or displeasing to him so far as they are agreeable or opposite to that Election. Nor does this destroy the Liberty of God, that he must necessarily will these while he does will them: For every thing, while it is, necessarily is; but this Necessity is consequent upon, and not antecedent to the Divine Will. The Divine Election therefore is not determined by the Goodness of things, but the Goodness and Fitness of them arises from that Election, and that is best for them which is most agreeable to that Choice of the Deity whereby he will'd them to be what they are. From hence, I think, it appears sufficiently that God is such an Agent as delights in things merely because they are chosen.

XVIII. Yet it is to be remark'd, that this self-determining Power is not of such a Nature as to imply infinite Perfection; for it may be consistent with an imperfect understanding, and other Appetites, as we have shewn before: 'Tis not therefore peculiar to God, or incommunicable; there is no reason therefore for us to doubt whether a Creature may partake of it; if God were pleased to communicate it, there seems to be no contradiction in the thing for a Creature to be capable of it. Now that Being which has this gift bestow'd upon it, will manifestly be more noble than the rest, and a more perfect resemblance of the Deity: since therefore God has created the less perfect Beings, we may, without any absurdity, believe that he has not omitted the more perfect. Let us see then whether there be any Tokens of this Power among the Divine Works.

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SUBJECT

* For the possibility of such a Power, and of its being communicated, see Dr. Clarke's *Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*, p. 82 and 85. 7th Edit. For the Perfection of it, see Note 82 and §. 2. of this Chapter.

A Being
endow'd
with this
Power is
more per-
fect than
one that
wants it;
yet this
does not
imply in-
finite Per-
fection,
therefore
it is com-
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ble.

SUBJECT. V.

That Man partakes of the Principle of pleasing himself by Election.

Some reasons are offer'd to shew this.

I. **I**T appears, I think, from what has been said, that there is such a Principle as this in Nature, and that it is also communicable. We are now to enquire whether Nature has conferr'd it upon us : If we consult our own Minds, we may possibly entertain a doubt whether we are always passive in our voluntary Acts : namely, whether the Goodness of Objects determines our Elections according to the Degrees of it, which are, or are believed to be in them ; or to speak more plainly, whether we always choose things because they please us or seem convenient ; or whether they sometimes appear indifferent in themselves, or inconvenient before the Choice, and acquire their Goodness from it, and are for this reason only agreeable because they are chosen. We have seen that there is in Nature such a Power as this, which can produce a Convenience or Goodness in things by willing them ; but whether we partake of it or no is the doubt. Now that we do partake of it may I think be evinced from the following Reasons. First, If we be conscious of an inherent Liberty. Secondly, If we experience in ourselves those Signs and Properties which have been declared to attend this Principle. Thirdly, If the Causes which are supposed to determine the Will be evidently insufficient, or arise from Election instead of producing it.

II. As

II. As to the first ; We experience in ourselves a Principle of this kind, *i. e.* a free one, to such a degree of certainty, that if our Minds be consulted we can hardly doubt of it ; and from hence it is that all Men of all Nations, while they follow'd the Guidance of Nature, and attended to the Perceptions of their own Minds, have constantly asserted their Liberty, at least in some particular Actions : Nor has any one, unless he were forc'd to it, and as it were circumvented by Philosophical Subtilties, ever deny'd either that he was free, or that he could please himself in choosing one or other out of many Objects presented to him, tho' that which was preferr'd were no ways preferable to others in respect of any intrinsic worth.

First, Experience.

III. In this therefore, as in many other Cases, the Vulgar seem to be much wiser, and to reason more justly than Philosophers. For the Vulgar generally follow the natural Sense of the Mind ; and tho' they be dull enough in forming long Deductions, yet in such things as are the immediate Objects of Sense and Experience, they are often more accurate than Philosophers themselves. For these being either puff'd up with the Vanity of appearing wise above the Vulgar, or impos'd upon by their own Subtilty, often frame Monsters of their own, and deny things that are the most manifest : while they are striving to pursue Truth thro' Coverts impervious and inaccessible to human Wit, they leave her behind their Backs, and are blind in full Light. Hence some have deny'd Motion, and others Rest, others Space, others all Sense in Brutes, others the being of a *God*, and others all manner of Truth : and on the same account, some have deny'd Liberty, *viz.* because they were not able to unravel the Difficulties in which they themselves had involv'd it by their Subtilties. The ignorant

The vulgar often judge better of matters of Fact than Philosophers.

and unlearned do much better in flighting all such Arguments, and judging of things ingenuously according to the dictate of their Senses and Experience; and if their Judgments be taken, we have clearly gain'd the Cause: for all these declare that they are conscious of this free Principle within them, which yet cannot, as we have shewn, be well explain'd otherwise than we have done: The Sense of our unprejudic'd Mind agrees with these, nor is the common Testimony of Mankind to be esteem'd of little importance in a matter of Fact. (54.)

IV. Secondly,

NOTES.

(54.) The Substance of what *Leibnitz* objects against this Argument [k.] amounts to thus much, *viz.* That it is no proof of the non-existence of a thing because the Vulgar don't perceive it; they are no Judges of any thing but what is perceiv'd by the Senses; they believe the Air to be nothing when it is not mov'd; they know nothing of the subtle Fluid which causes Gravity, or of the magnetic Matter, much less of immaterial Substances: and therefore the several Causes of Action, the secret Springs, the Reasons and Inclinations, may be all unknown to them, and yet we absolutely determin'd (as he believes we always are) either by the constitution of our own Bodies, or of those about us, or by a thousand little things which, upon due attention and reflection, we might be able to discover. --- We reply, that tho' in many Cases our not perceiving a thing be no Argument that it does not really exist, yet in some Cases, in this particularly, it is: To feel no Pain, to be conscious of no Idea, is to have none: and in like manner to perceive no motive or reason of Action, is the same as not to act upon any, or to perceive that we act without one. If any one (whether Philosopher or Peasant) be thinking upon a Subject, he must, at that instant, know the Subject that he is thinking on, or however, that he does think on something: 'tis likewise self-evident, that every reasonable Man, when he resolves upon some View, or follows an Inclination, must be conscious of that View, or at least be sensible that his Resolution was form'd upon some View or other, In these Cases therefore, and in all the modifications of Thought, not to be, and not to be perceiv'd, is the very same thing.

But

[k.] *Remarques*, p. 477.

IV. Secondly, If we experience in ourselves the Signs and Properties which belong to this Power, it cannot be questioned but we have the Power itself: Now these are a Self-consciousness that we are the true Cause of our Actions; an Ability to act and please ourselves in contradicting our natural Appetites, our Senses and Reason. If it be evident from Experience that we can do these things,

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'Tis proved that we partake of this Power, because we discover the Marks and Properties of it in ourselves.

NOTES.

But beside the absurdity of being influenc'd by a Motive which we know nothing of; beside the Impossibility of reconciling these imperceptible Movers with any kind of Liberty, (for which see Note 45.) we reply, secondly, that our Author does not conclude against the Existence of a thing because the Vulgar do not perceive and take notice of it, but on the contrary argues, that there must be such a thing as a Liberty of Indifference, because they do continually perceive and acknowledge it; because they clearly perceive and experience it in themselves, or at least imagine that they do so; nay, because they have as great Evidence of such a self determining Power, as they have of any thing, even of their own Existence. and consequently they must either be deceiv'd in every thing, or not deceiv'd in this [1.] The present Argument is therefore built on matter of Fact, and will be conclusive here, tho' our Ignorance be never so great in other Cases. Our assurance of a Truth which we do clearly perceive, is not the less for there being a great many other Truths which we do not perceive: and tho' our not perceiving a thing were no Argument that it does not exist, yet our actual perception of it is a Demonstration that it does. It is not, therefore, *because we do not consider the Causes that communicate Motion to the Soul, or are not able to delineate the precise manner of that Communication, that we assert the Soul to be self-motive* (as the Author of the late *Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity* argues, p. 15.) But we assert that it is self-motive, because we *feel* it to be so, and have as great Evidence of it as we could expect or conceive ourselves to have, were it really so. And that Author unreasonably begs the Question, in supposing that there are such Causes and Communicators in a Case where he has, where he can have, no Evidence at all of them. But this *Dissertation* is fully confuted by Mr. Jackson, to whose Answer I refer the Reader.

[1.] See Note 59.

In the first place, we impute our Actions to our selves, whereby we own ourselves to be the true Causes of them. Hence it is that we distinguish Misfortunes from Crimes.

it will be too certain that we have such a Power as is able to please itself barely by Election.

V. In the first place then, we have declared that a Being endow'd with this Principle is the only true efficient Cause of its Actions, and that whatever it does can be imputed to it only. Now all Men impute the Actions of their own Will to themselves, and esteem them truly and properly theirs, whether they be good or bad ; which is a certain Sign that they do not perceive themselves to be determin'd from elsewhere to the Choice or Exertion of them, otherwise they would not look upon themselves as the Cause, but the Determiner. It cannot be otherwise than from a consciousness and firm persuasion of this Truth, that wrong Elections give us more trouble than such things as proceed from Ignorance and inevitable Error. 'Tis on this account only that a light Evil occasion'd by our own Choice grieves and afflicts us more than a very great one from the Action of another. If we expose ourselves to Poverty, Disgrace, or an untimely End, by an Act of Choice, our Conscience remonstrates against it, Remembrance stings us, and we cannot forgive ourselves, tho' we were secure both from human Punishment and the Wrath of God. But when the same Evils befall us by external Force or the Necessity of Nature, we bewail our Condition indeed, and complain of Fortune, but have none of that wounding Anxiousness, and vindictive Reproach of Conscience, which scourges those that become miserable by their own fault. As therefore he that enjoys this Principle must necessarily blame himself if he bring any Inconvenience upon himself by his own Choice ; so he that does blame himself, demonstrates that he has this Principle. For as it is impossible but that he should accuse himself, who believes that he is the true

cause

cause of his own Misery, so on the other hand, 'tis certain that he who does accuse himself, thinks that he himself is the true cause of his Misery: otherwise he would grieve, complain, and be angry with the Person that compell'd him to commit such things as he finds make him uneasy, but would never condemn himself as the Cause and Author of them, unless he were conscious that he could have hinder'd them. If the grief arising from a Crime be distinct from that which is occasion'd by a Misfortune, 'tis plain that this can be on no other account, than because the Crime proceeds from a free Agent, *i. e.* one who determines himself to Action, but the Misfortune from a necessary one.

VI. 'Tis plain then from our *Conscience* of Good and Evil Actions, that we have this active Principle in some respect within us. For we not only rejoice in such things as are done well, and grieve at the contrary, but also impute them to ourselves, and either blame or applaud ourselves as the Authors and true Causes of them: which is the first and surest Sign that our Minds are sensible of their Liberty, and that they could have pleas'd themselves in doing otherwise than they have done. (55.)

This is a most certain Sign that we are conscious of our liberty.

VII. The

NOTES.

(55.) 'Tis pleasant to observe how the Author of the *Philosophical Enquiry* endeavours to answer this Argument, by confounding the two Ideas of Sorrow and Self-accusation; of a Misfortune and a Crime, as his Predecessor *Hobbs* had done before. "Conscience (says he) being a Man's own Opinion of his Actions, with relation to some rule, he may at the time of doing an Action contrary to that rule, know that he *breaks* that Rule, and consequently act with reluctance, tho' not sufficient to hinder the Action. But after the Action is over, he may not only judge his Action to be contrary to that rule, but by the absence of the pleasure of the Sin, and by finding himself obnoxious to Shame, or by believing himself liable

" to

The second token of this Power, that it can

VII. The second Sign or Property of this Power is, that it is able to oppose the natural Appetites, Senses
go against the Appetites, &c.

NOTES.

“ to Punishment, he may really accuse himself; that is, he
“ may condemn himself for having done it, be sorry he has
“ done it, and wish it undone, because of the consequences
“ that attend it [m.]. Where, not to insist upon the perpetual abuse of the Words, *do, act, &c.* which upon this Hypothesis must have a Signification directly opposite to that which they now commonly bear; what can we mean by a Man's accusing or condemning himself, when he is sensible that he has done nothing which he could have alter'd or avoided; or rather done nothing at all, but only *suffer'd* all the while from some other? He may indeed perceive and judge himself to be miserable, and be sorry that he is so, and wish himself otherwise; but what is all this to a Criminal Shame, Remorse, and Self-conviction? Is this all that we understand by a *Guilty Conscience*? Can he blame, reproach, or be angry with himself for being only what another made him, and what he knows he could not possibly help?

As this is matter of Fact and Experience, we appeal to the common Sense of Mankind, whether the Ideas of Guilt, Remorse, &c. be not entirely different, and evidently distinguishable from these. The same holds with regard to our blame or accusation of another, as has been shewn at large by Bishop Bramhall, to whose *Castigations* of *T. Hobbs* I must refer this Author. “ I ask'd (says the Bishop [n.]) why do we blame
“ free Agents? since no Man blameth Fire for burning Cities, nor accuseth Poison for destroying Men. First, he returneth an Answer, *We blame them because they do not please us.*
“ Why? May a Man blame every thing that doth not please his Humour? Then I do not wonder that *T. Hobbs* is so apt to blame others without Cause. So the Scholar may blame his Master for correcting him deservedly for his Good. So he who hath a vitious Stomach may blame healthful Food. So a Lethargical Person may blame his best Friend for endeavouring to save his Life. And now, having shot his bolt, he begins to examine the Case. *Whether blaming be any thing more than saying the thing blamed is ill or imperfect.* Yes, mo-
“ ral

[m.] *Philosophical Enquiry concerning human Liberty*, p. 105, 106.
[n.] Pag. 762.

Senses and Reason, and can please itself in the Opposition. If we experience this Ability in ourselves, we may be certain that we partake of such a Power.

VIII. With respect to the natural Appetites, we have said before †, that this Principle, when it happens to be joined with natural Appetites in the same Person, often runs counter to them, and pleases itself in restraining them; if we find that we can do this, 'tis a Sign that we have it. But who has not experienc'd this in himself? who has not

'Tis shewn that we can do this in regard to our Appetites.

NOTES.

"ral blame is much more, 'tis an Imputation of a Fault. If a Man be born blind, or with one Eye, we do not blame him for it: but if a Man has lost his Sight by his Intemperance, we blame him justly. He enquireth: *May we not say a lame Horse is lame?* Yes, but you cannot blame the Horse for it, if he was lamed by another, without his own Fault. *May not a Man say one is a Fool or a Knave (saith he) if he be so, tho' he could not help it?* If he made himself a Sot, we may blame him; tho', if he be a stark Sot, we lose our Labour. But if he were born a natural Idiot, it were both injurious and ridiculous to blame him for it. Where did he learn that a Man may be a Knave and cannot help it? or, that Knavery is imposed inevitably upon a Man without his own fault? If a Man put fire to his Neighbour's House, it is the fault of the Man, not of the Fire. He hath confess'd formerly, that a Man ought not to be punish'd but for Crimes; the reason is the very same, that he should not be blamed for doing that which he could not possibly leave undone; no more than a Servant whom his Master hath chain'd to a Pillar, ought to be blamed for not waiting at his Elbow. No Chain is stronger than the Chain of *Fatal Destiny* is supposed to be".

See the same Author's Definitions of Liberty, Necessity, &c. with his Defence of them, p. 756, &c. and his Reply to all T. Hobbs's Evasions (since transcrib'd by the Author of the *Philosophical Enquiry*, p. 91, &c.) in his *Vindication*, p. 679, &c.

† Subject. 3. par. 11, 12.

not sometimes voluntarily suffer'd such things as are hard, incommodious, and painful to the natural Appetites, and taken delight in such Sufferance, as if that were some kind of Good superior to the Gratification of the Appetites? (56.) Nay the Pain itself arising from the Violence offer'd to these natural Appetites, if we do but choose to bear it, becomes in a manner agreeable, which would otherwise be very irksome. From whence it is most apparent that this Pleasure depends upon the Choice; for while that continues, it continues too; when that is chang'd, 'tis gone. Now such Elections as these are made every Day, and none can be so much a Stranger to himself, as not to be conscious of them. (57.)

IX. It

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(56.) To this *Leibnitz* answers, "That it is only opposing "or ballancing one Appetite with another. We sometimes "bear Inconveniencies, and we do it with pleasure, but "this is only by reason of some hope, or some satisfaction "which is join'd to the Evil, and which surpasses it". We reply, if by hope be meant an expectation of some future Good, 'tis plain that we can oppose and resist any natural Appetite without any such Expectation, as may be experienc'd when we please, in Hunger, Thirst, &c. The prospect of the bare pleasure of willing to do so cannot be the Good hoped for, since that is a sure attendant on every such Volition; all the satisfaction then which appears to be join'd with the Evil, and to counterballance it in any such Cases, can only be the pleasure arising from the actual Exertion of the self-moving Power, which is the thing our Author contends for. See the latter part of Note 45.

(57.) 'Tis a common and just Observation, that Men as well as Children bear any Labour or Fatigue which they undertake voluntarily, with half the Uneasiness and Grief which the very same thing would give them, if they were forc'd to undergo it; which cannot, I think, be accounted for, but upon our Author's Principle.

IX. It is to be observ'd farther, that we do not only embrace with pleasure such things as the Appetites refuse, and reject such things as they desire, but alter, as it were, Nature itself by an obstinate Election, and make these Appetites pursue what they naturally avoid, and fly what by Nature they desire. And this takes place not only in Appetites, but also in the Objects of the Senses. Some things are naturally unpleasant to them, some things bitter, nauseous, deform'd; yet these are made tolerable by the force of Election, and by a change of the natural Propensity, at length become Delights †. On the contrary, what was sweet, beautiful, &c. being rejected by the Will, becomes at length disagreeable. We could not possibly do this, if we had not a Power of pleasing ourselves by other Means, than the agreement of Objects to the Appetites and Senses. For whence comes it that such things as are sweet, comely, excellent, commodious; nay, all that are grateful to the Appetites and Senses should be rejected, and when once rejected, should become irksome and offensive? On the contrary, whence is it that Griefs, Pains, Torments, nay Death itself should be agreeable when voluntarily undergone, unless from this Principle which pleases itself in its Election? If it be granted that we have such a Principle, it may be easily shewn how these things can be effected, for natural Good may, by the Power of it, be chang'd into Evil, and Evil into Good: for it has a Good in itself superior to these, by the Power of which it can overcome and alter the Nature of them: but that this cannot admit of any other Explanation will be shewn below ††.

That we can do it also in our Senses, and in a manner change the nature of things by an obstinate Election.

X. These

† See Mr. Locke's *Chapter of Power*, §. 69. *Tho' all this may be effected by the sole Power of Election, and without the Reasons which he there assigns for it.*

†† See the following Section.

That we
can con-
quer not
only our
Appetites
and Senses,
but also
our Rea-
son by the
force of
Election.

X. These things are generally supposed to be done by the Power and Prescription of *Reason*; and 'tis thought, that the Will is thereby directed to embrace things disagreeable to the natural Appetites and Senses: I confess this sometimes is, and always ought to be done according to reason; for we have hinted above, that some regard should be had to these things in Elections; but very often the Case is far otherwise. We have shewn before, that a Power which is capable of pleasing itself by Election, cannot be determin'd by reason; for the Understanding depends upon it, rather than it upon the Understanding. 'Tis therefore the *third* Mark and Property of this Power, that it can run counter, not only to *Appetites* and *Senses*, but also to *Reason*. If we can do this, we must own to our Sorrow, that we partake of it. But that we can, by the force of Election, conquer not only the Appetites and Senses, but the Understanding too, (S.)

daily

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(S.) 'Tis objected that the Will doth not indeed always follow the Judgment of the Understanding, because there are other Motives that come from insensible Perceptions and secret Inclinations which determine it: but that it always follows the most advantageous representation of Good and Evil, which results from Reasons, Passions and Inclinations whether distinct or confus'd: and yet it is alledged that this is not contrary to Liberty or Contingency. For there are two kinds of Necessity, one founded on a Contradiction, *i. e.* the Proposition affirming a thing to be includes such a Necessity that it should be, as to make it a Contradiction to say it might not be, the Causes that produce it being necessary. The other kind is when there are sufficient Causes to produce the Effect, and such as will infallibly produce it, but there is no Contradiction in saying they may not produce it. Tho' therefore he that understands perfectly all the Causes and Motives that concur to an Event, must know the Reasons how it comes to pass; and that those Reasons were so sufficient that they prevail'd

daily Experience teaches, and we have reason to lament that it can be prov'd by so many instances that

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vail'd certainly and infallibly; and the Man that had such a representation of the prevailing Good or Evil of what he was to choose, was carried certainly and infallibly to the Resolution he took; yet this is not necessarily, because it doth not imply a Contradiction that he should have determin'd himself otherwise.

Licet enim nunquam quicquam eveniat quin ejus ratio reddi possit, neque ulla unquam detur indifferentia æquilibrij, cum potius semper sint quædam præparationes in causa agente concurrentibusq; quas aliqui prædeterminationes vocant: dicendum tamen est has determinationes esse tantum inclinantes, non necessitantes; Ita ut semper aliqua indifferentia sive contingentia Sit salva; nec tantus unquam in nobis appetitus est ut ex eo actus necessario sequatur. Nam quamdiu homo mentis compos est etiamsi vehementissime ab ira, siti, vel simili causa stimuletur semper tamen aliqua ratio sistendi impetum reperiri potest & aliquando vel sola sufficit Cogitatio exercendæ libertatis & in affectus Dominij.

In answer to this, which seems the strength of what is objected against the Author's Notion of Liberty, I desire these few things may be consider'd:

First, that it is not easy to comprehend this necessity of Contradiction, which is inconsistent with Liberty, or distinguish it from that Necessity which is only founded on Convenience, and yet never fails to succeed, because there is always a sufficient Reason or Cause to produce the effect. I wish there had been an Example given of the one and to'ther that we might have been able to pass a better Judgment of them. For to me it seems that at this rate all the Actions of Beasts are as free as those of Men. If a Beast be never so hungry, and turn'd out into never so tempting a Pasture, yet there is no Contradiction in saying that he may abstain from eating. Nor do I see how his Appetites being determin'd more oblige him to eat, than a Man's, when all Circumstances, Motives, Predispositions and Qualifications incline him to it.

2dly, At this rate the effects of all natural Causes would be free. For it is no contradiction to say the Sun will not rise to morrow, but his rising is no more free on that account. And in truth I do not find that any Propositions but those that concern metaphysical and abstract Verities, are in this Sense necessary. All the effects of natural Causes have only a *positive* or hypothetical necessity, that depends on the Will of God. Yet
if

that we please ourselves in Elections contrary to the natural propensity of Senses and Appetites, and at the same time against the dictate of Reason.

XI. We

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if we consider only the Sun, and the part he has in raising himself, he cannot be said in any tolerable sense to be free in rising. And so if we consider all things given which are necessary to an Action, either a Man can in these Circumstances forbear his action, or he cannot; if he can he is indifferent, for *positis omnibus ad agendum requisitis potest agere vel non agere*, which is the very definition of an indifferent, free Agent: If he can't suspend the act, then is the necessity as great on him in these Circumstances as on the Sun to rise.

If it be said the case is different, because a Man has Understanding which is always ready to suggest to him new Considerations to stop his Actions. I answer, whence come these new Considerations that alter the Man's Circumstances? If from the Will, then it determines itself after all, and is not determin'd by any disposition, motive or reason from without: But if those Considerations that change the Will are independent of it, and arise from any external disposition, reason, or inclination, he is no more free that is determin'd to his Choice by these, than the Sun is free to move when natural Causes determine him to that Motion.

Every one may not see all the Chains and Movements that lead him to his Choice, but if the will be *passive* in its Determination, they are as certain and infallible as if he were drawn with Chains of Adamant. And whereas it is said that the mere thought of exercising our Freedom is sometimes sufficient to stay the importunity of all our Passions and Inclinations: I answer, if the Will can cross all external Causes which incline it to a determination purely on this account, that it will exercise its Liberty, then it is a clear case, the exercise of its Liberty is a greater good to it than all other Considerations, which is the very thing I plead for.

But 3dly, I ask how comes this Consideration of exercising its Liberty in its way? The Understanding, you say, offers it. But is it without Cause that it offers it, or could it not have offer'd it? If the Cause be in the Understanding, that is necessary, and could no more forbear offering it than the Sun could forbear rising. But suppose this Consideration offer'd, no matter how, can the Will still reject it? If it can, we are as

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XI. We have seen an Atheist supported by the
Obstinacy of a perverse Mind, enduring Torments,

This ap-
pears from
Instances.

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far from a determination as ever. For that rejecting must be either from the Will itself, or some other Cause, concerning which the same Questions recur; and so on till we come at the first Cause, God. In all which Chain every link is necessarily connected with the next before it, and so according to the Representation in Poets, the fatal Chain is tied to the Chair of *Jupiter*. He, and he alone is accountable for all the Good and Ill of all sorts in the World. Nor doth it in the least help Liberty or Contingence that there is no contradiction in the Propositions that relate to the Being or not Being of Things; for as long as there is a Chain of natural or moral Causes that certainly and infallibly produce the effect, in which the Will is absolutely passive, there is no more room for Liberty in intelligent Causes than in natural.

I know very well Men do many things willingly, as Beasts eat their Food, and that some call this Liberty and Contingence; but they might as well call it an Elephant or a Horse. For if this were the Question, whether Men did things voluntarily and with a full inclination, no body cou'd question but they did: but it is plain when we ask whether a Man be free or no, our meaning is whether he has a full power to do or not do a thing notwithstanding all previous Conditions and Circumstances, in which providence has placed him. Not that a Man is always absolutely indifferent: for he may have Reasons and Inclinations that may byass him greatly one way; yet notwithstanding that byass he has still a power to act against them all, and please himself in so doing.

'Tis plain to me that they who are against this true Freedom must be prepossess'd with an opinion that all things in Nature are passive and acted on by others; which was expressly Mr. *Hobbs's* Doctrine: and tho' they endeavour to distinguish themselves from his Disciples, 'tis in vain, their sentiments come to the samething as to necessity, and the same causes, reasons and arguments are produced by both; the conclusion also is the same, only the one calls that an absolute necessity, which the other calls necessity of convenience, that is of a thing's being, because there is sufficient reason to produce it. For the very reason by which he proves his necessity, is this of a *sufficient Cause*. If the cause, says he, be sufficient, and all Predispositions, Conditions and Qualifications requisite be present, the effect

Confinement, and Death itself, rather than abjure his beloved Impiety: We have seen a great many Persons

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effect will certainly follow; which is true. If then the consent of the Will be caused by something without itself, those conditions being present, it will necessarily follow. If it be not so caus'd, if it has a power in itself to act and make a thing good or bad, agreeable or disagreeable by its choice, 'tis plain that nothing external can determine it. This proves Liberty, *a priori*. For if there be such a power 'tis evident that *positum omnibus extra se ad agendum requisitis, potest agere, aut non agere*. All that is pretended to determine it is the antecedent considerations of Good or Evil; but where the chief good expected arises from the determination itself, and is consequent to it, there 'tis impossible it shou'd be determin'd by such Considerations.

And this seems to me the true reason, why some are so angry at this new Notion as they call it of things pleasing us, because we choose them, since it utterly destroys their Notion of a passive Will determin'd only by antecedent views of Good and Evil, and demonstratively establishes Freedom, therefore they treat it as a Chimera, a Fairy and Romance.

But 2dly, 'Tis urg'd that this is a power to choose without any Motive, without any final or impulsive Cause, which is a great imperfection. Answer, I deny that this is to choose without any motive or final Cause. 'Tis choosing indeed without any motive or cause, which is foreign to the Will; so that it does not depend in its Operations on any external Objects, but has the Cause, motive and end of its actions in itself; and sure 'tis not the worse for being thus independent: it has a Cause and End, even to please itself, and surely to have it in its own power to do so is far from an Imperfection.

Suppose two Men, one has sufficient to feed and cloath himself in his Possession, the other is forced to go abroad and beg for both, and let any one judge which of them is in the most perfect or happy Condition.

3dly, 'Tis said it does not appear how pure indifference can contribute to Happiness; on the contrary the more a Faculty is indifferent the more must the Person possess'd of it be insensible of the Good he enjoys. But sure those that raise such Objections have either never read or little minded the Book. If the Author had taught that the Faculty continued indifferent *after* the Choice, there had been ground for such an Objection;

Persons voluntarily throwing away their Fortunes, Life and Soul, lest they should be disappointed in

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Objection; but on the contrary he holds that after the Election is made the Will is as much attached to the thing chosen whilst the Election continue, as the natural Appetites are to their Objects; and it enjoys it with as much, nay greater pleasure, and to such a degree that sometime it prefers the Enjoyment of it to Life. But the Happiness lies in this, that it is not obliged to choose, and when it has chosen, if it can't enjoy the Object of its choice, it may reject it again.

4thly, 'Tis urg'd that such a Faculty as this would render Science useless, reduce all actions to mere Chance, and leave us no Measures or Rules for them.

I can't but wonder what should induce any to bring such Arguments. The Case is this: Man is placed by God in a World where he is concerned with, and has relation to many Objects; he has many Appetites which he may gratify by the right Enjoyment of these Objects; he may meet with many disagreeable things in the course of Affairs, and may employ himself in many things, that in the end will prove impossible to compass, that may hurt his fellow Creatures, or inroach on things forbid him by his Creator: To comprehend these he has an understanding given him, as well as a power to choose or refrain from any of them; but because his Understanding is not infinite, and therefore he may often mistake, and it may so happen that the bars and limits assign'd by God and Nature may hinder him from enjoying what his natural Appetites require, and his Judgment sees wou'd be most agreeable to him, therefore God has given him a power of Choice, whereby he may make those things agreeable that would be otherwise, were he only to gratify his natural Appetites. So that this Power is superior to them all, and in a great measure commands them and their Actions, insomuch that he finds a pleasure and Satisfaction often in curbing and restraining them. Nay this Faculty is of such force that it always carries its Satisfaction with it; and tho' it cannot absolutely change the nature of the Appetites, or make us not feel the natural Evils that surround us, such as pain, torment, disappointment; yet by its exercise it raises us so much Satisfaction as to make these tolerable, if not pleasing to us.

Now must not every one see that such a Faculty as this acts on the greatest reason and for the the best end, even to make all

a foolish Choice. We have beheld not a few disregarding the Intreaty of their Friends, the Advice of their Relations, the Dictates of their own Mind, Dangers, Distresses, Death, the wrath of God, and the pains of Hell; in short, despising all that is Good, or could appear to be so, when set in competition with such things as, exclusive of the Goodness which they receive from Election, are mere Trifles and worth nothing at all; such as have no manner of Good or pretence of Good in them. There have been Persons who knowingly, without any kind of hope, any kind of belief, have destroy'd themselves and their Relations, and yet were in their right Mind and consistent with themselves, if a right Mind may be judg'd of by sober Words and a serious tenor of Action. Did these Men follow Reason, or any other Good beside the fruition of their Choice? We have shewn already that this Power may produce these and greater Ab-

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all the actions of a Man's Life, as far as possible, pleasing to him? And doth it not appear that such a Will needs plain and certain Measures, and the greatest prudence and judgment to act by: otherwise it may fall into impossible absurd or wicked Choices. It has been shewn in the Book what limits are assign'd our Wills by God and Nature, and how necessary it is we should keep within them. In short the Argument is as if one should alledge a Prince is absolute Governour of his Kingdom, and must not be control'd by his Subjects, therefore he needs no Councillors, because he is not obliged to be determin'd by them. But sure the more absolute he is, the more need he has to prescribe good Rules to himself, and advise with the best Counsellors he can find, because he has it in his power to rule well, and none is to blame but himself if he do not. Whereas if he were to be determin'd by his Counsellors, he wou'd be under no such concern, since they, not he, wou'd in all reason be answerable for his Mistakes.

furdities; for since it is suppos'd to be of such a Nature as can please itself in its Act, wherever it can exert that Act, it can also please itself, even in opposition to the natural Appetites, the Senses and Reason. If then such a Principle be granted to be in us, it will not seem strange that we should be able to do things that are repugnant to these; if this be not allow'd, it cannot be made appear how so many Absurdities, so many things disagreeable to Reason, to Sense; so many things contrary to the dictate of the Mind, should every Day be committed by Mankind.

XII. Nay, which may seem more strange, the Will appears to have so great a Power over the Understanding that the latter is so far subdu'd by its Choice, as to take Evil things for Good, and forc'd to admit Falsities for Truths. Neither will this appear impossible to one who recollects that the Senses are no less natural Faculties, and have by Nature as quick a Relish of their proper Objects, and can as well distinguish those that are agreeable from them that are disagreeable, as the Understanding. If therefore we sometimes please ourselves in choosing what is repugnant to the Senses, 'tis also possible for us to take pleasure in embracing what is dissonant to Reason. The Senses are forced to admit and tolerate such things as are disgustful to them, which things they take for agreeable by use, having as complete Enjoyment of them as of those that are adapted to them by Nature †. The same may happen sometimes to the Under-

That the Understanding admits not only evil things for good, but Falsities for Truths viz. being under subjection to the Will.

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† Nay generally more so: 'Tis a common Observation, that such things as were at first the most disagreeable of all to the Palate, become by use the most delightful: viz. Wines, Tobacco, Olives, &c.

standing, viz. to be compell'd by the Will to admit Falsities for Truths, to believe them thro' custom, and at last make use of them seriously as Truths. Hence comes that common Saying, *that we eagerly believe what we eagerly desire*; and some take a pleasure in subduing not only Sense, but Reason too. I confess, he that does this, acts foolishly and is much to blame; but from this very thing, that we act foolishly, that we are to blame, 'tis evident that we not only can, but actually do please ourselves in Elections, which are made contrary to Reason; and that the Judgment of our Understanding depends upon the Will, rather than that the Will is determin'd by it. From hence it is evident that all the Signs and Properties of a Power of pleasing itself by Election agree to us, and therefore we certainly partake of it.

'Tis proved that we have this Power from a consideration of these reasons which are supposed to determine the Will.

XIII. The same will appear thirdly, from considering the Reasons which move us to the choice of these Absurdities, according to the Opinion of those Men who think that the Will is *passive* in Elections. For if, while they are labouring to assign Reasons for these and the like Determinations, they produce nothing for Reasons but the very Elections themselves, or their Effects, it will be apparent that they are in a Mistake, and offer Effects for Causes; which will appear more fully from an Enumeration of those Reasons which are supposed to move the Will in such Cases.

These are enumerated.

XIV. The Principal of these Reasons are *Errors of the Understanding, Obstinacy of the Mind, the force of Passions, and Madness*; on these are charg'd all the unreasonable, absurd, and impious Actions of Men; these are esteem'd the Causes of all such Elections as cannot be allow'd to proceed from the intrinsic

intrinsic Goodness of the Objects which are chosen: but this is all groundless.

XV. For in the first place, as to *Errors of the Understanding*, 'tis certain that we sometimes choose hurtful Objects by mistake, which we often lament, but never impute to ourselves, except we be conscious that this Error was voluntary; *i. e.* in some respect ow'd its Origin to Election. Election then is prior to all culpable Error, for that depends upon it. 'Tis not therefore always by mistake that we choose Absurdities, but by choosing Absurdities we mistake the Truth. But to confess the Truth, we are hurried on in an absurd Election, tho' we see and know all that we are about to do: if then there be any Error, 'tis only this that we judge it better to enjoy a free Election, than to be exempt from natural Evils. Hence it is evident, that there arises so much Pleasure from Election as is able to impose upon the Understanding, and induce it to prefer that to all kinds of natural Good, nay to Life itself. But whether this be done erroneously or wisely, 'tis the strongest Argument that we have such an Elective Self-pleasing Principle as this within us.

XVI. Secondly, as for *Obstinacy*, by which they suppose that we are moved to choose absurd things; 'tis plain that this is nothing else but the perseverance of a bad Election: neither can Obstinacy and Perverseness be explain'd otherwise than by Elections. If it be granted that things please us because they are chosen, we see clearly enough what Obstinacy is, *viz.* an unnecessary adherence to an Election, and a Self-complacency in it contrary to the dictates of Reason, and with the loss of natural

First, Errors of the Understanding: these are shewn to depend upon deprav'd Election rather than to cause it.

Secondly, Obstinacy: which is shewn to be nothing else but persevering in a deprav'd Election.

Good. (58.) But if the Will be determin'd from without, there will be no such thing as Obstinacy.

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(58.) *Leibnitz* (in his Remarks frequently cited above) argues [a.] "That Obstinacy is not barely the continuance of a "bad Election, but a disposition to persevere in it, proceeding from some Good, that a Man forms to himself, or "from some Evil which one supposes to attend the change. "The first Election, says he, was made perhaps thro' mere "Levity, but the resolution of adhering to it comes from some "stronger Reasons or Impressions". But if this be all that is meant by Obstinacy, how come the World to fix so bad a Notion to that Word? If it be a disposition always proceeding from a prospect of Good, or dread of Evil, and founded on second thoughts and stronger Reasons: how can it ever be deemed a Crime? Again, if the *first* Election can be made without any external Motive, (which he seems to allow by assigning *Levity* as the sole Cause of it) why may not the perseverance in it be so too? may not the same Cause be suppos'd to produce the subsequent Elections, as well as the first? In short, *Leibnitz*, after all his seeming opposition to our Author on the head of Liberty, most evidently grants the Question both here, and p. 480. where he affirms, that in effect we are able to change the Natures of things, and make these transformations above mentioned. "But this (says he) is not as among "the *Fairies*, by a simple Act of that Magic Power; but because a Man darkens or suppresses in his Mind, the representations of the good or ill Qualities naturally join'd to "certain Objects, and because we only regard those which "are agreeable to our Taste, or Prepossessions; or even because we join by force of thought, certain Qualities, which "are only found united by accident, or by our customary way "of considering them". Now what is it to darken or suppress the representations of good or ill Qualities,--to regard some only and neglect others,--and to join Qualities to Objects by the force of thought,--but to exert this very Power in debate? Which often chooses the fruition, or even the consideration of some one out of many equal and indifferent Objects, and by that simple Act makes it agreeable to our Taste, and joins such Qualities to it as could neither proceed from Chance nor Custom, nor any Association of Ideas whatsoever. See the Conclusion of this Subject in the following Note.

By an obstinate Person we shall only mean one that has continued a long time in a pernicious Error, without any Motive to change his Judgment. Now he that does this is miserable indeed, but cannot be call'd in the least degree obstinate, according to the common Notion of Mankind.

XVII. Thirdly, since neither Errors nor Obstinacy are sufficient to explain the Nature of these Elections, they fly to the *Power of the Passions*; viz. the Desire of Fame or Glory; Anger, Hatred, &c. These are the Causes, say they, why we choose absurdly, and by them the Choice is determin'd. But Fame or Glory have no manner of Good in them, especially to those who believe that they shall not exist after Death: why then are these Men content to purchase Glory with Life? Certainly from no other Cause beside Election; 'tis by Election that we have form'd these Idols to ourselves, and from thence they derive whatever Good is in them. To be talk'd of after Death, to mount upon the Wings of Fame, to extend our Name to distant Regions; these things please us on no other account but because we will them. Obscurity, Oblivion, Retirement will be as pleasing to the Man that chooses them, and have been so. Those Persons then who imagine that these determine Elections, take Effects for Causes. For these, which are nothing in themselves, shew us that they acquire so much Goodness from Election as makes them over-balance all kind of natural Good.

XVIII. The same must be said of Anger, Hatred, Love and Despair, whereby many believe they are driven into Absurdities. But in reality all that is absurd and pernicious in these Passions proceeds from Election. Nature has given us Passions which are generally innocent, while solicited only by their proper Objects, and natural Opportunity

Thirdly,
The violence of Passions, viz. Desire of Fame and Glory, &c. all which are prov'd to derive their inordinate force from Election.

The same is shewn of Hatred, Love, &c.

tunity, as we see in Brutes; but they are compell'd to change the natural Objects by the Power of Election: thus Anger and Hatred are excited by the Will, and apply'd not to such things as are naturally hurtful: nor Love and Desire to such as are naturally desirable, but to others of a quite different kind, with which they have no natural Congruity, such as Fame and Glory after Death. Of this kind also are most of the Instruments of Luxury, which are commonly said to please, purely by the strength of *Fancy*, that is in reality, by Election. Hence it is that Men pursue with so great Eagerness, and such an impetus of Passion, things which are in themselves trifling, pernicious, and absurd. Nay they barter away Life itself for Trifles, and when they cannot enjoy them, cast off that in despair. 'Tis the Election itself which substitutes these things as fit to be prosecuted by these Passions instead of their natural Objects, and while they are hurry'd on, not according to the exigence of Nature, but the command of the Will, they confound every thing, transgress the bounds of reason and utility, and in despite of these rage without limits or restraint.

Of Envy
and Re-
venge.

XIX. As for Envy and Revenge, they are not owing to Nature but the Will, and setting aside Election, are mere nothing. For whatever is pretended to the contrary, there can be no other account given why any one should undergo Labours, Dangers, Grievs and Difficulties; why he should lose his Reputation, Family, Country, nay his Life, for the Satisfaction of his Envy or Revenge, but that he resolv'd within himself, but that he chose to satisfy them. 'Tis evident that the most unexperienc'd Person is sufficiently convinc'd of this. But these, when once embrac'd by Election, become more agreeable than those things which Nature has made

made necessary. Those absurd Elections then are not made by the force of these Passions, but the absurd and irregular force of these proceeds from the Elections.

XX. They who perceive that these Causes are insufficient, have recourse to *Madness* and *Phrenzy*, in order to account for absurd Elections: but this is playing upon Words, and taking Madness in a different Sense from that wherein it is commonly understood. He is look'd upon as mad that is so far disorder'd in his Mind as not to be able to deduce one Idea from another, nor make Observations upon what he sees: but these Men who do so many absurd things enjoy the above mention'd Powers, and have their Understanding and Senses strong enough by Nature: what is it therefore which drives them into Absurdities? The power and prevalence of the superior Faculty, viz. the *Will*, which has a Good peculiar to itself, which it produces by Election. This it pursues regardless of all that Reason, the Body, the Condition, Appetites and natural Faculties require. For while it can provide for and please itself, it is not at all solicitous about any thing which may prejudice these, but has a certain Complacency in its own Exercise, and endeavours to augment its Happiness by the pursuit of such things as are repugnant to them. For the more Difficulties and Absurdities it encounters, the more it applauds itself in a consciousness of its own Abilities; which seems to be the very thing that we call *Vanity* and *Pride*. Hereupon it compels the Senses, Reason, and natural Appetites, to be subservient to its Elections: nor can he be call'd a Madman who acts against Reason, thro' the force of a superior Faculty, any more than he that falls from a Precipice by the violence of a superior impulse. For it is not every one who acts against reason, that must immediately

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be look'd upon as Mad, but only he that acts absurdly from some injury done to the understanding Faculty itself, or an Impediment to the Use of Reason; he that could have follow'd the dictate of Reason, and yet knowingly violated it, must not be reckon'd mad, but wicked, unless we will impose upon ourselves by changing the customary Names of things.

All these things cannot be explained otherwise than by admitting a Principle of this kind.

As much Good arises from this Principle, so it is attended with this Evil, *viz.* a Power of sinning.

This mistake, that the Will follows the Judgment of the Understanding, arose from hence, *viz.* that it is imprudent in us to act without consulting the Understanding

XXI. If it be granted that we have this superior Faculty, 'tis plain enough that all these things may come to pass. For he that is endow'd with it, will be able to please himself in the Prosecution of his Elections, even to the detriment of both Body and Mind; to the prejudice of Senses, Appetites and Reason; which we often see done to our Amazement; but unless we have this Faculty imparted to us, it does not seem possible for us to create Good to ourselves by Election, and to prefer what is thus created to all natural Good whatsoever.

XXII. These things, I confess, ought not to be done; but if nothing could be done which ought not, there would be no such thing as a Fault. As therefore much Good arises from this Principle, so there is this Evil also, that by it Crimes and Follies are committed; And it has this Inconvenience, that it can do what it ought not.

XXIII. From these and other Arguments which might be brought, I think it is evident that God has given us a Principle of this kind, and that our Will is only determin'd by itself. They are mistaken therefore who affirm that either the Appetites, Passions, or Understanding, determine Elections. What probably gave occasion to the Mistake was, that other things please or displease us, *viz.* such as are agreeable to the Appetites or Senses, beside those which we choose: Now it being observ'd that we have regard to these in Elections,

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and do not choose any thing repugnant to them, but upon necessity, and that all Men are of Opinion, that the Judgment of the Understanding ought to be made use of in choosing, and being accustom'd to this kind of Choice, we become at last persuaded that it is absolutely necessary, and that our Wills are always determin'd by some Judgment of the Understanding: at least, that it is a Condition requisite in the Object, that the Mind judge the thing chosen to be good and agreeable to the Appetites. Whereas the contrary to all this is generally true, *viz.* that the Mind judges things to be good because we have willed them, because we have formed an Appetite in ourselves by some antecedent Election, and those things which we embrace by this *fictitious Appetite*, as we may call it, give us equal Pleasure with that which we desire by the Necessity of Nature.

XXIV. Nay we choose Objects which are contrary to all the Appetites, contrary to Reason, and destitute of all Appearance of Good, perhaps for this only Reason, that we may assert our Liberty of Election. 'Tis certain that every one can do this, and he that does it, proves by an Experiment that he is free, and has a Power of pleasing himself in Election. Nor can he be said to be determin'd by the Judgment of the Understanding; for this reason is made by the Mind itself, and may serve equally for every Election, since it is drawn from the Indifference of the Will itself: and he who does any thing upon a reason which is made by himself, and is indifferent to either Side, must be esteem'd to act in the same manner as if he had done it without any reason at all. 'Tis evident therefore that we have this Power, and make use of the Appetites and Senses only as Spies and Informers; of Reason as a Counsellor; but that the Will

We can act in order to shew our Liberty, which is prov'd to be the same as acting without any reason at all.

Will is Master of itself, and creates pleasure for itself in Objects by Election. (59.)

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(59.) Upon the whole it appears that the true description of Free-will must include thus much. A Power of choosing or not choosing, or of choosing either Side in any given Case, naturally independent of any mediate or immediate, external or internal force, compulsion, influence or necessity; physically indetermin'd by either bodily Sensations, Appetites, &c. or mental Perceptions, Reason, Judgment. 'Tis an Ability of determining either among equal and indifferent Objects, or of preferring the pursuit of some before others that are entirely different from or contrary to them: or lastly, of preferring the very consideration of some unknown Objects to all the rest; of deliberating upon, or attending to some particular Ideas, and resolving to overlook others, tho' equally presented to the Mind, and suppos'd to be of equal Importance.

All this is contain'd in the very Notion of a *Self-moving Power*; (tho' none perhaps have given so full and distinct an Explication of it as our Author) for that which in strictness moves itself, is properly and physically independent of, and indifferent to all external Movers, as long as it continues to do so; what is determin'd in certain circumstances by or according to particular Sensations, Motives, &c. and cannot possibly be determin'd either without or against them, is so far, and in such circumstances, only moved, acted upon, and purely passive. If then there be any such thing, properly speaking, as an active Principle, it must be endow'd with such an absolute Indifference as our Author supposes: and when we speak of the *strongest Motives*, we don't mean such as have the greatest physical Influence or Weight in turning the ballance of the Will (since we suppose none of them to have any at all) but only such as the Mind most commonly determines itself upon in fact; and to argue from such determinations that these Motives must have such an Influence both absolutely and comparatively, *i. e.* whether taken by themselves, or in opposition to each other; is manifestly to beg the Question, and still to suppose that it cannot move or direct itself, notwithstanding our most evident perception and experience of the contrary. And that we have such experience, a little reflection on ourselves will convince us. "I think (says S. C.) I may appeal to any considering Man, whether he be not in all ordinary Cases sensible of an ability of darting his thoughts upon any
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S E C T. II.

Where it is shewn that Happiness consists in Elections.

I. FROM what has been said above, it appears that a Being endow'd with a Power of choosing is more excellent and perfect than one that is expos'd to Motions from without, and meets with less inconvenience.

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"particular Object, even antecedently to any deliberation, and then, whether after deliberation about particular Objects he cannot resume his deliberation, and sometimes vary his Judgment; and whether, after the clearest Judgment, and most deliberate Choice of particular things or actions, he be not still conscious of a power of suspending his practice, of resuming the consideration of the Objects whenever he pleases, or of immediately choosing or practising the contrary, without being determin'd by impressions from without, or impediments from within. But we have no clearer proof of our own Existence than *Consciousness*: and I conceive we need not expect greater Evidence of any thing than we have of our Existence [p.]".

If then our Mind has such a power of selecting some particular Ideas out of many perceived by the Understanding, and attending to them alone without any previous apprehension of their nature and tendency, without any special Reason, Motive or Inducement whatsoever to such particular Choice; if the Mind, I say, does in some Cases exert such a power as this, then it is in these Cases absolutely free. It cannot here be directed

[p.] *Impartial Enquiry*; &c. p. 42, 43. See also an *Essay on Consciousness*, p. 205, &c.

that is without it : For that which neither acts nor is acted upon, is the farthest from Perfection, since

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rested by the Judgment, since it is suppos'd to act independently of it: nay it may be properly said sometimes to influence and direct, or rather to obstruct and subvert the Judgment itself, for as much as it confines that to some particular Objects only, and of consequence renders it partial, and precipitates it in the Choice of these, and withdraws others from it, which were absolutely necessary to a compleat View of the Subject, and an exact determination about it. Hence the spring of all Errors, at least all criminal ones, hence vitious, absurd Elections, and a Labyrinth of Woe. From the same Power also duely apply'd proceeds the happy consciousness of Desert, and in it is entirely founded all the reason of Reward. Its usefulness then, and necessity, appear both for the establishment of Morality, the ground of all rational Happiness; and also, that we might always have wherein to please ourselves, which (as our Author has shewn in the latter end of Subsect. 4.) otherwise we very often could not. Hence it appears I think sufficiently, that this Power is one of our greatest Perfections, tho' (like all other Perfections that come short of Infinity) it be liable to the greatest abuse, and so capable of being turn'd into the worst of Imperfections.

It remains to be enquired with our Author, whether all the Happiness arising from it counterbalances the Misery, and consequently, whether we and all other rational Creatures might not have been as well or better without it. But for this see §. 2. and 5.

We shall here only add a Word or two in vindication of this Principle against the three principal Opposers of Liberty above mentioned. In the first place then, we don't assert that by this Power the Mind can choose Evil *as Evil*, or refuse Good *as Good*, i. e. that the former, as such, is or can be a *Motive* for Choice, or the latter for Refusal: But we say that it can choose the one and refuse the other *without any particular Motive at all*; (i. e. any drawn from the particular nature of the Object chosen,) nay, in opposition to the strongest Motive (*viz.* that Motive which presents the greatest Happiness, and which it usually does, and always ought to follow) purely by the force of its free, active or self-moving Power [q.]

You'll

[q.] See Jackson's *Vindication of human Liberty*, p. 49, &c. or the beginning of E. Strutt's *Defence of Dr. Clarke's Notion*, &c.

since it is of no more use in Nature than if it were nothing at all ; that which is purely passive in its
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You'll say it does this to prove its own Power, and the pleasure attending such proof is the strongest Motive in these Cases. I answer, that granting this to be so (which yet is not very probable, as appears from what was observ'd from the *Essay on Consciousness* in Note 45.) yet this, as our Author observes, must be a Motive of its own creating, which, with respect to Volition, is the same as none at all. Nay this is the very thing we are endeavouring to prove, *viz.* that the Soul has a power of determining to think or act, and of pleasing itself in such determination, without any other Motive or Reason but what is produced by itself, and follows that very determination ; without any external Cause whatsoever ; in which Power all its Liberty consists, and the greatest Part of its Happiness, as will appear in the next Section.

Nor secondly, will such a Power as this only make us liable to mistake the true Good which is in things (as the Author of the *Philosoph. Enquiry* and *Leibnitz* argue) but on the contrary, it often *makes* true Good or Happiness in those things which of themselves had none at all ; and improves those things which have, and alleviates those which have the contrary Qualities ; and of consequence is not an *Imperfection*, but a very valuable and necessary Perfection. Our Author does not suppose us left to an absolute, blind indifference in all Objects (as *Leibnitz* often urges) without any Guide or Direction in the Choice of them ; which would indeed be an Imperfection ; but affirms that the Mind or *Man* is sensibly and necessarily affected by some, and informed by his Understanding of the Nature and Effects of others, and so is sufficiently directed to the Choice of these which are in themselves good and agreeable to his Constitution, and *vice versa* ; yet still with the reservation of a full Power of following or not following that Guide, of neglecting or refusing that Direction : Which Power therefore, even in these Cases, remains still unaffected. In other Objects, he shews that the *Man* is totally indifferent, which yet, by an arbitrary Choice, he can make to be no less constituent Parts of his Happiness.

Whence, in the third place, a reply may be form'd to the common Question, *What Benefit* is there in a Power of choosing freely among things that are really indifferent, and exactly alike ? We answer the Benefit of enjoying *any one* of them ; which

Operations is one degree more perfect, but that which has the Principle of its Actions within itself, since it approaches, as it were, nearer to God, and is more independent, is also more *of itself*, i. e. it seems to be made for its own sake, and chiefly to respect its future Benefit, and on that account to be more noble and perfect. Nor does it seem possible for a greater Perfection to be communicated than the fruition of such a Principle. The more free any one is, and the less liable to external Motions, the more perfect he is: God has therefore multiply'd this kind of Creatures as far as the System and order of his Work allow'd, and decreed

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which Enjoyment a Man could not possibly have without such a Liberty, but must necessarily hang in perpetual Suspense, without any Choice at all? This *Leibnitz* owns to be an unavoidable consequence of his Opinion [r.] and to avoid this Absurdity, is driven to a greater, *viz.* to deny that there are any such indifferent and equal things in Nature [s.] the contrary to which has been abundantly evinc'd already with respect to both God and Man.

Lastly, to the Argument against the Possibility of such a Liberty, so frequently repeated by the two Authors above mention'd, *viz.* that Actions done without any Motive, would be *Effects* without a Cause; We reply, in short, that it is a plain *Petitio Principij*, in supposing Motives to be the real *physical efficient* Causes (and these are the only Causes which can concern the present Question) of Volition or Action, which we deny; and yet are far from supposing these Acts to be absolutely without a Cause; nay we assign them another, and affirm that their only true and proper Cause is this self-moving Power, and the only Cause of this is the Creator who communicated it.

On this Subject may be seen Dr. *Clarke's Demonstrat.* p. 136, &c. 2d Edit. or his *Remarks*, &c. p. 28, &c. or *Chubb's farther Reflections on Natural Liberty.* *Collection of Tracts*, p. 388, &c.

[r.] *Essais de Theodice*, p. 161, &c.

[s.] See his 4th Letter to Dr. Clarke.

decreed that such as are passive in their Operations should be subservient to these.

II. Since therefore Happiness, according to the common Notion of it, is granted to arise from a due use of those Faculties and Powers which every one enjoys; and since this Power of determining ourselves to Actions, and pleasing ourselves in them, is the most perfect of all, whereby we are the most conscious of our Existence and our Approach towards God, our chief Happiness will consist in the proper use of it, nor can any thing be absolutely agreeable to us but what is chosen.

(T.) It is to be confess'd that many external Ob-

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piness will consist in the Exercise of it, *i. e.* in

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(T.) Against this it is objected, 1st, That the Author here describes Free-will to be a Power of choosing this or that without any dependence either on the other Faculties or Attributes of the free Agent, or on the Qualities of external Objects.

Answer, The Author never said or imagin'd that Liberty was a power to choose in all Cases without any dependence on the other Faculties or the Qualities of Objects, but the direct contrary; *viz.* that all other Faculties of the Agent were to be consider'd, his Appetites consulted, and the fitness of Objects observ'd. He expressly teaches that if a free Agent choose any thing contrary to the natural Appetites without any Cause, he gives himself unnecessary trouble, if any thing above his power to compass, or impossible in the Nature of things, he makes himself so far unhappy. That which the Author maintains is only this, that Goodness is the Agreement of a thing to some Appetite, and that agreement may either arise from the natural fitness of the Object to the Appetite, or the Appetite's accommodating itself to the Object; that God has given us a power in many Cases, and indeed in the most common Affairs of Life, to accommodate our will to things; that this is done by our choosing, them and whatsoever, we so choose, if we can enjoy it, as long as the Choice continues, will please us; and lastly, that this power is of mighty advantage to us; for we can't expect that things should always answer our natural Appetites, and therefore since it is unreasonable all the World should

jects, many that are offer'd by the Senses, please us ; but if we look into the thing more narrowly, this

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should be made to accommodate us, it is a great Benefit that God has given us a power to accommodate ourselves to the things as we find them ; if we make a right use of this power we may be always happy, for we may always choose such things as we can enjoy, and reject those that can't be had, and if we do so we may be always pleased.

Thus things may become Good or Evil to us by our Choice and our Happiness or Misery will depend upon it. Now he that would in earnest confute this Notion has but one of these two things to do, either first, to shew that there is no such Power or Faculty possible, or 2dly, That there is no advantage in it.

I will put the rambling Objections that I have met with in as good a method as I can, tho' they are generally so little to the purpose, that it is harder to bring them in than answer them.

2dly, Therefore it is urg'd that we know by experience that to make a Man please himself in his Choice, it is not necessary that he should believe that he is not insensibly and imperceptibly directed to it by some external Cause; and the inference from this, if intended against the Author, must be, that therefore a Man's choosing a thing doth not make it pleasing to him; but nothing like this follows; all that can be justly inferr'd is that whether a choice be free or necessitated it is sufficient to make the thing chosen agreeable.

It were in vain to produce all the Instances impertinently brought to prove that a necessitated choice may please us. Yet to shew how strangely some Authors can wander from the point I will examine one or two of them: First, it is said, if a Man should upon mature Deliberation resolve on a thing, and whilst about to execute it, on a sudden a strong impetuous thought comes into his Mind to do something else, and he follows that and succeeds, he would conceive an extraordinary Joy; for he must imagine that God, a good Angel or his good Fortune had prompted him to do it, and therefore it is not his Choice pleases him.

I answer, First, it is plain such a Man alters his Choice, and makes a new one, and that new one pleases him; if his former Choice continued, he cou'd not have made the new one,

this will appear to arise from hence only, that these are as Motives which induce us to exert an

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one, nor would the doing the thing he is about otherwise satisfy him.

But 2dly, We must distinguish between the Choice and the means of obtaining it. When once the Choice is made, the most easy and effectual ways of obtaining the thing chosen please us best. A Man is to fight a Battle; his choice is to conquer, he thinks of means to execute it. Several ways occur and he pitches upon one, which pleases and is chosen not for itself, but as subservient to his desire of Victory. An Angel appears and directs him to another: none can doubt but this will cause extraordinary joy in him, because it brings him to obtain his Choice by the most certain and infallible means. Now this is so far from proving that Choice is not the thing that gives goodness to Objects, that it directly proves the contrary. For here the only thing that makes him reject what his reason proposed to him as the best means to obtain his Choice, is because he has discover'd a better. On the other Hand, if a General out of treachery should design to lose a Battle; and it happened in the hurry that he shou'd be forced to do something that gain'd it, he would not please himself in the Action. Here's a Victory that is good to one and ill to another, and the difference lies plainly in the one's choosing and the other's rejecting it.

But 2dly, 'tis objected, that a *Jansenist* or *Calvinist* who gives an Alms, and is persuaded that God inspires him to do so, is better pleased with himself than a *Stoick*, who attributes to himself all the Glory of a charitable action. Well what then? Therefore things do not please us because we choose them. No such matter. A true Christian, call him *Jansenist*, or what you will, chooses to prefer the Glory of God to his own, and therefore he is better pleased to think the Glory of what he does belongs to God, than to himself, as this is more agreeable to his Choice.

In short all the Instances I have seen are of the same Nature, and if there were a thousand of them they all receive the same answer, they are nothing to the purpose, and prove no more than that Men are best pleased with the most effectual means to obtain their Elections.

But 3dly, It is alledged that if the Happiness of Man consists in his Choice, God ought to have left him fairly to that Choice,

Act of Election, whereby we embrace them as if they were agreeable to the natural Appetites: for tho'

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Choice, so that neither the other Faculties of his Soul nor Qualities of Objects should have any power over him to restrain the use of his Freedom.

If I understand this right, the meaning of it is that God should not have given Man any particular Appetites determin'd to their Objects, nor made any thing impossible for him to attain that he pleas'd to choose. This I confess had been a freedom with a witness, for it had put it in the power of every Man to turn the World as he pleas'd. But if one Man had this power no other cou'd have had it. For things can be but one way at once, and if one Man had put them into a certain method, all the rest must either have been content with that or been miserable; but God has put them in the way that is best, and since they must not be changed he has given every Man a Power to conform himself to them, and please himself in the Choice: And to secure the preservation of Men the better he has given them natural Appetites to such things as are necessary for their support, and thereby guarded their Choice from hurting them as much as the nature of things, and the circumstances in which they are placed will permit; which is so far from being an injury, that it is a great instance of Divine Goodness by setting bounds to our Choice where it might hurt us, and leaving us in all other matters to please ourselves by a free Election. Thus he has oblig'd us to take care of our lives by a strong Appetite to continue our Being. He has secur'd our feeding our Bodies by the Appetite of Hunger, so that we are uneasy under it, and yet that uneasiness is not so great, but our choice, tho' with some difficulty, will make it pleasing to us; and so in all other Appetites by which we are prompted to supply our natural necessities. And thus they always mistake the Matter that presume to teach God what he should do.

But 4thly, It is urg'd, that we desire Happiness necessarily, and cannot choose Evil as Evil, and therefore our Choice does not make things agreeable, that is good. But I see no manner of consequence in the Argument, it rather proves the contrary. For we must take notice that Good and Evil are respective things, and have relation to some Appetite. Now we have several Appetites determin'd to their Objects, and the things agreeable or disagreeable to them are good or bad antecedently

tho' the Will cannot be determin'd to Election by any thing but itself, yet it may be *persuaded to de-*

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to choice. But there are other things, that have no agreeableness or inconveniency to any Appetite before Election, and then are good or bad as they agree with that Choice. Now 'tis plain that there is nothing good or bad in respect of our natural Appetites, but we can choose it, even Death itself: and therefore it is not meant of them or of this sort of Evil, when we say we can't choose Evil. But it is absolutely impossible that we shou'd what is contrary to choice, and so Evil in that sense, for then we shou'd choose it and not choose it at the same time. This gives us the reason why we cannot choose Evil *as such*; because it is made good by our Choice. And if a Man's choice of things and enjoying them be that which makes him happy, it is impossible he shou'd not choose Happiness, because whilst he chooses and enjoys a thing, he cannot at the same time choose to reject and want it, that is to be unhappy.

But 5thly, 'Tis further objected that those who believe that they are only free from constraint, those that think their Will is determin'd by the Understanding, and those who are of opinion that they possess indifference of Will are all equally content with themselves, so they choose conveniently, that is, so they enjoy their choice or attain some great good whether they foresaw it or no.

I answer, this may be true, but nothing to the purpose; since it is manifest all of them make a Choice, and provided they obtain what they have chosen they are so far satisfy'd, which only proves that whether we believe our Choice be necessitated or voluntary, it is of so great force as to make the thing chosen agreeable, *i. e.* Good, as long as the Choice lasts.

The true point in Question here is which of these Hypotheses will best secure the Happiness of Men. As to the First of these Opinions that supposes us free only from constraint, and that our Choice is necessarily determin'd to the good or ill we conceive in Objects, the Author has proved that on this supposition Happiness is impossible, in his 5th Chap. Sect. 1. Subsect. 1. par. 18. As to the 2d, which supposes the Will to be determin'd by the last act of the Understanding, this is shewn to be equivalent to necessity, because the Understanding is necessary and obliged to judge as things appear to it. And

termine itself, in order to avoid what is absurd and disgusting to the Natural Appetites.

III. For

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as to the 3d, that places an indifference in the Will, the Author has shewn, Chap. 5. Sect. 1. Subsect. 2. par. 8. that mere indifference of Choice is of no use, but rather an impediment to Happiness, except the Will have at the same time a power to make the thing chosen agreeable. If such a Power be in the Will, the Author shews Subsect. 3. of the same Sect. Par. 22. that the Agent possess'd of it may be happy tho' he have a very imperfect Understanding and commit many Mistakes.

It ought likewise to be consider'd that if we really have this Power, it is not material whether we know or believe that we have it or no, for whatever our opinion of it be, it will do its own Work. If a Man believe himself free, as generally Men do, when he really is necessitated by a force he doth not perceive, he is never the freer on that account. And if he believe himself necessitated contrary to what he feels in his own Mind, as some are perswaded to do by the sophistical Arguments of vain Philosophers, he is never the less free for that. And hence it is that whatever opinion Men have concerning the Freedom or necessity of choice, they are equally pleas'd or displeas'd with it, when once it is made; because the pleasure doth not arise from their opinion concerning the Faculty, but from the use of it.

But lastly, 'tis said that the good Angels and Saints in Heaven have no such Liberty as this; that the good Angels are perfectly determin'd to love God, and the Souls of Men as soon as they enter Heaven, cease to be indifferent to Good and Evil, and can't make any other than a good Choice.

If this is intended against the Author's Position, the Inference must be either that the Angels and Saints do not choose to be in Heaven, or that Heaven doth not please because they choose to be there, neither of which Consequences do at all follow. But then is it not strange that a Liberty of indifference which remains no longer than our miserable sojourning on Earth, and is at an end as soon as a Man begins to be perfectly happy, should be necessary to our Happiness, and the Fountain of it here? To which I answer, that the whole Argument is founded on a great mistake.

The Author believes that the Angels and Blessed in Heaven are happy only by this means, that they freely choose every act that they perform, and are always able to execute what they choose.

III. For 'tis certain that we make use of the Assistance of the Understanding in Elections, and hold it as a Light before us to distinguish Good from Evil ; but we use it as a Judge and a Counsellor, not as a Sovereign and Dictator : and to speak the truth, in order to avoid foolish and hurtful

Election
is the
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choose. I do own that they never choose amiss, nor ever will : but the reason of that is not want of Power, but because either 1st, their Circumstances are such that they have no opportunity to make such Choices : Or 2^{dly}, because they are so well pleas'd with the choice they have made that they will never alter it ; or 3^{dly}, because their Experience has shewed them what misery an ill choice has brought on them or others. Time was when some Angels made an ill choice and were thrown into Hell for it ; can we wonder if those that remain are grown wiser, and have learnt by the misery of their Fellows to choose better ? The same may be said of the Saints. They may remember the Miseries they suffer'd here on Earth, and that may teach them how to avoid the like : But to argue that because they will not choose amiss, therefore they cannot, is a false Conclusion. The truth is, herein consists their Virtue, their Goodness and Merit, that having the power to choose amiss they will not, and being posses'd of a Faculty which they may either use well or abuse ; they employ it to the best. Thus we may understand how the Saints and Angels are confirm'd in Goodness, not mechanically, or by a physical restraint on their Wills, but by the firmness of their resolution and steadiness of choice. If the case were otherwise, their Virtue were no Virtue, nor any way praise worthy ; they would be good Creatures, as the Sun is good, but no more thanks to them than to him.

Let us consider farther, that tho' the Angels and Blessed in Heaven should have lost their Freedom so far as not to be able to choose Evil, yet this doth not take away their Choice in other actions. We must not think that these blessed Creatures are altogether idle, and have no business or exercise of their Faculties ; they surely employ themselves in what is good, and as there may be great variety of actions in which they may employ themselves with pleasure, there is still choice enough left them, and the reason why one sort of exercise pleases them more than another arises from their Choice. For having no necessities

ful things, rather than to acquire what is good and agreeable. For whatever we choose will (as was shewn before) be *ipso facto* good and agreeable, except it lead us into something contrary to the Appetites, or otherwise absurd. The Understanding therefore points out and admonishes us (as we said before) to avoid these external Evils, or to embrace the Good: but till we have exerted an Act of Election about them, these do neither become absolutely agreeable, nor the others odious. We have prov'd before that this is the Case, and it will be evident from Experience to any one that considers it. If then nothing please us but what is in some respect chosen, 'tis manifest that our Happiness must be sought for in Election.

He therefore that has a free power of choosing, can always please himself.

IV. We have shewn above, that an intelligent Creature, which is merely passive in its Operations, cannot be made entirely happy: for as it is liable to external Motions, it must necessarily meet with hurtful as well as useful Objects; for all things cannot be useful. It remains therefore, that a Creature which is to be exempt from all kind of Grief should have the Principle of his own Happiness within him, and be able to delight himself, in

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necessities to supply by labour as we have here, no particular exercise is necessary to them, and therefore nothing can be supposed to make one exercise more pleasing than another, but their Choice. And in truth we count ourselves the most happy here when we have no particular business to oblige us to labour, but are left to employ our time as we please.

But lastly, we don't know how 'tis with the Saints and Angels in Heaven, we know they are happy, but how or by what means we are entirely ignorant, and must be till we get there, and therefore no argument ought or can be drawn from the state of their Happiness to ours.

in what manner soever external things be dispos'd, *i. e.* that he have the Government of his own Actions, and may please himself by willing either this or something else : Such an Agent as this is, will be satisfied with any Object that occurs ; since Objects are not chosen by him because they please him, but on the contrary, please him because they are chosen. Whoever therefore has free Choice may make himself happy, *viz.* by choosing every thing which befalls him, and adapting his Choice to things.

V. And it is by this Means only that Creatures seem capable of being made completely happy : for since things themselves are necessarily fix'd by certain Laws, and cannot be chang'd, it remains that the Elections be alter'd, in order to make them conformable to things, *i. e.* to the Will of God : for thus free Agents will have a Power in themselves of attaining Happiness. Hence it is that we are so frequently admonish'd in Holy Scripture to be *conformable to God* * ; on this Point our Salvation and Happiness turn : And with good reason ; for what is Happiness, if not to be in every thing as we will or choose ? But he who chooses to conform himself in all things to the Divine Will, must certainly be always what he would be, and will never be disappointed in his Choice : however external things fall out, a Person thus dispos'd may enjoy Happiness, nor does any one seem to have been capable of it on other terms.

VI. But perfect Happiness, may some say, is not to be expected ; for those Beings which are united to terrestrial Matter must necessarily be affected with the Motions of it, as was shewn before,

We can change our Elections to make them conformable to things, and so can attain Happiness.

Care of the Body and the natural Appetites disturb Elections

and hinder our Happiness from being perfect.

* Rom. 12. 2: Coloss. 3. 1, 2, &c.

and cannot bear the dissolution of the Body, or the impairing of its Organs (which are yet unavoidable) without some Pain and uneasy Sensation. I confess, absolute Felicity is by no Means to be hoped for in the present State: But yet the more our Elections are conformable to things, the more happy we are; if then our Elections were perfectly free, we should also be at Liberty to enjoy perfect Happiness: but since the care of our Bodies, and the natural Appetites disturb our Elections, and sometimes byass them to one Side, we cannot please ourselves in Elections absolutely, and without a Mixture of Uneasiness. For tho' they afford Delight, and even greater than the natural Appetites, yet they do not remove all manner of Uneasiness, nor extinguish the Sense of Pain. While therefore we are in this State, we must acquiesce with a mix'd and imperfect Happiness; such as the present State of things affords; and it is plain that this, such as it is, arises only from Elections. For tho' we cannot by mere Election always extinguish the Pain and Uneasiness which arises from our being forc'd to bear such things as are disgusting to the natural Appetites, yet we can choose to bear these things, and please ourselves in that Choice; the Consciousness of our Powers in bearing these surpassing the Uneasiness of Pain, nay perhaps augmenting the Pleasure so far as that the Excess of it shall overcome the Pain arising from the frustrated Appetites by so many Degrees as could have been obtain'd, if there had been no contrariety between them and the Election. For instance, if one feel two Degrees of Pain from a Distemper, and receive six Degrees of Pleasure from an Election to bear it with Patience and Decorum; subtracting two Degrees of Pain from these six of Pleasure, he has four of solid Pleasure remaining:

remaining: He will be as happy therefore as one that has four Degrees pure and free from all Pain. If this be granted to be possible, we may be as happy with the natural Appetites, as if we had been without them, nor shall we have any reason to complain of them. (U.)

VII. And

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(U.) The true advantage of such a Faculty appears in many instances, as is observ'd in the Book. First, when by the course of Nature and the Order of the World we are obliged to undergo many things contrary to our natural Appetites, many things painful and disagreeable. 2dly, when by the weakness of our Understanding we are obliged to make choices the consequence of which we cannot foresee, as it must often happen to a finite Understanding. 3dly, when the general good of the World requires us to sacrifice our particular Interest or Appetite. Lastly, where there is little or no difference in matter of choice as it happens in most things of Life. In all these and many other Cases the right use of this Faculty gives us ease and Satisfaction, and without it we must be in continual torment.

If it be said that Reason tells us we ought to be content and submit in such cases, and therefore if the Will be determin'd by the last act of the Understanding, there will need no such Faculty as the Author pleads for, that can make a thing good by choosing. I reply, on the contrary this very case shews the necessity of such a Faculty. For suppose I am sick and feel great pain, my Understanding tells me this is unavoidable, that it is the Will of God and the course of nature, and therefore I ought to bear it with patience. If I have a power of choosing thus to bear it, and by that choice of making it pleasing to me, it is to very good purpose that my Understanding makes this representation, for by means thereof I obtain a degree of Happiness in the midst of all the natural Evils that oppress me. But if I have no such power to choose, or if I choose and that choice does not make the thing I suffer better, it is in vain that my Understanding makes such a representation; it only tells me that I am miserable, but yields me no help. Counsellors are of great use to a Person that has a Power to execute what they advise, otherwise their advices are in vain, and only serve to augment the Person's Misery by shewing his impotence to help himself. 'Tis thus between the Under-

standing

We have
reason to
admire

the Divine
itself in

VII. And here, by the Way, we may admire
the Divine Goodness and Wisdom, which (since
Objects

Wisdom which created an Appetite that has wherewith to please
its own Nature, howsoever external things be disposed.

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standing and the Will, if we suppose no power in the Will by choosing to make Objects agreeable or disagreeable, it is in vain for the Understanding to advise us to choose them. To what purpose should we choose them, when our Choice can make no alteration in them as to their Good or Evil Qualities?

But here it will be said that antecedent to the Choice there is a goodness in bearing sickness patiently, and the Understanding by representing that Goodness to the Will determines it to choose it, and from that sense of Good arises the pleasure and ease we find in patience. But this I think is a plain mistake: for we often find one Man of better sense than another uneasy under pain, whilst the weaker makes it easy to himself.

If you discourse these two you'll find that the Man of better Understanding has a much clearer representation of all Motives that may induce patience than the other, knows exactly all the benefits of Contentment, and how much it is his interest to comply with his circumstances, and yet he does it not. How then comes this difference? Whence can it arise but from this that the one chooses to comply and the other does not? If it be merely the reasons and motives being more advantageously represented to one Man than the other, that makes the one patient the other impatient under pain; either that representation arises from some free act of the Will, or from some natural or accidental disposition, inclination or circumstance of the Agent. If from a free act of the Will, then it recurs to what was pleaded for at the first, *viz.* that we are pleased because we choose. But if the representation that determines our Choice arise from any natural or accidental disposition, &c. these being all external to the Will, and out of its power, 'tis plain the determination can't be free. He is a happy Man to whom such a disposition, &c. happens, but he can't be look'd on as more virtuous or commendable than he that chooses ill because he wants them. He may be commended as Gold or Jewels are, because he has some things that agree to our desires, but not as an Agent that merits thanks or praise for Virtue.

And

Objects are generally fix'd and confin'd under certain Laws) could create an Appetite that should have

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And here I must observe that the generality of Men imagine that every thing antecedently to choice is either Good or Evil, and we so far concerned in it, that except we could poise the whole World exactly, and ballance all future consequences with respect to our convenience or inconvenience, we could never perform any act but what must either contribute to our Happiness or hinder it. But this is a most false Supposition and contrary to reason as well as experience. For it happens in a thousand Instances that the things we choose are of so little moment as to be perfectly indifferent to us, and that only pleases best which we choose. A Man is walking in a bowling-green, the exercise of his Limbs is all that he designs, and which way soever he walks he is equally pleased. But if any hinder him after he has chose his way, or force him to a different one, it will provoke his Anger, and perhaps put him on a Quarrel that may cost him his Life.

There's no necessity therefore that to make an equilibrium for the Will, the World should be so divided that all impressions from one part, and the other should be actually equal, for as a Man may turn the beam of a ballance with his hand, tho' as many weights lie in the other Scale as it can hold, so the Will may determine itself, tho' all the considerations the World affords lay in opposition to the thing we choose, but it often happens that the World affords none at all either way, and then the Will turns the ballance as it pleases. And in truth, if our Happiness were concern'd in every circumstance of Life, it were unreasonable to oblige us to choose before we knew them all, which is impossible, and so God would have made a right Choice depend on an impossible Condition. Whereas if we have a power by the pleasure of our Choice to ballance the inconveniencies that happen from outward things, it sufficiently justifies the Divine Goodness, tho' he has put us in such Circumstances that it is impossible always to regulate our Choice as we would have done had we foreseen all the Consequences that attend it.

But here 'tis urged, that tho' a Man doth not always perceive the reason which determines him to choose one of the two things that seem perfectly equal, yet there is always some secret impression that does determine him. But this is to suppose the very thing in Question; just as if a Man shou'd go about

have wherewith to satisfy it within itself; and might render any State agreeable, barely by willing it.
Now

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about to solve an Objection, to which he cou'd find no other answer, by telling the Objector that it cou'd not be true, because if it were, the position against which he produced it must be false.

In short, we prove the Freedom and Indifference of the Will by producing many Instances where there is no motive to determine it one way more than the other; Nay, when all visible Motives are against it. To which the Enemies of Free-will reply, 'tis true, they can't produce or find any reason; but there is one, tho' imperceptible to the Man that chooses as well as to the rest of the World. Which as it is said without reason needs none to confute it.

But they ought to remember that to choose any thing for a reason not known or observ'd; is to choose without reason; a reason unknown is no reason at all, except they'll say that the will is determin'd as mechanically as matter is by impulse.

But we carry the Matter yet much farther, and shew that where there are many and strong Motives, great conveniency and agreeableness to our natural Appetites on one side, and nothing but the exercise of our Liberty on the other, we often prefer that to all these Motives, and are well pleased with ourselves, when we have done so.

The Men that might live an easy and quiet Life engage in business, toil and labour, and every one is so well pleased with his Choice, that it is hard to say amongst so many states, and such variety of Conditions which are most happy: and tho' they sometimes complain when pressed with inconveniences, yet as *Horace* observes, hardly one would change if an Option were given him. If the things themselves please abstractedly from Choice, most Men being of one Make, and having the same Passions, Wants and Appetites, those only that had all things suitable to those Appetites cou'd be pleased, and all the World wou'd be confined to one way of living.

But as Happiness arises from the Choice, it so happens that in the great variety of Circumstances wherein Men are placed, they generally are pretty equally happy, because they enjoy their Choice. A Mariner is a life that seems intolerable to me, and destitute of all those things that are agreeable to my natural Appetites; suppose then I am forced to that kind of Life, must I needs be miserable? No, I will and can make it my

Now Free-Will has this Effect by accommodating itself to Objects, when the Objects themselves cannot be chang'd. For the Man will be no less happy who chooses what he knows will come to pass, than he who brings that to pass which he chooses; the one may be always done, the other is often impossible: this therefore, or none, is the Way to arrive at Happiness. 'Tis hard to comprehend how he can fail of Happiness who has it in his Power to please himself. This seems to

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B b

have

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my choice, not from any Motive which my Understanding affords me, for it represents it as disagreeable in every respect. But I will choose it and resolve to follow it, that it may please me, and by the force of that Choice it will at length become agreeable.

If it be said that the necessity which is on me to lead that sort of Life determines my Choice; I answer, that quite contrary nothing is more opposite to choice than force, and we find nothing is apter to make us reject and be displeased with a thing than to see it forced on us. My being forced therefore on Ship-board would rather raise an aversion than pleasure in me; but as soon as by the power of my Free-will I resolve to live that Life, and be pleas'd with it, I find the pleasure begin and grow upon me. If there be any Wisdom in the World undoubtedly this is the Master-piece, to make all things easy to us by choosing the state and condition of Life in which necessity has placed us.

But my Understanding representing the evil and hardship of a thing with the necessity of bearing it, will no way contribute to my ease except at the same time it assure me that I can take away or diminish the natural Evil that accompanies it, if I choose to endure it with Contentment. Without this the Consideration of the necessity that is upon me would rather encrease the difficulty and uneasiness I feel, than allay it; as knowing the danger of a distemper encreases a Man's fear of Death, if at the same time no remedy be offer'd.

In short, the exercise of this Faculty of making things agreeable by Choice is all the remedy Nature affords us under unavoidable sufferings; if we have it not, we have none; and if we have, it takes off the complaint we make against God for putting us in such Circumstances where we necessarily must undergo such Evils.

have been the Opinion of the ancient *Stoics*, who had the same thoughts of Liberty with those laid down above, but did not explain them distinctly, nor comprehend the whole Series of the Matter.

However, 'tis very plain that they placed Happiness in the Use and Election of such things as are in our own Power, which yet would be impossible, if we were not able to please ourselves in Election. (60.)

S E C T.

N O T E S.

(60.) Our Author's mentioning the *Stoics* here, might probably give *Leibnitz* his reason to suspect him of maintaining all the absurd Consequences which that Sect are said to have drawn from the above mentioned Principle. They indeed (if they be not greatly misrepresented) urg'd it so far as to assert, that nothing external could hurt or incommode us except we pleas'd: That all Good and Evil was entirely in our Power, and of our making, and consequently that all outward things were indifferent and alike to us, antecedent to our own Choice. Which Notions, being contrary to every Day's Experience in Pleasure and Pain, led them on to deny that the latter was properly an Evil, or rather that there was any difference at all between them. This Doctrine is indeed liable to *Leibnitz's* Objections of confounding all the distinctions of things, — of contradicting the natural Appetites, — making Reason and Understanding useless, — and subverting all the other Faculties of the Mind. These and the like Reflections, I say, are justly made upon the Doctrine of the *Stoics*, as they have generally express'd themselves, and overthrow a total, *absolute Indifference* of the Mind to will in all Cases; but are nothing at all to our Author, who never contended for it; but on the contrary, insists upon a necessary, fix'd, and unalterable difference in the Natures of things, according to the present System; and has allow'd their full force to both Reason and the natural Appetites, all over the last Section, as well as in the foregoing Chapters of this Book,

But this has been explain'd in the Notes above. For an application of this Sect. see §. 5. Subject. 2. and the Notes to §. 5. Subject. 3.

S E C T. III.

Concerning undue Elections.

I. FROM hence it is sufficiently evident what kind of Elections are to be called *undue* ones: For it appears that God has given us this Faculty of choosing, that we may please ourselves in the use of it, and be happy in the fruition of those Objects which we choose. For it is a Happiness to obtain the things chosen, and Misery to be frustrated and fall short of them. Whensoever therefore we knowingly make such a Choice, as not to be able to enjoy the things chosen, 'tis plain that we choose foolishly and unduely: for we bring upon ourselves unnecessary Misery, since we could have chosen otherwise with equal Pleasure. Whoever then chooses knowingly what he cannot obtain, or what may produce unnecessary trouble to himself or others, he must be esteem'd to choose unduely. And this may be done, first, If any one choose *Impossibilities*. It may seem strange that any Person should choose a thing which is impossible, knowing it to be so; but 'tis very probable that this has happen'd sometimes, as was said before.

II. Secondly, If he choose such things as are *inconsistent* with each other: he that does this contradicts himself, and evidently cuts off all hopes of Enjoyment. When we will any thing, we must take all its necessary consequences together with it.

B b 2

But

To fall short of what we choose is Misery; we choose amiss therefore when we choose what cannot be enjoy'd: This is done 1st. when such things are chosen as are impossible.

Secondly, When those things are chosen which are inconsistent with each other.

* Sect. 1. Subject. 5. par. 10; 11; 12.

But all things here are of a mix'd kind, and nothing is pure from all degrees of Bitterness: we often therefore will that part in a certain thing which is agreeable to the Appetites, and refuse the rest: but this is in vain, since the agreeable Parts cannot be separated from the disagreeable ones: we must therefore either choose or reject the whole. He that does otherwise cannot possibly satisfy himself, since he must bear with what he would not: He is therefore voluntarily unhappy by an undue Election.

Thirdly,
If the
things
chose be
not in the
power of
the Elec-
tor.

III. Thirdly, he must be esteem'd to choose unduely, who aims at such things as he knows not to be in his Power. For it is a hazard whether he enjoys those things that are not in his Power; and it is foolish to commit our Happiness to Chance; while therefore it is in our Power to choose only such things as we are certain of obtaining, we risk our Happiness, or throw it away when we pursue Uncertainties: Now we owe as much Happiness to ourselves as is in our Power, and ought to use our utmost Endeavours to attain it; but we lose this by undue Election when we desire those things which we know to be out of our Power.

Fourthly,
If any
choose
that which
is pre-oc-
cupy'd by
the lawful
Choice of
others.

IV. Fourthly, That also is an undue Election, which obliges us to seize those things that are lawfully occupy'd by the Elections of other Men. To be disappointed of an Election is Misery, as we said before; to enjoy it, Happiness. Every one therefore that is endow'd with a Power of choosing, has a right to the enjoyment of the thing chosen, so far as is necessary to the Exercise of his own Faculties, and is no impediment to the Good of others. But he must be esteem'd an impediment to the Good of others, who will appropriate to himself what is common, or assume more and greater Advantages from the common Stock than fall

fall to his Share. Those things then which are pre-occupy'd by the Choice of other Men, belong to the Choosers, and cannot justly be taken from them: therefore he that covets them would have what is not his due: *i. e.* endeavours by an undue Election to rob others of their Right. This is to be referr'd in an especial Manner to such things as are pre-occupy'd by the Choice of the Deity; for these are to be esteem'd by all as sacred and prohibited: nor can any one meet with Success that opposes himself to God, and chooses what God disapproves. For what God wills must necessarily come to pass, but God wills the Happiness of all Men as far as it is possible; therefore he that offends unnecessarily against the Happiness of any one, is suppos'd to offend against God, and to choose what is not his due.

V. Fifthly, On this account it is unlawful for us to desire those things which are *hurtful* to ourselves or others. By hurtful things I understand those that lead to natural Evils, *v. z.* such as are prejudicial to the Body or Mind. It appears from what has been said, that things please us because they are chosen, but Reason persuades us to abstain from such Elections as may prove pernicious to our own Minds, or those of others, or such as defraud the Appetites unnecessarily: for we owe a Gratification to these Appetites, when it can be procured without greater Detriment. Therefore an Election opposed to these *gratis*, and without any reason, must be judg'd an undue one, because

Fifthly,
When
those
things
which
tend to
Natural
Evils, are
chosen
without
the Ne-
cessity.

it deprives us of the due Enjoyment of our Appetites. (W.)

S E C T.

N O T E S.

(W.) It has been objected, that 'tis a Contradiction for God to create such a Faculty as is above describ'd, and yet that it shou'd choose amiss: for what can be amiss to a Faculty that can make every thing good by choosin'g it? But the answer is plain, the Faculty is not so indifferent but it has Limitations, and he that has limits certainly does amiss by transgressing them. Tho' there is a natural Power in the Will to choose a thing in opposition to all its natural Appetites and the dictates of the Understanding, and hereby to give itself some degree of pleasure for the time, and we see that it sometimes doth so; yet the Evils that proceed from such an exorbitant exercise of this noble Faculty plainly shew that it ought not to have done so; and the Author never said or imagin'd any one would think he meant that Wisdom and Prudence were usefess to such an Agent, or that he ought not to regulate the exercise of this Faculty so as to prevent its choosin'g impossible absurd or inconsistent things, or the clashing of his Choices with his natural Appetites and their Satisfaction. A King must have a Power to punish his wicked Subjects with Death, and to reward those that deserve it with Honours and Riches; if he had not this Power, he could not govern. But shall he therefore kill the innocent and squander away his Favours on the undeserving? So a Man has Free-will by which he may choose Objects, and gratify himself in the Choice; doth it therefore follow that he may choose things impossible, things beyond his power, or contrary to his natural Appetites? Yet if he had not this natural Power to choose, he could no more be happy than a Prince could govern that had not the Power of Rewards and Punishments.

S E C T. IV.

How it is possible for us to fall into undue Elections.

I. **T**IS difficult to comprehend, as was said before, how one can fall short of Happiness who has it in his Power to please himself, yet if he choose in the foregoing Manner, or the like, he must necessarily fail of his Choice, and his Appetite be frustrated, *i. e.* he must be unhappy. But how is it possible, you'll say, that any one should make such a Choice? † I answer, This may proceed first, from *Error* or *Ignorance*. Secondly, from *Inadvertency* or *Negligence*. Thirdly, from *Levity*. Fourthly, from a contracted *Habit*. Fifthly, from other *Appetites* implanted in us by Nature. Not that the Will can be determin'd by these or any thing else which is external; but that from hence it takes an handle and occasion of determining itself, which it would not have had otherwise.

This is done five ways.

II. First, As to the first of these, we have proved before that we are liable to Errors and Ignorance; and that this is to be reckon'd among the natural Evils. When therefore we are forc'd to choose among things not sufficiently known, our Errors are not to be charg'd upon us, nor is it credible that God will suffer them to prove fatal to

First, By Error or culpable Ignorance.

B b 4

us.

† See Locke's Chapter of Power, §. 57, &c.

us. But when we are under no manner of Necessity, an Election often presents itself to us in Matters sufficiently understood, and then we hurry on without a strict and careful Enquiry, and choose Impossibilities, &c. and therefore are not entirely free from Fault, since we ought to deliberate and examine things before Election.

Secondly,
By Negligence.

III. Secondly, These undue Elections therefore happen thro' Inadvertency, for by due Care we might perceive the Good and Evil which is in Objects; but being negligent and supine, we are frequently imposed upon, and suffer for our Negligence, by falling into the foremention'd Inconveniencies.

Thirdly,
By giving
too great
Indulgence
to
the Exercise
of
Election.

IV. As to the Third, Since the Pleasure of a free Agent consists in Election, 'tis no wonder that he gives himself as large a Scope as he can in the Exercise of it. Neither will it be any thing surprising, if in this full Exercise of Elections, he sometimes transgresses the Bounds prescrib'd him by God and Nature; and light upon some things which are attended with no very prosperous Issue, (*viz.* Absurdities and Impossibilities) since he will attempt every thing. For he pleases himself in the Trial, tho' he be unfortunate in the Event; but this is no Excuse; for every one is obliged to take care of himself, lest he be too fond of indulging new Elections, and from Levity become unduely offensive to himself or others.

Fourthly,
By Obscurity,
or a
Habit.

V. Fourthly, We see that frequent Choice creates an Habit; this seems to proceed from hence, that as we delight in an Election often repeated, we are easily induc'd to hope that the same Pleasure will always follow the same Act, whereupon we grow supine and negligent, and disregard the Alterations of things; and he that does this may easily

easily fall into such Elections as will not be attended with Success. Beside, 'tis difficult for us to change those Elections, the Delight of which is fix'd and, as it were, riveted in the Mind by frequent Experiment: Yet we are not excusable for rushing upon absurd and impossible things, in order to avoid the Uneasiness attending the Change of Election. And if we search into the Cause more narrowly, we shall find that most undue Elections arise from this unseasonable Perseverance, all which come justly under the Censure of a culpable Obstinacy.

VI. Fifthly, It has been often hinted, that we consist of a Soul and Body, that these are mutually affected by each other, and that from hence various Appetites arise in us, such as the Preservation of the Body, Desire of Offspring, and the like; and whatever is an impediment to these, *that* we esteem hurtful. If therefore we be not upon our Guard, we are hurried on by the Importunity of them to Absurdities, or when we give a loose to our Elections, we grasp at such things as offer an unnecessary Violence to them: hence arise an immense train of Uneasinesses to ourselves and others; hence comes Violence and Injury to our Nature and the Natural Appetites, to which we owe at least a moderate Indulgence: hereupon we rashly and unlawfully seize those things that are pre-occupied by the Elections or Appetites of other Men; nay, are not so cautious as to refrain from what is determin'd by the Will of God himself: from these and the like Occasions it happens that we abuse our Liberty, and by undue Elections bring natural Evils upon ourselves or others. For as we are endow'd with Liberty in these and the like Cases, we may either use it according to the dictate of Reason,

Fifthly.
By the
importu-
nity of the
natural
Appetites.

son, or abuse it : this Power seems to be included in the very Notion of created Liberty.

Why every thing ought not to be chosen, and why Elections are not easily chang'd.

VII. It appears from hence how cautiously Elections ought to be made ; for tho' nothing pleases us but what is chosen, yet we do not only take delight in *choosing*, but much more in *enjoying* the things chosen, otherwise it would be the same thing whatever we choose : we must take care then that our Elections be made of such things as we may always enjoy. For if they be of perishable Objects, or such as are not in the least answerable to the end of the Elector, he that chooses them must necessarily grieve at the Disappointment. He may avoid this, will some say, by changing his Election, when the thing chosen perishes or fails ; but it is to be observ'd that Elections are not chang'd without a Sense of Grief and Remorse. For we never think of altering them till we are convinc'd that we have chosen amiss. When therefore we are disappointed of the Enjoyment of that which we have chosen, we despair, become miserable, penitent, and conscious of an Evil Choice, and then at last begin to alter our Choice, which cannot be done without an anxious and uneasy Sense of Disappointment, and the more and longer we have been intent upon any Election, so much the greater Pain it will cost us to be forced to change it. Hence proceeds the Difficulty which we feel in altering Elections ; hence many had rather persist in absurd Elections than undergo the trouble of altering them : For things please us because we will them, but to reject what we have once willed is contradicting ourselves, and cannot be done without a very disagreeable

greeable struggle and convulsion of the Mind : as any one may learn from Experience. (61.)

SECT.

NOTES.

(61.) Any one that attentively considers the Workings of his own Mind, will soon be satisfy'd of the Truth of all that our Author here advances ; he will observe what difficulty and reluctance he feels in receding from what he has once firmly resolv'd upon, tho' perhaps he can perceive no manner of Good in it except what arises purely from that Resolution. To make a Visit at a certain time ; to walk to any particular place ; to recreate ourselves with this or that kind of Diversion ; may be Actions in themselves perfectly indifferent and trivial : but when once propos'd, even upon mere whim and caprice, and resolv'd on with as little reason, they become often as much the Objects of our Hope and Desire, the thoughts of prosecuting them give us as great pleasure and satisfaction, and we are as unwillingly withdrawn from them, and as much disappointed when we fall short of the fancied enjoyment of them, as we should be in Matters of the last Importance. Every Man that has taken the least notice of what passes within him, is able to give numberless Instances of the truth of the foregoing Observation : which may serve to convince us how great the force and power of *Valision* is, and what excellent use it may be of in Life. How it supplies us with courage and constancy in the most arduous Undertakings, and enables us to surmount the greatest Difficulties : how it qualifies and alleviates our Pain, and augments the Sum of our Happiness ; and makes us run contentedly the Round of low and otherwise tedious pursuits, and bear with pleasure the otherwise insupportable load of human Woes. This shews the great usefulness and necessity of such a Principle, and will lead us to consider with our Author, in what a cautious manner it ought to be exerted, lest it fall upon wrong and improper Objects, and thereby, instead of lessening, increase our Misery, and become itself the greatest part of it. That this Principle of Liberty, tho' frequently attended with these consequences, is yet a Gift worthy of the most beneficent Donor, must appear from a general computation of its Good and Evil Effects, with regard to the whole System, which will be the Subject of the following Sections.

S E C T. V.

*How Evil Elections are consistent
with the Power and Goodness of
God.*

S U B S E C T. I.

*Proposes the Difficulty, with a Preparative to
the Solution of it.*

The Evils
of Free-
Agents are
not neces-
sary, and
therefore
seem to be
permitted
by God
voluntari-
ly.

I. **W**E have shewn that moral Evils arise from undue Election; that Elections are free; and that it is not at all necessary for any one knowingly and willingly to pursue the worse. Moral Evils cannot therefore be excused by necessity, as the natural ones, and those of Imperfection are. 'Tis plain that created Nature implies Imperfection in the very terms of its being created (since what is absolutely perfect is very God) either therefore nothing at all must be created, or something imperfect. We have shewn that by the same Necessity Natural Evils are annex'd to things naturally imperfect, and that God, agreeably to what infinite Power and Goodness required, permitted no manner of Evil in Nature, the absence whereof would not have introduced more or greater Evil. Since therefore Inconveniencies attend either the presence or absence of it, God made that which
was

was attended with the least. There are no Evils then which could possibly be avoided, and therefore they must be look'd upon as necessary, since the Imperfection of a Creature did not admit of pure and absolute Good. But this Necessity does not appear in free Agents: For the Evils incident to them seem to proceed, not from imperfection of Nature, but *free Choice*, and are therefore permitted by God voluntarily, since neither the Nature of Things, nor the Good of the Universe require the permission of them: that is, the World would be as well without as with them.

II. 'Tis to be observ'd, that God permitted the former kind of Evils because they were inseparable from things; either therefore the things must not have been created, or their inherent Evils tolerated: But Evil Elections have no necessary connection with the free Acts of the Will: neither does the Nature of Man require that he should choose amiss: nor does any benefit accrue to him from these Elections which could not be obtained without them, as it does in Hunger, Thirst, Fear, and the rest of the Passions; for without these Affections, as was shewn, the Animal would soon perish; but no Evil would befall us (nay what Good would not?) if we always attended to Reason, and never chose amiss. Since therefore Man might bring the greatest pleasure to himself, and exercise his faculties by choosing always well, how comes it to pass that God suffers him to hurt himself and others unnecessarily by Evil Elections? If it be said that a Power of choosing either Side is contain'd in the very Notion of Liberty; this must be allow'd, but yet there seems to be room enough for the Exercise of Liberty, tho' the Will were confin'd to the choice of what is lawful and convenient; what need is there then of such a Power as may extend to the choice of Evil?

Moral Evils have no necessary connection with a free Nature, nor are of any advantage to it.

III. This

Here the
lies the
stress of
the Diffi-
culty, viz.
why did
God per-
mit those
Evils

which are
neither ne-
cessary nor
useful?

We don't
know so
much of
the Nature
of think-
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as of ma-
terial ones
and there-
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less pre-
pared for
an An-
swer to
this Diffi-
culty, than
to the
former.

III. This seems to be the hardest point, the main stress of the Difficulty, viz. Whence come Moral Evils; i. e. those that are not necessary? If they be said to be necessary, how are they free? If they be not necessary, why does God permit them? The latter seems repugnant to the Goodness of God, the former to the Nature of a free Agent.

IV. It must be confess'd, that we are less prepar'd for a Solution of this Difficulty than the former; for the Nature and Systems of the Intellectual World are less known to us than those of the purely Material one: Material Objects surround us, and occupy all the Inlets to Knowledge; and are the only things that immediately affect our Senses. They intrude upon us with an infinite Variety, and produce many and various Sensations in us. But of intellectual Beings of their Operations, or of the mutual connection between them, we have but very few, and those very obscure Notions, viz. such as arise only from the reflection of our Understanding upon itself, or are collected by the use of Reason deducing one thing from another: For, of all intellectual Beings, our own Mind alone is immediately perceiv'd by us; nor can we (as in Bodies) compare the Notions arising from it, with them that proceed from other Sources: all our Knowledge therefore of Spirits or thinking Beings is deriv'd from this alone. 'Tis no wonder then if we be very much in the dark in our Reasonings about these and their Operations: and do not so clearly perceive the necessity of allowing Free-Will to them, as contrariety in the Motions of Matter; nor so easily apprehend what Inconvenience would follow from restraining the exercise of Liberty, as we see the consequence of taking away the motion of Matter. We know that without Motion the whole

whole Mass of Matter would prove entirely useless, and that there would be no room for so many Animals as now we find receive their Origin and Subsistence from it; which is justly esteem'd a greater Evil, and more intolerable than all the natural Evils arising from Matter and Motion: and we should find the same thing in the prevention of the use of Free-Will, if we understood the System of the Intellectual as well as that of the Material World. But if we can shew that more Evils necessarily arise from withdrawing or restraining the use of Free-Will, than from permitting the abuse of it, it must be evident that God is oblig'd to suffer either these or greater Evils. And since the least of these necessary Evils is chosen, even infinite Goodness could not possibly do better.

V. Let us try then whether the abuse of Free-Will could be prohibited with less detriment to the whole System, than what arises from the permission of it. There are three Ways whereby God may be conceiv'd able to have prevented bad Elections; first, If he had created no Free Being at all. Secondly, If his Omnipotence interpose, and occasionally restrain the Will, which is naturally free, from any wrong Election. Thirdly, If he should change the present state of things, and translate Man into another, where the occasions of Error and incitements to Evil being cut off, he should meet with nothing that could tempt him to choose amiss.

The abuse of Free-Will may be conceiv'd to have been prevented three ways, which are consider'd in the following Subsections.

SUBJECT.

S U B S E C T. II.

Why God has created Free Agents.

God might have prevented moral Evils, if he had refused to create any free Being.

But without these the World would have been a mere Machine, and every thing passive.

I. **A**S to the first, 'Tis certain that God was not compell'd by any necessity to create any thing at all, he might therefore have prevented all Moral Evils, if he had not endow'd any Being with Free Choice ; for so there would have been nothing that could sin. But such a monstrous Defect and *Hiatus* would have been left in Nature by this means, *viz.* by taking away all Free Agents, as would put the World into a worse Condition than that which it is in at present, with all the Moral Evils that distress it, tho' they were multiply'd to a much greater Number.

II. For in the first place, if we set aside Free Agents, *i. e.* those which have the Principle of Action within themselves, there is properly nothing at all Self-active, for all other Beings are merely passive : there is indeed some kind of Action in Matter, *viz.* Motion ; but we know that it is passive even with regard to that ; 'tis therefore the Action of God upon Matter, rather than of Matter itself ; for it does not move itself, but is moved. Without Free Agents then the whole World would be a mere *Machine*, capable of being turn'd any Way by the Finger or Will of God, but able to effect nothing of itself. Nay the whole Work of God could not of itself exert one single Act or Thought, but would be totally brute and stupid, as much as a Wheel or a Stone : it would continue sluggish and incapable of Action, unless actuated by external

nal force. Second Causes could therefore effect nothing which might be imputed to them, but all would be done entirely by the first. We need not say, how much a World thus constituted would be inferior to the present, nor how incommodious and unworthy of its Divine Author.

III. Man, you'll say, necessarily assents to this Proposition, twice two make four; but tho' his Mind is necessarily driven to this Assent, and consequently is not *free*, yet he is *active*: for it can scarce be said that a Man is passive in giving his Assent †. The same may be affirm'd of God, who tho' we suppose him to be absolutely free in his primary Elections, yet when these are once fix'd, he must necessarily execute what he had decreed: nevertheless he is properly Self-active in all Cases, consequently there may be something active in Nature, tho' there were nothing free.

Objection from those who declare that the Understanding is active, tho' it is necessary, as also God himself.

IV. As to the former Part of the Objection, 'tis not very clear what may be the efficient Cause of intellectual Assent; if the Object, then the Mind is merely passive in the Act of Understanding: nor is Assent imputable to it any more than Descent to a Stone; but if the Object be esteem'd only a Condition upon which the Understanding acts, we shall want a Cause to determine the Understanding; for that cannot be supposed to determine itself, any more than the Fire determines itself to burn combustible Matter. For no body judges the combustible Matter to be active when it is set on Fire, or that the Fire burns of itself without being kindled by something else. The World then without Liberty will be a piece of Mechanism, where nothing moves itself, but every thing is mov'd by an external Cause, and that by another, and so on till

Answer to the former part of the Objection

Vol. II.

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† See Note 42.

we come at the first, namely God ; who will be the only Self-active Being, and must be esteem'd the real Cause of all things : neither can any thing, whether well or ill done, be ascribed to others.

Answer to
the latter.

V. As to the latter part of the Objection, That Being must be denominat'd Free, who is held by no other tie than his own Election : But God is no otherwise oblig'd to execute his Decrees, therefore he is free, if he did but make his Decrees freely ; and is purely active in every Operation wherein he executes them. For he suffers nothing by necessity, nor from any other beside himself, and is determin'd to act by his own Liberty.

God has a
complacency
in his Works,
and if nothing
were free, that
would be
wanting
in them
which is
most agreeable
to the
Deity.

VI. Secondly, We believe that God created the World in order to exercise the Powers he is possess'd of for the Good of the Universe ; the Divine Goodness therefore delights and applauds itself in its Works, and the more any thing resembles God, and the more 'tis Self-sufficient, it is to be esteem'd so much the more agreeable to its Author. But any one may understand how much a Work which moves itself, pleases itself, and is capable of receiving and returning a Favour, is preferable to one that does nothing, feels nothing, makes no return, unless by the force of some external Impulse : any Person, I say, may apprehend this, who remembers what a Difference there is between a Child caressing his Father, and a Machine turn'd about by the hand of the Artificer. There is a kind of Commerce between God, and such of his Works as are endow'd with Freedom ; there's room for Covenant and mutual Love. For there is some sort of Action on both Sides, whereby the Creature may in some measure return the benefits of the Creator, at least make an acknowledgment for them ; and if any thing in the Divine Works can be conceiv'd to be agreeable to God, this must certainly

certainly be so *. One such Action as this is preferable to all the Sportings of Matter, or the Labyrinths of Motion; if there had been no free Creatures, God must have been deprived of this Complacency, which is almost the only one worthy of him that he could receive from the Creation. 'Tis therefore as much agreeable to God that he should have made such Beings, as it is to the World that they should be made: for if nothing of this kind had been created, the very best thing among the Creatures, and that which is most agreeable to the Deity, would have been wanting. 'Tis better therefore to permit the abuse of Liberty in some than to have omitted so much Good. For the Defect and Absence of such Agents is to be esteemed a greater Evil than all the Crimes which are consequent upon the abuse of Liberty.

VII. Thirdly, From what has been said, we learn that some Evils which necessarily adhere to things, *viz.* Natural ones, and those of Imperfection, did not hinder the Divine Goodness from creating the Good with which they were connected, since the excess of Good compensated for the fewer and less Evils which were unavoidable: Thus God chose such Animals as were Mortal, afflicted with Hunger, Thirst, and other Passions, rather than none at all. If then those Evils which were *necessary* and foreseen did not hinder God from creating the Good that was annexed to them, how much less should the *possible* Evils arising from the abuse of Free-Will hinder his Goodness from creating Free-Agents? To enjoy free Choice is a greater Good than simple Life, but we willingly accept this latter with all the train of Natural Evils, how much more gratefully should we embrace the Gift of Liberty,

Necessary Evils do not always hinder the Creation of things, much less those which are only possible.

* Paradise lost, B. 3. C. 100, &c.

Natural
Evils are
greater
than Mo-
ral ones,
and Free-
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greater
Good than
the Natu-
ral Appe-
tites.

berty, attended only with some Danger of Evils, but not with the Evils themselves, as in the former Cases, (62.)

VIII. Fourthly, It must be observ'd that Elections are therefore esteem'd Evil, because they lead us into Natural Evils. For if an Election contain nothing absurd or prejudicial, 'tis not a wrong one. Hatred of God, Rebellion against his Commands, Murder, Theft, Lying, are Sins, because they are hurtful to ourselves or others, because they deprive us of natural Good, and lead to Evil. Elections therefore are wrong and undue on account of the natural Evils which sometimes attend them; Natural Evils then are greater than Moral †: For that which makes any thing bad must necessarily be worse itself: But Free-Will is better than natural Appetites, and a Gift more worthy of the Deity, it is not therefore to be deny'd to the Creatures on account of the concomitant Evils, any more than the natural Appetites and Propensities: both of them indeed sometimes lead us into the same Evils, but with this Difference, that the one, viz. the natural

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(62.) In relation to us, indeed, a Gift which is attended only with the possibility of some Inconveniencies, appears to be of more dignity and value than one that brings some degree of unavoidable Misery along with it, and as such it ought to be receiv'd with proportionable gratitude by us. But with respect to a Being who foresees all the Abuses of Free-Will, all the contingent Evils consequent thereupon are as certain as the natural and necessary ones, and therefore ought to be equally provided against. This Argument therefore about the *Contingency* of Moral Evil, so far as it relates to the Deity, need not be insisted on, since our Author allows the Divine Prescience, and consistently with that, offers reasons sufficient for the Vindication of the other Attributes of God in the present Case.

† See Chap. 4. §. 4. par. 8. and R. i.

natural Appetite, loads us with Evils by necessity; but the other, viz. Free-Will, not of necessity, but only if we please. These might have been avoided since they are contingent, but those could not, since they force themselves upon us against our Wills: If therefore it was not unworthy of God to create an Appetite which was attended with necessary Evils; how much more agreeable was it to his Goodness to have endow'd us with Free-Will, by which these Evils may be avoided or at least alleviated? If the natural Appetite be a greater Good than what these Evils which flow from it can overballance, and therefore worthy to be implanted in Animals by the Deity; how much more excellent a Good will Free-Election be, by which alone we become capable of Happiness, tho' join'd with the danger of falling into Evils by abuse?

IX. Fifthly, If the State of Man would be worse without Free-Will than with it, 'tis plain that Liberty diminishes instead of increasing the Sum of Evils, and is bestow'd upon us for that end. But how much more miserable the State of Man would be without Liberty than it is with it, will appear to any one who considers what sort of Creatures we should be without Election. For if Man were not free, he would be driven by the violence of Matter and Motion, and sooner or later be quite overwhelm'd with those natural Evils which necessarily arise from the Nature and Laws of Motion. But it is better to struggle with some of these with Liberty, than all of them with necessity; the former is the Condition of Men, the latter of Brutes†. If by being deprived of Election we should be freed from all kind of Evil, we might complain of God for giving it; but seeing that whether we be free or

The State of Man would be worse if Free Will were taken away.

† Only in some Degree. See the Observation from Bayle in Note 24.

or bound by the chain of Fate (while we have Bodies) we must necessarily endure those Evils which are consequent upon the affections of Bodies ; (nay those very Evils which we were afraid of falling into by a wrong Choice) 'tis in vain to desire the absence of Liberty, by relying upon which, and using it aright, we may avoid the most bitter part even of these necessary Evils.

Free Agents only are capable of perfect Happiness, therefore it is better to enjoy Liberty.

X. For in the Sixth place, it is most manifest that the greatest Good, and that whereby Men excel other Animals, is owing to Liberty. By the assistance of this we rise above Fate, and when attack'd from without by adverse Fortune, we find our Happiness within ourselves. Other Animals have nothing to oppose to a Distemper, Death, or Pain ; nothing to delight themselves in, except Sleep, Food, and the Appetite of propagating their Species. But a free Agent, in the midst of Pains and Torments, of Hunger and Thirst, nay Death itself, has wherewithal to please itself, and to blunt the Edge of all these Evils. We complain of our Bodies, that by being tied to them, we are oblig'd to undergo very many and great Hardships ; how much more full of Complaints should we be if we were entirely subjected to them, and hurried into Evils without any Remedy or Relief ? Is it not better for us to have our Happiness in our own Power, than to be oblig'd to seek it elsewhere, nay rather to despair of it ? Which Happiness is only to be found in a Free Choice, as was shewn before. From hence it appears, I hope, sufficiently why God created Free Agents notwithstanding the abuse which they were liable to. For he chose a Creature which would sometimes do amiss, rather than that every thing should be drawn on by Fate, and

and a Chain of Necessity, into inevitable Evils.

(63.)

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XI. But

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(63.) Our Author having shewn in Sect. 2. that the greatest part of our Happiness consists in this Principle of Election, here points out some of the many Inconveniencies that would attend the loss of it. First, If there was no such thing as a free Agent, all would be mere Mechanism and necessary Effects of the first Cause, *i. e.* the best and noblest part of Nature would be cut off, that which of all others is most worthy of and agreeable to the Deity. There would be no Creatures capable of making any kind of return, of paying any reasonable Obedience and Duty to God; no possibility for him to display his Wisdom, Goodness and Mercy in the Government of them, nor any means of bringing them to the sublimest Degree of Intellectual Happiness, *viz.* that which arises from *Morality*. Secondly, Those passive Beings themselves would be in a much worse Condition than they now are. They would be deprived of all the Happiness which they now enjoy from the choice of indifferent Objects; they would be necessarily exposed to all the natural Evils arising from the general Laws of Matter and Motion, *viz.* Distempers of the Body, Inclemency of the Seasons, Hunger and Thirst, &c. which Liberty enables them frequently to guard against and avoid, and frequently to bear with pleasure, and even to convert to their superior Good: nay, they must inevitably undergo the greatest part of those very Evils which at present, by this Power, they have at most only a *possibility* of incurring. Thirdly, Without Liberty, the other most exalted Powers of the Mind would be entirely useless, and often aggravations of our Misery. "A Faculty of Understanding (says Dr. Jenkin [a.]) without a Will to determine it, if left to itself, must always think of the same Object, or proceed in a continued series and connection of thoughts without any Aim or End; which would be a perpetual Labour in vain, and tedious Thoughtfulness to no purpose: but if it should be sometimes determin'd by something external to new Objects, yet what use of Reason could there be in Contemplations, which were merely obtruded and forc'd upon the Mind?" And to foresee a train of Evils, without any power of acting against and opposing them, must

[a.] *Reasonableness of the Christian Religion*, 2d vol. C. 12. p. 238. 5th Edit.

The benefits of Free-Will could not be had without a Power of Sinning.

XI. But you'll say, that you desire the Pleasure and Advantages arising from free Elections, but would not have the Power to Sin; *i. e.* you would have a Liberty restrain'd by Nature within certain bounds, so as never to extend to Evil. But it may be justly doubted whether this was possible in the present state of things: For Free-Will is naturally an active Power, and determines itself to Action, and requires nothing more in Objects, than that they should give occasion for the Exercise of Elections; 'tis therefore active in its own Nature. Now, whatsoever is limited by another admits of bounds, and is therefore passive with respect to the Limiter; it seems equally absurd then for a Free Agent to be thus limited, as for Matter, which is in itself and of its own Nature passive, to determine itself to Action, and is perhaps no less impossible. (64.)

XII. Secondly,

NOTES.

must be only anticipating Misery, and adding the future to the present, and a sense of our Inability of ever helping ourselves to both. These Considerations are sufficient to prove, that the want of Liberty in general would be an irreparable Damage to any conscious System.

For a fuller Explication of them see Mr. *Jackson's Defence of human Liberty*, p. 79, &c. and *Scott's Christian Life*, Part 2. C. 4. Sect. 3. p. 318, &c. 8vo. or *Sherlock on Providence*, C. 7. p. 24c. 2d Edit. or *D'Oyly's First Dissertation*, C. 10. or Dr. *Jenkin* in the Chapter above cited.

The next Enquiry must be, what Consequences would attend either the Limitation of this free Power to some particular Objects, or the Infringement and Suspension of it on particular Occasions.

(64.) If Matter were made *active*, it would be no longer Matter: in like manner if a self moving or active Being were render'd passive, it would be no longer what it now is, nor have the same properties which it now has. Hence appears the absurdity of supposing a Liberty, properly so call'd, to be determin'd to some particular ways of acting, 'tis the same as the Liberty of a Stone

XII. Secondly, If the Will were naturally restrain'd to choose Good only, it must have this restraint either from the *Object* or the *Understanding*: But neither could be done. If some things were in themselves always Good, and others Evil, it might be possible indeed that the Will should no more admit of Evil than the Sight does of Savours: But Moral Good and Evil are very frequently not absolute things, but merely relative: for there is almost no Action which proceeds from Choice, but what may be Good or Evil upon a change of Circumstances†. Even Natural Evils themselves are sometimes good and eligible. Free-Will then must needs

The Will could not be determin'd to Good by Objects, since the Goodness of them generally proceeds from Election.

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Stone to some particular Ways of moving, i. e. no Liberty at all. The very Essence of Liberty includes an absolute Physical Indifference to either Side in any given Case. Such a Liberty as this has been shewn to belong to Man in respect of *Willing*. He can will or choose any thing in Nature, he can also either choose or refuse any thing, and therefore to determine his Will to some Objects, or incline it to one Side in any given Circumstances, would be so far to destroy it. The Question then is not, whether a Man might be necessarily inclin'd to some particular thing or act, and yet continue to have Free-Will; for that, I think, is a contradiction. But whether he should have his power of willing destroy'd on some particular Occasions, or whether he should be sometimes alter'd and made what at present he is not. Whether this Change of Man's Nature would in the main prove worthy of the Deity, or beneficial to the World, will be more fully examin'd in the following Subsection: our Author proceeds to enquire how this determination could possibly be effected in the present State of things, and if upon Enquiry into all the imaginable Methods of effecting it, they appear to be either insufficient for the End proposed, or attended with worse Consequences than the pre-Establishment, this must be an invincible Argument against them.

† See Turner's *Discourse of the Law of Nature, and the reason of their Obligation*, Sect. 23, 24. or Puffendorf of the *Laws of Nature*, B. 1. C. 2. Sect. 6.

needs be indifferent to all external Objects, and those things which are now agreeable, become shortly disagreeable, according to the infinite variety of Circumstances and the Exigence of Affairs. The Will therefore cannot be determin'd to Good by Objects. Nay, to confess the Truth, we generally do not choose Objects because they are Good, but they become Good because we choose them. The Goodness of them therefore is for the most part determin'd by the Election, and not that by the Goodness. For we have shewn before †, that this is the Nature of an Elective Faculty, and such it ought to be, otherwise we could not have the least possibility of attaining Happiness in so great a variety and uncertainty of outward things ††.

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XIII. Thirdly, The Will was no more capable of being determin'd perpetually to Good by the *Understanding*, than by Objects. For the *Understanding* acts necessarily, and represents nothing as Good but what proceeds from Objects; if therefore the Will were determin'd by it, it would neither be free nor always able to please itself. For the *Understanding* often represents all external things as sad and unprosperous, and could never make us take natural Evils, such as Death, Labours, Torments, for real Good, tho' it might induce us to bear them in prospect of a farther End. But to endure a thing in view of a farther End, is to undergo present Misery in hopes of future Happiness; i.e. to weigh a present Evil against a future Good, and of two Evils to choose the less; which Reason indeed persuades us to do, since it is necessary that it should be done: but this helps nothing towards a Vindication of the Divine Goodness, which has imposed this Necessity upon us: nor can he

† Sect. 1. Subsect. 3.

†† See par. 16 and 17 of this Sect.

he be happy by the Judgment of his own Understanding, who must undergo these things. But if it be granted that things please us, not because the Understanding judges them to be eligible, but because we resolve to exercise our Free-will in performing them, even these will become agreeable by Election, and the Understanding will perceive them to be made so, and not make them to be so. 'Tis not therefore the Office of the Understanding to govern the Will, but to discover means for the attainment of that which is chosen, and to give warning when it chooses such things as are absurd or impossible: For the Understanding, as we said before, judges that to be good which is agreeable to our Choice, except this lead us into Absurdities. In order therefore to avoid Absurdities, we make use of the Understanding as a Monitor, not a Master.

And from hence, I think, it appears how inconvenient it would be for the Choice to depend in all cases upon the Understanding. For since the Judgment of the Understanding depends upon the Objects themselves, and the natural congruity which they bear to the Appetites; if the Choice were to be determin'd by its Judgment, 'tis evident that we must necessarily want a great many things which the Understanding judges to be good, and could never hope for solid Happiness, (65.) since
Objects

NOTES.

(65.) That is, if every thing which the Understanding represented as good in itself, made a *necessary Part* of my Happiness, I should be always unhappy, since I could never attain to all the Good I saw. Whereas by this Power of willing, I cut off several of these apparent Goods, and only make such to be constituent parts of my Happiness as I choose, and if I chose only such as I could obtain, I might be always Happy. This

Objects are fix'd, as we said before †, and can never answer to our natural Appetites in every Particular. In order therefore to the attainment of continual Happiness, it was necessary that we should be able to please ourselves in some respect, independently of the Understanding, and by Election to constitute those things good and agreeable to us, which the Understanding, if there had been no such Election, would have pronounced offensive, disagreeable and painful: From hence it appears how fit it is that this Power should be freed from the Government of the Understanding; but if it is freed, it could not be determin'd by it.

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XIV. Fourthly, It is to be observ'd that the Divine Power is Infinite, and that there are innumerable things possible to it which are repugnant to one another, and destructive of each other, and cannot by any means be consistent. If therefore God should act according to the Infinity of his Power, without any regard to his other Attributes, he would effect nothing at all, or else immediately destroy what he had effected. His infinite Wisdom and Goodness therefore gave bounds and restraint to his Power, which would otherwise confound every

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This Proposition, viz. *that all Good does not make an Essential Part of our Happiness, because we do not will it*, is asserted by Mr. Locke [b.] and well urg'd as a Reason why the greater Good does not absolutely determine the Mind: and the same, I think, might as justly be affirm'd of *Pain*, viz. That the removal of all Pain does not make a necessary part of our present Happiness, since we do not always absolutely *will* or *desire* to remove it. But on the contrary choose to bear it, and by that Choice, often produce a Pleasure, which does more than counterbalance it. See C. 5. Sect. 2. and Note 45.

† Sect. 1. Subsect. 3. par. 2.
[b.] Chapter of Power, §. 43.

very thing; and these must of necessity be equally Infinite with his Power, otherwise infinite Evils must certainly arise from infinite Power. But a Creature, as his Elective Power necessarily extends farther than his Wisdom and Goodness, is made naturally liable to fall sometimes into Evils. 'Tis well known that Mathematicians sometimes suppose a Line to be infinite in which they may take a Point wherever they please. Now since our Election may be made as we please, the Wisdom and Goodness whereby it is to be govern'd, ought to be infinite: for if the Line be finite, a Point may be pitch'd upon beyond it: and in like manner, if the Goodness and Wisdom be finite, the Choice may be made without and beyond them, that is, amiss. But since all created Wisdom and Goodness must necessarily be finite, it follows that there wants a sufficient restraint upon Elections, and that every free Creature is necessarily *defectible*. As then all created Beings are necessarily imperfect in general, so every one has its own peculiar Defect. And this kind of Imperfection, *viz.* the Power of Sinning, is proper and peculiar to such as enjoy Free-Will: nor can they be conceiv'd separate from each other, any more than Contrariety from Motion. (66.)

XV. From

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(66.) As Motion without Contrariety would be of no use, so Liberty without a Power of doing amiss, if such a thing were possible, would be of no value: it would not have the good Effects and Ends for which Liberty was given: particularly it would not be attended with the happy consciousness of *Desert*, or the Idea of receiving a Benefit by way of reward, conferr'd upon us for having done what was right and good, and what we might as easily have not done. From which Idea, as including *Self-Approbation*, &c. we frequently feel a far more exquisite Pleasure, than from the intrinsic Value of the Benefit itself:

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XV. From hence it appears that a Faculty of pleasing itself by Election cannot be determin'd to Good by *Objects*, in the same manner as the Sight is to Light, or Taste to Savours, (since Goodness is not always an absolute Quality in things, like Light and the Objects of Sense) nor by the *Understanding*, since many things must be chosen in which the Understanding can perceive no manner of Good, except that they are capable of being chosen, and when chosen please, because they exercise the Faculty. And tho' the Objects of Election are not Infinite, yet in a finite number there are infinite respects in which Good or Evil may be produced: There's need then of infinite Wisdom and Goodness to direct the Choice, lest it deviate into Evil. Since therefore a Creature endow'd with Wisdom is finite, it is impossible but that it shou'd have a natural Power of sometimes choosin'g wrong.

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XVI. Fifthly, If the Will was confin'd to the Choice of those things only which the Understanding declares to be good, or was restrain'd from choosin'g till the Goodness of the Objects were apparent, we must of necessity hesitate in many things, and be anxious and solicitous in all. For since things are connected together by a long chain of Consequences, it is impossible for us to form a right Judgment of the absolute Goodness of them, without a foreknowledge of these Consequences, we must therefore have been oblig'd to use all possible
Disquisition

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itself: Nay, without this Idea, to be loaded with Favours would prove even an Uneasiness to a generous Mind. This Notion will be farther explain'd and vindicated in the following Subsection; for the Truth of it we must appeal to the constant Experience of the ingenuous part of Mankind.

Disquisition before every Election, and suspend the Choice where any Suspicion of Error or Ground of Doubt shou'd appear: but such a Disquisition and continual Solitude would be a greater Bar to Happiness than many Errors and natural Inconveniencies. For if the Will can produce Good to itself by choosing, the Errors and Inconveniencies to which it is expos'd by a bad Choice, may be compensated by the Pleasure which arises from the Sense of Liberty. But if we were oblig'd to all possible Enquiry, more inconvenience would be felt from that Obligation, than from some Errors in Elections; nor would all of them be by this means avoided; for after all possible Examination, a finite Understanding may be deceiv'd. Evil Elections are to be avoided on account of the Uneasiness consequent upon them, if therefore such a Disquisition as is necessary to discover the Good, and a Suspension of the Elective Faculty till that Good be discover'd, would bring greater Uneasiness than some wrong Elections, a Man will be more happy with a Power of doing amiss, than if he were oblig'd to wait for the determination of the Understanding in every Case. For it is better that some Persons should sometimes do amiss, and suffer Uneasiness from the Conscience of having done so, than that all Men should in every Case be always afraid, uncertain, and solicitous, nay generally cease from all manner of Action.

XVII. Such is the Nature of our Will that it can please itself in Election, and by its own Power make the things chosen agreeable, tho' in themselves disagreeable to the Appetites. And tho' this cannot be done at all times, and in every Object, yet it is better to run the hazard, than to be deprived of so useful a Faculty, or to be restrain'd from Election till an imperfect Understanding, such

'Tis better to be in danger of Sinning, than to cease from Election.

as that of Man necessarily is, were clearly convinced of that Impossibility. It is therefore convenient for us to derive our peculiar and chief Happiness from the Will itself; for if it depended on the Understanding it would come with Difficulty, Pains and Anxiety, and we could seldom enjoy it pure and unmix'd. 'Tis better therefore for us to be able to please ourselves without a long Speculation of Antecedents and Consequences, tho' with a danger of Sinning, than to cease from Election, and be restrain'd from the Exercise of our Faculties, till a whole train of these were perfectly apparent, which if it could be at all, yet would not be without Pain and Anxiety, as any one will find that tries. (67.)

SUBJECT.

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(67.) All that *Bayle* objects to this [c.] is taken from the Nature of Good Angels, and Glorified Souls, who, according to him, are no less happy in themselves, nor perform a less acceptable Service to the Deity for the want of it; and why therefore might not we?--- To what was observ'd about the Inconclusiveness of all such Arguments as are drawn from Beings of a different Order in Note *H.* we shall here add, first, that it is more than we are oblig'd to grant, that either Angels or Saints in Heaven are absolutely devoid of Liberty. They may have more clear Impressions of Good and Evil on their Minds, more enlarged Understandings, fewer and less Temptations, &c. without being less free [d.]; nay they must be in one sense more free, the more they are so qualified [e.] This way of reasoning therefore proceeds upon a false, or at least uncertain Hypothesis.

Secondly, Tho' it should be granted that these glorious Beings, supposing them all necessary, might have as ample Knowledge,

[c.] See his Answer to the Queries of a Provincial, and Crit. Diss. Article Marchionites, Remark F. &c.

[d.] See A. Bp. Dawes's 5th Sermon. p. 73, 74. and the latter end of Note T.

[e.] See the beginning of Note 72.

S U B S E C T. III.

Why God does not interpose his Omnipotence, and occasionally restrain the Will from depraved Elections.

I. **T**IS evident from what has been said, that it was agreeable to the Divine Goodness to have created Free Agents, for without these the System of Nature would have been imperfect: nor could their Actions have been determin'd to Good by any natural Propensity or Limitation, in the same manner as the Senses are limited by Objects: But yet it is certain that they depend upon God for their Actions, and if he should suspend his Influence, they would not act at all. Since therefore he could so easily hinder the abuse of Liberty, why does he suffer it? Why does he not restrain Elections

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More and greater Evils would arise from thence, than from the abuse of Free-Will.

N O T E S.

ledge, as ardent Love of the Divine Perfections, and consequently be as happy in the Enjoyment of God and themselves, as if they were all free; tho' they might have no occasion to see or experience Vice, in order to their being fully acquainted with the Excellence of Virtue, and made sensible of the Infinite Wisdom, Power, and Goodness of the Deity, shewn in the Government and Suppression of the former, and in the Production and Improvement of the latter: Tho', I say, these exalted Beings could be supposed to have a thorough Intuition of all the Attributes of God without any such manifestation of them in his Works; (against which Notion see *D'Oyly's First Dissertation*, C. 8. and *Conclusion*, p. 123.) yet it does not seem possible for such imperfect Creatures as *we* are, to attain unto this excellent Knowledge, and enjoy the happy Effects of it on any other Terms than the present. We could not sure have had

tions when they tend to Vice and Absurdity? We grant that this Objection cannot be satisfactorily answer'd otherwise than by shewing that more and greater Evils would befall the Universe from such an Interposition, than from the abuse of Free-Will. In order to which it is to be consider'd,

It would be as much Violence to prevent the Action of Free-Will, as the Motion of the Sun.

II. In the first place, That this cannot be effected without *Violence done to Nature*. 'Tis allow'd that Elections ought to be free, and that thinking Beings cannot otherwise be happy: God himself in creating them has determin'd, as it were by a Law, that they should be free. For by giving them a Nature endow'd with Choice, he allow'd them to make use of it. They cannot therefore be hinder'd without Violence done to the Laws of the Creation. I grant that God can dispense with the Laws of Nature; but who will require or allow this to be done frequently? The bounds of this World, and the number of thinking Beings are unknown to us, but we believe that the System of Nature will endure for ever. Now as all things depend upon the Will of God, we cannot have any other

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had so lively an Idea of the *Mercy* of God, if there had never been any proper Objects of it. We could not have been so thoroughly conscious of our Dependency or Danger; nor had so grateful a sense of our constant Support, our frequent Deliverances, nor consequently have arrived to so great a degree either of Virtue or Happiness in this Life or the next, by any other Method; as will be further shewn in Notes 80 and 83. Either then these Happy Beings are still perfectly free, which Freedom constitutes the greatest part of their Happiness; and let any Man try to prove the contrary; or at least they once were so, in order to their greater Perfection, and are now only alter'd by being translated into another State, and put out of farther Tryal; and consequently they belong to our Author's third Expedient, which will be examin'd in Subsect. 5.

other Security of our Happiness, and of the Duration of the World, than the Divine Constancy and Immutability : the Universal Laws of Nature are the Assurances of this Constancy, and upon them does the Security and Happiness of the whole Work depend. It is not therefore to be expected that God should lightly dispense with these Laws, much less alter them by his Omnipotence every Moment. Since then it is provided by an Universal Law, that Free Agents should procure to themselves Happiness by the use of Election, and it is impossible but that these, being left to themselves, should sometimes fall into depraved Elections, would it not be an Infringement and a Violation of this Law, if God should interpose and hinder the use of that Faculty which by the Law of Nature he had established ? We don't expect that the Situation of the Earth, or Course of the Sun, should be alter'd on our account, because these seem to be things of great Importance, and we apprehend it to be unreasonable, that for our private Advantage the Order and Harmony of things should be changed, to the detriment of so many Beings. But to alter the Will, to stop Election, is no less a Violation of the Laws of Nature, than to interrupt the Course of the Sun. For a Free Agent is a more noble Being than the Sun, the Laws of its Nature are to be esteem'd more sacred, and not to be changed without a greater Miracle. There would then be a kind of Shock and Violence done to Nature, if God should interfere and hinder the Actions of Free-Will ; and perhaps it would prove no less pernicious to the Intellectual System, than the Sun's standing still would be to the Natural. His Goodness therefore does not suffer him to interpose, except when he foresees that the Evils arising from our depraved Elections are greater than those which would

ensue upon an Interruption of the Course of Nature, which he only can know who knows all things. (68.)

God by interposing in the Elections of his Creatures, would quite invert the Method of treating Free Agents.

III. Secondly, Such an Interruption as this would not only do Violence to Nature, but quite invert the Method of treating Free Agents. This Method is to hinder or excite Elections by Rewards and Punishments : To divert them from unreasonable or absurd things, and draw them to better by the persuasion of Reason. But it is doubtful whether the Nature of the thing will permit an Election to be determin'd by Impulse, or as it were by immediate Contact. For it seems equally absurd to attempt a change of Election by any other means than those above mention'd, as to desire to stop the Impetus of Matter by Intreaty or offering Rewards. May we not with the same reason expect that Mat-

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(68.) By this last Concession our Author evidently allows that God may sometimes have sufficient reason to interpose in matters relating to our Elections ; (tho' perhaps he never acts upon the Will by *Physical Impulse*, or irresistibly, which will be consider'd in the next Subsection.) his Design therefore is only to shew that this ought not to be done frequently, or as often as Men choose amiss. Now this may be illustrated in the same manner as we treated of the Laws of Motion. That there are general Mechanic Laws in the Natural World, the Establishment and Preservation whereof tends more to the Happiness of the Creation, and is every way more worthy of the Deity, than to act always by *particular Wills*, was shewn in Note 25. If these Laws were frequently alter'd and unfix'd, they would cease to be Laws, and all Action, Labour, Contrivance which depends upon the Stability, and computes the future Effects of them, must cease, or at least prove insignificant. In like manner *Liberty* has been proved to be an Universal Law of Intellectual Beings, and the great Use and Excellence of it evinc'd, and therefore we have equal reason to suppose that it could not be, at least not frequently, suspended, without as great Inconvenience as would attend the Violation of these Laws

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ter should be moved by Rewards and Punishments, as the Will influenc'd by *Physical Impulse*, as they call it? For it is by these Means that they would have God to stop or alter the Choice. So preposterous an Interposal would confound every thing, and leave nothing certain in Nature. How fatal such an Experiment would be, and how it would affect the Minds of the Observers, or what Suspicions concerning God and their own Security, it might suggest to the whole System of thinking Beings, God only knows. We see that human Laws cannot be dispens'd with, without very many Inconveniencies, which yet, as they are made upon an imperfect Foresight, and can provide for few Cases, seem naturally to require some Interposal: how much greater Evils may we apprehend from a Dispensation with the Divine, the natural

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of Mechanism. If this were done in the Rational World, all Studies, Enterprises, Arguments; all kind of Reasoning and Policy would be vain and useless; all rewardable Action, and its concomitant Happiness (of which in Note 66 and more below) must entirely cease. Nay, perhaps to deprive a rational Being of Free-Will, would be altogether as absurd and inconvenient, as to endow a Machine with Reflection, or an Edifice with Self-motion. But our great Ignorance of the Intellectual World must render any Argument of this kind very uncertain. However, thus much we are sure of, that so great Violence done to the Will, would be directly contrary to the general Method of God's treating reasonable Creatures, and quite opposite to the end of all those Manifestations he has made of his Nature and Will; the very Reverse of all those Arguments, Exhortations, Promises and Threats, which are the Subject of Reveal'd Religion: a Man that believes any thing of these (upon the Belief of which I am now arguing) can never imagine that they are all made use of to no purpose, as they must be in a great measure, if the Will could be over ruled occasionally without any considerable Inconvenience. This is what our Author endeavours to prove in the following Paragraph.

Laws ; on the Observance of which the Good of the whole depends ? This seems to be the reason why God makes use of so much Labour and Pains, so great an Apparatus of Means, (69.) so many Precepts, Persuasions, and even Entreaties for the Amendment of Mankind ; which nevertheless he could effect in a Moment, if he were pleas'd to apply force ; and he would undoubtedly do it, if he had not foreseen more Inconveniencies from a Change in the Order of Nature, and Violence done to Elections.

He would take away that which is the most agreeable to us in Elections, viz. a Conscionableness that we might have not chosen.

IV. Thirdly, That which gives us the greatest Pleasure in Elections, is a Conscionableness that we could have not chosen ; without this 'tis no Choice at all ; but such is the Nature of us rational Beings that nothing pleases us but what we choose. In order therefore to make any thing agreeable to us, 'tis necessary for us to be *conscious* that we choose it voluntarily, and could have refused it : But if God determine our Election extrinsically, the most agree-

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(69.) The History of the *Jewish* Nation affords good Instances of this. What an apparatus of outward Means was continually made use of in the Government of that stiff-necked People ? What frequent Murmurings, Rebellions and Apostacys were permitted, and then punish'd ? What numerous Miracles, both of the remunerative and vindictive kind were apply'd, in order to bring them to some tolerable sense of their dependence on God, and a suitable practice of the Duties resulting from it ? All which would have been unnecessary at least, if one Miracle exerted on their Minds could have done the business ; if their Understandings could as well have been illuminated and their Wills reform'd at once, and if their Practice produced by this means, and as it were extorted from them, would have been equally agreeable to the Deity.

agreeable Part of all is taken away (X.) For we must either be conscious that God determines our

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Will

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(X.) 'Tis objected, that this explication of Free-Will makes *Adam* more unreasonable in the state of Innocence than his Posterity in the state of Corruption. For according to this it would have grieved him to think that his choosing right was due to God's assistance, and that he would not have believed himself happy, if when he was ready to break God's Command, he had perceiv'd that God by his Grace had interposed and enabled him to resist the Temptation. Whereas in truth, such a discovery would have made him, as it must make us, more happy, tying him by a new Obligation to acknowledge the Sovereign Goodness of God, and on that account to love and adhere to him the more closely. But it is alledged that the Author is absolutely of another Opinion.

I answer, the Objector may assure himself, the Author has no such Opinion, nor is there any thing like it in the Book or that can be deduced from it. What the Author says is, that God has made Man an intelligent Creature, capable of pleasing himself by Choice; that the proper way to move his Will is by Rewards and Punishments as the proper way to move Bodies is by physical Impulse; that in the ordinary Course of things it is as improper, and perhaps as impracticable to move the Will by any other force than that of rational Motives, as to attempt to move a Body by Rewards and Punishments: That there is this difference between them, that a body necessarily moves when impelled, but the Will is not necessitated by the moral Motives proposed to it. That there are two sorts of Goods, which may be proposed to a Man, one that arises from the conveniency of things to our natural Appetites, and is antecedent to Choice, and another that is founded in the Choice itself, and consequent to it; and that the 1st is subordinate to the second.

When therefore these two interfere, the first gives place to the latter: and hence we see many Men prefer their Choice even to Life, which is the greatest natural Good, tho' 'tis true, this is done with difficulty and reluctance. But when there is no such interfering between the Choice and Appetites, there the Man is entirely free, and can make the thing chosen good without mixture, which happens in a thousand Instances of Life, and therefore there is much more Good than Evil in it.

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Will or not ; if we be conscious, how can that be agreeable which is obtruded on us by force ? If we be

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As to *Adam*, he was placed in this State of Freedom because his Nature required it ; and the Author believes God might have prevented his choosing amiss, if he would have alter'd his Nature, Motives and Circumstances, that is made a new World for him, and left this without intelligent Inhabitants. I do not deny but God may stop Man from executing his Choice, when he is ready to make an ill one ; for no body ought to presume to limit the Divine Power. But I say, when a free Agent is ready to make an ill choice, and wou'd do it if not prevented by an Almighty Power, he is already guilty in the sight of God, such a readiness is an obliquity in his Will and a moral Evil, and therefore God is not obliged to prevent the Execution of it ; for that were to prevent the Punishment, tho' the guilt be contracted : and it is easy to see what the Consequence of such a procedure may be in a World that is to be govern'd by Rewards and Punishments, and what effect it might have on those innumerable Myriads of intelligent Beings that are under the Government of God, and that are all now virtuous by their Choice, and thereby justly distinguish'd in their Rewards and Circumstances, and possess'd of that most valuable perfection and only moral Good, an active conformity to the Will of God. Whereas if the Will of Man were necessitated and held by an irresistible force from choosing amiss, the whole intellectual Creation would be let loose and under no kind of moral Obligation to concern themselves about their Choices, and so there cou'd only be a passive Conformity to God's Will, and no room for Virtue or Holiness, which are the most valuable Goods in the World ; and hence to avoid some Moral Evil there wou'd be no room left for any moral Good.

Against this it is urg'd that the *Elec* are thus prevented by God's Grace, and yet no body denies them to have moral Good. The Holy Scriptures teach us that it is the *Spirit of God* that Works in us to will and to do, and that it is his *Grace* that efficaciously determines the Wills of those that are predestinated.

To this I answer, that Man by his ill choice and abuse of his Faculty of Free-Will had disabled it from choosing Spiritual Good. When a Man loses a Limb or an Eye, or is wounded in any mortal Part, he can't have that Limb restored or be recover'd but by a Miracle ; and the same will hold as

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to the Spiritual Functions, when they are lost or disabled only he that gave them can restore them. Now this the Holy Scriptures and the Catholic Church have taught us to be the case of the Will of Man in his corrupted State as to spiritual Objects, and therefore the effectual interposition of God's Power to restore Man is the Christian Doctrine. But tho' the restoring the Faculty to its former state be the immediate Work of God's Spirit, yet the acts perform'd by that restored Faculty are Man's and he is free in the exerting of them, and this I take to be likewise the sense of the Catholic Church. 'Tis true, those who are thus elect'd and influenc'd by God will certainly use their Free-Will right so far as the Gospel requires in order to their Salvation; but it is not because they have not the Power to do otherwise, but because they make their Choice otherwise; nor doth it follow because they can choose amiss, that they will do so. *A posse ad esse non valet Consequentia.*

If it be ask'd, why God did not afford this help to all Mankind. I answer that the Elect are design'd for a station in Heaven void for them by the fall of the Angels, or some other way, and that a certain number may be so provided and no more; and when the number of the Elect is full, then will follow the Consummation of all Things. But it is reasonable to permit God to choose the Persons to whom he will vouchsafe this supernatural Favour, and to take care that the pardoning and recovering of Sinners may not have an ill effect on the rest of his Creatures: and this he has done partly by letting several of them suffer for an Example, and partly by appointing such a Satisfaction for them in the death of our Saviour, as is capable to deter both Men and Angels from failing in their Duty, more than the Punishment of the Malefactors cou'd have done. For nothing could more fully demonstrate the determinate decree of God not to dispense with Obedience to his Laws, on the Observation of which the Good of the whole depends, than that he would not pardon a few on a less Consideration than the interposition and Death of his Son.

But secondly, God may be conceiv'd to have permitted *Adam* to fall not only for the reasons above, but likewise because it was better for him upon the whole than if he had been kept from the act of Guilt by an invisible force. He had no reason to presume this, but the Power of God is so great that he

lections be our own or God's. Nay the force of Laws, together with the Efficacy of Rewards and Punish-

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he brought Good out of Evil, and made *Adam's* State after his Fall more advantageous to him than Innocence had been. This is plain from Holy Scripture that prefers our State under the second *Adam* to what it was under the first. And as it was better for *Adam* himself, so it is not certain but it was best for his Posterity. For some of them it undoubtedly was, I mean those that are found in Christ: and as to the rest, it doth not appear but all things consider'd it was as good for them too. We have a Notion that if *Adam* had not fallen all his Posterity would have continued innocent, and been free from all natural Inconveniencies: but the Author shews that neither the Holy Scriptures nor the Catholic Church has determin'd either of them; nor is it said how every one that was to be born would have used his Free-Will if he had been tried, nor that even those who used it right would have been subject to no natural Evil. And therefore 'tis a very uncertain Argument that is drawn from these suppositions, and ought not to be opposed to the Goodness of God.

But lastly, however this Matter stand, it is to be supposed that it was best for the whole that things shou'd be as they are, and that the hindring Man from falling by an irresistible force would have been more mischievous in general than his Sin. We know that God, as the Author observes, is to govern an innumerable multitude of Creatures to all Eternity, and he only can comprehend what influence any action may have on that System in infinite Ages. It has been shewn that there is a Community and Connection amongst them all, and each is or may be affected with what his fellow Creature doth or suffers; and it is impossible for any but God to be a judge of this. We see that in the greatest Number imaginable, if we change but one unit after a few Multiplications and Divisions the whole product is entirely alter'd. The same might happen in the World in an infinite series of Mutations, if any one action were changed: it must be of great consequence to the whole if God should interpose and alter any the minutest thing, and perhaps change the Whole original Scheme. If therefore that Scheme was at first contrived to the best Advantage of those Creatures of which it consisted, to alter any thing in it wou'd certainly make it worse; if it had not been best for the whole that Man shou'd be permitted to fall, God wou'd not have done it,

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Punishments, would be quite destroy'd. For who would regard Laws or Rewards, when he was certain that God would hinder him from doing any thing which might occasion the Loss of Rewards, or make him incur the Punishments? But however this be, 'tis very certain that our greatest Pleasure, nay our very Reward, consists in being conscious that we have used our Choice aright, and done those

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it, and if it was best he ought not to alter it. Free Creatures were necessary to the perfection of the World, that is such Creatures as being essentially short of perfection were capable of choosing amiss. And to make them thus free and absolutely hinder the use of that Freedom appear'd a greater Evil than the fall of a few: for that wou'd have defeated the very end of their being made Free Agents, which was that they might make themselves happy by choosing right. Thus good Men here are happy, the blessed in Heaven, and all the Holy Angels, so far as we know of them.

But it is farther urg'd, cou'd not God have determin'd their Wills to good, and neither let them nor any other Creature know it, and then the ill effects which could be apprehended from the Example might have been avoided? The meaning of this Expedient, so far as I can understand it, is that God shou'd have receiv'd and cheated all rational Creatures at once and tho' he had given them Faculties to discern truth from falsehood, yet he should have obliged them all to believe a Lye. Sure he delights in Treachery and Falsehood that can suggest such an Expedient.

But suppose God should deceive Men and Angels and make them believe that they choose when really they do not, but their Wills are secretly determin'd, yet this would not obtain the end, or supply the use of Free Choice or yield the pleasure which is the result of it. For it is not, as observ'd before, the belief of our being free that gives us the pleasure, but the true and right use of the Faculty: Tho' a Man believ'd never so firmly that he sees or knows a thing, yet if his Faculty of Sight or Knowledge were not really exercis'd, he wou'd neither have the use nor the pleasure of them. And at the same rate if a Man have not the free exercise of his Choice, he will neither have the use nor pleasure arising from it.

those things which we might not have done. On the other hand, 'tis the greatest Grief and Affliction to have omitted such things as would have tended to our Happiness, and were in our Power: one of these could not be had without the other, and if none were suffer'd to grieve for a bad Election, none would rejoice for a good one. But it is better that some few should grieve for their own folly, than that all should be deprived of the Rewards of their good Actions. That Privilege then of doing well, and pleasing ourselves in what is well done, could not be had without the hazard of Sinning; if God should take away the one, the other would vanish of itself.

But you would have the Pleasure which arises from Election without the Danger; that is, the End without the Means: Neither do you observe that the greatest Pleasure in this Case is, that you could have done otherwise: and this arises from the very Nature of Pleasure, which seems to be nothing else but *a Sense of the Exercise of those Faculties and Powers which we enjoy*. The more therefore any Action is *ours*, the more it pleases us; and since a Free Action (which we could either exert or omit) is the most of all ours, it must necessarily please us most: But if the Will were confined to one Side, or detain'd from the other, the Action would cease to be ours, and the Pleasure would perish together with the Sense of Liberty. A Mind conscious of Virtue is the Pleasure and Reward of good Actions, but unless it were possible

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possible for it to become conscious of Vice,
'tis plain it could not be conscious of Virtue. (70.)
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(70.) In opposition to what our Author has here advanc'd, Boyle [d.] brings a great many Arguments drawn from the Tenets of Calvinists, Spinozists, &c. who believe that all their Actions are necessarily determin'd, and yet are no less pleas'd with them. Nay some, says he, rejoice in this very thing, that they are under the absolute Direction of the Deity. *Dij me tuentur* -- [e.] and to be naturally determin'd to the best was always look'd upon as a peculiar Happiness, and they that came nearest it were esteem'd the best Men, as the known Compliments to Cato and Fabricius declare. Some are as well pleas'd with what they have by Lot or Inheritance, as what they get by their own Labour: Witness the Pride of antient Families, &c. *Gaudeant bene nati*, is a common Proverb; and among the Things, *quæ vitam faciunt beatiorē*, Martial reckons *Res non paria Labore sed reliqua*. And again: If, says he, we did take delight in choosing things, yet it would be enough for us if God conceal'd his determination from us, and we only believ'd that we were free to choose and act.

We need not, I think, spend much time in answering such Arguments as these. For the Calvinists, &c. notwithstanding all their absurd Tenets, have evidently this Consciousness of Choice within them, which is the secret source of the Pleasure that attends their Actions, and cannot be extinguish'd by any of their Principles, but overcomes them all, and constantly puts these Men upon such Endeavours as are vain and useless upon the Supposition, and inconsistent with the Belief of Fate and absolute Predestination: which shews us that these Notions are neither acted upon in Life, nor pursu'd to their utmost Consequences; that they rest in pure Speculation, and are generally laid aside in Practice; in short, that they are absolutely inconsistent with human Nature, as well as human Reason.

Secondly, Some Persons may rejoice in being under the particular Care, Protection and Government of the Deity; but then their Joy proceeds not so much from a bare Contemplation of what the Deity does for them, as from considering *on what account* he does it, *viz.* because they are agreeable to him, and proper Objects of his Favour, and that on account of something which

[d.] Answer to the Queries of a Provincial, p. 665. Fol.

[e.] Horace, B. 1. Ode 17.

You may urge, that you had rather want this Pleasure than undergo the Danger; that is, you had

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which they *themselves* have done. If *Horace* meant otherwise by his *Dij me tuentur*, he had small reason for what he adds in the next Line, *Diis Pietas mea & Musa cordi est*. But in truth this and most other of *Bayle's* Testimonies are Rhetorical or Poetic Flourishes, rather than Philosophic Truths, and consequently not worth a serious Examination. To draw any thing like an Argument from another's Words, we should at least be sure of his determinate Meaning, of the precise number of his Ideas, as well as the justness of their Connection together, which we must never expect from such kind of random Quotations. It may not therefore be improper to observe here once for all, that *Bayle's* usual Method of reasoning from Authorities must be very weak and unphilosophical; and calculated rather to blind Men's Eyes, than to inform their Understandings.

Thirdly, We are pleas'd indeed with what we call *Good Fortune*, when a great Sum of Money comes to us by Lot, or a large Estate, or a Title by Inheritance; and are perhaps the more delighted, the greater the Change is in our Circumstances; and the less Expectation we had of it [f.] But is this Pleasure comparable to that Intellectual or Moral Pleasure, that sublime Satisfaction and Self complacency, which we feel upon acquiring a like Sum of Money by some laudable Act, or egregious Undertaking, that may properly be called *our own*? Is it equal to that solid Comfort, and Self approbation which every ingenuous Mind is sensible of from his doing what *deserves* an Estate or Title, and receiving these as the proper Recompence and due Tribute of such Deeds? The Man that can value himself more upon his Descent from an antient Family, than upon being by these means the Founder of a new one, is a disgrace to his Descent, and unworthy of the Arms he bears. But to return:

There is undoubtedly an agreeable and exalted Consciousness attending all the Blessings which we ourselves are instrumental in procuring, infinitely beyond all the Satisfaction which they could afford us, if we knew ourselves to be unconcern'd in the Attainment, and unworthy of the Enjoyment of them. This is the great Spur and Incitement to many noble

[f.] See Note 19.

had rather be a Brute than a Man: neither could you by, this means avoid these natural Evils which
you

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ble Actions here, and will be part of the Crown and Reward of them hereafter, (as is illustrated at large by Dr. Scott in the first Vol. of his *Christian Life*, and by Dr. Jenkin, in his *Reasonableness of Christianity*, 2d vol. C. 12. prop. 2.) And tho' we cannot properly merit any thing at the hand of God, yet the Consciousness of having perform'd such Actions as are in themselves acceptable to, and rewardable by him, and of receiving Blessings from him in return for such Actions, must very much increase our Happiness in the Enjoyment of these Blessings, both in this World and the next, (as is shewn in the same places.) Nor lastly, could we receive this Pleasure which now results from our Choice and Action, if we were determin'd in every thing by the Deity, supposing that Determination conceal'd from us, and we only made to believe that we were really free to choose and act. For, as our Author observes, this would be to arrive at the End without the Means, and to have the Effect without the Cause. All our Ideas of Merit arise from, and are entirely founded in *Free Choice*: this (as far as we can apprehend) is the necessary Medium to such Moral Happiness; and we can no more conceive how one should come without the other, than how we should see without Eyes: and for us to have this Pleasure, tho' another did the Action, would be the same as for one Man to be conscious of his doing what some other really did, or for him to see by some other's Eyes. Such Suppositions as these would breed endless Confusion. For we must either know whether another did this Action or not; if we do know this, then how can we attribute that to ourselves, or pride ourselves in that which we know belongs to another? If we do not know this, then how can we attribute to ourselves, or please ourselves in any thing? Since every thing in and about us may, for what we know, be done by another, and so we in reality may never deserve either praise or blame. The natural consequence of which is, that we might as well never aim at Desert, or strive to do any thing at all: and this is the genuine Product of all such Suppositions as question the Veracity of our Faculties, and would make us suspect that we may be imposed upon even in the regular Operations of our own Minds. The same Arguments with those of Bayle, as well as the like method of reasoning, are made use of by the Author of the *Philosophical Enquiry*, &c. p. 98, &c. and p. 71, 72. Where he thinks,
" It

you dread so much as foolishly to wish yourself a Brute, lest you should fall into them. But supposing it were convenient for you to be a Brute, yet it could not be convenient for all Nature: The System of the Universe required free Agents: without these the Works of God would be lame and imperfect; his Goodness chose the Benefit of the Universe rather than that of yourself; especially when this is better for you too, tho' you be so ungrateful as not to confess it.

Free Agents are placed as it were out of the reach of Divine Power, the Government of these therefore is the proper Exercise of the Divine Wisdom, wherein God delights.

V. Fourthly, As it would be prejudicial to Man, to all Nature, for God to hinder bad Elections by his absolute Power, so nothing can be conceiv'd to be more disagreeable to himself. We have said that God made the World in order to have something wherein to exercise his Attributes externally: But since he has several Attributes, he cannot exercise them all in every thing alike. His Power therefore exerts itself chiefly in one thing, and his Wisdom and Goodness in another. He exercised his Power in creating the World, and putting it into Motion; his Goodness and Wisdom in the Order and Agreement of things: But the Divine *Wisdom* seems

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“ It may not be improper to observe, that some of the Pleasures Man receives from Objects are so far from being the Effect of Choice, that they are not the Effect of the least Premeditation, or any Act of his own, as in finding a Treasure on the Road, or in receiving a Legacy from a Person unknown to him”. But has a Man the same Pleasure in these Cases as if he had done something to *deserve* a Treasure of the Public? or had the Legacy conferr'd on him as a Reward for his good Deeds to the deceased Person, his late lov'd Beneficiary or intimate Friend? If this Author can find a difference in these two Cases, this Observation of his must be improper: if he cannot, I am sure he has a different Sense of things from the rest of Mankind, and of consequence is not to be argued with.

seems to have set apart the Government of *Free Agents* as its peculiar Province. Herein it fully exercises itself, and acts up to its Infinity; for if it were finite it would not be equal to so great a Task. It does not seem a very extraordinary thing for God to be able to govern and absolutely direct such Beings as are merely passive, and deprived of all Motion of their own, whereby they might make any Resistance. For those things obey easily which do not move but when they are moved. Neither is there need of infinite Wisdom to govern them, for infinite Power, with a moderate use of Wisdom, would have been sufficient. That there might be a Subject therefore whereon the infinite Wisdom of God should display itself, he created *Free Agents*; which, being as it were put out of his Power and left to themselves, might act in a manner independent of his Will. 'Tis evident to any Person how much more difficult it is, and how much greater Exercise of Wisdom it requires to direct a Multitude of these to a certain End, and make them conspire to the common Good, than to order Brute Beasts, and such as have no Power of themselves, in what manner you please. To them that consider the vast Multitude of *Free Agents*, which is almost infinite, and their Independence (since every one is, at least in many Cases, absolute Master of his own Actions, and is permitted by God to act according to that Liberty) God seems to have given a Specimen of the Extent of his Wisdom, which is able thus certainly and effectually to bring to the End proposed, so many *Free Spirits*, so many *Agents* that were in a manner set at Liberty from his Dominion, and committed every one to his own Government.

Here is the proper place for Wisdom, wherein (setting aside, and in a manner suspending the Exercise of his Power) he attains his Ends by Prudence only, by mere Dexterity of acting, and brings it to pass that so many jarring Wills depending on themselves alone, and no more inclined to either Side by the Divine Power, than if there were no such thing, shall yet conspire together to promote the Good of the Universe. 'Tis impossible that this Exercise of Wisdom should not be very agreeable to the Deity, if any thing in his Works may be esteem'd agreeable to him. But if he were oblig'd to interfere with his Power, that would seem to argue a Defect of Wisdom; for what occasion is there for him to interpose and stop the Liberty of Election before granted, if his Wisdom could provide sufficiently for the Good of the whole without altering his Design †?

It would therefore be neither agreeable to God, nor useful to us, that God should always hinder bad Elections.

VI. From hence it seems sufficiently evident why God would not interpose his Power, or intermeddle with our Elections, since that could neither be advantageous to ourselves nor to the whole System, nor agreeable to God. 'Tis no wonder then that absolute Goodness permits Evil Elections, since for the most part they could not be prevented without greater Evils. But if that can ever be done, there's no doubt but God will take care that the very best shall be done. (71.)

SUBJECT.

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(71) What has been urg'd in the foregoing Subsection about the Divine Interposition in human Elections must be understood in a limited Sense, *viz.* as relating only to an *immediate* Influence, or an absolute Determination of the Will, *i. e.*

† See Dr. Jenkin, 2d Vol. C. 12. p. 240. &c. 5th Edit.

SUBSECT. IV.

Concerning the Efficacy of Prayer.

I. **S**OME may apprehend that God is not so averse from interposing immediately in the Affairs of this World as is here asserted; and that the Laws and Order of Nature are not of so great consequence with him, but that he may be easily and frequently induced to dispense with them, contrary to what we have here advanc'd. For this seems to be the common Opinion of Mankind. Every Supplicant that addresses himself to God, believes that this is effected by the Deity thro' his Prayers: for if he perceiv'd

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to such an intermeddling with Elections as would make them to be no Elections at all. For it appears from the following Subsection, that our Author did not intend to exclude all kind of Interposition in the Government of Free Agents, but only that particular sort which would subvert their natural Powers, or be destructive of their Freedom. Tho' God has establish'd general Laws both in the animate and inanimate World, yet he has not left these entirely to themselves, but influences, directs, and governs them in such a manner as is most conducive to the great End for which he design'd them; which End could not be attain'd without such a particular Influence, as will be shewn below. In determining the *manner* of this Government we must beware of the two Extremes of supposing either first, that the Deity always influences second Causes or acts (as *Malebranch* terms it) by *particular Wills*, in the Natural or Moral World; which would dissolve all Laws of Nature, destroy the Liberty of the Creature, and reduce every thing to Fate: or secondly, that he never interposes in the Government of either World, but lets the general Laws of Mechanism

it to be otherwise, he could hope for nothing from the Prayers he offers to the Deity. For if all came to pass according to the natural Order of things, and the Series of Causes, who could hope to be delivered from a Distemper or Calamity; from Evil Affections or Temptations, by virtue of Prayer? These things are either effected by the immediate Interposition of the Divine Power, or are requested of God in vain. For if they depend upon their own proper Causes, which may not be alter'd, those Causes

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Mechanism or of Liberty take their natural Course; and operate as it were independently of himself; which would entirely destroy a particular Providence, and render the general one in a great measure useless. The bad Consequences which would attend the former of these Schemes have been touch'd upon above: The latter (which is particularly espous'd by Leibnitz in his System of *Pre-establisht Harmony*, and by Mr. *Whiston* in his *New Theory of the Earth*) will be obviated in the following Subsection. I shall here only add the Opinion of S. C. on the present Subject: "[s.] 'Twas highly suitable to the Divine Wisdom in the Government of the World, both to pre-ordain some of the principal Events with relation to the entire human Community, or to the more considerable parts of it, and to reserve to himself a Right of interposing and influencing particular Agents, as in other Cases, so more especially in order to the accomplishment of these Events. That he has actually done so is abundantly clear from Scripture-Prophecys, and Histories. And that in so doing he has acted in a manner most worthy his Wisdom, is no less manifest. For hereby it appears that the Divine Government is equally opposed to Chance and Destiny. Had the Deity taken no Care of Futurity, but left every Man to the Conduct of his own Inclinations, and natural Effects in general to the Influence of their Causes, without ever interposing to direct them to the attainment of his great Design; this would have been almost in effect to divest himself of the Government of Rational Agents, and to subject their Affairs to Chance, and to the hazard of the utmost Disorder" and

[s.] *Impartial Enquiry*, &c. p. 115.

Causes would produce their Effects as well upon the omission as the offering of these Supplications. But if God sometimes vouchsafes to suspend or change the Order and Laws of Nature to gratify his Votaries; why may not the same be done to prevent the abuse of Free-Will and Natural Evils? Either this Interposition must be admitted in order to oppose these Evils, or it must be rejected with regard to Prayers. This Difficulty deserves an Answer. We attempt to solve it in the following manner.

II. 'Tis to be observ'd then, in the first place, that all *Prayers* are not heard by God, nor do we hope that all things shall be done which are requested of him, but only such as he has declared to be

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"and Confusion. Or had he, on the contrary, absolutely or
"fatally determined every Event, tho' this would have been
"far enough from divesting himself of the Government of the
"World, yet it would have been a Government unworthy of
"the Deity, a Government entirely exclusive of all proper
"Sin and Punishment, Virtue and Rewards: wherein himself
"would in effect have been the only Agent, and all the Crea-
"tures stupid and passive. Whereas, by pre-ordaining the
"most material Events, and suffering the Creatures freely to
"exert their Faculties in all convenient Cases, he appears most
"wisely to have chosen the middle way, and thereby to have
"equally avoided the Mischiefs of both Extremes". See also
p. 116.

All the Difference between this ingenious Writer and our Author is, that in the Government of the World he supposes the general Law of Liberty to be sometimes suspended, as well as the Laws of Motion. Whereas our Author, tho' he asserts the same of the latter, yet he denies it of the former; at least does not grant that such an Abridgment of Liberty is necessary to the aforesaid Government: How on this Principle he accounts for that which we generally mean by a *Particular Providence*, answering the Prayers, and thereupon often influencing and over-ruling the Affairs of Mankind, will be shewn in its proper place.

God does
not hear
all Pray-
ers.

agreeable to his Will, and has in some respect promis'd to perform. Those things then which are unnecessary, trifling, inconsistent, hurtful, or petitioned for in an unlawful Manner, are not to be expected by the Petitioners, tho' they be requested never so frequently.

God is oblig'd to the Creatures, by his Goodness and by Covenant.

III. Secondly, God may be under a two-fold Obligation to his Creature, first from his Goodness, whereby he is oblig'd so to order all external things, that Existence shall be better than Non-existence to all who duely perform their Duty. Secondly, By some Covenant or Agreement whereby he engaged, under certain Conditions, to bestow some Favours upon Men, notwithstanding they were Sinners: Which Covenant, tho' it may not be esteem'd a natural one, yet it cannot be judg'd to be against Nature, or to offer Violence to it.

What may be request- ed of the Deity relates ei- ther to the Mind, the Body, or external things.

IV. Thirdly, The things which are requested of God either belong to the Mind, viz. that the Mind be sound and vigorous, and able to govern the Affections, &c. or to the Body, that Life and Strength be prolong'd, &c. or to external things, that the Weather be serene and seasonable for the Fruits of the Earth, &c. Now these differ from each other, and ought not to be prayed for under the same Conditions.

God does not give Assistance to our Minds at random, but under as certain Laws as those of the Na- tural World.

V. Fourthly, As to the Mind, since the Elective Power is the chief Part of Man, and is self-motive, 'tis scarce conceivable how it should be determin'd from without itself. For that which determines it- self is entirely different from that which stands in need of another to move it, and these appear to be no more applicable to the same thing, than a Square and Circular Figure are to the same Surface, at least their Natures must be chang'd to make them com- patible. But yet this Faculty, as well as others, may be vitiated by abuse and a perverse manner of acting.

acting, and when it is thus vitiated, 'tis probable that God only can restore it, for it is suppos'd to be subject to him alone.

This Assistance must be afforded to Mankind in such a manner that no blemish be thereby cast upon the Divine Constancy, nor any Prejudice done to his Wisdom in establishing the Laws and Order of Nature. Now that all kind of Interposition does not prejudice these, appears from hence, viz. that it is most worthy of the Divine Majesty to have reserved to himself a Power over Nature, especially while the Being over whom this Power is reserv'd enjoy their Liberty; it seems not only proper that God should be at Liberty to act in this manner with them, but also necessary, provided this be not done at random, but under some known and certain Conditions. And here the Divine Wisdom has exerted itself in a wonderful manner, and devised a Way to reconcile the Constancy of God, and the Sanctity of the Laws of Nature, with that Assistance which is occasionally afforded to Mankind upon their Request. Man might presume upon some Method of effecting this before Revelation: but 'tis to this alone that we owe the clear and undoubted Manifestation of it. From hence we learn that God will give his *Holy Spirit*, under some certain Laws and Conditions, to those that are fitly disposed: which would be as certain and constant a Principle of Spiritual Actions to them that are endow'd with it, as Nature itself is of the Natural. Since therefore this Spirit by its Grace assists our depraved Will, and in some respect restores it to its Vigour, it cannot be judg'd to violate the Order of Nature, any more than when its Influence sustains natural Causes. If it be ask'd what those Laws are, under which the Influence of this Spirit is promised. I answer, all such things as are neces-

sary to Salvation are promised to them who make a right use of their present Abilities, --- that pray to God thro' *Christ* for an Increase of them, --- and that celebrate the *Sacraments* as the Law of God requires. Upon these Conditions this Spirit descends into the Minds of Men, and by its holy Inspiration forms them to Piety.

The Aid
of the *Holy*
Spirit is
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culous.

VI. The giving of this Spirit, and obtaining it by *Christ*, was a most miraculous Work of Divine Power, but the Operations of it, since they are now produced according to fix'd Laws and a settled Order, as regularly and constantly as the Works of Nature, cannot be reckon'd a *Miracle* any more than these are: For I call a *Miracle* a sensible Operation of God, which is perform'd in a Way contrary to Nature; and as it happens beyond all certain and fix'd Order, it proves God to be the immediate Cause and Author: But the Interposition of the Divine Power exerted about the Will is not an Interposition of this kind, for it is done, as we said, according to a certain Rule and Order, and therefore cannot be miraculous. I confess that this is indeed an Exception from the general Law of Free Agents, (72.) but it is no less regular than the

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(72.) He does not mean that this is an Exception from the Law of their *Liberty*, as appears from what immediately follows; but from their being left entirely to themselves; or to the casual Impressions of those external Objects and Agents which surround them; from their acting solely upon Principles of their own Formation or Discovery, and following the Guidance of their natural Understanding, without any internal Assistance: which seems to be the general Law of this their present State of Probation. The *Holy Ghost* then, according to our Author, does not subvert and supersede, but rather strengthen, preserve and perfect our natural Freedom; it repairs the breaches made therein by the Violence of Temptations, by the Force

the Law itself, nor any more repugnant to their Nature. From hence it appears how God may interpose

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Force of Evil Habits; it counterballances the Influence of Evil Spirits, and restores the Mind to its native *Equilibrium*, or Indifference. How these Effects may be suppos'd to be produced in us, and of what kind the Influence of the Holy Ghost, of Good and Evil Angels is, will be consider'd by and by. We shall first give the Opinion of an Author or two concerning what the Holy Spirit's Operations *are not*, or that they cannot be in any respect destructive of our natural Powers.

"In the first place, The manner of the Spirit's Operation is not inconsistent with the Nature of Mankind; which (says Dr. *Stebbing*) is a Truth so fully and so liberally granted by all Parties, that nothing needs to be said to prove it. Now Man we know is an *intelligent* and *rational* Being, able to discern between Good and Evil; he has also such a *Freedom* or *Liberty* of *Will* as makes him accountable to God for his Behaviour in this Life. By consequence the Spirit must not be suppos'd to operate in such a manner as not to make the least use of the Understanding, nor must it be so far inconsistent with Freedom and Liberty, as that a Man's Actions may not properly be call'd his own [1.]. Again, "such is the manner of the Spirit's Operations, that they do not make our own Care and Diligence after Virtue and Godliness unnecessary, but that on the other hand the Operations of the Spirit will do us no Good, if our own Endeavours be wanting. Thirdly, He does not produce his Effects in us all at once, but in such Order, and by those Degrees that suit with our Capacities and Qualifications [u.] Lastly, His Motions are not discernable by us from the natural Operations of our Minds. We feel them no otherwise than we do our Thoughts and Meditations, we cannot distinguish them by the manner of their affecting us from our natural Reasonings, and the Operations of Truth upon our Souls, so that if God had only design'd to give the Holy Spirit to us, without making any mention of it in his Word, we could

[1.] *Treatise Concerning the Operations of the Spirit*, C. 7. p. 123. 8vo.

[u.] *Ibid.* p. 124.

terpose in Matters relating to the Will, and yet not violate the Order of Nature, nor injure his Con-
stancy.

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" could never have known, unless it had been communicated
" to us by some private Revelation, that our Souls are moved
" by a Divine Power when we love God and keep his Com-
" mandments [w.]".

This is a Confirmation of what our Author has declared a-
bove, particularly that the Holy Spirit's Operations cannot be
call'd *miraculous*. A larger Proof and Illustration of the fore-
going Propositions may be seen in the same Chapter. The Con-
sequence resulting from them, *viz.* that the Spirit does not ope-
rate *irresistibly*, is clearly proved and defended against Turretin
in Chap. 8, 9, &c.

See also *Scott's Christian Life*, Part 2. Ch. 4. par. 5. p. 237.
" God (says that Author) in the ordinary course of his Go-
" vernment doth as well leave *free* Agents to the natural *Free-*
" *dom* with which he first created them, as *necessary* ones to these
" Necessities which he first *impress'd* upon their Natures. For
" his *Providence* is *succedaneous* to his *Creation*, and did at first
" *begin* where that *ended*, and doth still *proceed* as it *began*, *or-*
" *dering* and *governing* all things according to the several *Frames*
" and *Models* in which he first *cast* and *created* them. Nor can he
" order and govern them *otherwise* without *unraveling* his own
" *Creation* and making things to be otherwise than he first made
" them. For how can he ordinarily *necessitate* those Agents
" whom he first made *free* without *changing* their Natures from
" *free* to *necessary*, and making them a *different* kind of Being
" than he *made* them? So that tho' in the course of his Govern-
" ment God doth powerfully *importune* and *persuade* us, yet he
" lays no *Necessity* on our *Wills*; but leaves us free to *choose* or
" *refuse*; and as the *Temptations* of *Sin* incline us *one* way, so
" the *Grace* of *God* inclines us *another*, but both leave us to our
" *Liberty* to go which way we please."

See also Bp. Burnet on the 10th Article of the Church of
England, and A-Bp. Tillotson's 160th Sermon. p. 455. vol. 3. or
147th Sermon. p. 319. 3d. Edit. Fol. or Dr. Rymer's Gene-
ral Representation of Reveal'd Religion, C. 9. p. 210, 211.

If the foregoing Observations be true, it follows that the or-
dinary Operation of the Spirit cannot be any *Physical Influence*,
or immediate Determination of the Will; it must therefore be
only a *Moral Influence*, or mediate, rational Determination.

[w] *ibid* p. 125, 126.

stancy. Not that God actually determines the Will by an immediate Influx, for by this means the Act of Election would change its Nature, and be imputed to God rather than to the Will of the Creature

NOTES.

the Manner of effecting this may be by injecting Ideas, Representing Arguments, exhibiting Motives, and assisting the Understanding in its apprehension of them. This I think is all that Mr. *Wollaston* could mean by the Words *Suggestion, Impulse, or silent Communication of some Spiritual Being* [x]: and seem to be the only intelligible Notion of the Influence of either Good or Evil Spirits: in which sense I believe that we are very frequently acted upon and over-ruled in order to promote the Good of the whole, and compleat the Designs of a particular Providence. The Author last Mention'd has given us a fine Description of the manner in which this Government of Free Beings may be exercised and apply'd to the Ends above mention'd. "It is not impossible (says he, y) but many things
 "suitable to several Cases may be brought to pass by means of
 "secret and sometimes sudden Influences on our Minds, or
 "the Minds of other Men whose Acts may affect us. For
 "instance; if the Case should require that N. should be delivered from threatening Ruin, or from some Misfortune
 "which would certainly befall him, if he should go such a
 "way at such a Time as he intended; upon this occasion
 "some new Reasons may be presented to his Mind why he
 "should not go at all, or not then, or not by that Road;
 "or he may forget to go; or if he is to be delivered from some
 "dangerous Enemy, either some new turn given to his Thoughts
 "may divert him from going where the Enemy will be; or the
 "Enemy may after the same manner be diverted from coming
 "where he shall be, or his (the Enemy's) Resentment may be
 "qualify'd or some proper Method may be suggested, or Degree
 "of Resolution and Vigor may be excited. After the same manner, not only Deliverances from Dangers and Troubles but
 "Advantages and Successes may be conferr'd. Or on the other Side, Men may, by way of Punishment for Crimes committed, incur Mischiefs and Calamities. I say, these things
 "and such like may be. For since the Motions and Actions of
 "Men, which depend upon their Wills, do also depend upon
 "their Judgements, as these again do on the present
 "Appear-

[x] *Religion of Nature delineated*, p. 106.

[y] p. 105.

ture, but that in some manner he restores the Faculty to its Perfection, and makes it, when thus fitly dispos'd, exert its proper Actions according to the Rectitude of its Nature, without any Diminution of its Liberty.

VII.

NOTES.

“Appearances or Non-appearances of things in their Minds;
 “if a new prospect of things can be any way produc'd, the
 “Light by which they are seen altered, new Forces and Di-
 “rections impress'd upon the Spirits, Passions exalted or a-
 “bated, the Power of judging enliven'd or debilitated, or the
 “Attention taken off, without any Suspension or Alteration
 “of the standing Laws of Nature; then without that, new
 “Violations, Designs, Measures, or a cessation of thinking
 “also may be produc'd, and thus many things prevented that
 “would otherwise be, and many brought about that would
 “not.” See also *Sherlock on Providence*, p. 51. 2d. Edit.
 Again (z) “That there may be possibly such Inspi-
 “rations of new Thoughts and Counsels may perhaps ap-
 “pear farther from this, that we so frequently find Thoughts
 “arising in our Heads, into which we are led by no Discourse,
 “nothing we read, no clue of Reasoning, but they surprise
 “and come upon us from we know not what Quarter. If
 “they proceed from the Mobility of Spirits stragling out of
 “Order, and fortuitous Affections of the Brain, or were of the
 “Nature of *Dreams*, why are they not as wild, incoherent, and
 “extravagant as they are?” Is it not much more reasonable
 to imagine that they come by the Order and Direction of an all-
 seeing and all-gracious God who continually watches over us,
 and disposes every thing in and about us, for the Good of our-
 selves or others? Not to speak of the agreeableness of this No-
 tion to the Opinions and Belief of the best and wisest Men
 in all Ages. The Consequence Mr. *Wollaston* draws from the
 whole is perfectly agreeable to the Scope of our Author. “If
 “this be the Case, as it seems to be, that Men's Minds are
 “susceptive of such Insinuations and Impressions as frequently
 “by ways unknown do affect them, and give them an Inclina-
 “tion towards this or that, how many things may be brought

[z] p. 107.

VII. Fifthly, It may be demonstrated that the *Prayers* themselves have some natural Power and Efficacy with regard to the Will: For *Prayers* are certain Endeavours towards the Exercise of Liberty, and contain in them Acts of Election, tho' perhaps imperfect ones; and such is the Nature of all Powers, that they acquire Strength by trial and exercise, and every Act, tho' imperfect, is a Step to a more perfect one, till they have attain'd to a Habit and Facility of acting. The constant Exercise of Prayer may therefore tend, by a natural Efficacy, to restore the proper use of Free Will, and regain its native Vigour.

Prayers naturally tend to perfect the Mind.

VIII. Sixthly, The same may be said concerning the Government of the Passions and Affections, which constitutes so great a Part of human Felicity: we have shewn that the Elective Power is superior to all others, and has the Government of them, and that when the Mind is corrupted with Vice, the Will in a great measure falls from that Power which Nature gave it. Yet the inferior Affections of the Mind have not quite shaken off the Yoke, they still obey, tho' with some difficulty, but use and exercise are necessary to implant an Habit of Obedience in them. Since therefore *Prayers* contain in themselves an exercise of Election, they have a natural Efficacy to strengthen the Elective

And to subdue the Affections.

NOTES.

"to pass by these means, without fixing and refixing the Laws of Nature, any more than they are unfix'd when one Man alters the Opinion of another, by throwing a Book proper for that purpose in his way?

To the same purpose see *Scot's Christian Life*, Part 2. Vol. 2. §. 1. p. 81, 82.

I hope the Reader will excuse me for insisting so long on this Point, since false Notions concerning it have produc'd the most pernicious Consequences to Religion in general, as well as the principal Objections against our Author's System.

tive Acts, and by the same means accustom the Affections to obey : for a repeated Act augments the Power and overcomes Resistance. (73.)

IX. Se-

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(73.) *Prayer* puts us upon making good Resolutions, and endeavouring to subdue our vicious Inclinations : it animates our Zeal, and enflames our Affections ; it exercises and improves our Faith, our Hope, and Charity ; and therefore is in itself a Means of strengthening our Faculties, and removing all Impediments to a due Exertion of them. It also makes us sensible of our strict Dependence on the Deity, of our manifold Wants, and the great Benefit of his Supplies, and of consequence it naturally fits us for them, and inclines us to make a right use of them when we do receive them. " It is not only a Means, (says Dr. Barrow [x.]) by Impetration acquiring for us, but it is an effectual Instrument working in us all true Good. It is the Channel by which God conveyeth Spiritual Light into our Minds, and Spiritual Vigour into our Hearts. It is both the Seed, and the Food of Spiritual Life, by which all holy Dispositions of Soul, and all honest Resolutions of Practice are bred and nourished, are augmented and strengthened in us. It exciteh, it quickeneth, it maintaineth all pious Affections. The love of God can no otherwise than by it be kindled, fomented or kept in Life, (without it we certainly shall have an Estrangement and Aversation from him) it alone can maintain a constant reverence and awe of God, keeping him in our Thoughts, and making us to live as in his Presence. It chiefly enliveneth and exerciseth our Faith in God ; it is that which begetteth in us a savoury Relish of Divine things, which sweetneth and endeareth to ourselves the Practice of Piety ; which only can enable us with delight and alacrity, to obey God's Commandments : It alone can raise our Minds from the Cares and Concernments of this World to a sense and desire of Heavenly things.

" God's End (says Mr. Chubb) in requiring this Duty of Prayer, is wholly and solely the Good and Benefit of his Creatures, viz. that it may be a means to work in the Petitioner a suitable frame and temper of Mind, and to dispose him to a suitable Practice and Conversation, and so render him a suitable and proper Object of God's special Care and Love.

And

IX. Seventhly, As to Material Objects, *viz.* our own Bodies and the Elements, 'tis plain that the intellectual World is more noble than the Material, and consequently that this latter was made for the sake of the former, and is subservient to its use: But since the Actions of Beings endow'd with Understanding and Will are free, and on that account contingent, they necessarily produce a Contingency also in material Substances which depend upon them. For we can excite certain Motions in our own Bodies, and communicate them to the adjacent ones, which Motions are not in this Case produced merely according to Mechanic Laws, but the direction of the Will.

Nor would they have happen'd at the time or in the manner they do, if the Will had not by its own Liberty excited them. Neither do we suppose that any Violence or Disorder happens hereby to the Laws of Nature; for Nature itself has provided that the less should give way to the more noble, that is, local Motion to the Action of the Will, as being the more excellent of the two. We must believe the same concerning Agents of a superior Nature, and the more noble Order they are of, the greater

The Actions of Free-Beings will produce a contingency in material things, yet this does not offer any Violence to Nature.

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" And as this is God's End in appointing this Duty, so for this End he requires the frequent Returns of it, that the Mind of the Petitioner may be habitually seasoned with a sense of himself [a.] See also Bp. Patrick's Discourse concerning Prayer, Ch. 8 and 9.

These Effects and Uses of Prayer, most of which are discoverable by natural Reason, prove sufficiently, I think, that Prayer is a *natural Duty*. Concerning the *Efficacy* of it, and the manner whereby Providence may be supposed to answer our particular Requests, see the following Notes to this Subsection.

[a.] Chubb's *Traacts*, p. 180, &c.

greater Sphere of Action is to be attributed to them. Such little Creatures as we Men are, can convey Water in Canals, drain such Parts of the Earth as are naturally cover'd with Water, drown the Dry-Land, and produce a great many other Changes both in the Earth, the Water and the Air. Who then can affirm but that there may be other Agents who could change almost the whole Elements, if they were not prohibited by certain Laws? All who acknowledge the Existence of such Beings, are agreed that these things are possible; now it must be allow'd that whatever is perform'd by these Beings, is done according to the Laws of Nature, and that no manner of Violence is hereby offer'd to the Order of it, any more than by the Actions of our own Will.

There is a System of intellectual as well as material Beings, which act as much upon each other.

X. Eightly, And as all material Beings are connected together, and by mutual Influence act upon each other; viz. the Superior upon the Inferior; the Sun upon the Æther and the Moon, and that upon the Air, Water, and Earth; and perhaps *vice versa*; so 'tis in like manner probable that there is a certain Order and System of intellectual Beings constituted, who are no less subordinate to one another, and operate upon each other by a mutual Influence, according to the Laws establish'd by Nature.

God makes use of the Ministry of Angels in the Government of Mankind, nor is this any Violence to Nature.

XI. Ninthly, There seems to be no reason why God should not make use of the Ministry of those Beings in the Government of this World † whenever it may be expedient. This we see is done in some measure upon our Earthly Globe. For he makes use of Men to govern other Animals, and some Men are set as Guardians over others. And as the Attendants of Princes and Judges per-

from

† See the Religion of Nature delineated, p. 108, 109.

form their Office, not as they themselves please, but according to the Appointment of their Masters, or the Laws; so in like manner we are to believe that Agents more excellent than us (which we stile ministring Angels) discharge their Office according to the Laws prescribed by God. Suppose therefore this, about assisting such as regularly apply to God, to be one of these Laws; let them be commanded to relieve those who make their humble Addresses to him, and let the manner of invoking him be prescribed by Nature, or some positive Law: Can it be doubted whether they would not as readily exert their Powers for the Assistance of these Supplicants, and as diligently discharge the Duty of relieving them from distress as a Judge's Officer, or a Prince's Servant performs the Commands of his Master? And so long as these things are done according to the general Order, and under such Conditions as are agreeable to Nature and Reason, they can be no more deem'd repugnant to the Order of Nature, or the Laws appointed for the Government of the World, than civil Government and the Laws among Men are. Here is nothing contrary to or inconsistent with the Laws of universal Nature: for it does not seem any more repugnant to these that Angels should use their Powers for the Relief of such as pray to God, than that Men should help each other according to their Abilities. If it be granted that these things are so, it will be very apparent how our *Prayers* may have their Effect, and the desired Changes may be produced in our Bodies, and the Elements, without doing Violence to Nature, or disturbing the Order establish'd by God. Nay it may be provided by a Law, that our Wishes be thus fulfill'd: and we need not declare how much this Power over external things granted to free Agents, may tend to raise

our Affections and incline the Wills themselves. 'Tis very well known how great an Influence the Temperature of the Blood and Motion of the Spirits have over these. Since then our Bodies are by a Law of Nature capable of being moved by free Agents, at least when we desire it, 'tis not impossible but that by the Means of these Bodies, they may have Access to the Soul; and tho' they cannot act upon the *Will* immediately, yet they may indirectly excite it to exert its own Acts. (74.)

God is not oblig'd to take away the abuse of Free-Will, since he has establish'd a Method of assisting his Worshipers.

XII. Tenthly, There's neither any occasion nor room to explain how agreeable this is to Reason and the Holy Scriptures. Let it suffice to observe how large a Field is hereby open'd for Prayer, and how effectual it may be for obtaining the Assistance not only of God himself immediately, but also of his Ministers.

It must be confess'd that God sometimes relieves the Distress'd, and when apply'd to, interposes in Matters relating to the Will: but these things are effected according to the Universal Law of Nature. And tho' this be superior to that which is implanted in the particular Nature of some Beings; yet it is no less natural with regard to the System of Universal Nature; neither are we to believe that this

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(74.) That is, as a Man is excited or inclin'd to any thing by a Prospect of the Pleasure or Pain which may attend the Prosecution or Omission of it; or, as we commonly say, by another's *working upon* his Passions, his Hopes, or his Fears: For that superior Beings act upon us in no other sense, that their Influence consists only in occasioning pleasant or disagreeable Ideas in us, in representing Arguments, Motives, &c. to us, may perhaps be gather'd from Note 72. And, I think, it must be allow'd that this is very consistent with that Physical Indifference, or absolute Freedom of the Will above described.

this is often done, but only in Cases where a particular Nature cannot be left to itself without Detriment to the whole. Nor is God, because he sometimes vouchsafes to interpose and help the Suppliant, also oblig'd entirely to remove the abuse of Free-Will; that is, in reality, to destroy the Nature itself. By a Law of Nature, the Exercise of that Faculty belongs to such Agents as are endow'd with it, and tho' that Law admit of an Exception, yet it cannot be quite abrogated, without greater Damage done to the whole than what may happen from the abuse of it. Nor is God obliged, because Prayers have their Effect with him, to relieve such as don't pray to him at all.

XIII. Eleventhly, This seems to establish the *Efficacy of Prayers* much better than their Opinion who hold that all is fix'd by God in a fatal Conca-tenation, and that such things as are requested of God, and seem to be obtain'd, are not in any respect owing to the Prayers, but that God has by his Foreknowledge join'd the Actions of the Will with corporeal Motions, in such a manner that they should happen together, but without any other relation to each other than what arises from his Pre-ordination, as appears in the Agreement between the Index of a Watch and the Sun.

The *Efficacy of Prayers* cannot be accounted for if all things be left to necessary causes.

For instance: God has pre-ordain'd a Storm from necessary Causes, and that some notorious Offenders shall be sailing in it; when they are in danger they shall repent and pray to God, and at length the Wind shall cease.

Thus a Calm ensues upon the Prayers of the Petitioners, but without any Connection or Dependence on each other, merely by the force of pre-

disposed Causes, which do not require any Interposition of the Divine Power. (75.)

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(75.) The foremention'd Hypothesis of a pre determin'd and necessary Connection between Corporeal Motions and the Operations of the Will, is advanc'd by *Leibnitz* in what is commonly call'd his System of the *Pre-establiſh'd Harmony*, which occurs in several of his Works, an account of which may be seen in *Fabricius* [b.] An Explanation of it by *G. Hanſcius* may be found in the *Present State of the Republic of Letters*, Vol. 4. for Octob. 1729. There are some Objections against it in *Bayle's* Dict. Article *Rozarius*. Rem. L. — But as the whole of it is built upon a Supposition that the Mind has not a Liberty of *Indifference*, and of consequence no proper Liberty at all, we need not spend any time in confuting it, having, I hope, sufficiently establish'd the contrary Principle above, and thereby remov'd the Foundation of it.

Mr. *Whiston* in particular has espous'd the Opinion which our Author alludes to, and enlarg'd upon it in the following Manner [c.] “ Our Imperfection is such, that we can only act *pro re nata*, can never know beforehand the behaviour or actions of Men, neither can we foresee what Circumstances and Conjunctions will happen at any certain time hereafter. And so we cannot provide for future Events, nor pre-dispose things in such a manner that every one shall be dealt with, or every thing done, no otherwise than if we were then alive and present, we should think proper and reasonable, and should actually do. But in the Divine Operation it is quite otherwise. God's Prescience enables him to act after a more sublime manner, and by a constant Course of Nature and Chain of mechanical Causes to do every thing so as it shall not be distinguishable from a particular Interposition of his Power, nor be otherwise than on such a particular Interposition would have been brought to pass. He who has created all things, and given them their several Powers and Faculties, foresees the Effects of them all; at once looks thro' the entire Chain of Causes, Actions and Events, and sees at what Periods, and in what manner 'twill be necessary and expedient to bring about any Changes,

“ bestow

[b.] *Delectus Argumentorum*, &c. p. 387, &c.

[c.] *New Theory*, B. 4. C. 4, Solution 87.

The Assertors of this Opinion are oblig'd from the common sense of Mankind to allow that God

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is

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" bestow any Mercies, or inflict any Punishments on the
 " World. Which being unquestionably true, 'tis evi-
 " lent he can as well provide and predispose natural Causes for those
 " Mutations, Mercies or Judgments: he can as easily put the
 " Machine into such Motions as shall, without a Necessity of
 " his mending or correcting it, correspond to all these fore-
 " seen Events or Actions, as make way for such Alterations af-
 " terwards by giving a random Force to the whole: and when
 " these two ways are equally possible, I need not say which is
 " most agreeable to the Divine Perfections, and most worthy
 " of God". And again: [d.] We pray to God for fruitful Sea-
 " sons, for Health, for Peace, for the Success of our Endeavours,
 " for a Blessing on our Food and Physick, and deprecate the contrary Miseries from us. Yet at the same time
 " we see the Seasons depend on the settled Course of the Sun,
 " or other natural and necessary Causes; we find our Health
 " or Sicknes to be the proper Effects of our Dyet and Regimen:
 " we observe Peace and War subject to the Intrigues of Princes,
 " and the plain Results of visible Conjunctions in human Affairs:
 " we know that worldly Prudence and Cunning has a main stroke
 " in the Success of Mens Labours: we feel the advantageous Effects
 " of some Food and Physic, and have reason to believe that the same
 " does very much result from the Goodness of the Drugs, the fitness of the
 " Proportion, and the Skill of the Physician, and can frequently
 " give a plain and mechanical Reason of the different Operation of all
 " these things; neither do we hope for the Exercise of a *miraculous* Power
 " in these or the like Cases. In short, " Second Causes, says he, will
 " work according to their Natures, let Mens Supplications be never so
 " importunate: and to expect a Miracle in answer to every Petition,
 " is more than the most religious dare pretend to". See also
 " Mr. Wollaston's Illustration of this Hypothesis, p. 104. or Dr.
 " Eddes's *Body of Divinity*, 1st vol. p. 154.

We shall propose an Answer to it in the following Note. Let it suffice at present to observe, that this particular Interposition of Divine Power which our Author contends for, is very improperly stiled *miraculous*, as may be seen from Note 72 and the 6th Paragraph of this Subsection.

[d.] Ibid. *Corollary*, p. 362. 1st Edit.

is to be invoc'd ; and that such as duly offer up their Prayers have their Requests granted : but as they are of Opinion that things go by Fate, and that there is no room for *Contingency*, or a *particular Providence*, they have invented this Scheme that there might be, or at least might seem to be, some room for Prayers. But all this is to no purpose : For since God has made Agents free, and allow'd them the use of Liberty, he must also have reserv'd to himself a Liberty of treating them according to what their Nature requires, which cannot be done without a peculiar Providence, and immediate Interposition ; without these no Efficacy will be left to Prayer, no Worship to God, no Honour to Religion ; For if the Production of those things which we request depend upon antecedent, natural, and necessary Causes, our Desires will be answer'd no less upon the Omission, than the offering up of Prayers. Vows and Prayers therefore are made in vain. If it be said that the Supplicants could not omit them, since they were pre-ordain'd. I answer : He that could omit them could not possibly offer them : his Omission therefore is not culpable : And he that is employ'd in Prayer to God undertakes a superfluous Office : for these Petitions in reality contribute nothing to the Effect, and no reason can be given why that should be required which is of no Benefit. (76.)

XIV.

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(76.) Tho' this Answer is very solid, and may by some perhaps be thought sufficient ; yet, as the Point before us is of the greatest Importance ; since wrong Notions concerning it cause Perplexities which disturb the Minds of most Men, as Mr. *Whiston* observes [e.] and since the Scheme of Providence so elaborately

[e.] *New Theory*, p. 362.

XIV. 'Tis scarce possible for one who reads this not to think of that famous Difficulty, *viz.* how the Contingency of things can be consistent with the Divine *Prescience*: Neither is it proper to meddle with it in this Place: For it would require a whole

An Intimation that this is not repugnant to the Divine *Prescience*.

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elaborately display'd by that Author will not, I fear, help to clear them, as he promises, but rather occasion worse; — on these accounts it will not be improper to give a fuller Confutation of it from such Authors as endeavour to prove that the foremention'd Scheme of Providence is both impossible in itself, and attended with Consequences destructive of the very Notion of Prayer, and most other Duties of Religion. “The Abettors of the mechanical Hypothesis, [*f*] says Dr. *Jenkin*, “argue, that he is the best Artist who can contrive an Engine “that shall need the least meddling with after it is made. But “it ought to be consider'd what the Nature of the Engine is, “and what the ends and uses of it are; and if the Nature of it “be such that it cannot answer the Ends for which it was “framed, without sometimes an assisting hand, it would be no “point of Wisdom in the Artificer, for the Credit of his “Contrivance, to lose the most useful Ends design'd by it. “As if, among other uses, this curious Engine were design'd “to reward the good, and punish bad Men; to remove the “Punishment upon Amendment, and to renew it upon a relapse: since brute Matter is incapable of varying its Motion, “and suiting itself to the several States and Changes of free “Agents, he must assist it, unless he will lose the chief End “for which it is to serve. It is no defect in the Skill and Wisdom of the Almighty, that Matter and Motion have not “Free-Will as Men have; but it would be a great defect in “his Wisdom not to make them the Instruments of Rewards and “Punishments, because it is impossible for them of themselves “to apply and suit themselves to the several States and Conditions of Free Agents. The Nature of Matter and Motion is “such, that they cannot serve all the Designs of their Creator, without his Interposition, and therefore he constantly “doth interpose according to a certain Tenor which he hath “prescrib'd to himself”;

He

[*f.*] *Reasonableness of Christianity*, 2d vol. p. 218. 5th Edit.

whole Book. Let it suffice to give a hint, that the Solution of it depends upon considering the *Manner*

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He proceeds to a particular Examination of the *Pre-establifh'd* Order in p. 221. which he opposes with much the same Arguments as these that follow from Dr. Fiddes [g] “ As to the
 “ Opinion of those who say, God upon the Foresight of the
 “ Prayers of Men to him, disposeth the Order of things in such
 “ a manner, that what they pray for shall happen, or what
 “ they deprecate be averted; this is altogether inconceivable;
 “ or rather, in the Nature of things, supposing Men free Agents,
 “ impossible. For tho’ God does foresee which way
 “ Men will act, yet nothing upon the Mechanical Hypothesis
 “ can follow from his Action, but according to the Laws of
 “ Mechanism. In case any one, for instance, should pray to
 “ be deliver’d from the danger of some infectious or pestilential
 “ Distemper, the Vapour whereby ’tis propagated, will,
 “ notwithstanding, pursue its natural Course, and produce its
 “ Effect wherever it falls upon a proper Subject; it can make
 “ no manner of Distinction between him that *sacrificeth* and
 “ him that *sacrificeth not*. God may indeed, by some secret
 “ Impulse on the Mind of Man, which yet he is at Liberty to
 “ follow, be the occasion of diverting him from the Scope of
 “ its Motion; or perhaps, on some extraordinary Exigence,
 “ by an invisible Power, retard, accelerate, or obstruct its
 “ Course; but still, if all things operate mechanically, whether
 “ Men pray or no, it will unavoidably have its proper
 “ Effect. There is another Case wherein the Motives to
 “ Prayer, if all things come to pass by the fix’d Laws of
 “ Mechanism, appear still more evidently groundless. A Man
 “ in the Heat of Battle, prays that God would preserve him
 “ from the Instruments of Death, which fly every where about
 “ him; yet a Ball from a Cannon or a Musquet will necessarily
 “ pursue the line of its direction; it depends however on the
 “ choice of Man, whether he will give it such a particular
 “ Direction as by the natural tendency of it will take way the
 “ Life of the Person who deprecates the Danger wherewith he
 “ finds himself surrounded. In this Case it is impossible, upon
 “ any foresight of his Prayers, that the order of Causes, which
 “ are in themselves of arbitrary and uncertain Determination,
 “ should be dispos’d after such a manner

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ner by which we apprehend the things of God: (77.)
He that understands that manner rightly will never
stick at this Difficulty.

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“ner as certainly to produce the desired Effect of them”.
Concerning the Impossibility of adapting a fix’d and immutable
Law to the State and Condition of Free or mutable Agents,
see B. 2. Part 1. p. 154.

Lastly: “It is of great use to us (says Dr. *Sherlock* [b.] to
“understand this which teaches us what we may expect from
“God, and what we must attribute to him in the Govern-
“ment of Nature. We must not expect in ordinary Cases
“that God should reverse the Laws of Nature for us; that if
“we leap into the Fire it shall not burn us; or into the Wa-
“ter it shall not drown us: and by the same reason, the Pro-
“vidence of God is not concern’d to preserve us when we
“destroy ourselves by Intemperance and Lust: for God does
“not work Miracles to deliver Men from the evil Effects of
“their own Wickedness: But all the kind Influences of Hea-
“ven which supply our Wants, and fill our Hearts with
“Food and Gladness, are owing to that good Providence
“which commands Nature to yield her Increase; and those
“Disorders of Nature which afflict the World with Famines,
“Pestilence and Earthquakes, are the Effects of God’s Anger
“and Displeasure, and are order’d by him for the Punishment
“of a wicked World. We must all believe this, or confess
“that we mock God, when we bless him for a healthful Air
“and fruitful Seasons, or deprecate his Anger when we see
“visible Tokens of his Vengeance in the Disorders of Nature.
“For did not God immediately interpose in the Government
“of Nature, there would be no reason to beg his Favour or de-
“precate his Anger upon these accounts”. — And to the
same purpose he urges, p. 71. That without this Belief, that
God takes a particular Care of all his Creatures in the Govern-
ment of all Events that can happen to them (which Belief ap-
pears to be impossible upon the *Mechanical Hypothesis*) there is
no reason or pretence for most of the particular Duties of Reli-
gious Worship, as is fully proved in the same place. See also
C 9. Concerning the true *Notion*, as well as the *Reasonableness*
and *Necessity* of Prayer, see p. 381. *ib.*

(77.) He means the Scheme of *Analogy*, concerning which
see his Note C. We have given our Notion of the Word
Prescience.

[b.] *On Providence*, p. 38. 1st Edit.

The Reader may observe, that in this and other Places, I intersperse some things which belong to
Revealed

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Prescience in Note 10. R.e. see also Mr. Jackson on *Human Liberty*, p. 62. But tho' we cannot perhaps determine the precise manner of God's knowing the free Acts of Men, yet we are certain that he does and must always know them: since otherwise he would know many things now which he did not know once, and consequently his *Omniscience* or Infinite Knowledge would receive addition from Events, which (as we have made appear in R. 1.) is contrary to the true Notion of Infinity. This general Argument drawn from God's infinite or perfect Knowledge, seems to me the only one which can come near to a Proof that he must always have a compleat and equal Knowledge of such actions as are in themselves absolutely contingent, as all those evidently are which depend upon the Free-Will of the Creature. These actions (as we formerly observ'd) may properly be call'd *Future* with respect to us or other Men, and the Knowledge of them in the same respect be stiled *Fore-Knowledge*. But with regard to the Deity, whose Existence and Attributes can have no relation to time, *i. e.* to which nothing can be at a distance; I think, the Expression is absurd; and we must necessarily either admit the fore-mention'd absurdity of supposing his Knowledge limited, or else allow that all things are at all times equally in his view; and consequently that Knowledge, as in him, hath nothing to do with *fore* and *after*.

If we admit this Notion of things being always present to God, tho' successive to us, which seems to be the only way of conceiving how Contingencies can possibly be Objects of any Knowledge; If this, I say, be allow'd, then all things, actions, &c. which can properly be said to exist, will be equally proper *Objects* of God's Knowledge, since he is hereby supposed not to know them *in fieri*, or *in their Cause*; but *in esse*, or in their *actual Existence*. Which at the same time gives us the *Medium* of their being knowable, *viz.* Their real Existence; and makes it as easy for us to imagine how God should always know them, as how we should ever know a thing when it is immediately presented to us.

'Tis submitted to the Reader, whether this old Notion of the Schoolmen be not still the best we are able to frame upon the present Subject.

Revealed Religion, contrary to what I intended at first; which happen'd because some Objections seem'd to arise from reveal'd Religion, in opposition to the Principles and Arguments here laid down. Since therefore I had determin'd to produce nothing but what was perfectly agreeable to the Articles of Faith, and the Principles of the Christian Religion, I found it necessary to call in the Scripture to my Assistance, that the Answer might come from the same Quarter with the Objections.

One that knows nothing of *Reveal'd Religion* cannot bring these Objections; one that does not believe it has no right to urge them. For if he be sensible that the Objections are of any force, he must of necessity also admit the Solutions, since both of them depend upon the same Authority. (78.)

SUBJECT.

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(78.) This general Argument lies against all those who bring Objections from the Scripture Account of the *Creation, Fall, &c.* viz. either they believe the Truth and Divine Authority of those Books, or they do not; if they do, then they must believe them also when they declare that all the Works of God are holy and just and good; and consequently that the foremention'd Difficulties are no real Arguments against the Divine Attributes: if they do not; then the whole falls to the Ground. For to admit one part of an account and reject the other, when both depend upon the same Authority, is evidently unreasonable.

Objections therefore drawn from the Scripture account of these Matters can but be mere Arguments *ad hominem* at best; and are of no force either to make or justify an Unbeliever.

SUBJECT. V.

Why God does not translate Man to some other Place, where nothing would occur that could tempt him to choose amiss.

This is the same as if it were ask'd, why God did not give the Earth to be inhabited by the Brutes only.

I. 'TIS plain, that in the present State of things it is impossible for Man to live without natural Evils, or the danger of erring. 'Tis a common Question, why does not God change this State, and translate Man to some other, where all Occasions of Error and Incitements to Evil being cut off, he might choose only Good; *i. e.* in reality, Why has he placed Man upon the Earth? Why did he not leave it to be inhabited by the Brutes alone? There are some perhaps who expect such things as these from the Divine Goodness, but without any Sense or Reason; since it manifestly appears to be better that we should contend with the present Evils, than that the Earth should be void of all rational Inhabitants. (79.)

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(79.) To ask why Man was placed in such a World as this, is to ask why he was created at all? Since if he was to be made what he is, *i. e.* consisting of a Soul and a Body, this World was a proper place for him. To the Question, Why should he be made of such a Nature as denominates him *Man*, or placed in this lower Class of Beings? a sufficient Answer is given in Note 24, where, I think, it is render'd probable, that the same Goodness which excited the Deity to create Beings of the highest Order, would induce him both to create as many of that Order as could commodiously exist together, or

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Some make it a Question, why so great a Part of the Earth is given away to the Brutes ; but these Men would have it all left to them ; and Mankind itself extinct,

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be consistent with the Good of the whole ; and likewise to produce a Series of as many inferior Orders, and as many particular Beings in each of those Orders as could be conceiv'd to exist between himself and nothing : or so long as Existence in the very lowest Order might be a Benefit either to the Beings of that Order, or to those of some other. The Consequence of which is, that we must either have been placed in the Class we are in at present, or no where, since by the Supposition every other Class is full. And there will appear sufficient reason for our being created in this Order, and placed where we are, rather than not created at all, provided that Existence be a Blessing to us, or that we receive in general more Happiness than Misery in this present State : which point will be consider'd in the next *Subsection*.

That these several Classes may be supposed to advance gradually towards Perfection, and of consequence that we in time may be removed into some better State, see Note 19 and 20.

These Considerations will supply us with an Answer to Bayle's Objection against what our Author advances in this Paragraph. ' This (says he) is just like as if a King should ' confine several of his Subjects in his Dungeons, till they ' were 60 Years old, because these Dungeons would otherwise be empty. But to make any *likeness* at all in these two Cases, it must be made appear in the first place, that we really meet with more Evil of all kinds than Good in this World ; and consequently, that it were better for *us* to be out of it than in it : contrary to what our Author has proved in Ch. 2: par. 7. Ch. 4. §. 8. par. 7. and in the following Subsection : and secondly, it must be shewn also, that we might have been placed in some better World, without any Inconvenience to the *rest of the Universe*, contrary to what may be concluded from the former Part of this Note, and that other to which it refers.

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II. We have often declared that Evils are chiefly to be avoided, nay that they are prohibited by God, because they are prejudicial to human Nature, but how much worse would it be to take that Nature entirely away? They therefore who require this of the Divine Goodness, desire the greatest Evil of all as a Remedy for Evils. The same Persons also, that with such Earnestness desire a Change of their Condition, are afraid of Death, forgetting that this Change of their Condition is what they dread the most of all in Death.

III. Mankind believes indeed from the Light of Nature, that God will translate good Men into a better State, but it is necessary that they should be prepared here, as Plants in a Nursery, before they be removed into the Garden where they are to bear Fruit (80.) God has therefore decreed this Life

NOTES.

(80.) *Bayle* objects, that our Author's comparison here is not a just one, since God cannot be ty'd to the use of common means, and a slow Progress of second Causes. He is not obliged to nurse us up as a Gardener does his Plants, but might as well have produced us adult and ripe in Perfection, and have made us happy at once. — But perhaps it may appear a little doubtful to a Person who attentively considers Note 19, whether this could be done even in *natural* Pleasure. However, I think, 'tis absolutely inconceivable how it should be effected in *Moral* Happiness. If we consider the Nature of Virtue and of Man, it will not be possible for us to imagine how this could be implanted in him at first, or infused into him afterwards, or he be in any wise made morally perfect or good on a sudden. The Idea of Virtue consists in a repetition of free Acts, and therefore it cannot be receiv'd *passively*: and tho' the Disposition might be thus communicated, yet to compleat its Nature, and make it actually productive of true moral Happiness, there must necessarily be requir'd due time for Exercise, Experience and confirmed Habits, as may be gather'd from the *Preliminary Dissertation*; and will farther appear from Notes 82 and 83.

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Sect. 5. Sub. 5. *Of Moral Evil.*

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Life to be as it were the Passage to a better. Thus this Earth is replenish'd with Inhabitants, who being

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From the Nature of Man also, or a Being in his imperfect State, we may fairly infer that he could not have so great an Idea of the moral Perfections of the Deity, nor so clear an apprehension of the contrary Qualities, nor consequently, a suitable affection for the one, and an abhorrence of the other, if he had not some experience of both [i.]

We know not the real Value of a good thing, we cannot be duly sensible of its Excellence, except we have been in some measure acquainted with its Opposite, or at least have perceiv'd the want of it on some occasion. "Does any one (says Leibnitz [k]) sufficiently relish the Happiness of good Health who has never been sick? Is it not most times necessary that a little Evil should render a Good more sensible, and consequently greater?" See also Note 19. The same holds stronger still in Moral Good: which is a confirmation of the *Alternative* that *Lactantius* speaks of [l]; and which is well describ'd by *A. Gellius* [m]. It does not therefore seem possible for us to have a due Knowledge of Virtue if we had never seen Vice. Without this Knowledge of Virtue, we could not ardently desire it, without such a desire, and a sedulous prosecution of that desire, we could not attain to the proper exercise of it, and without this attainment we could not have any consciousness of desert, any comfortable self approbation, or true Moral Happiness.

It appears then that Virtue is an Act of our own, that a Series of these Acts is requisite to constitute an habit of Virtue, and of consequence that this cannot be *inspired* into any Being, or however not produced in one of our weak frame *on a sudden*: and in the last place, that this present State is necessary (as our Author says) to train us up, and fit us for a better. That this Life is properly a State of *Trial* and Probation, and the Virtues of it absolutely necessary to the Happiness of the next, see *Rymer's General Representation of Reveald Religion*, Part 2. Ch. 3. p. 385. &c. and *Scott's Christian Life*, Vol. 2. Ch. 4.

[i.] See Note 67.

[k.] *Memoirs of Literature*, v. 3. Art. 25. p. 118.

[l.] *De Ira Dei*, §. 13. sect. sub fin. and 15.

[m.] B. 6. Ch. 1.

ing educated under Discipline for a while, till they have finish'd their Course, shall depart into another State suited to their Deserts. They who find fault with this in God, seem to me to do the same as if one who is ignorant of Agriculture and Harvest should laugh at the Sower for throwing away his Corn. For there is no doubt but the present State of things is as necessary, not only to the Earth lest it should be void of Inhabitants, and to the Animals, which for the most part depend upon the Labours of Men, but also to Men themselves:

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Ch. 4. §. 3. p. 321, 335, &c. 8vo. and *Sherlock on Death*, C. 1. §. 3. p. 77, &c. 4th Edit. or *Rel. of Nat. delin.* p. 213, 214.

To the same purpose is that excellent Paper in the *SpeEtator*, No. 447.--- "The last use I shall make of this remarkable
 "Property in human Nature, of being delighted with those
 "Actions to which it is accustomed, is to shew how absolutely necessary it is for us to gain habits of Virtue in this Life,
 "if we would enjoy the pleasures of the next. The State of
 "Bliss we call Heaven will not be capable of affecting those
 "Minds which are not thus qualify'd for it; we must in this
 "World gain a Relish of Truth and Virtue, if we would be
 "able to taste that Knowledge and Perfection which are to
 "make us happy in the next. The seeds of those Spiritual
 "Joys and Raptures which are to rise up and flourish in the
 "Soul to all Eternity must be planted in her during this her
 "present State of Probation. In short, Heaven is not to be
 "look'd upon only as the Reward, but as the natural Effect
 "of a Religious Life." See also *Tillotson's Sermon*. 1st vol. Fol. p. 51, 82, 85, &c. and the 78th Sermon. 2d vol. p. 591. Concerning the true End of Man, and the Means of obtaining it, and the Nature both of those Virtues which will constitute the greatest part of Heaven, and of those *Instrumental Duties* by which we are to acquire, improve, and perfect these Heavenly Virtues, or make our own Heaven, see *Scott's Christian Life*, vol. 1. particularly Ch. 3. which Notion is also well defended by Dr. Rymer in the Chap. above-mention'd. See also Dr. *Laughton's Sermon*. on *Rom. 6.* 23.

selves: and as requisite in the Divine Administration, in order to some better Life, as Seed-time is to Harvest, (Y.)

Vol. II.

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SUBJECT;

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(Y.) But it is ask'd, since Man is capable of a better State, why did not God place him in it immediately? Can it be agreeable to an infinitely good Being to delay so great a Benefit, and make his Creatures wait for it with a long train of Sufferings, when he might have placed them in that happy Condition at first? Wou'd we count him a kind beneficent Man that serv'd his Friends thus, and made them buy his Favours with a long attendance and a severe exercise of Patience? Is it not a Rule that he that gives frankly gives twice, and that benefits lose their grace when dispensed with a slow hand?

To this I reply, that we shou'd not be surpris'd if we were able to give no reason for God's conduct in this particular. For since it's impossible that we shou'd have a perfect view of the contrivance and whole fabric of the Universe, 'tis likewise impossible that we should be able to discover the reason of every thing in it. But if in those parts that we are acquainted with, we discern apparent footsteps of Wisdom and Goodness, we ought to conclude that the same go thro' all the rest, tho' we can't trace them.

But 2dly. Tho' this answer be true and sufficient, it happens that we have no occasion for it at present. For we believe that we are able to give a very good account why God did not place Mankind in the same certainty and Degree of Happiness that we expect in Heaven. In order to this let us consider,

1st. That the World so far as known to us is one intire Machine, in which all the parts have a mutual respect, and dependance on one another, and contribute to the support and preservation of the whole. This is a proof of the Unity and Wisdom of the Maker.

2dly. That in such a vast Machine it was impossible all the parts shou'd be of the same sort or have the same Offices, and of consequence there must be in the several parts of the System different Bodies of different Constitutions and Qualities.

3dly. That every one of these were capable of subsisting and supporting animals, but then it was impossible that all those animals shou'd be of the same kind, or have the same qualifications or conveniencies.

4thly. The Case being thus, all that cou'd be expected from the framer of the whole was that he shou'd fill each of these parts

SUBSECT. VI.

Concerning the Scarcity of Happy Persons, and the General Corruption of Mankind.

Some Objections
proposed
concerning the
Rarity of
Happy
Persons.

I. **B**UT it may seem strange, that of so great a Multitude of Men, so few should attain to Happiness. For whether that be supposed to arise from the fruition of such things as are agreeable

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parts of the Universe with proper Animals, which might enjoy themselves and live as conveniently as the circumstances of the place allow'd: and where the circumstances of the station would not afford conveniencies greater than the inconveniencies that attended it, that place shou'd be left void, since that was better than to fill it with miserable Creatures. By miserable I understand, as the Author does, creatures whose Being, taken in the whole duration of it, has more evil than good.

5thly. If we conceive some of these Creatures of such a nature that they may either forfeit, or lose the place in which they are, or grow unfit for it by the imperfections that attend their bodies or circumstances, a case which we see often happen to Men in this life; then it will be agreeable to the wisdom and goodness of the common Author to contrive the Matter so that those in a worse station shou'd grow up to a capacity of sitting and filling those Habitations which the others deserted or became incapable of possessing any longer. We see such transmutations and translations happen among the Animals.

Thus Insects being generated and prepared in Water, at a proper time desert their Womb of Water or Earth, get Wings and mount into the Air, which then affords them a more convenient habitation.

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able to the natural Appetites, or from free Elections, 'tis manifest, that not even one of a hundred

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6thly, The same may be said of Men. They were created at first on the Earth, because there was no other Place for them, all others had their proper Inhabitants, and were full, and therefore Man must either be here or no where. Now this Earth is part of the Universe, and of such a Nature that it was impossible the Animals in it should be freed from all Inconveniences, that is exempted from all natural Evils: But our Good and Wise God so contrived it by his peculiar Care and Favour that Man, the only Intelligent Being in it, should be exempted from the greatest of these Evils, that is absolute Extinction by Death, and be capable of Translation to a better Place when it should become void, and accordingly the fall of the Angels made room for Men. This is so easy a Thought that I find many are of Opinion that Man was created with design to fill the Place from whence the Angels fell, and that these Angels are not sent to Hell till there be Men enough to fill their place in Heaven.

7thly, If we conceive that the Creatures thus advanced have more pleasure in their Advancement than those that desert or change their Station lose by their Fall, it seems agreeable to the Wisdom and Goodness of God to permit such an Exchange; for by that means his Favours are more equally distributed to his Creatures, and there is more Good in the whole World than would be if this were not permitted. If all Creatures were equal, and in Stations equally capable of Happiness there were no room for such an Exchange. But since such an Equality is impossible, the next Good to it is to let each intelligent Creature have its turn in the best Station or at least a possibility afforded him of having it.

8thly, This seems to be the Intent of what the Scripture declares concerning a certain Number of *Elders*, which must be compleated before the End and Consumation of the World. A better Reason cou'd scarce be given why a certain Number was to be fill'd up before the last Day, than that this Earth was design'd to prepare as many Inhabitants to be translated into Heaven as were wanting; nor how any should be wanting but by the fall or departure of some of the Inhabitants placed there by God at first. But it was reasonable that this should be proposed to Mortals by way of Reward, and that as many as God vouchsafed this Favour to should be at Liberty
by

thousand is truly happy. In vain then do we enquire about the Means which lead to Happiness; the Power

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by a trial of their Virtues to shew themselves worthy to succeed the fallen Angels. This seems to offer a Reason why God permitted Men the Use of Free-Will, *viz.* to shew himself just and equitable to his Creatures, so that those of a lower Class cannot complain of God since he has put it in their Power to better their Condition, if they will use their Faculties aright: nor those in a higher State to be too proud of the Divine Favour and despise their inferiors, since if they abuse that Favour they shall be obliged to quit it to such of these inferiors as shall better deserve that Station. Nor could there possibly be a more equal Distribution of things, supposing it was necessary that there should be an inequality among Beings and different Degrees of Happiness among rational Agents.

Methinks if these things be duly consider'd they give a very good account why God did not at first create Man in as good a Station as he is capable of filling. Why he made a trial of him, and allow'd him the Use of Free-Will. Why he train'd him up in Labour and a painful Exercise of Virtue in order to make him a fit Inhabitant for Heaven. He did not confine Man to the Earth as a Prison. But as a prudent Gardener prepares his Plants in a Nursery to be removed into the Field or Garden, as soon as the Trees which grow there have been converted to their proper use: In like manner does the most Wise framer of the World prepare Men here for a removal into Heaven as soon as a place shall be ready to receive them. Or like an indulgent Father who educates his Children at School, and does not admit them to the Management of his domestic Affairs or public Business till room be made for them by the removal of such as occupy these Posts. Hence appears the Reason why Men are born weak, ignorant and unfit for Business, *viz.* to keep a Proportion between their present State, and the Offices they are design'd for.

'Twould be to no purpose for them to be born in a Condition fit for public, domestic or manly Functions, when at the same time there was no room for them to exert themselves, these being all taken up by others. 'Tis reasonable therefore that they should wait for their own turn, which will come soon enough when the present Possessors are gone off the Stage. Nor in the mean time are they in a state of Misery, and as it were shut up in a Dungeon, but in a Condition sufficiently happy and eligible, and

Power of Election is bestow'd on Man to no purpose, since it so rarely attains the end for which it was imparted.

II. Secondly, The far greater part of Mankind neglecting this Power of pleasing themselves in Elections, or rather, to confess the truth, not in the least observing that they have it, or that Happiness is to be expected from the use of it; give themselves up entirely to the Government of their natural Appetites and Senses, and are plainly hurried on according to the Impetus and Direction of

That the power of Election is not regarded.

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and a better than which cou'd not be given without ejecting those which enjoy it at present.

Farther, if we conceive certain Creatures that by their Constitution are naturally subject to dissolution, as 'tis demonstrable that all things consisting of Matter are; and that the raising up new ones in the Place of such as decay yields a greater Pleasure to those that thus grow up than such as are already come to maturity could enjoy in the continuance of their being, then will it be agreeable to the Goodness and Wisdom of God to permit those that are thus grown up to decay according to the tendency of their Nature, and to substitute others in their room; rather than prevent their Dissolution by a miracle. Which sufficiently justifies the Goodness and Wisdom of God in permitting that Succession of Generations which we see in the World. God does not therefore deny or delay his Favours thro' any want of kindness and beneficence, but because they cou'd not be bestowed sooner without detriment to others. He could indeed have not created Men before the best place they were capable of was ready for them. But in the interim he had deprived them of the Benefit which they now enjoy, and there would have been no room for Merit or Demerit, for Divine Justice or Mercy. Is it not more reasonable, more worthy of God, to reward them with the Kingdom of Heaven for their Obedience, and the Proof of their Virtues exhibited in an inferior State, than out of mere good Pleasure to bestow so great a Favour on them, who had done nothing at all, had given no Specimen of their Disposition? The 1st, you'll say argues greater Munificence?

But

the *Animal Nature* as much as Brutes. If therefore we have this Power in us, it seems to be given us in vain, *i. e.* to such as neither use it, nor are conscious that they have it.

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III. Thirdly, Hence all Mankind lie polluted and immers'd in Vice and Wickedness; and 'tis not one or two, but every one, that deviates from the right use of Election. How can these things be reconcil'd with the Care and Providence of an infinitely good and powerful God?

These are
best an-
swer'd by
reveal'd
Religion.

IV. I confess, that this Corruption of Manners, and almost universal Deviation from the way to Happiness, is better solv'd from Reveal'd than Natural Religion, and that the necessity of a *Revelation* is from hence rightly proved. For since the true Cause which gave rise to this is a matter of Fact, *viz.* the Fall of the first Man, it cannot be discover'd merely by the Strength of Reason; but we stand in need of *Historical* Tradition to transmit this,

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But it is the part of Prudence to moderate Liberality, and since all could not partake of it equally (as in this Case 'tis plain they could not) to prefer the most deserving. But it is urg'd, why did God create more than could be provided for in the very best way? I answer, because he was not so sparing of his Favours as to deny Existence to any thing to which it would be a Benefit, and which might enjoy more Good than Evil in it. 'Tis plain that different Orders make for the good of the whole. The superior ones have Faculties to exercise upon those in a lower state, by the exercise whereof they may increase their own Happiness and assist others. As for the inferiors, can any thing contribute more to their Security and Satisfaction than to find themselves committed to the care of such powerful and beneficent Guardians, and enjoying their Help and Protection? Thus the whole Work of God is admirably connected together, and all the parts subservient to each other, and demonstrate both the Wisdom and the Goodness of their Author.

this, as well as other matters of Fact, down to us. But tho' there had been none such, and we were ignorant of the Fall of the First Man, yet we should have been furnish'd with a proper, tho' not so clear an Answer, since the Misery or Corruption of Mankind tho' really lamentable, yet is not so great but that it may be reconciled with the good Providence of God.

V. For as to the first Objection taken from the fewness of them that attain to Happiness, we may reply that Happiness is two-fold, *perfect* and *absolute*, or *moderate* and partial. I call that perfect which answers in every respect to our Wishes, and that moderate which, tho' it does not equal our Desires, yet is not quite destitute of agreeable Enjoyments, with which Life being accompanied, and sweeten'd as it were by the Mitigation of its Evils and the Alleviation of its Cares, becomes a Blessing, and worth a prudent Man's Choice. As to the former, 'tis certain that it cannot fall to the Lot of any Man in this present State, nor is it a Debt due from God to a Creature, tho' never so innocent. Since the Condition of Men is, and must necessarily be such (while we inhabit this Earth in its present State) as will by no means admit of this absolutely perfect Happiness. For Pains, Grievs, and the rest of those which we call natural Evils, cannot, as things now stand, be totally avoided, but by the preternatural Favour of the Deity. The Earth then must either be left destitute of Inhabitants, or we must take up with a moderate share of Happiness; this also is a Gift worthy of God, and fit to be accepted and embraced by Man. Neither is this a rare Felicity, and which happens to few Men; for all may enjoy it, and most actually do; especially if they will make a prudent use of their Elections. For if

Many attain to a moderate Happiness

there be any bitter thing in Life, it generally flows from depraved Elections, and by a right use of these, any thing which creates uneasiness, or can make us weary of Life, might be mitigated or remov'd. To conclude, tho' we complain of the Miseries of Life, yet we are unwilling to part with it, which is a certain Indication that it is not a burden to us, and that not so few attain this moderate Happiness, as the Objection would insinuate. (Z.)

VI. As

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(Z.) 'Tis objected that the Proof brought here to shew that there is more Good than Evil in the World can't be solid, because it is founded on one of the greatest and most evident Infirmities of our Nature. For both Divines and Philosophers have condemn'd this fond desire of Life as the greatest Imperfection attending Mortality, and have judg'd no Evil to be greater than the fear of Death.

I confess indeed that an immoderate Desire of Life, as also the dread of Death, becomes sinful when to preserve one or avoid the other, we are hurried into the Violation of the Laws of God, but in itself 'tis neither Evil nor an Imperfection; nay, 'tis good and part of the Duty we owe to God the Giver of Life and to ourselves. To be Mortal is indeed an imperfection, but to fear Death and endeavour to avoid it by all lawful Means is no new Infirmity of Nature, but a necessary means of preserving the good Gift of God so long as he thinks proper to indulge it. 'Tis also to be observ'd that this fear of perishing is founded in the sense or opinion of the Pleasure and Satisfaction which we have in Life, and these must bear a proportion to each other. Increase the Opinion of the Goodness of Life and the fear of Dissolution increases likewise: For that a Man should have a great sense of the Pleasure and Satisfaction he has in a thing, and not to be afraid of losing it when he apprehends it in danger, is absurd and impossible. The fear of Death then is not an imperfection but a preservative of Life, and a necessary Consequence of that great Love and Value which we have for it.

But 2dly, 'Tis urg'd that it cannot be the sense of the good we find in Life that makes us desirous of it, and afraid of Death, since Christians that are persuaded of another Life, and firmly believe

VI. As to the second thing objected, *viz.* that most of us are either ignorant or regardless of this Power of pleasing ourselves by Election; upon a thorough Enquiry it will be manifest, that the use of this Power is neither disregarded, nor so rare as might appear at first Sight. I own there are few who

Men make use of this Elective Power tho' they do not observe it.

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believe it to be infinitely preferable to the present are yet equally desirous of living and afraid to die with those that have no such Hope. But they were worse than Pagans if the reason of that Fear was because they thought there was more good in this World than in Heaven: and therefore it is no good Argument to prove that there is more Good than Evil in the World because every Creature is fond of its Being, and desires to preserve it.

To all which I answer, that from hence it is manifest that the sense of all animate Creatures and the Opinion of Mankind both bad and good is with the Author, and I shall always sooner suspect the subtilty of a Philosopher disputing against common Sense and Experience than the truth of those.

But 2dly, whereas it is pretended that the best Christians are afraid to die, which proves that 'tis not the Opinion of Goodness in the present Life makes Men fond of it.

I answer, That the Nature of things is and ought to be such that they operate more or less according to their distance. Thus the Sun at the distance of so many Miles seems only a Foot broad; and every thing in like manner lessens both in its apparent magnitude and efficacy. Now since the Pleasures of Heaven are at a great distance from us and can only be apprehended by Faith and Hope, 'tis no wonder that they are overbalanced by the Pleasures of this Life which are present and immediately affect our Senses.

If any ask why God made us so that things at a distance are less affecting. I answer, if Causes did operate equally at all distances it wou'd confound the Order of the World, and bring infinite Inconveniencies on the Creatures. If the Sun were as hot at the present distance as it would be if we touch'd it, neither Plants, Animals, nor the Earth itself could subsist a moment, but all must vanish into Smoak. In the same manner if things past or to come did equally affect our Minds and disturb the Passions, Appetites, &c. we cou'd not pass one Day with Ease and Satisfaction. God therefore has well and wisely provided

who take notice of this in themselves, or observe that the Pleasure which they feel in acting arises chiefly

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vided that we should not lose the present good either thro' dread of futurity or memory of what is past, but that the benefits of this mortal Life, tho' small in comparison, shou'd often affect us more than much greater ones to come. The good of the whole System required that we should stay our appointed time in this World, was it not therefore graciously ordain'd that this World should appear very good and desirable to us?

But 2dly, tho' good Christians believe that Heaven is much better than this present State, yet the best are conscious to themselves that they are Sinners, and have often offended a just God, and consequently have some doubt and terror on them when they are summon'd to appear before his Tribunal.

Farther, we are so fram'd as not to attempt great, difficult and unexperienc'd Matters without some Emotion and unusual Astonishment of Mind: which was necessary to prevent us from undertaking such things rashly and carelessly as might greatly prejudice ourselves or others e're we could foresee the Consequences. Now the Passage from this Life to another is entirely new, untry'd, unknown: 'Tis no wonder therefore that the very strangeness of the thing and greatness of the Change gives Men a shock and makes them rather choose to stay where they are, especially since they find themselves well pleas'd with their present Life. Neither is this without a Providence. For if the Passage to another World could be enter'd on without any such Passion or Emotion, and every thing that attended it were as clear and evident to us as the Circumstances of this present Life, all delay would be an insupportable Torment to good Men, nor could they wait their due time without the greatest pain, impatience and uneasiness. How much better has the good Author of Nature dispos'd things by providing that Mortals should be content and happy in this present Life, and at the same time enabled to bear the necessary Evils of it by the prospect of a better? Thus is the Earth furnish'd with Inhabitants which are so well pleas'd with their Lot as to be very unwilling to quit it, and yet are not without hopes of something greater. This seems to have been long since observ'd by the Poet.

*Vitæurosq; Dei celant, ut vivere durent,
Felix esse mori.*

But

chiefly from the Exercise of it. But nevertheless they do exercise it, and taste the Pleasure arising there-

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But 3dly, 'Tis alledged that many desire Death in great Afflictions, but are hinder'd from attempting to dispatch themselves either first, for want of Courage, or 2dly, for fear of Infamy, or 3dly, for fear of Damnation. I answer, we see Men live and very fond of Life that are restrain'd by none of these. Men of approved Courage, who profess to believe nothing after this Life, and who may easily find ways of putting an end to it without suspicion of Suicide, and yet they live on and willingly bear all the Inconveniencies of old Age and Diseases. Nay, no body is more desirous of Life than such Men, as was observ'd in the Book C. 4. S. 8. Par. 7.

Farther, as to Courage, we generally look on it as cowardice for a Man to kill himself, and that contributes to make such an attempt infamous. But 2dly, Courage is the Power of attempting hard, painful, and disagreeable things: therefore Mens wanting Courage to kill themselves is a plain Argument that Life is an exceeding great Good, and that a Man can hardly be brought to such a degree of firmness and callousness of Mind as to deprive himself of it.

As to Infamy, that, as we said before, may easily be avoided. A Dose of Opium will do the Business, and leave no room for Discovery. But supposing Disgrace to be a sure attendant on Self-murder, these Men are often notoriously profligate and know themselves to be infamous for all sorts of Vice, and yet disregard, nay glory it it. Can we believe such Persons wou'd be restrain'd from dispatching themselves for fear of hurting their Memories after Death, which they think they shall feel nothing of, when they despise much greater ignominy while they still live and are sensible of it?

As to the Fear of Damnation, This can never move Atheists, and yet none, as we observ'd, are more desirous of Life: they profess to love it above all things, and call those fools and Madmen that part with it on any account.

'Tis also remarkable that a kind of religious Melancholy drives most Men to Self-murder, which proves that the fear of Damnation is no such hindrance to it.

But lastly, 'tis urg'd that the Vulgar are incompetent Judges of the Benefits and Inconveniencies of Life, and therefore we ought to appeal to the Sentence of wise Men who have duly consider'd them; and if these had leave given to live their
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therefrom. And it is the same in the Exercise of this Power as in some Organs of Sense, tho' we are entirely ignorant which they are, or of what nature, yet we use them, and by the use of them perceive external things. Thus we please ourselves in choosing, tho' we are not aware that things please us because they are chosen. Now that this is so will be evident if we examine those things which afford Pleasure to both young and old, wise as well as foolish. For if the greater part of them have no manner of Connection with the natural Appetites, nor with the Necessities of Nature, it will appear that they have pleased us no otherwise than

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Lives over again, they would not accept it; as *Mothé de Vayer* affirms of himself. But I answer, that in this Case there's no believing *Mothé de Vayer*, or any Man on his Word; the Experiment was never made nor had he ever the offer; and therefore he neither knew what he would have done in such Circumstances, nor have we any Security that he spake his true Sentiments. Perhaps he was an old Man and knew he must soon die, and then it was wisely done to use all the means he could to put himself out of love with Life, as that makes Death more easy.

But 2dly, I observ'd before that Causes lose their Efficacy at a distance, now the Pleasures of Life are past long ago with old Men, and the Inconveniencies of Age upon them, no wonder then that those distant Pleasures do not influence them so much as to make them desirous of living their whole Lives over again for the sake of them: which is also a great Providence to persons that are necessarily Mortal, and seems the only way of reconciling them to Death.

But 3dly, The proposing to a Man to live his Life again is not a motive equivalent to what is past. A Man's being ignorant of futurity eases him from the anxiety that the Knowledge of the unfortunate Parts would raise in him, and leaves him at liberty to hope the best; which is a great part of the Happiness of Life. But when we offer him to live the same Life over again, we cut off all his Hopes, destroy the agreeable Novelty of the good Parts, and give him only a prospect of the

uneasy

than by virtue of Election. Let us weigh the trifles of Children, and the serious Affairs of Men; the Temerity of Fools, and the Counsels of the Wife; and it will be evident almost in all of them that they are neither determin'd by Reason nor Nature, but please by Election only*. This, among other things, may appear from the Diversions of *Cards* and *Dice*. Nothing is more agreeable to all, or pleases more; but upon no other account, if we examine it thoroughly, than because we *will* be thus employ'd.

Nay that *dire Lust of Rule* which bewitches mortal Minds, and transports them beyond themselves, which cannot be satisfy'd unless the whole World be subdued, and even not then; this neither receives

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uneasy Passages that he must meet with in it: all which must make his Life a thing quite different from what it was when he first lived it. But if we would propose to a Man of sixty Years to lengthen his Life for sixty more with the same strength and vigour he had at twenty, and let him take his Chance, I doubt if one in a million would refuse the offer.

Lastly; let us suppose that a Man has lived happily many Years, and at length falling into some great Misfortune or grievous Pain dispatches himself. This does not prove that he thinks the Life God hath given no benefit, or worse than Death; but only that the small and miserable part which remains to him is not worth the living. A Man has a Vessel of good Wine which he drinks with Pleasure to the Dregs, then throws them out. Will any one conclude from thence that the Man thinks a Vessel of Wine no valuable Present? And yet this is exactly the Case of such Self-murderers.

From the Whole I think it manifest that Life, such as it is, is a valuable Good, and consequently fit to be bestowed on us by a good God. As it has more Good than Evil in it, 'tis plain we are obliged to him that gave it; and it is a very wicked and ungrateful thing for any one to pretend the Contrary.

* See more of this in Sect. 1. Sub. 5. par. 11, 12, &c.

ceives its Origin nor Approbation from Nature or any innate Appetite.

But the force of Election is never more apparent than in some Men's insatiable Avarice, and continual Study to heap up unprofitable Riches, for no use, no end, but to satisfy their Choice. Behold the covetous Man brooding over his Gold; a Curse to his Relations, a Jest to his Neighbours, a Reproach to Nature; depriving himself of Food, Sleep, Rest, and other Necessaries, and yet applauding himself still. Why do these things please which are so unnatural, so absurd, so preposterous? Can they be explain'd otherwise than from this Principle that we are pleas'd with what we *choose*? This is still felt and pursu'd, tho' he that does this be not conscious that he is doing it, neither observes what it is which pleases him. It is not therefore the Direction of the Senses, or the Impulse of Animal Nature only, which transports us into Vices and unlawful Acts; these are commonly done against the Remonstrance of those Appetites which are implanted by Nature, against the Remonstrance of Sense and Instinct, no less than Reason, and the least Crime we commit is in obeying them. We may learn then, to our great Misfortune, that we are not entirely driven by the *Impetus of Animal Nature*, and that this Power of pleasing ourselves by Election does not lie idle; but rather that it is the too great and inordinate use of it which transports us into Wickedness.

Elections produce the same effect in the Moral World as Motion does in the Natural.

VII. As to the third Objection, *viz.* that the *Corruption* of Mankind is almost *universal*; it is to be observed in the first place, that Elections produce the same effect in the Moral, as Motion does in the Natural World; neither is it any more to be expected that in our present State all Elections should be consistent and uniform, than that all Motions should

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should be so. Now as contrariety of Motion is a necessary Cause of natural Corruption, so the interfering of Elections is of Vice or Moral Corruption. God could indeed take away both, *viz.* by destroying Motion and free Choice; but while these are permitted, neither of the Evils could be prevented in the present State of things.

VIII. Secondly, We may observe that things are connected together, and have a mutual dependence on each other, on this account, as Machines which require the most Workmanship may be stopped or disordered by the defect of a single Nail or Wheel: so the Error or Offence of one Man puts the rational System or Society of Mankind out of order. Any Person, by almost one single free Act, may destroy a House or Ship, nay a City or a Fleet by Fire or Wreck. Any King or Governor can, by an easy and free Act, overwhelm whole Nations with War, Rapine, Slaughter and Villany. A Father may beget Sons, who being yet unborn, are sure of inheriting his Diseases and Infirmities as well as his Goods. Nor could it be otherwise while the Nature and Condition of Men and of the Earth are such as we experience them to be. Either therefore Liberty and the Connection of things must be destroy'd, or these Evils tolerated.

IX. Thirdly, 'Tis certain that God does not permit any bad Elections, but such as may be reconciled with the Good of the whole System, and has digested and ordered every thing in such a manner, that these very Faults and Vices shall tend to the Good of the whole. For as in Musick, Discords, if heard separately, grate and offend the Ear with harshness, but when mix'd in consort with other Notes, make the more sweet and agreeable Harmony; in like manner bad Elections, if consider'd alone, are look'd upon as odious and detestable,

Things are connected together, and a Defect in one affects many others.

Vice and Wickedness, tho' deform'd in themselves, do not impair the Beauty of the whole.

detestable, but compared with the whole System, they promote and increase the Good and Beauty of the whole. For when they are temper'd they become medicinal to each other by that very Contrariety, and those which would poison separate, when mix'd become a Remedy.

For instance, One by a depraved Choice raises an immense Sum of Money, and a vast Estate, and either the same Person or his Heir, by his Vanity and Profuseness, compensates for what he had acquir'd by his Extortion, and perhaps does as much Good by squandering away his ill-gotten Wealth to the most idle Purposes, as if he had bestow'd all upon the Poor. For he applies a Spur to Industry, whereas he would otherwise afford an handle to Sloth. The rich Man offends in Luxury and Idleness: the Poor transgresses no less by too much Labour and Solitude, which he indulges perhaps for no other End than to provide Instruments of Luxury for the Rich: but each of them pleases himself in his Choice, and 'tis almost the same thing with respect to the benefit of the Universe, as if one had converted to pious Uses what he spent in Luxury, and the other had labour'd moderately to provide only what was useful. The same almost may be said of all Vices, they are prejudicial, but only to the Criminals themselves, or those that deserve to suffer; nay they are often beneficial to others; and so long as the whole comes to no harm, 'tis fit to allow every one the use of his own Will, and let them suffer for their Sin. God could indeed cut off all Occasion of Sin, by taking away free Elections: But it is plain that this would be far from an Advantage to intelligent Agents. 'Tis our Business to prevent bad Elections, and if we will not, we suffer for our Folly: But God will

will procure the Good of the whole by our Folly no less than by our Wisdom. (81.)

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(81.) We may add, and by our *Sin* no less than by our *Righteousness*. Thus it may be said in a good Sense that *private Vices* (as well as private Misfortunes) often become *public Benefits*, tho' the Authors be no less liable to Punishment. But it will be objected, that this makes Vice to be necessary for the Public Good, and therefore to be no Vice at all, nor consequently punishable. For a tendency or opposition to the general Happiness of our System, is the very Nature and Essence of Virtue or Vice: If then what is call'd my Wickedness tends to the Good of the World, how can I be punished for it? And if my Action promotes the Glory of God, *why doth he yet find fault?* We answer, Vice naturally and in general tends to the Misery of any System; so that if *all* were vicious, all would be wretched; and on the contrary, if every one were virtuous, all must be happy; to be vicious and to be productive of Pain or Misery, would then be convertible terms. But in a mix'd irregular State, where some pursue the Rules of Virtue and others do not, the Case is very much alter'd, there Pain or Evil, and such Actions as produce it, may often be the most proper means to remedy some greater Evil, or procure some superior Good; to reform a Vice, or improve a Virtue; in which Case, tho' that way of acting which in general tends to Misery, happens to be productive of some real Happiness which could not have been produced without it, yet this is not sufficient to excuse or justify it, nor is it so much the consequence of its own Nature, and attributable to its immediate Author, as an effect of the superintendency of some other Agent, who applies it, and makes it instrumental to some End of his own; who brings Good out of Evil, or from the Evil takes occasion to do still more Good than he could be conceived to have done without that Evil.

All this I think may be suppos'd of God, and yet the different Natures of Good and Evil continue fix'd. Man, cannot see all the Consequences and Connection of things, must be oblig'd to some general Rules of acting, and whenever he deviates from these Rules he does amiss; at least when he intends to act against the very *End* of these Rules, *i. e.* the general Good, he evidently sins, let the Consequence of his Acts be what it will. Thus the Actions of a Man may be often morally Evil to himself, tho' they prove naturally Good

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X. If this be true, it is a sufficient Vindication of the Divine Goodness, notwithstanding such a plentiful Crop of Vices be permitted; nor need we insist upon a longer enquiry how this may be applied to particular Cases; for whether this Corruption was occasion'd by the *Fall of our first Parents* as Truth itself declares, or by any other Cause whatever, 'tis certain that God would never have permitted it, if it could have been prevented without greater Damage to the whole. (82.) We may

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Good to some others: they may proceed from a bad Intention in him, or he may be a Transgressor by acting against his Rule; and tho' God may have an occasion of *Glorifying* himself thereby, of displaying his Wisdom and Goodness, &c. to a higher degree than they could otherwise have been exhibited; and therefore may reasonably permit the Actions of this Man, and convert them, either to the Punishment and Correction of himself or other Sinners, or to the Blessing of some righteous Persons; yet the immediate Author is nevertheless accountable both to God and Man for such his Actions. Instances of this kind are innumerable, and may be seen in *Sherlock on Providence*. See particularly what is required from God's Goodness in a State of Discipline. p. 221, 224, 230, &c. 2d Edit. or in *Simplicius on Epictetus*, p. 83. 4th Edition, Lond. 1670.

What has been said here only relates to God's *permitting* Moral Evil, so far as it is a means of some prepollent Good.

S. C. in his *Impartial Enquiry*, &c. carries the Matter farther, and supposes that God may for the general Good decree some such Acts as may be morally Evil; which I can see no reason or necessity for supposing. How he endeavours to make this out and reconcile it with the *Holiness* and *Justice* of the Deity, may be seen in Part 1. Ch. 11. prop. 9. p. 94, &c.

(82.) Perhaps such a Scheme as this of the *Fall* appears to be, from the Representation given of it and its effects, in Scripture, was necessary to make us duly sensible of the Nature of Good and Evil, to acquaint us more fully with the Moral Perfections of the Deity (which could not have been so clearly exhibited to us if there had never been any room for the Exercise of them) and consequently to bring us to an I-

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may wonder indeed that almost all Mankind are polluted in Wickedness, and that God puts no stop

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imitation of these Perfections, and thereby to the greatest and most refined Happiness that our better part is capable of. Man (as we observ'd in Note 80.) is a very imperfect compound Being, who, by the constitution of his Nature, seems incapable of being made truly wise and virtuous, or which is the same thing, *morally* happy on a sudden, he must therefore receive Improvement gradually, and as he is to compleat his good Habits by a Series of virtuous Acts, so it seems proper for him to be train'd up by various Dispensations, and a Series of Events adapted to the several Faculties of his Body and Mind, the various constituent Parts of his Nature, and different Sources of his Happiness: accordingly we find that the Happiness of Man in first Estate was chiefly *Animal*, to which an Earthly Paradise was exquisitely fitted; a Change in this was probably requisite to introduce the *rational* or *moral* kind into the World, and to make him direct his Thoughts to something higher than mere sensitive Delights. This we are told was the Method of Divine Providence with the *Jewish* Nation in particular, who had a Law of Carnal Ordinances to exercise them for a while, and lead them on to the Expectation of better things; to spiritualize their Notions by Degrees, and prepare them for the Heavenly Doctrines of *Messiah*. And why might not the like Method be made use of in the Government of Mankind in general, or even all rational Beings? What if God, willing to make known the greater Riches of his Glory, suffer'd our first Parents to fall soon from that Condition wherein he created them at first, in order to raise them and their Posterity to a much higher State of Glory and true Happiness after? And who can prove that the former was not conducive to the latter? We believe that the Bliss of Heaven will infinitely exceed the Pleasures of a Terrestrial Eden; why then should we not suppose that the less might be in some manner useful and introductory to the greater? Why might not a short Life in Paradise be as proper a State of Probation for the Virtues of this present World, as this World is for the Glories of another? There is a Passage concerning Paradise in *Scott's Christian Life* * which confirms this Notion: But it is the most fully explain'd by Mr. D'Oyly in his *first Dissertation*, C. 3.

to the Progress of those Vices which deform his Work ; but in reality this is no more to be wonder'd

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C. 3. p. 31, &c. I shall transcribe so much as may be necessary to shew his general Design. " If we consider our Nature as
 " it came in *Innocence* out of the hand of its Creator, God
 " foresaw how very soon it would fall from its primitive Puri-
 " ty, and therefore design'd it farther for a *much happier* State,
 " rais'd and refined by a clearer and more extensive *Manifesta-*
 " *tion* of himself : But had it stood, the Reward (at least as far
 " as we know) would have been the indefeasible Possession of
 " Paradise in this World, the enjoying of an immortal Life
 " here on Earth, checquer'd as it were with Spiritual and Sen-
 " sitive, or Animal Pleasures. And for their Conduct in that
 " State God seems to have left them (one or two Instances
 " excepted) under the Direction of the *Law of Nature*, the *Spi-*
 " *ritual* or Religious Part of which taught them to look up
 " to him as the Creator of the World, the Lord and Author
 " of their Being ; and to fear and obey him as their Almighty
 " Sovereign. The *Civil* part of it furnish'd them with right
 " Reason, dictating what was necessary to be done in order
 " to their well being in this World. So that had they stood,
 " their Happiness would probably have been---what that of
 " Mankind was afterwards---a mixture of *rational* and *sensitive*
 " or bodily Enjoyments. And as to any Knowledge of God,
 " farther than that now mentioned ; it may, I conceive, be
 " thought reasonable to presume that they had the same awful
 " sense of his *Veracity* as of any other Attribute ; and yet how
 " very easily were they wrought into a Belief by the first Story
 " they heard, and from they know not whom, that he had
 " acted *collusively* in barring them the Fruit of the *Tree of*
 " *Knowledge*, designing by it only to keep them down under
 " the Veil of Ignorance, and that there was no such immi-
 " nent Danger of Death consequent to their tasting it, as they
 " were at first made to believe ? Whatever such Knowledge
 " therefore we suppose them to have had, it may be doubted,
 " its Impressions were not vivid and forcible enough to influ-
 " ence their Wills to suitable Efforts in *loving* and *cleaving*
 " steadily to him : since no one can love whom he does not
 " believe, and without Faith 'tis as impossible to *love* as to
 " *please God* : So that those Impressions could not consequent-
 " ly be very instrumental in making an Addition to their
 " Happiness, as has been shewn above. Nay as to *Adam* him-
 " self

der'd at, than that this inferior World is by Motion universally subjected to natural Corruption.

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"self in particular, it may perhaps seem reasonable to think he
"had not that profound Reverence and awful regard for the
"Divine Majesty which he might justly have been expected
"to express, (tho' not under the Circumstances of a *Criminal*)
"since after the Fact committed, he seems attempting to screen
"his Guilt, even by throwing the blame *obliquely* upon God
"himself, where he answers, *The Woman whom Thou gavest*
"to be with me, she gave me of the Tree and I did eat [b]."

The Author proceeds to enquire into the State of Religion in the Antedeluvian World, the Patriarchal Ages, and down to the *Jewish* Dispensation, and shews that Mankind could not from the Works of Creation and Providence alone (which yet were their only means of Knowledge) have so extensive and perfect a Knowledge of God as was requisite to advance their Happiness properly so call'd, as rational Agents, to any considerable Degree; nor consequently to be the foundation of a Worship worthy of him. From whence he concludes, "The
"Faculties of our rational Nature must have lain dormant and
"useless as to the greatest Happiness it was capable of attaining
"by the *Exercise* of them; and as to the highest Honour and
"most exalted Worship it was in itself qualify'd to pay to the
"Divine Majesty, unless he had pleas'd to make provision for
"the farther *Manifestation* of himself: which, in what manner he has in his infinite Wisdom and Goodness determin'd
"to effect, will appear by laying open the most *advantageous*
"Changes which have been made as to these and other respects,
"by the appearance of *Christ in the Flesh*. For if it be shewn,
"that by that amazing Transaction he has so display'd the infinite Excellencies and Perfections of his Nature, as to give
"the utmost possible Scope to the whole rational Creation, to
"exert their noblest Faculties, and strain them up to the most
"exalted astonishing Thoughts of, and seraphical *Devotion* to
"him: if farther he has thereby apply'd the most proper and
"forcible means to rectify the *Moral Errors*, reform the Vices,
"and overcome the *daring Wickedness* of Mankind; and lastly,
"if it be shewn that he has done all this in such a manner
"that it could not have been effected to *so great Advantage* any
"other way, then will it be demonstratively evident, that
"whereas

For as Contrariety of Motions necessarily works a Change in solid and heterogeneous Bodies, and transposes them into another Form and Condition, whence necessarily proceed Dissolution and Concretion, Corruption and Generation: In like manner free Choice necessarily administers occasion of Sin to Agents endow'd with an imperfect Understanding, and obnoxious to Passions and Affections. And as in the natural World the Corruption and Contagion of one thing extends itself to others, and acquires Strength by spreading; so also in the moral, if Election once deviate to Evil, the Poison is diffused along with it, and seizes and infects all about it.

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"whereas he foresaw from all Eternity, that Man whom he had decreed to create would abuse his *natural Liberty*, and so, being tempted, fall into Sin: There was infinite reason on this account, why he might have pleas'd also, in his infinite Wisdom and Goodness, to have decreed to permit it, thereby to open a way for the stupendous *Manifestation* of himself, as above express'd. And particularly — that by what follow'd from it, Mankind might become capable of attaining far *greater Happiness* than they would have been, had our first Parents continued innocent". p. 43.

How this Author makes out the fore-mentioned Particulars may be seen in the remainder of his *Dissertation*.

See also Dr. *Jenkin* on the same Subject [c.]

Now this is not, as *Bayle* objects [d.] "To compare the Deity to a Father who should suffer his Children to break their Legs, on purpose to shew to all the City his great Art in setting their broken Bones. Or to a King who should suffer Seditions and Factions to encrease thro' all his Kingdom, that he might purchase the Glory of quelling them". But rather like a King who permits some of his Subjects to put their seditious Designs in practice, and to promote a Revolt, in order to illustrate his Wisdom, Power and Goodness more fully.

[c.] *Reasonableness of Christianity*, 2d vol. C. 12;

[d.] *Crit. Dict.* p. 2488.

But yet both *natural* and *moral Corruption* have their Bounds, neither does God permit them to spread farther than is conducive to the Good of the whole*. It may seem strange to us that he suffers both

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fully in reducing them to their Duty, and to convince them more clearly of the Expedience and absolute Necessity of obeying him, and thereby to confirm them, or at least all the rest of his Subjects, in a well grounded Obedience to his Government, in which their Happiness entirely consists: Or like a Father that finding his Children obstinately disobedient, suffers them sometimes to wander astray, and fall into some Dangers and Inconveniencies, and lets them smart under the Misery which they bring upon themselves, in order to make them more sensible of their need of his Assistance and Direction, and thereby more dependent on him for the future, and more subject to him, and therefore more sure of Happiness. This Comparison is well explain'd by *Sherlock on Providence*, Chap. 7. p. 262.

Hence it will appear that we have reason to suppose that the Fall of Man from Earthly and Animal Delights, was design'd to raise him to a Rational and Heavenly State of Happiness, and to make way for such a wonderful Display of all the Divine Attributes in that Expedient, as could not have been exhibited at all, or not in so high a Degree without it; and consequently that this Method was the very best even for *our own System*. But if this Supposition seem improbable, or insufficient, yet why may not all the Misery in this System of ours promote and encrease the Happiness of some others [e.]? We have good reason to believe that there is some Connection between the different Systems of the Universe; but have small ground to imagine ours the best, why then may it not be subservient to a better? This indeed is only Conjecture; however, I think it would be no easy Matter to confute it; till which be done, we may very safely conclude with our Author, that the *Fall itself*, as well as all the Sin and Misery consequent upon it, cou'd not have been prevented without greater detriment to the whole; and one may say the same of *Eve* as the Poet did of the hand of *Mutius Scævola*: *Si non errasset, fecerat illa minus* [f]

* See *Sherlock on Providence*, Ch. 7. p. 261. 2d Edit. and *Scott's Christian Euse*, V. 2. C. 4. par. 3. p. 318, &c. 8vo.

[e.] See Note 83.

[f.] See *Leibnitz Essais de Theodicee*, Part 2. §. 239. Concerning the Manner of the Fall. See the 7 1st Chapters of *Revelation examin'd with Candour*, &c. or the *Universal History* C. 3.

both of them to wander over this World of ours without Restraint ; but what is our World to the whole System of the Universe ? How small a Part ! how next to nothing ! Let this whole Earth of ours be stain'd with Corruption of both kinds ; suppose it clouded and benighted with Darkness and Vice, yet it will be but like a very small Spot in a very beautiful Body, which is so far from lessening, that it encreases the Comeliness and Beauty of the whole. The Earth, notwithstanding its Obscurity, has its Use and Place in Nature, which it could not commodiously fill if those things which render it liable to Darkness and Corruption were removed. The same must be said of Men, they have their proper Use and Station, and in order to fill it commodiously, they were to be created of such a Nature and Disposition as might easily be corrupted with Vice. Neither have we any more reason to conclude that all free Agents are involv'd in Evil Elections, because this happens almost universally to Men, than that all the Regions of the Heavens are subject to the same Changes that our Air is liable to. The whole Work of God may be bright and beautiful, tho' that Point which constitutes our World seem by itself rude and undorn'd : and tho' some Parts appear to us, who have not a View of the whole Contexture, larger or less than the just Proportion requires, yet they may agree with others in the most perfect Symetry. Nor need we presume upon the Divine Wisdom and Goodness in the *Moral*, any more than in the *Natural* World. The Crimes and Vices themselves are very few in comparison of the free Agents,

(A A.)

(AA.) and may contribute to the Good of the whole, no less than natural Corruption does to the Preserva-

NOTES.

(AA.) Concerning the prevalence of Moral Evil in the World, the Objector is so confident as to declare that no-body can have the least doubt of it, and he dares say the Author himself believed it. But the Author professes himself to be of a quite different Opinion. He firmly believes and thinks he very well comprehends that there is much more moral Good in the World, nay in the Earth, than Evil. He is sensible there may be more bad Men, than good, because there are none but do amiss sometimes, and one ill act is sufficient to denominate a Man bad. But yet there are ten good acts done by those we call bad Men for one ill one. Even Persons of the very worst Character may have got it by two or three flagrant enormities, which yet bear no proportion to the whole Series of their Lives. The Author doth not know the Objector, nor with whom he converses, but he must profess that among such as he is acquainted with, he believes there are hundreds that would do him good for one that would do him hurt, and that he has receiv'd a thousand good Offices for one ill one. He could never believe the Doctrine of *Es'bs* that all Men are Bears, Wolves and Tygers to one another; that they are born Enemies to all others and all others to them; that they are naturally false and perfidious; or that all the good they do is out of Fear not Virtue. He that describes Mankind in this manner may give us cause to suspect that he himself is such, but if Mankind were taken one by one perhaps not one could be found in an hundred thousand that could truly own the Character. Nay the very Authors of this Calumny, if their own Characters were call'd in Question, would take all possible Pains to remove the Suspicion from them, and declare that they were speaking of the Vulgar, of the bulk of Mankind, and not of themselves. Nor in reality do they behave in this manner toward their Friends and Acquaintance; if they did, few would own them. Observe some of those that exclaim against all Mankind for treachery, dishonesty, deceit and cruelty, and you'll find them diligently cultivating Friendships and discharging the several Offices due to Friends, Relations and their Country, with Labour, Pain, loss of Goods, and hazard of Life itself: even where there's no fear to drive them to it, nor inconvenience attending the neglect of it. This you'll say proceeds from Custom and Education. Be it so: However the World then has

Preservation of the System. Nay one Man's Fault is often corrected by the Vices of another, and the Deformity

NOTES.

has not so far degenerated from Goodness but the greater Part of Mankind exercise Benevolence, nor is Virtue so far exiled not to be supported and approved, praised and practised by common Consent and public Suffrage and Vice is still disgraceful. Indeed we can scarce meet with one, unless press'd by necessity or provoked by injuries, who is so barbarous and hard hearted as not to be mov'd with Compassion and delighted with Beneficence to others; who is not inclined to shew Good-will and Kindness to his Friends, Neighbours, Children, Relations, and diligent in the Discharge of civil Duties to all; who does not profess some regard for Virtue, and think himself affronted when he is charged with Immorality. If any one take notice of his own or another's Actions for a Day together, he'll perhaps find one or two blameable, the rest all innocent and inoffensive. Nay, 'tis doubtful whether a *Nero* or *Caligula*, a *Commodus* or *Caracalla* [g.] (tho' Monsters of Mankind, and prone to every act of wickedness and Fury) have done more ill than innocent Actions thro' their whole Lives.

'Tis to be observ'd in the second place, that one great Crime such as Murther, Theft or Rapine is oftener talk'd of more universally reported, and much longer remember'd than a thousand good, peaceable, generous Deeds, which make no noise in the World, nor ever come to public notice, but are silently pass'd by and overlooked. Which very thing shews that the former are more rare than the latter, otherwise they would not be received with so much Surprise, Horror, and Astonishment.

3dly, 'Tis observable that many things are done very innocently, which Persons unacquainted with the Views and Circumstances of the Actors esteem criminal. 'Tis certain we cannot judge of the goodness or badness of an Action from bare Appearances, but rather from the inward Motions and Intentions of the Mind, and the light in which the thing appear'd to the Agent. *Nero* kill'd a Man that was innocent, but who knows whether he did it out of premeditated Malice? Perhaps some entrusted with the care of his Person, or a flattering Courtier, whom he is obliged to depend on, informs of this innocent Man as plotting a conspiracy against the Emperor's Life

[g] See *Cardans Encomium* of *Nero*.

Deformity stamp'd upon the Works of God by the Wickedness of some, is obliterated by the supervening

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Life, and urges dispatch lest he be first surprized: Perhaps the Informer is imposed upon himself, and thinks it real: 'tis plain such Circumstances very much lessen the Guilt; and it is probable if the Crimes of Princes were weigh'd impartially, and the whole Process laid open, many things might be offer'd which would greatly alleviate them.

4thly, Many things are done thro' Ignorance of the Law, and because those who commit them do not know that they are vicious; nay they are often esteem'd Virtues. Thus *St. Paul* persecuted the Church, and himself owns that he did it out of ignorance, and therefore obtain'd Mercy. How many things of this kind are done daily by such as profess different Religions? 'Tis true, these are Sins, but Sins of Ignorance, which easily obtain Forgiveness, and as they do not proceed from an evil Disposition, and depraved Will are scarce to be reckon'd in the number of Moral Evils. Whoever falls foul on others out of a Love of Virtue, Hatred of Vice, or Zeal towards God, does wrong, but ignorance and an honest heart make very much for his excuse. This Consideration alone wou'd take a great deal off from the number of wicked Persons.

Neither does this excuse hold only in matters of Religion; Party prejudices have also a share in it, which induce Men to extirpate with Fire and Sword those that they believe to be public Enemies and Traytors to their Country. There's no Error more pernicious to Mankind and which has produced more or greater Crimes than this; and yet it arises from an honest Mind. The Mistake lies here, that they forget that their Country and Commonwealth ought only to be defended by just and lawful Means and not at the expence of Humanity.

5thly, Prejudice and Surmise makes many wicked that really are not so. The most innocent Conversation between Man and Woman gives the Malicious a handle to suspect and slander them. From any one single Circumstance that usually attends a criminal Action the suspected Person is found guilty of the Fact itself: From one bad Action a Man's whole Life is disparag'd and judg'd to be of the same tenor: if one Member of a Society be caught in a fault, all the rest are presum'd to be as bad. 'Tis scarce credible how many are look'd upon as scandalously wicked thro' such Suspicions, who are very far from

vening Iniquity of others. By the vitiated Elections of some, a Stop is put to the Wickedness of many ;

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from it. Confessors and Judges in criminal Cases know very well how small a part of common Fame is true, how little it is ever to be trusted.

6thly, We must distinguish, and the Law itself sometimes does, between such things as proceed from Malice and premeditated Wickedness and those that arise from violence of Passion and disorder of Mind. The guilt is very much extenuated when the Person offending is under Provocation, and as it were transported beyond himself by a sudden Fit of Resentment.

These things are all known to our most equitable Judge, who will pass a merciful, and not a rigorous Sentence on us: and for these Reasons, we believe, he forbid us to judge any thing before the time. We only know the outsides of things, and 'tis possible that such as seem to us the greatest Crimes, wou'd upon seeing the whole procedure, and making proper Allowances, appear to be the least. Many Virtues as well as Vices lie in the Mind invisible to human Eyes: 'tis speaking at random therefore to pronounce upon the number of one or other, and he that wou'd from thence infer the necessity of an Evil Principle ought to be esteem'd a rash Judge, and an Usurper of God's Tribunal.

Lastly, it may be observ'd that the continuance and Increase of Mankind is a sure proof that there is more Good than Evil in the World. For one or two acts may have a pernicious influence on many Persons, nay all immoral Actions tend to the destruction of Mankind, at least to the common detriment and diminution of them: Whereas a great many, even numberless good actions must necessarily concur to the preservation of each individual. If therefore bad Actions exceeded the Number of the good there would be an End of human kind. We have clear Evidence of this in those Countries where Vices multiply, the Number of Men continually decreases and the Place grows desolate; but upon the return of Virtue and Goodness 'tis again stock'd with Inhabitants.

This is a sign that Mankind cou'd not subsist if ever Vice were prevalent, since many good acts are necessary to repair the loss which attends one bad one. One single Action may take away the Life of a Man, or of several; but how many acts of benevolence and humanity must necessarily contribute to the bringing up, educating and preserving every one?

From

many; and the Virtue and Happiness of a great many is confirmed and increased by the Misery of

NOTES.

From what has been said I hope it appears that there is more good than evil among Men, and that a good God might make the World, notwithstanding the Argument drawn from the contrary Supposition. But almost all of this is unnecessary, since the whole Universe may have ten thousand times more Good than Evil, tho' this Earth of ours had no one good thing in it. This World is too small to bear any proportion to the whole System, and therefore we can form but a very unequal Judgment of it from hence. It may be the Hospital or Prison of the World, and can any one judge of the Healthfulness of a Climate from viewing an Hospital where all are sick? or of the Wisdom of a Government from a Place of confinement where there are only Madmen? or of the Virtue of a People from a Prison where there are none but Malefactors? Not that I believe the Earth is really such a Place, but I say it may be supposed such, and any supposition which shews how a thing may be, destroys the *Manichean* Argument drawn from the impossibility of accounting for it.

In the Interim I look upon this Earth as an Habitation abounding with Delights, in which a Man may live with Comfort, Joy and Happiness; I own with the greatest Gratitude to God that I myself have lived such a Life, and am persuaded that my Friends, Acquaintance, Servants, have all done the same: and I believe that there's no Evil in Life but what is very tolerable; especially to those who have hopes of a future Immortality.

For a Proof that the good of both kinds in the World is superior to the evil, see Sherlock on Providence C. 7. Hutcheson on the Passions, p. 177. &c. Leibnitz, Essais de Theodicee, or Memoirs of Lit. Vol. 3. or Chubb's Supplement to the Vindication of God's Moral Character. Tracts p. 281, &c. or Lucas's Enquiry after Happiness. Vol. 1. Sect. 2. C. 2.

a few ; nay an Opportunity of doing Good is offered to such as are so disposed, which never could have been if none had abused their Choice. (83.)

SUBJECT.

NOTES.

(83) Upon the whole, from that little which we know of the Scheme of Divine Providence in the Formation and Government of the *Moral World*, it seems very reasonable for us to conclude concerning this, in the same manner as we did concerning the *Natural World*, viz. That no considerable part of it can be alter'd for the better ; or that no Evil in it could either have been originally avoided, or may now be removed, without introducing greater.

Since the whole Controversy depends upon the truth of this general Conclusion, 'tis proper that we should be as fully satisfy'd as possible about the ground of it. But to attempt to demonstrate it by an Induction of Particulars would be infinite, I shall therefore choose rather to illustrate it by a review of some of the Principles before laid down. In the first place then the Deity is suppos'd out of pure Benevolence to have created as many immaterial Beings of the noblest kinds as were agreeable to the Order and Convenience of his System ; for his Benevolence, being unbounded, seems to require this as much as it does the Creation of any Beings at all : The same Benevolence also prompted him to produce more imperfect, mix'd ones, because even those were better than none. He endow'd these with an absolutely free Principle of *Volition* and *Action*, because such Freedom was absolutely requisite to their Happiness in every respect, especially to that for which he chiefly design'd them ; viz. Goodness, Virtue, or a resemblance of his own Moral Qualities, which is the supream and only Happiness of a rational Being. He continues this Freedom to them, tho' many abuse it to the Corruption of their Natures, and Introduction of the greatest Misery ; because this abuse proportionably improves the Nature, and increases the Felicity of others, and so Liberty still tends to the Good and Perfection of the whole : and this it may be conceived to do in the following manner. The miserable Effect of the abuse of Freedom by some in this World, makes all others much more sensible of the Nature and Consequences of Sin, and more careful to avoid it, and renders them conscious of a double Pleasure in using their Powers aright. it exerciseth some Virtues in them which could have no place without it ; it preserves, improves and exalteth others, and consequently

S U B S E C T. VII.

Wherein the Principles before laid down are apply'd to the Solution of some Objections.

I. FROM the foregoing Principles it seems not impossible to answer such Objections as are commonly brought against the Goodness and Providence of God. For in the first place, when it is objected, that Moral Evil is not a necessary concomitant of human Nature, and therefore is voluntarily permitted by God, and that no Benefit arises from the permission of it, as there does from Hunger, Thirst, and the Passions: We must reply,

Moral Evils are not necessary in respect of Free-Will, but they are necessary with regard to God, so that he must either tolerate these or greater.

N O T E S.

quently raises their whole Nature to a higher degree of Perfection than it could otherwise acquire. By parity of Reason we may believe in the next World also the Goodness as well as Happiness, of the Blessed will be confirmed and advanc'd by reflections naturally arising from their View of the Misery which some shall undergo: which seems to be a good reason for the Creation of those Beings who shall be finally miserable, and for the continuation of them in their miserable Existence*.)

"To have escaped Hell, and to find ourselves in the unchangeable Possession of Salvation by the free Mercy and Goodness of God, and by the Death of his own Son, are Thoughts which must create a new Heaven as it were in Heaven itself; I mean, they will enlarge our Souls to the utmost Capacity of our Natures, and fill and actuate them with such Divine Ardors of Love, as if we had been kept necessarily from all Sin, seem impossible to have been raised in us†.

This

* See the Appendix, §. 2. par. 9.

† Jenkin, 2d vol. Ch. 12. p. 244, &c. 5th Edit.

ply, that Liberty of Choice is a necessary Concomitant of our Nature, and that the Exercise of it cannot be hinder'd, as we have seen, without greater Evils: In respect then of our own Will, Moral Evil is not necessary, but in respect of God it is, *i. e.* he must either tolerate this Evil or a greater; from hence also proceeds no small Advantage to universal Nature, as well as to Mankind.

Cicero's
Objection
taken from
a Physician
who gives his
Patient Wine
when he
knows that
he will
die of it:
Or a Father
who leaves his
Estate to a
Prodigal
Son.

II. Secondly, Hence we perceive the Answer to *Cicero's* Objection in his third Book, *De Natura Deorum*, where *Cotta* is introduced arguing in this manner: "If a Physician knows that his Patient, who is order'd to drink Wine, will drink too much and dye of it immediately, he is greatly blameable for allowing him it. Thus is this Providence of yours to be blamed, which has given reason to such as it knew would make a perverse and wicked Use of it." He proceeds also to confute those Persons who endeavour to excuse Providence, by saying, "that it does not follow that we are not very well provided for by the Gods, because a great many use their Gifts perversely; since many make a bad use of their Paternal Estates, and yet these cannot be said to have no Benefit from their Fathers." To which he replies in these Words: "I wish the Gods had not bestow'd that Cunning upon Men which very few make a right use of: Insomuch that

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This then we may with Reverence presume to have been the principal Design of God in permitting all Mankind to bring themselves into such a dangerous Estate, and some of them to suffer under it; and perhaps the same reason will hold for his permitting the *Fall of Angels*: For I think it plainly appear'd from Note 13. that the Good or rather *Goodness*, of the Creature, is properly the ultimate End of all

“ that this Divine Gift of Reason and Deliberation
 “ may seem to be imparted for a Snare, and not
 “ a Benefit to Mankind.” He adds, “ We leave
 “ Estates to our Children in hopes of leaving them
 “ well, wherein we may be deceiv’d ; but how
 “ can God be deceiv’d ? ”

III. To all which we reply, First, That it is very unfair to compare the Reason which is granted to Man with Wine given to the Sick. For a sick Person may enjoy Life, and even recover, without Wine ; but Man cannot be what he is without Reason. The Comparison therefore is very improperly made between things that are *disperate*. Neither is there a less difference between *sinning* and *dying*. 'Tis very true, that no body would let a sick Person take Wine which he knew would kill him : but yet any prudent Physician would allow his Patient to take some Meat, without which he knew that he certainly must die, tho’ he understood that upon taking it the Fever would encrease a little. In like manner God has given Reason to Men, without which they would not be Men, tho’ he foresaw that some Evils would arise from it. Reason therefore ought to be compared to Life, and natural Evils to the Distemper. If then God were to take away Reason lest Men should use it amiss, he would be like a Man that kills his Son for fear he should be sick.

'Tis shewn that the Comparison is ill put between Reason and Free-Will, and the giving of Wine ; and that God, if he took away Liberty for fear we should sin, would be like a Man that kills his Son for fear he should be sick.

I i

IV. Se-

NOTES.

all the Dispensations of God, and not his own *Glory*, any farther than it is a means to it. His *Glory* seems to be display'd no otherwise than as it is *subservient* and *necessary* to this End ; and necessary it is, since Goodness is of our own making, and must require Knowledge, Example, Trial, &c. (see Note 67) as Motives and Means to further us in the gradual Formation of a suitable Temper and proper Habits here,

the

Reason is no less improperly compar'd to an Estate.

It tends to the good of the whole, and of ourselves too, that we should have the use of Free-Will: for we had rather be what we are than in the Condition of Brutes, or without Reason.

IV. Secondly, Human Reason is improperly compared to a *Patrimony*, since it is the very *Being* and *Life* of Man: and who would rather put his Son to Death than suffer him to lead a sort of an irregular Life?

V. Thirdly, We ought to remember that we are not born for ourselves alone, but are subservient to Nature as Parts of the Universe, tis reasonable therefore that we should bear such things as tend to the Good of the whole, tho' they be a little inconvenient to us. Now we have shewn before that the Abuse of Reason cannot be prevented without Violence done to the Laws of the Universe, without Detriment to Mankind and to ourselves: If therefore a Father could not refuse a Son his Inheritance, without breaking the Laws of his Country, without injuring his Family, and lastly, without the Loss of his Son's Life, he would not deserve to be blam'd for giving him it, tho' he understood that he would make a bad use of it: Especially if he foresaw that the Brothers of this Prodigal would take warning by his Error and become frugal, and that the Estate which he spent would turn to their Benefit. The same must be said

NOTES.

the Enlargement and Improvement of which will constitute our Heaven hereafter, as *Scott* and *Dr. Rymer* have shewn at large: Virtue therefore or *Moral Good* cannot (as *Bayle* imagines) be infused into us miraculously: neither could God, according to the Order of our Ideas, have acquainted us with so much of his adorable Nature, his Mercy, Long-suffering, Goodness, and Truth (as he himself describes it [b]) nor consequently have brought us to so great a resemblance of it by any other Method. The sole

[b] *Exod.* 34. 6, 7.

said of the Physician who gives his Patient a Glass at his Request ; which if he did not give, the Patient would immediately stab himself. Is he culpable if he compound for a less Evil, in order to avoid a greater ? More especially if many labour under the same Distemper, and would not be convinc'd of the danger of using Wine but by Experiment, would it not be better to let one or two make the Experiment than that all should perish ? God therefore knowingly permits us sick Persons to use Wine ; for tho' we abuse it, yet our Condition will be better than if he had not bestow'd it upon us. If any urge that it is better not to be at all, than to be miserable, and consequently that it is no more proper to deprive us of Life, than to suffer us to abuse it. I answer as before, That we must make a Distinction in Misery ; for where there is more Evil than Good, it is indeed preferable not to be, than to be involv'd in this kind of Misery, but that which attends human Reason is not such, by our own Judgment. For we had rather be what we are than not be at all, or be without Reason. Else why are we unwilling to change our Condition with the Brutes, or Mad-men, if we do not think it better than theirs ?

I i 2

VI. But

NOTES.

Idea of a *Being infinitely perfect* as Bayle objects [i] would not do the Business, nor if it were receiv'd and would have been attended to, could it be of sufficient force to influence the Minds of Men, and regulate their Practice, as is evident from daily Experience. The present Scheme of Providence was therefore necessary, in order to produce in the generality of Men the greatest degree of *Goodness* in this Life, which is the ground and foundation of their *Happiness* in the next. Even there also may the Memory of their former Trials (as was hinted above) the

[i] Crit. Dict. p. 2488.

Cicero has
neither
brought
apposite
Similes,
nor given
good Ad-
vice to
Provi-
dence.

VI. But to conclude, *Cotta* in *Cicero* has neither brought pertinent Similitudes, nor given good Advice to Providence. For God, as a Physician, does not give Wine to the Sick Person to kill him; but to one that will die, in order to prevent his dying sooner. Nor has the Divine Father given an Inheritance to his Sons that they may waste it, but has bestow'd it upon such as will waste it, lest they should

NOTES.

the Consciousness of their own happy Choice, when others did, and they had the same Power and the same Temptations to have done otherwise: the joyful Reflection on their past Dangers and present Safety, and the natural Consequence of all this, Love and Gratitude, and Glory to God in the Highest, and mutual Congratulations of each other—These and the like Contemplations will (as *Dr. Jenkin* says) create a new Heaven in Heaven itself.

And tho' in one respect a view of the Misery which the damned undergo, might seem to detract from the Happiness of the Blessed, thro' Pity and Commiseration: yet under another, a nearer, and much more affecting Consideration, *viz.* that all this is the Misery which they themselves were often exposed to, and were in imminent Danger of incurring; in this View, why may not the sense of their own Escape so far overcome the Sense of another's Ruin, as quite to extinguish the Pain that usually attends the Idea of it, and even render it productive of some real Happiness? To this purpose apply that of *Lucretius*, B. 2.

Suave mari magno turbantibus æquora ventis

E terra alterius magnum spectare laborem;

Non quia vexari quæquam est jucunda voluptas:

Sed quibus ipse malis careas quia cernere suave est.

But however this be, most of the foregoing Reflections seem just and unexceptionable.

I shall conclude with another Passage from *Dr. Jenkin* [F] which sets them in the strongest Light.

[F] p. 242.

should want Necessaries. Whereas if *Cotta* had been Counsellor to Providence, he would have advised Physicians to let their Patients die with Thirst, lest some of them should drink too much; he would have persuaded Parents either to kill their Children, or never beget them, lest they should make a bad use of their Estates when they came to Age. (84.) (B B.)

I i 3

VII. From

NOTES.

“ It must advance the Happiness both of Angels and Men in
 “ Heaven, that upon Choice and Trial they have prefer’d
 “ God before all things, and upon that find themselves con-
 “ firm’d and establish’d in the perpetual and unalterable Love
 “ and Enjoyment of him. This very Consideration, that they
 “ might once have fallen from his Love, inspires them with
 “ the highest Ardors of Love, when they rejoice in the infi-
 “ nite Rewards of so easy and short a Trial: and the Reflec-
 “ tion upon the Dangers escaped heightens even the Joys of
 “ Heaven to them, and makes an addition to every Degree of
 “ Bliss. The remembrance of their past Sins and Tempta-
 “ tions, and the Sense of their own Unworthiness arising from
 “ that Remembrance, will continually excite in the Blessed
 “ fresh Acts of Love and Adoration of God, who has raised
 “ them above all Sin and Temptation, and fix’d them in an
 “ everlasting State of Bliss and Glory. The Trial that the
 “ Righteous underwent here, makes up some part of their
 “ Happiness in Heaven; and in what Degree soever their
 “ Happiness can be supposed to be, yet it is in some measure
 “ increased, and as it were endeared to them, by reflecting on
 “ their former State of Trial, in which they were subject to
 “ Temptation and Sin.”

See the same handled more distinctly in the first of Mr. D’
 Oyl’s four Dissertations, Ch. 10. A-Bp. *Dawes*’s 5th Sermon
 on the *Eternity of Hell-Torments*, Argument the 4th. p. 73, &c.
 or *Scott’s Christian Life*, Vol. 5. p. 100.

(84.) The same holds good against all *Bayle*’s Comparisons,
Cric. Dict. Art. Paulicians. Rem. E. F. KΔΔ, &c. p. 2488.
 where he says, that to permit Men to sin rather than to over-
 rule their Wills, is like a Mother that lets her Daughters go to
 a Ball, where she is sure they will lose their Honour, and then
 pleads in her own Justification, “ that she had no mind to
 “ restrain

The Ob-
jection of
Epicurus
proposed
which ac-
cuses God
of Impo-
tence if he
was not
able; or
of Envy,
if he was
able to re-
move
Evils.

VII. From the same Principles we may solve that very strong Objection of *Epicurus* against Providence, which *Lactantius* enforces in his Book *De Ira Dei* †: and, as some think, does not sufficiently answer. It stands thus: "Either God is
" willing to remove Evils, and not able, or able
" and not willing, or neither able nor willing. If
" he be willing and not able, he is impotent,
" which cannot be apply'd to the Deity: If he be
" able and not willing, he is envious; which is
" equally inconsistent with the Nature of God. If
he

NOTES.

" restrain the Liberty of her Daughters, nor to shew Distrust
" of them." Again [N] If a Son should see his Father ready to
" throw himself out of the Window, either in a fit of Fren-
" zy, or because he is troubled in Mind, he would do well
" to chain him, if he could not restrain him otherwise." And
in none no more.

" To have regard to the Free-Will of a Man, and carefully
" to abstain from laying any restraint upon his Inclination,
" when he is going to lose his Innocence for ever, to be eter-
" nally damn'd; can you call that a lawful Observation of
" the Laws of Liberty? You would be less unreasonable if
" you should say to a Man who gets a Fall near you, and breaks
" his Legs, that which hinder'd us from preventing your Fall is,
" that we were afraid to undo some Folds of your Gown, we had so
" great a respect for its Symmetry, that we would not undertake to
" spoil it, and we thought it was much better to let you run the ha-
" zard of breaking your Bones," &c. [m]

In all which this Author evidently mistakes the Case, by
comparing the Destruction of Free-Will (for this is the only
thing, as we have prov'd, that can prevent the abuse of it)
which Will has been shewn to be the very Life and Soul of
Man; to such mere trifles as confining his Body or discompo-
sing his Habit: Whereas, from the foregoing account of the
inestimable worth of Liberty to each Individual, and the many
Advantages that arise in common, even from the abuse of it,
it plainly appears that to abridge, or which is the very same, to
deprive

* S. 12. p. 435. Cambr. Edit.

[N] Crit. Diss. p. 2497:

[m] p. 2497.

" he be neither willing nor able, he is both en-
 " ous and impotent, and consequently no God. If
 " he be both willing and able, which is the only
 " thing

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deprive a Man of Liberty for fear he should abuse it, would, in regard to him, be just as good as to knock him on the Head for fear he should maim or disfigure himself. And with respect to the Public, he would be far more unreasonable who should desire the abstinence of this Liberty, because of its frequent abuse, than he who should wish that there were no such things as Fire, Wind, or Water, in the World, because so many Men, Houses, and Ships are destroy'd by them.---As the rest of *Bayle's* elaborate Similes are founded on the same Misrepresentation, one hint of this kind is, I think, enough to invalidate them.

(*B.B.*) 'Tis urg'd that the Author acknowledges the Goodness, Wisdom and Power of God to be infinite, and that it was out of pure Goodness that he made Man and gave him Liberty of choice as a means of Happiness, and therefore it ought not to be such a Liberty as may be abused and become a means of Misery, at least God should have set a guard on it that whenever it was about to yield to Evil he might have interposed and prevented it. Thus kind and wise Parents indulge their Children in the use of their Liberty, but so as to be always near them and prevent its doing them mischief. A good and prudent Mother will suffer her Daughter to go abroad, but if she understand that she is like to be seduced, she will leave her play or business and run to rescue her Child. The same is observ'd of a Husband in regard to his Wife; and the Mother or Husband that do not take this care are neither counted wise nor good. How then can God be infinitely wise, good and powerful that does not take care to prevent mens choosing ill, especially since their eternal Happiness or Misery depends on it?

Answer. These Comparisons are not apposite to the purpose, particularly in the following respects.

1st. The care of a Daughter or Wife is the principal part of a Mother's or Husband's charge, so that no other business can in the usual method of Management be compared with it, and therefore the Mother or Husband that fails in it, are wanting in that which ought to have been the chief part of their Care. Whereas Sinners, whether Angels or Men, are but a small and inconsiderable part of those that are under the direction of Providence,

“ thing that answers to the Notion of a God, from
 “ whence come Evils? Or why does he not re-
 “ move them?

VIII. We

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Providence, and consequently there is no Parity between the Obligations.

2dly. The Mothers and Husbands in the foremention'd Instances may generally take care of their Children and Wives without prejudicing the rest of the World or interfering with their other Duties, and where this happens, their Neglect is inexcusable. But when the saving a Man's Country is concern'd, or any publick Good at stake, the Husband must leave his Wife and the Mother her Daughter, tho' they were sure that by their absence their Children and Wife wou'd be corrupted.

3dly. The Mother or Husband may hinder the Corruption of their Child or Wife without maiming or destroying them; for if the case were that a Mother must either venture her Daughter and let her take her choice, or kill her, I suppose there's no Mother but in such circumstances wou'd let her Daughter take her Course.

4thly. In the instance before us here's no good or advantage to the Person seduced or to the Family by letting her follow her Choice; but in the other Case, 'tis often more advantageous to the Person that chooses amiss, and always to the World, than if he had not been suffer'd to use his Liberty. And if there were no more but the consideration of God's being able to turn the Sins of Men to the best, whereas a Mother or Husband had no such Power, it were sufficient to shew the Disparity.

The Case therefore ought to be put thus, suppose a Mother had many Millions of Daughters that by their very Nature were capable of being corrupted, that she had no other means to prevent their being of such Nature, but by not bringing them into the World, suppose likewise that she must either suffer them to be in circumstances which will expose them to Temptations, or they must have no Being. Suppose lastly that she had no possible Means to secure them but either by locking them up altogether from Society, or 2dly by putting out their Eyes and depriving them of their Senses, or 3dly by destroying all Mankind that there might be none to seduce them. *Where* were it more goodness in a Mother to suffer one or two of the Millions to be corrupted, or to use these Remedies to prevent it?

If

VIII. We must take the third of those four Branches of his puzzling Argument; *viz.* That God neither will nor can remove Evils. (85.) Yet we deny the Consequence. He is neither to be e-

steem'd

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If it be said that if she knew who they were that would yield to Temptations, she would confine them and leave the rest at Liberty. I answer, if the permitting those few to smart under the Effects of their ill Choice were the very Means and Motive by which the rest were induced to make a good one, and perhaps all wou'd be seduced if not fixed in a right choice by the terror of such Examples, it wou'd still be agreeable to Goodness to suffer them to make the choice and feel the Effects of it.

Methinks the Case thus stated doth much better represent the circumstances of God's permitting Sin, than as the Objection puts it. For I have already shew'd that God has created as many indefectible Beings (if any such be possible, which is indeed very doubtful) as this or any System of the World will allow: that he has placed as many of the Beings that are capable of defection in Places and Circumstances that will secure them from Temptation, as there was room for, in this or any other possible Model of the Creation. That after these more perfect Beings were created, and these more secure places filled, there was still room for many Creatures of other sorts, and that many such were possible, but all with a Capacity of choosing ill, and the inconveniency of Temptations; and that there was no other way to secure them all from inconveniencies, but either by not making them at all, or not allowing them the use of their Faculties, or lastly changing their Nature into another sort, than the System of Creatures would allow. In this case the Questions are, whether it was better and a greater Instance of Goodness in God to condescend to give these imperfect Creatures a Being, and to dispense with their Imperfections, or to deny it to them? 2dly, whether it was greater Goodness in him to give all his Creatures a free use of their Liberty, which is the greatest pleasure of a rational Creature, and without which they cannot have a full Enjoyment of themselves, tho' he foresaw one in many Millions wou'd abuse it; or to debar the whole from such a Satisfaction? Especially when the Misfortune of that one secured the rest of those many Millions.

(85) *Leibnitz* would rather say, "that God could take them away, but he was not willing to do it absolutely; and for a

" very

'Tis a Contradiction, that all Evils be removed from created Beings: God is not impotent therefore because he does not remove them.

steem'd Envious nor Impotent because he does not work Contradictions: But it is a Contradiction that all Evils should be removed, without removing the whole Universe; which would be the greatest of all Evils. For some kind of Evils adhere (as we have often declared) to the very Natures of things, and cannot be removed while any created Nature continues. For when a Circle is once made, all the Lines drawn from the Centre to the Circumference must necessarily be equal; neither is God impotent because he cannot make them unequal while it continues to be a Circle: In like manner, when he has made a Creature, he must necessarily tolerate the Evil of Imperfection in it, which is as essential to it as an Equality of the *Radij* is to the Circle. When therefore Matter, Motion and Free-Will are constituted, he must necessarily permit Corruption of things, and the abuse of Liberty, or something worse. For these cannot be separated (as was shewn) without a Contradiction. God therefore is no more impotent because he cannot remove these Evils from things while the things themselves remain, than because he cannot separate an Equality of the *Radij* from a Circle. The Consequence then is false which charges God with Impotence because he cannot remove Evils.

IX. Neither

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"very good reason, because he should have taken away the Good at the same time, and because he should have taken away more Good than Evil [4]."

The Answer of Lactantius is as follows. "Deus potest quicquid vult, & imbecillitas vel invidia in Deo nulla est: potest igitur mala tollere, sed non vult, nec ideo tamen invidus."

[4] *Pemargues* p. 488.

IX. Neither is that Assertion less false which attributes it to Envy that he will not. For he that always wills the best, and the least of many Evils, is absolutely Good and the farthest from Envy: and we have shewn that this is the Case with respect to God. If a Person had his Choice either to abolish or not to abolish Evil, he would be malicious if he did not abolish it. But when the choice is between this and a greater Evil, he that chooses the less is far from being malicious. The Divine Goodness therefore reduces God to this Difficulty, that he must choose to make either no Creature at all, or an imperfect one; either no such thing as Matter and Motion, or tolerate Contrariety and Corruption in things; either no free Agent, or admit a Power of sinning. He must necessarily have chosen one of these, and 'tis easy to say whether of them was more directly opposite to Envy.

X. To speak my Thoughts, I dare confidently, but with Reverence, pronounce that God would neither have been infinitely powerful nor good, if he could not have made any thing which we call Evil. For there are some things possible which are not consistent with each other, nay are repugnant and mutually destructive, *i. e.* are Evils to each other: If God were unable to produce any

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" vilus est, idcirco enim non tollit quia sapientiam (sicut
 " edocuit) simul tribuit, & plus est boni ac jucunditatis in sa-
 " pientia quam in malis molestiis; sapientia enim facit ut
 " etiam Deum cognoscamus & per eam cognitionem, immor-
 " talitatem assequamur, quod est summum Bonum. Itaque
 " nisi prius malum agnoverimus, nec poterimus agnoscere
 " Bonum: sed hoc non videt Epicurus, nec alius quisquam. si
 " tollantur mala tolli pariter Sapientiam, nec ulla in homine
 " remanere virtutis vestigia, cujus ratio in sustinenda & super-
 " anda malorum a caritate consistit. Itaque propter exiguum
 " compendium sublatorum malorum, maximo & vero & pro-
 " prio nobis bono careremus.

God al-
ways
chooses
the least of
Evils,
and there-
fore is not
envious.

God
could nei-
ther be
conceiv'd
to be in-
finitely
powerful,
if he were
not able to
create im-
perfect Be-
ings, *i. e.*
Creatures,
or things
that are
contrary
to each o-
ther; *i. e.*
Evils: nor
infinitely
Good, if he
had been
contented
in himself,
and deny'd
Existence
to every
thing else.

of these, how would he be infinitely powerful, since he could not do all that is possible? Nor would it be less injurious to his Goodness to be unwilling, for by this means his Power must lie idle and never effect any thing at all; since nothing can be simply Good and exempt from all manner of Evil, but God himself. If therefore the Divine Goodness had deny'd Existence to created Beings on account of the concomitant Evils, he might really have been esteem'd Envious, since he had allow'd none to exist beside himself, and while he refused to admit any kind of Evil, he would have rejected all the Good. Thus vanishes this *Herculean* Argument which induced the *Epicureans* to discard the good Deity, and the *Manicheans* to substitute an Evil one.

Epicurus therefore is deceiv'd who endeavours to attribute impotence and Envy to the Deity, when he ought to have inferr'd the highest Power and Goodness.

XI. *Epicurus* then is both a Deceiver and deceived himself, when from the present Evils he concludes against the Omnipotence and Goodness of the Deity. Whereas on the contrary God would neither have been powerful nor good if he had not tolerated Evils. From a competition or (if we may be allow'd the Expression) a *Conflict* of two Infinites, i. e. Omnipotence and Goodness, Evils necessarily arise. These Attributes amicably conspire together, and yet restrain and limit each other. There is a kind of Struggle and Opposition between them, whereof the Evils in Nature bear the Shadow and Resemblance. Here then, and no where else, may we find the primary and most certain Rise and Origin of Evils; and here only must we look for that celebrated Principle of the Antients.

Νεῖκος ἐλόμενον ἔστι δόρις ἀμαρτήσωνται

The Pestilential Strife and Bloody Fight.

Empedocles.

APPENDIX:

Concerning the Divine Laws.

S E C T. I.

Why God made Laws when he knew that they would not be observed.

I. **T**HE Divine Laws are either those which God has implanted in the Nature of every Being, or those which he has published to Mankind in a particular manner, by certain *Messengers* chosen and sent for this Purpose. For since a *Law is the Will of a Superior sufficiently promulg'd to an Inferior, and attended with the Hope or Fear of Reward or Punishment*: 'tis plain that God may be conceiv'd to have made this Declaration of his Will to his Creatures two Ways: First, by giving them such a Nature as requires that some things be done, and others avoided, in order to its Preservation: those things which are made known to us in this manner, are commanded or forbidden, we say, by the Law of Nature: and that Law which thus discovers itself to our Understanding we look upon as the Will of God promulg'd

The Divine Laws are either natural or positive.

mulg'd to his Creatures: For we are very certain that God, according to his Goodness, wills the Good and Preservation of all things which he himself has made, as far as possible: and consequently hates any thing that is hurtful to the Creature.

Particular
Laws
ought to
give place
to more
general
ones, since
all kind
of Repug-
nancy
could not
be avoided

II. Now it must be observ'd that these natural Laws are either *Universal* or *Particular*; and 'tis fit the particular ones should give way to the more Universal, and those of less Moment to the more important. For instance, 'tis of the Nature of Body that it be capable of Motion, that it be stopp'd and broken in Pieces by meeting with others in Motion, and this is the *Universal Law* of Bodies. But it is of the Nature of an Animal to preserve itself, and use its utmost Endeavour that the Parts of its Body be not separated or dissolv'd, and this is the *particular Law* of Animals.

Now since these Laws are sometimes inconsistent, it is reasonable that the latter, as being a particular one and of less Consequence, should yield to the former: and this is evidently the Will of God. If it be ask'd, Why did God make Laws which in some respect interfere with one another? I answer, as before, That this could not be avoided without a greater Evil: Since therefore of two Evils the less is to be chosen, God will'd that particular Laws, and those of less consequence, should give place to the more Universal and those of greater Importance, rather than remove that Inconsistency, for there arises less Inconvenience to Nature from thence.

The same
must be
said of
those
Laws
which re-
late to the
moral
World.

III. The same must be said of those Laws which relate to Morality. 'Tis the *Universal Law* of Free Agents, that they shall please themselves by Election, but there are some things eligible which may be prejudicial to some particular Beings. Now it is better, as was said before, that Particulars be injur'd,

injur'd, than that the Universal Law of Free Agents be violated. We must suppose then that God willed this as the less Evil of the two. Men are permitted therefore to abuse their Free Will, and 'tis necessary that God should tolerate either this Inconvenience or a greater. But it is not at all necessary that Man should make an Evil Choice; therefore he alone is faulty; for it proceeds from his Act that God is reduced to a necessity of choosing the least among many Evils.

IV. From hence it appears that all the Laws of Nature are always observ'd according to the Will and Intent of God. For he will'd that the Particular should give place to the General ones, and that Man should sin rather than be driven from Sin by force. You'll say, why then is he angry at Sinners, since nothing is done against his Will? I answer: When Anger is attributed to God, 'tis *after the manner of Men*†; whereas it is ordered and effected by the very Nature and Constitution of things, that whoever does any thing in opposition to any Law of Nature, tho' it be a particular one, shall bring some Inconvenience upon himself. By which contrivance God has taken care that the very least Law should not be violated rashly and without Necessity. When an Offender therefore, who willingly breaks a particular Law, brings certain Misery upon himself, God who wisely coupl'd these together, is said to be *angry*: Because a Man in Anger would not take any other or more effectual Revenge on the Person that provok'd him; and the Evil which naturally attends a bad Election is to be esteem'd a Punishment inflicted as it were by an angry God.

† See Chap. 1. § 3. par. 10. and Note C.

God may alter or add to the Laws of Nature, and give us assurance that he intends to do so; hence the origin of positive Laws, and a Revelation.

Laws are the means of informing Free-Agents of what is useful or prejudicial to them.

V. As to the second sort of Divine Laws, viz. the *Positive*; 'tis certain that God, who is the Author of Nature and establish'd the Laws of it, can either alter them or add to them when he sees it proper. Neither does he want Means, whenever he pleases, to assure Mankind that he will do it. When therefore we find any Alteration in the Laws of Nature, we may from hence conclude that God demands our Attention. And hereupon we esteem the Promulgation of a new Law recommended to us by this Token to be an authentic Declaration of the Will of God. In this manner were the *Mosaic* and *Evangelic* Laws establish'd; viz. by *Miracles*.

VI. But it is usually ask'd, Why did God establish and promulge those Laws which he knew Men would not observe? It must be answer'd, That these Laws are Means of acquainting Free Agents with what is expedient for them, and of moving them to the choice of it. Neither does their Nature admit of any that are more efficacious: for it is such as must be persuaded and not compell'd. Notwithstanding therefore God knew that his Laws would not be observ'd by all, yet he proposes them to all, for by this Means a great many learn their true Interest, thankfully embrace the Laws and obey them; and the rest are no worse for them, since they would be involv'd in the same Evils which they feel from the Sanction of the Laws, and perhaps greater, tho' these Laws had never been. (86.)

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(86.) 'Tis a very useful Observation which our Author makes in this place, and illustrates in the following Section, par. 3. viz. that the Divine Laws (especially those of the *Christian* Dispensation) are chiefly *Declarations* of the natural and necessary

But granting that some who transgress the Laws meet with greater and more Inconveniencies than they would have done without them, 'tis better that some should suffer Inconveniencies thro' their own fault, than that all should be depriv'd of the Benefit of the Divine Laws; God therefore out of infinite Goodness, which is always inclin'd to the best, promulg'd those Laws which he knew all Men would not observe.

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cessary Effects of Sin, or *Directions* and *Means* to avoid them; which necessary Effects are conceived to be the real *Sanction* of these Laws. Consequently these Laws cannot properly bring us into a worse State than we should have been in without them. — They do not introduce a new Train of arbitrary and additional Evils, but on the contrary are design'd in pure Goodness to lessen the Number of the old ones, — to forewarn us of the natural Consequences of our own Acts and Habits, and prevent those Moral Evils to which we are exposed by the very constitution of our Being; — which the universal Law of Liberty makes it possible for us to incur, and impossible for God to hinder, by any other means, as has been shewn above. Farther; this Notion, that most of the Misery both in this World and the next, is the *necessary Consequence* of sinful Actions, according to the fix'd Laws of Nature, rather than any positive Punishment immediately inflicted by the Deity, will, I am apt to think, have the greatest Influence on most Men to deter them from such Actions. I am sure I find myself more deeply affected with this Reflection, that Misery will follow of Course upon some certain Practices, and that by indulging them, I naturally and necessarily destroy myself, than I should be by a Prospect of the very same Degree of Pain threatned as a Punishment for such Practices. And the Reason of this is evident: I am apt still to hope that the latter may possibly be remitted: but the former leaves no room for Hope. Again, A due attention to this Doctrine, that all our moral Happiness in this World must be of our own making, and that disordered, evil Affections, irregular and perverse Habits, &c. will constitute a great part of our *Hell*, in the next, (which might be shewn in the same manner as was hinted concerning virtuous Habits, in Note, 80. but

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S E C T. II.

Concerning Divine Rewards and Punishments.

Punishment is a natural Evil connected with a depraved Choice.

I. **I**T was proper to say something concerning these, since Punishment is a natural Evil, viz. Pain, Disappointment of Appetite, or Damage annex'd to a wrong Choice, by a Foresight whereof we might be deterr'd from making a wrong Choice. In these consists the Power and Efficacy of Laws, nor would they be of any force without them. Now Good or Evil, *i. e.* Rewards and Punishments, may be annex'd, either by Nature, or by Laws of positive Institution.

II As

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is render'd unnecessary by the Authors there mention'd.) This Doctrine, I say, if rightly understood and apply'd, would discover the weakness of all such pretences to Salvation as are built upon the bare Belief of, or Confidence in what any other has done or can do for us; or even of what we do ourselves purely by way of *Opus operatum*. *i. e.* as ultimately relying on the bare Discharge of any Duty, and not using and applying it as a means to some farther End, v. g. on *Prayer*, as the mere Labour of the Lips; on the *Sacrament* as a Charm; on *Repentance* as a simple Act entitling us to Happiness: In short, of any thing which does not enter the Heart and improve the Temper. If Heaven be not so much the *Reward* of Religion, as the *natural Consequence* of a Religious Frame of Mind, and *vice versa*; then how absurd is it for us who are aspiring after that State, to stop by the way, to rest in any particular Acts of Religion as arbitrary Institutions procuring, and as it were *purchasing* it for us, instead of using them as, what they really are, fit Instruments to *work out* our own Salvation, by *producing* this frame of Mind in us; as proper Helps and Assistances enabling

II. As to *Nature*, all Evil is prejudicial to it, *i. e.* interrupts its Course: Evil therefore proceeds from some Violence done to Nature, and that which offers Violence must necessarily suffer it; for every natural Action has Re-action join'd with it. According to the Laws of Mechanism then Evil done to another is for the most part repy'd with Evil to the Doer, *i. e.* with Punishment. By which piece of Machinery or Contrivance God has manifested both his Wisdom and Goodness. For by this means he has taken effectual Care that none should transgress the Laws of Nature without Punishment, or offer unnecessary Violence to the Appetites of others; or if it were necessary to offer it, yet that it should not be without some Inconvenience to him that does offer it. For it is better that a Creature should be able to provide for its own Safety with some Inconveniencies, than that it should be at Liberty to offer needless Violence to others, and the Laws belonging to their particular Nature be broken to no manner of end: For by that means there would be more Evils in Nature than there are at present, and they would be multiply'd unnecessarily. Hence it appears how worthy it is of God to have framed the Nature of things in such a manner, that from the very Constitution of them, the Intemperate, Injurious, the Thief, Robber, Adulterer, Proud, Envious, &c.

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enabling us to acquire this Heavenly Temper? And on the other Side, how vain must be our Hopes of escaping Hell by any such Methods as these, if we still carry our Hell within us! *The Mind is its own Place, and in itself.*

Can make a Heav'n of Hell, a Hell of Heav'n.

Paradise Lost B. 1.

See Par 11: of the following Sect.

Evil is violence done to Nature; but every natural Action has re-action correspondent to it therefore: he that does Violence must necessarily suffer Violence, that none may sin without Punishment.

should have something to dread. If any one ask why there are not such Punishments as might effectually imprint a lively sense upon our Minds, and thereby totally restrain us from a wrong Choice? I answer: A greater Evil must not be done on account of a less; but if the Punishments and Dread of them were increas'd to such a Degree, as to be sufficient to prevent all kind of Evil, they themselves would be the greatest of all Evils, and the dread of them would more deeply affect, and be a greater Affliction to the Minds of Men, even of those who would not do amiss, than the Evils themselves are, for the Prevention of which these Punishments are proposed by God. It was therefore fit that there should be some measure in Punishments; viz. lest by being always present to the Minds of Mortals they should prove a greater Prejudice to our Ease and Happiness, than those very Evils which are prohibited under the Penalty of them would be, were we forced to undergo them.

Positive
Laws ac-
quaint us
with the
Punish-
ments
which at-
tend de-
prav'd E-
lections
from the
Nature of
the thing,
rather than
inflict new
ones.

III. As to the Punishments which God has affix'd by way of *Sanction to positive Laws*, we must affirm, that they are to be esteem'd as Admonitions and Notices of the Mischiefs consequent upon evil Elections, rather than that God himself will immediately inflict them. Natural Conscience is for the most part sufficiently able to inform us what is Good and what is Evil: but it was impossible for Nature to acquaint us with all the Consequences which attend our Actions in an infinite Train and Continuance of things. Now, lest we should be involv'd in Evils unawares, and contrary to our Expectations, God has inform'd us by positive Laws what our Condition must be if we will indulge ourselves in Evil Elections. And has promulg'd them by way of *Punishments* denounc'd, rather than by simple *Prediction*, that they might enter more deeply

ly into our Minds, and oblige us to take care of ourselves.

IV. But if there be any thing which is not reducible to this head, and seems to prove an *immediate Infliction* by the Deity, neither is that done without Reason. For it is fit that God should remove that Being out of the World which cannot be made consistent with the Good of the Universe: and reform that by Chastisement which would otherwise, thro' its irregular Motion, prove offensive to the Author, and all about it. Punishments then are annex'd to Evil Elections, in order to *prevent* them, and inflicted to *correct* and *amend* the Offenders, or to *deter* others from the like Offences. If therefore the Appointment and Infliction of Punishments prevent greater Evils than they are themselves; it follows that God has chosen the better Part in establishing and exacting them.

V. It may be ask'd, how this can agree with the Punishments of the Wicked, which the *Christian Religion* declares to be *Eternal*? For in the first place, 'tis plain that they are not inflicted either to reform the Guilty (for there is no room for Reformation in Hell) or to deter others from the like Guilt: for Sin will be at end, and the very possibility of sinning taken away before they shall be inflicted. They can neither be of use to the Dead therefore, nor to the Living; for they are kept secret while they might be of any use. Consequently there seems to be some other end of these Punishments, *viz.* to make Satisfaction to the Divine *Vengeance* for the Injury and Affront offer'd to his Majesty.

VI. Secondly, These Eternal Torments appear to be not very agreeable to the Divine OEconomy

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That the decreeing and inflicting Punishments prevents greater Evils.

'Tis ask'd in the first place, how this can be reconcil'd with eternal Punishments, which don't seem capable either of reforming the punished, or of being a warning to others.

'Tis ask'd in the second place how Punishments created all created,

ments can be eternal, since it is agreeable to Goodness to have things in such a manner that nothing might repent of its being

in another respect. For it is to be observ'd that God has fram'd all things and dispos'd them in such a manner, that nothing may repent of its having been made by him : for when it is come to this, that its Misery exceeds its Pleasure, the Being perishes, and is withdrawn from both. Not to *exist* therefore, or not to perceive any means of Relief, is the very worst Condition, as was shewn before †. A violent Object not only destroys the Sensory, but takes away the Sense itself ; the Divine Goodness providing that no Creature should be worse by its Existence than if it had not existed. And as far as appears, thinking Beings ought to be dealt with after the same manner, *viz.* When Pain, Sorrow, Fear, Anxiety, and the rest of the Passions and Affections increase to so great a Degree that the Mind receives more Evil than Good from the Sense of its Existence, 'tis reasonable that the Excess of these should extinguish Thought itself, as the Excess of bodily Pains destroys the Sense : Otherwise these miserable Beings seem to receive no Benefit from God, since Providence has reduced them to a State worse than that *Non-existence* in which it found them [p.] Neither does it seem a sufficient Vindication of the Divine Goodness, to say, that this befalls them thro' their own Fault, for it is hardly agreeable to Goodness to have placed any Being in that State which was obnoxious to such excessive Misery : For who would choose Existence attended with a danger that so very much over-ballances it ? He is not a wise Man that exposes all his Estate to hazard, nor a good Man that obliges any one to do it.

VII. Thirdly,

[p.] See Matth. 26. 24. and Mark 14. 24.

† Ch. 4. §. 8. par. 5.

VII. Thirdly, Whatever is perpetual must have a *natural and perpetual Cause*; for a perpetual Miracle is not to be expected. If therefore the Punishments of the Wicked be eternal, it seems necessary for these Punishments to arise from the Laws and Constitution of Nature. For it is scarce conceivable how a State of Violence should be perpetual. I have propos'd these Objections at length, lest I should seem to have declined them on account of their Difficulty, (87.)

VIII. As to the first Objection, I answer: It appears from the Light of Nature, that there shall be *future Punishments* but not that these shall be *Eternal*; we must not therefore enquire of Natural Reason why they are inflict'd; for they belong to reveal'd Religion, by which they are denounced:

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that

God is not therefore oblig'd to reveal how or why they are; perhaps the Reason is above our Comprehension.

To the first 'tis answer'd, that eternal Punishments are made known to us by Revelation, and that so: per-

NOTES.

(87.) The chief of those Authors who seem to oppose the strict, absolute Eternity of Hell-Torments, are A-Bp. Tillotson, T. Burnet, *de Statu Mort.* Ch. 10. p. 290, &c. T. Swinden in the Appendix to his Book on Hell. The Author of the Annotations on *Lux Orientalis*, p. 73, 74. S. Collier in his *Impartial Enquiry*, p. 105, &c. and his *Essay on Reveal'd Religion*, p. 142, &c. Whitby, Appendix to the 2d *Thess.* Bayle, *Episcopus*, and the *Fratres Poloni*. See also *Fabricii Delectus Argumentorum*, &c. C. 47. p. 720. and two Pieces in the *Phoenix*, &c.

Some of those who have particularly insist'd on the Defence of it are A-Bp. Davae, Jenkin, Fiddes, Lupton, Lake, Sherlock on *Providence*, Ch. 2. and on a *future State*. Rymér, Part 1st. Chap. 7. *Nichol's Conference with a Theist*, Part 3. p. 309, &c. *Scott's Christian Life*, vol. 5. p. 91, &c. 8va. and Discourse 22d. p. 435, &c. 2d vol. of his Works, Fol. *Patrick. Witenesses of Christianity*, Part 2d. *Bates on the Existence of God*, &c. Ch. 12. See the following Note and N. 91.

(88.) See

that is, there may be a Reason for them, but such as is beyond the mere natural Sagacity of Man to discover. Now we find many things of this kind in Nature; it does not therefore follow, because the Goodness of God has reveal'd to us that the Punishment of the Wicked shall endure for ever, that he is also obliged to reveal why and how that comes to pass. For perhaps it may be above the Power of our Mind to conceive it in the present state of Things.

It does not appear but that the Punishments of the Wicked may be of use to the Good.

IX. Secondly, Who will undertake to shew that the Eternal Punishment of the Wicked has no Tendency towards confirming good Men in the Choice of their Duty? (88.) If God make use of *Means* for that End, and do not immediately exert his Omnipotence alone, scarce could any other more effectual Means be found out to make the Blessed approve themselves in their Choice conformed to the Divine Will, and persevere therein, than the continual Contemplation of those miserable Beings who have done otherwise. Election is matter of Freedom, and not to be excited or prevented by other means than a Representation of *Good* or *Evil*

to

NOTES.

(88.) See A-Bp. Dawes's Serm. 5- p. 73, &c. or Note 83. Or it may be for the perpetual Benefit and Improvement of some other Systems; see the latter end of Note 82. Or perhaps for a standing Monument and Warning to the Heathen World during their State of Probation, which, for ought we know, may be extended beyond this Life, tho' we Christians have no reason to expect any farther Tryal.

See *Scott's Christian Life*, 8vo. 2d Vol. p. 551.

Something of this kind, I humbly apprehend, must be conceiv'd as the Reason for Hell-Torments, in order to make them consistent with perfect Goodness [9.] whatever we suppose the Nature of these Torments to be; of which below.

[9.] See Note 13.

to the Understanding. Since therefore God has undertaken to conduct and preserve an almost infinite Multitude of thinking Beings to all Eternity, thro' all the Changes and Successions of things, in as great a degree of Happiness as possible, without Violence done to Elections; where is the Wonder if he leave a few to the Misery which they brought upon themselves; thereby to give the rest a Warning how much they ought to stand upon their guard against the like? There's no necessity therefore to attribute eternal Punishment to the Divine Vengeance (nor is there properly any such thing in God, but it is ascribed to him, as other human Passions are in condescension to our Capacity). For since these Punishments may be conceiv'd to promote the good of the whole, they may arise from the Goodness, and not the Vengeance of the Deity.

X. As to the second Objection, The Matter is yet in debate, whether it were better to be miserable than not to be at all, and there are Arguments on both Sides. (89.) 'Tis manifest, that what the Objection mentions, viz. those Evils which over-balance the Desire and Happiness of Life put an End to Life itself, and that such Objects as are hurtful to the

Sense not to be at all. The Misery of the Damned may be like that of

To the second 'tis reply'd, that the matter is yet in debate whether it is preferable to be miserable or Mad-men.

NOTES.

(89.) A most elaborate Disputation on this Subject may be seen in Bp. Barlow's Remains, p. 470, &c. But our Author, in the last Subsect. of his Book, par. 5, &c. very reasonably grants, *That Non-existence becomes preferable to Existence whenever the Sum of Misery exceeds that of Happiness, and Evil becomes predominant in the whole*; and therefore, if he takes this Question in the same Sense, he had no great occasion to start it. Nay the Question will be about an absolute Impossibility, if any Misery which over balances the Happiness of Life do *ipso facto* put an end to Life, as our Author maintains in this very Paragraph: Concerning which Notion see Note 37.

Sense, at length destroy it. The same seems to hold good in thinking Substances, *viz.* those things which affect the Mind to a higher Degree than it is able to bear, may in like manner put an end to it. For they may be supposed either to drive us to Madness, or so far to disorder the thinking Faculty, as to make us think of nothing at all. Who can tell then whether the Punishment of the Wicked may not lead them into a kind of Phrensy and Madness? Thus they may indeed be very miserable, and become a sad Spectacle to others; they may be sensible of their Misery also, and strive against it with all their Power; but while they don't observe or believe that it is founded in perverse Election, they may hug themselves in the Cause the Effects whereof they abhor; being still wise in their own Opinion, and as it were pleasing themselves in their Misery.

Thus the more they labour under it, the more they embrace the Cause of it, and thereby become their own hindrance from ever getting free; and will not suffer themselves to be any thing but what they are. This we see done daily by mad and frantic Persons, and reckon it a part of their Unhappiness. The Divine Goodness therefore is not to be charg'd with Cruelty for letting them continue in that Existence, tho' it be very miserable, when they themselves will not have it remov'd: or for not altering their Condition, which they utterly refuse to have alter'd. 'Tis better for them indeed not to be, than to be; but only in the Opinion of wise Men, to which they do not assent. For they indulge themselves in their obstinate Election, and tho' every way surrounded and oppress'd with Woes, yet will they not alter what they have once embraced. We have frequent examples in this Life resembling this kind of Obstinacy.

XI. We

XI. We see perverse People voluntarily undergoing Pains, Afflictions, Torments, and even Death itself, rather than repent of their Resolution and change what they have once determin'd in their Mind. Nor is it uncommon for some to indulge and in a manner *please* themselves in their very Miseries. Thus the sorrowful love all such things as aggravate and foment their Grief: and in like manner the Envious, the Angry, the Ambitious, the Despairing: not that they are insensible of Uneasiness under these Passions, or don't believe themselves to be miserable; but because they had rather have that Misery so long as they enjoy their Choice, than want it and them too; or at least they can persist in it, because they do not observe that this Misery arises from thence. When therefore the Wicked obstinately oppose themselves to God, and refuse to make their Elections conformable to his Will, they take delight perhaps in that very Opposition: to hate God, to disobey his Commands, and strive against him with all their Power, is pleasing to them; and tho' they see themselves overwhelm'd with innumerable Evils, yet they had rather endure them all than repent. As Men that are desperately in Love, ambitious, envious, choose to bear Torments, loss of Estate, and hazard of Life, rather than lay aside these foolish and bewitching Affections. We may easily conceive then how the Wicked in Hell may be in very great Misery upon the increase of their Obstinacy and Folly, and yet unwilling to be freed from them. All see and exclaim against the Folly, Misery, and Madness of those Men who spend their Estate in Vice, impair their Health, and bring on an untimely Death; who involve themselves in Labours, Dangers, Death; and for no other end but because they will do so: yet they persist in this, and

The Damned choose their miserable State, as Lovers, angry, ambitious, envious Persons indulge themselves in those things which increase their Misery.

their

their Obstinacy increases with their Evils. These are some *Preludes* of the Misery of the Damned, and from hence we may understand that these Persons are extremely miserable, and yet will not be set at Liberty (90.)

It may be objected, that these miserable Beings may receive some kind of *Pleasure* from their *Elect*ions. But we place Felicity not barely in the *Act* of choosing, but much more in the *Enjoyment* of

NOTES.

(90.) From hence likewise we may understand what a natural, absolute, and indispensable Necessity there is for watching over all our *Habits, Affections, Appetites, &c.* for curbing our Passions, and correcting our Desires by *Reason*; for taking a strict and constant care that these be neither violent, irregular, nor fix'd on improper Objects in this Life, if we hope to avoid Misery in the Life to come. For if these accompany us into the other World, (and if we consider what *Scott* and *Rymer* have said on the Subject, it will appear infinitely probable that they do) the same or greater Unhappiness must unavoidably attend them there. If we shall have any Memory in the other World of what pass'd in this (which we must have, in order to give us either a good or evil *Conscience*, and to make us capable either of Reward or Punishment in that respect) how probable is it that we shall then also feel the force of all those *Habits* and *Associations* which in this Life were so strong as to raise Passions, Affections, &c. in us, and make us constantly proceed upon them for self-evident Principles, and pursue them for ultimate *Ends* of Action? “ And this being so, of “ what unspeakable consequence are the Actions of Men, that “ thus draw after them a Chain of Joys or Woes, as long as “ Eternity? And how careful ought we to be to what course “ of Life we determine ourselves, considering that our *Eternal* “ Fate depends upon what we are now doing, that every moral “ Action we perform is a Step to *Heaven* or *Hell*-wards, that in “ every bad Choice we make, we are planting our *Tophet*, or “ our *Paradise*, and that in the Consequence of our present “ Actions we shall *rue* or *rejoice* to eternal Ages? *Scott*, 2d “ vol. p. 26. See also 4th vol: Ch. 6. p. 692, &c. Fol. “ Edit. or *Hutcheson* on the Conduct of the Passions and Af- “ fections, §. 4, and 6. or Note 80. 86. 91. and par. 14, “ 15. of this Section.

of the Objects chosen. The more obstinately therefore any one chooses absurd and impossible things, the more miserable will he be when frustrated of his Choice; and we may imagine the damned to be always frustrated: nevertheless, after so much Warning and Experience, they don't intend to alter their Elections, but still persist in them, oppressed with the Sense and Weight of their Misery, and plung'd in deep despair. For it is possible that they may be regardless or ignorant that there is no other Way for them to be freed from these Miseries, but by altering their Elections, and not know how to do this, so as to persist in them for ever, and become more desperate by Disappointments, and to augment and multiply their Misery by new Attempts, which prove no less unhappy. The Power of willing the State they are in is not therefore of any Service to them towards the Attainment of Happiness, but renders them capable of Eternal Misery. For such Election may have the same Relation to this kind of Misery, as the natural Appetites have to Pain.

XII. Now it is sufficiently consonant to the Divine Goodness to permit or inflict this kind of Punishment, nor would it be less subservient to the Ends for which Punishments are wont to be imposed, viz. that by a previous Apprehension of them we may learn to be wise, and others be deterr'd from offending by our Example. For who does not dread Fury and Madness as the most miserable state of Mind? Who does not condemn the Folly and Madness of Men in Love, of envious and ambitious Persons? Especially when he beholds them labouring thereby under innumerable Evils, from which they will not be delivered?

Such Punishment is very great, and very well answers the End of Divine Punishments.

XIII. But

God
ought to
prefer the
common
Salvation
to that of
particulars

XIII. But allowing that Existence is worse than Non-existence to the Damned, let them imagine their Misery to be greater than it really is. Let it be a part of their Misery, to be conscious that they were the only Cause of all their Grief: yet since that could not be prevented without greater detriment to the whole, there's no room for objecting against Providence which always does the best. If God had made nothing at all, and been contented to have remain'd alone, there wou'd have been nothing that could sin, that could choose amiss, that could be miserable. But since it is impossible that there should be more *Gods*, the Deity made *Creatures* such as the Nature of a Created Being allow'd. Now it was expedient, for the Good of the whole, that some of these should have a Power of bringing Misery upon themselves by evil Elections. Nor can any thing be charg'd upon the Goodness of God in this, unless that he created *Men*, and not *Gods* equal to himself; and that he preferr'd the Salvation of the *Generality* to that of some *Particulars*. He chose therefore that some should regret their having been made by God, *viz.* thro' the abuse of their Free-Will, rather than that none should be happy by using it aright.

Answer to
to third
Objection.
Tis pro-
bable that
the Misery
of the
Wicked
arises from
the very
Nature of
Sin.

XIV. As to the third Objection, I believe it to be a great Truth that the Misery of the Wicked arises from the very Constitution of the Sinner, and that the Laws of Nature hold in evil Elections. We see that our Bodies may be maim'd for ever, and our Limbs dislocated and distorted to such a degree as to become totally incapable of those Functions for which Nature design'd them. Why should we not have the same Opinion of the Mind, *viz.* that by depraved Elections, Passions, and Affections, it may be so far diverted from the right way, of thinking, as to become equally disabled and unfit for governing its Actions according to

to the Dictates of Right Reason, as a lame Man is for a Race? We may see every Day that right Notions of things are capable of being perverted by a perverse Habit of thinking; and it is evident from Experience that we mistake and are ignorant of useful things. We are wont to labour under Prejudices, and be averse to sober Counsels; in short, we are willing to endure any thing rather than alter our Choice. 'Tis a common thing for us to please ourselves in Dangers, in the Ruin of our Fortunes, in the Loss of Ease, and Life itself; and our Volition, perverse as it is, sometimes appears more desirable than Friends, Kingdoms, Pleasures, or even Life. If therefore God does not interpose his Omnipotence, the same Errors, the same Ignorance, the same Habit of a perverted Mind and obstinate Propensity to Evil, which here draw us aside from the right Path, may continue with us for ever: nor will the Soul that is immers'd in this kind of Evil be capable of curing itself: For one that is infected with these Maladies is as unfit to help himself, as one that has cut off his Hands and Feet is unable to run or feed himself. (91.)

XV. Secondly,

NOTES.

(91.) This is the true Meaning of that *Macula Peccati* which always remains and sets us at Enmity with God, and under a natural Incapacity of Happiness, and seems to make it impossible for future Punishments to have any other Period than the total Extinction or Annihilation of the Subjects of them; and what Ground there can be to hope for that may be seen from the Authors referr'd to in Note 87.

Our Author, in the following Paragraph, explains how this *Macula* may be conceiv'd to render God and good Men our Aversion, and 'tis easy to apprehend how utterly incapable of Happiness that Man must be, whose whole Soul is bent another way; whose every Motion, Thought, and Inclination; whose

The
Wicked,
thro' Ig-
norance
and Error,
will de-
light in
such
things as
they can-
not enjoy,
and may
not know
how to
take de-
light in
any thing
else.

XV. Secondly, A Person of this Disposition of Mind hates God, for he sees that he has chosen such things, in the Enjoyment whereof he places his Delight, as cannot be consistent with the Divine Will. He therefore looks upon God as his Enemy, and consequently avoids all Commerce with him, and endeavours to abscond from him, but never thinks of changing his own Will; For thro' Error and Ignorance he knows not how to take delight in any thing else. Therefore he applies all his Endeavours to the Attainment of such things as cannot really be attain'd, and strives for ever in vain with a more powerful Being, *i. e.* God; nor ceases from struggling, tho' full of Misery and Despair. For tho' he feels himself tormented with a most exquisite Pain, yet he dreads a greater from the change of his Resolution: he sees Misery invading him on each hand, and is forced either to oppose the Deity without any prospect of Success, or to give over the Contest, and lay aside all Hopes of enjoying the Object of his Choice: He embraces

NOTES.

whose Designs, Desires, and Hopes, are all fix'd and riveted to those Objects which can never satisfy them, which are either quite different from, or contrary to the very Nature and Idea of true rational Happiness. A view of the Consequences attending each inveterate evil Habit, each ungovernable Passion, or Affection misapply'd, will shew the absurdity of supposing any Person in such a Case to be happy even in Heaven itself *. But this important Doctrine of the force of *Habits*, &c. in this World, as well as the Continuance of them in the next, has been so well stated and enforced by the Authors refer'd to above, that an attempt to give any further Illustration of it seems impracticable. I shall therefore dismiss it with a Passage from the *Causes of the Decay of Christian Piety*, Ch. 1. "Those immaterial Felicities we expect, do naturally suggest

[r.] See the Spectator, No. 90:

embraces the former, as the less Evil of the two, and yet a greater can scarce be devised. The perverse Fool may be pleased with the very Contest, tho' it proves to no manner of purpose. In the interim God leaves such an one to himself, who by pursuing absurd and impossible things will become troublesome to himself and others, assaulting some, and being attack'd by others like himself. We see in this World how much bad Men delight in heaping Misery on others, and who are therefore bad Men because they take delight in Mischief. The Servant of an absurd Master is unhappy, and so is he who lives near a malevolent and morose Neighbour. Suppose then the Wicked who are banished from God, and odious to all good Men, associating together, and 'tis easy to conceive what kind of Society that of Reprobates and Devils must be, how grievous and offensive to each other. We may observe how very pernicious a wicked Governor is in his Province, how miserable they that are subject to such: how much more wretched must the state of the Wicked be, who are subjected to,

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and

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" to us the necessity of preparing our Appetites, and hungers
 " for them, without which Heaven can be no Heaven to us:
 " For since the Pleasure of any thing results from the Agree-
 " ment between it and the Desire, what Satisfaction can *Spiri-*
 " *tual* Enjoyments give unto a *Carnal Mind*? Alas, what De-
 " light would it be to the Swine to be wrapt in fine Linnen
 " and laid in Odours? His Senses are not gratify'd by any
 " such Delicacies; nor would he feel any thing besides the
 " Torment of being with-held from the Mire. And as little
 " Complacency would a brutish Soul find in those purer and
 " refined Pleasures, which can only upbraid, not satisfy him.
 " So that could we, by an impossible Supposition, fancy such
 " an on- assum'd to those Fruitions, his Pleasure sure would
 " be as little as his preparation for it was. Those Eyes which
 " have continually beheld *Vanity*, would be dazzled, not de-
 lighted,

and join'd with none but mad, malicious, envious and froward Beings?

The Wicked are confin'd to certain places and Companions by the Laws of Nature, as we are to the Earth.

XVI. 'Tis to be believ'd that God has provided a place that is suitable and proper for them, and to which they are as much confin'd by the Laws of their Nature, as Fishes to the Sea, or terrestrial Animals to the Earth. What sort of a Place that is we know not, but it is reasonable to believe that there is such an one. Men in this Life choose for themselves Habitations and Companions according to their own Genius, Temper, and Disposition of Mind: and likeness begets Love: and who can doubt but the same thing may attend the bad and good after Death? The Good resort therefore to the Society of *God, Angels, and Spirits of Good Men*, but the Wicked choose those *Ghosts* which were Partakers in their Iniquity, and *Devils* for their Companions: And this may possibly be brought about by natural Instinct, and mere human Disposition. Nor is God wanting in Goodness if he suffers them to live in their own way, and enjoy the Life themselves have chosen. For this could not be prevented without doing Violence to the Laws of Nature. And these Punishments which the Wicked voluntarily bring upon themselves, tend to the Benefit of the Universal System of Rational Beings.

XVII. So

NOTES.

“ lighted with the *beatific Vision*; neither could that Tongue
 “ which has accustom'd itself only to *Oaths* and *Blasphemies*,
 “ find Harmony or Music in *Hallelujahs*. 'Tis the peculiar
 “ Privilege of the *pure in Heart*, that they shall see God; and
 “ if any others could so invade this their Inclosure, as to take
 “ Heaven by Violence, it surely would be a very Joyless Possession to these Men, and only place them in a Condition to
 “ which they have the greatest Aversion and Antipathy. So
 “ that Holiness here is not only necessary to the acquiring,
 “ but the Enjoyment of Bliss hereafter.

XVII. So much for *Moral Evils, Laws, Rewards and Punishments*. In which some things may appear too subtle for common Apprehension; but we ought to remember that the Dispute is concerning one of the nicest things in Nature, viz. the Operations of our own Mind: and whatever is said in order to explain these, must necessarily be subtle. On this Account the Art of *Logic* is call'd subtle, because it has these for its Object, and any thing that is more subtle than ordinary is reckon'd Logical. He that does not like any thing that is subtle therefore ought not to dispute about what relates to our own Minds. *Moral Evil* is as it were the Distemper of our Minds arising from the irregular Motion of the cogitative Faculties; now, as 'tis difficult to discover the Causes of those Distempers which infect the Body, so it is much more difficult to find out the Causes and the Motions of those Maladies which afflict the Mind. For it is necessary that we perfectly understand our own Minds, the Notions, Operations, and Means whereby the Will is moved, and the Understanding operates, before we can hope to make a full Discovery of these Passions of the Mind, and the Causes of them. And 'tis evident to any one how difficult that is; what subtle Abstractions, and long Deduction of Consequences it must require. 'Tis no wonder then if the Investigation of the Causes, and Origin of the *Evil of the Mind* require some things which are too subtle for all to comprehend.

The dispute about *Moral Evil* relates to the mind and its Operations, and on that account must necessarily be somewhat subtle.

S E C T: III.

Concerning the Question, Why bad Men are happy, and good Men miserable.

This Question has been so well treated by many, that there is scarce any room for scruple

The matter of Fact is often doubtful: for it is not good Men that are miserable, but rather reformed by Adversity: Nor are bad Men prosperous, but made bad by Prosperity.

I. **T**HIS Question seems to have some relation to the former. For if *Punishment*, that is, Natural Evils, be inflicted in Proportion to the desert of Evil Elections, whence come good things to evil Men, and Evil to the Good? 'Tis not so difficult to answer this Question upon the Supposition of a future State, as to make it necessary for us to insist much upon it. And it must be confess'd, that it has been treated of in a very proper Manner by several Writers: (92.) so that there's scarce any Room for Scruple. Nevertheless a few things shall be touch'd upon, and very briefly, that we may not repeat what has been said already.

II. In the first place then the matter of Fact is very often doubtful, notwithstanding the Complaints which many Persons make to the contrary. We see indeed good

Men that are miserable, but rather reformed by Adversity: Nor are bad Men prosperous, but made bad by Prosperity.

N O T E S.

(92.) Viz. *Sherlock* on Judgment, Ch. 1. §. 3. p. 76, &c. 1st Edit. — on Providence. Ch. 7. p. 258. 2d Edit. *Cudworth*, p. 877. *Cockburn*, Essay 5. prop. 7. 8. p. 137, &c. *Mollaston*, p. 71. and 110, &c. *Cradock* on Eccl. 9. 2. *Seneca*, Ep. 24. *Fiddes's* Sermons, Fol. 14 and 19. *Scott*, 2 vol. Ch. 4. §. 3. p. 331, &c. 8vo. and Discourse 16. p. 320, &c. 2d vol. Fol. *Stillingsfleet*, *Origines Sacrae*, B. 3. Ch. 3. §. 21. p. 326, &c. Fol. *Grew*, *Cosmologia Sacra*, B. 3. Ch. 2. §. 57. 58.

good Men frequently miserable, but it is a Query whether their Goodness may not be owing to their Misery, and they would have prov'd wicked if they had been tempted by Prosperity? It is not the Good then that are afflicted, but the miserable that are reclaimed. On the other hand, we behold happy, rich, and powerful Men that are wicked; but their Wickedness may be attributed to their Prosperity, and they would perhaps be very good if the Incitements to Evil were removed. 'Tis not the Wicked therefore that are happy, but the happy that are corrupted with Prosperity, and thereby fall into Wickedness.

III. Secondly, We are blinded with Prejudice, We are and thereby render'd very *partial Judges* of the Goodness or Badness of other Men. He that is *partial Judges of* our Acquaintance and befriends us is a good Man, Merit: he that favours our Enemies is a very bad one. from the instance of *Hannibal* and *Scipio*. Thus *Scipio* is celebrated by the *Roman* Historians, and if any hard or unprosperous Accident befall him, they begin to ask whether there be any Gods? Whether Divine Providence takes care of human Affairs? But *Hannibal* is condemn'd, his Victories are charg'd as Crimes on Providence, and they re-pine at his having been so long successful. Whereas 'tis really dubious whether of the two was the worse Man; both certainly were very bad: For their Aim was to put the World into Confusion, to subdue Nations by force of Arms, the one intending to make *Carthage*, the other *Rome*, the Head of the World, by Slaughter, Rapine, War, and Injustice. Now the Man that studies to oppress the whole World in Servitude, and bring it under the Power of that Nation to which he belongs, this Man is truly wicked and unworthy of Success, however he may veil his Ambition, Pride, and Fury in some particular Instances, under the specious pretence of Clemency and Love of his Country.

IV. Thirdly,

We are
bad Judges
of the
Happiness
of Men:
for those
are often
the most
miserable
whom we
esteem
happy
and the
contrary.

The chief
Happiness
here con-
sists in
Hope;
which is a
sign that
perfect
Happiness
is reserved
for ano-
ther Life,
and all
these
things
which be-
fal good or
bad Men,
are means
to it.

IV. Thirdly, as we are partial Judges of the *Deserts* of other Men, so are we no less unquali-
fy'd to pronounce on their *Felicity*. For we are ta-
ken with the pomp, and noise, and glittering out-
side of things, and consequently judge the Rich,
the Potent, the Noble, and the Learned to be
happy; but the Poor, Ignoble and Unletter'd,
miserable. And yet herein we are very frequently
mistaken, since neither of them are what they ap-
pear to be. For Life is often attended with more
Happiness among Cottages, Husbandry, and
Trade, nay in the midst of Bodily Pains and Di-
seases; than among Sceptres, Diadems, high Pe-
digrees, and superfluous Heaps of Books; since,
as we have shewn before, and Experience testifies,
Happiness lies chiefly, if not solely, in Election.

V. Fourthly, It is to be observed, that the
greatest Part of the Happiness of this Life consists
in *Hope*, and that the Fruition of the desired Ob-
ject is not answerable to the Hope pre-conceived,
which must be esteem'd an Indication that complete
Happiness is reserv'd by Nature for another Life;
the more then we aspire after, and adhere to the
present Objects, the less Care we shall take of those
things which tend to our future Happiness. It was
therefore wisely provided by God, that the Good
should not be corrupted with too plentiful an En-
joyment of the things of this World, but that the
Bad should have them in abundance: For by this
means all may understand that their time ought
not to be spent in these things, but that the Space
of this short Life should be employed in looking
after other Matters, *i. e.* such as regard Eternity.

To conclude, we must affirm that nothing hap-
pens to good Men which may not prove a Means
of greater Good; nor to the Bad, which may not
be for their Punishment or Reformation.

VI. And

VI. And I hope it appears from what has been said, that the Objections of the *Manicheans* and *Paulicians* are not so formidable as they have seem'd to some ; and that human Reason is not so blind but that it can solve these Difficulties from the Principles laid down, and such Suppositions as are generally admitted ; and tho' not absolutely certain, yet probable however, and such as we use to acquiesce in, in the Solution of other Phænomena.

Conclusion of the whole.

But I offer all these things to the Censure of the Learned : I submit them entirely to the Judgment of the *Catholic Church*, especially to the Governours of those Parts of it which constitute the Churches of *England* and *Ireland*. If there be any thing herein which seems not perfectly agreeable to their Faith, as I hope there is not, and would not have it, I desire that may be look'd upon as absolutely unsaid and retracted.

F I N I S.

I have, as I desire that you be looking upon as
 a friend, as I hope that you are, and would
 like to see you, and would like to be
 with you, and would like to be with you
 and would like to be with you, and would
 like to be with you, and would like to be
 with you, and would like to be with you,



2 I M I F

Divine Predestination and Fore-knowledge, consistent with the Freedom of Mans Will.

A

S E R M O N

Preach'd at

Christ-Church, *Dublin,*

May 15, 1709.

Before his Excellency.

Thomas Earl of Wharton,

Lord Lieutenant of *Ireland,*

A N D T H E

Right Honourable the House of Lords.

By his Grace

WILLIAM Lord Archbishop of *Dublin.*

The fifth Edition.

Die Lunæ 16^o Maii, 1709.

Ordered,

ON Motion, That the Lord Viscount Powerscourt, the Lord Viscount Blesington, and the Lord Viscount Strabane, do as from this House, give the Thanks of this House to his Grace the Lord Archbishop of Dublin, for his Sermon preach'd yesterday in *Christ-Church*, and desire his Grace to cause the same to be printed.

Jo. Smith, Cler.' Parliamentor.'



ROMANS VIII. 29, 30.

For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conform'd to the Image of his Son, that he might be the First-born among many Brethren. Moreover, whom he did predestinate, them he also called; and whom he called, them he also justified; and whom he justified, them he also glorified.

§ I. **I**N these Words the Apostle lays down the several Steps by which God proceeds in the saving of his Elect. 1st, He knows and considers those, whom he designs for Salvation. 2^{dly}, He decrees and predestinates them to be like his Son Jesus Christ, in Holiness here, and Glory hereafter, that he might be the First-born among many Brethren. 3^{dly}, He calls them to the Means of Salvation. 4^{thly}, He justifies: And lastly, He glorifies them: This is the Chain and Series of God's dealing with his beloved; in which he is represented to us as first designing, and then executing his gracious Purposes towards them.

I am very sensible, that great Contentions and Divisions have happen'd in the Church of God about *Predestination* and *Reprobation*, about *Election* and the *Decrees* of God; that learned Men have engaged with the greatest Zeal and Fierceness in this Controversy, and the Disputes have prov'd so intricate, that the most diligent Reader will perhaps, after all his labour in perusing them, be but little satisfy'd, and less edify'd, by the greatest part of all that has been written upon this Subject. And hence it is that considering

Men of all Parties seem at last, as it were by consent, to have laid it aside; and seldom any now venture to bring it into the Pulpit, except some very young or imprudent Preachers.

Not but that the Doctrine laid down in my Text, is undoubtedly true and useful, if we could but light on the true and useful way of treating it; for so our Church has told us in her seventeenth Article, where she informs us. *That as the godly Consideration of Predestination is full of sweet, pleasant, and unspeakable Comfort to godly Persons, so for curious and carnal Persons, lacking the Spirit of Christ, to have continually before their Eyes the Sentence of God's Predestination, is a most dangerous Downfall, whereby the Devil doth thrust them either into Desperation, or into Wretchedness of most unclean living.*

The Case therefore being thus, I shall endeavour to lay before you that which I take to be the edifying part of the Doctrine of *Predestination*; and in such a manner (I hope) as to avoid every thing that may give occasion to ignorant or corrupt Men to make an ill use of it.

§ II. In order to this, I shall

First, Consider the Representation that the Text gives of God, as contriving our Salvation; and shall endeavour to explain how these Terms of *Fore-knowing* and *Predestinating* are to be understood when attributed to God.

Secondly, Why the holy Scriptures represent God to us after this manner.

Thirdly, What use we are to make of this Doctrine of God's fore-seeing, freely *electing*, and *predestinating* Men to Salvation.

As to the first of these, you may observe that in the Representation here given of God's dealing with

with Men, there are five Acts ascrib'd to him, *Fore-knowing, Predestinating, Calling, Justifying, and Glorifying.* And about each of these great Disputes have arisen among Divines, and Parties and Sects have been form'd on the different Opinions concerning them. However, as to the three last, *Protestants* seem now pretty well agreed; but as to the two first, the Difference is so great, that on account thereof, there yet remain form'd and separate Parties, that mutually refuse to communicate with one another: tho' I believe, if the Differences between them were duly examin'd and stated, they would not appear to be so great as they seem to be at first view; nor consequently would there appear any just reason for those Animosities, that yet remain between the contending Parties.

§ III. In order to make this evident, we may consider.

(1.) That it is in effect agreed on all hands, that the Nature of God, as it is in it self, is incomprehensible by human Understanding; and not only his Nature, but likewise his Powers and Faculties, and the Ways and Methods in which he exercises them, are so far beyond our reach, that we are utterly incapable of framing exact and adequate Notions of them. This the Scriptures frequently teach us, particularly *St. Paul* in his Epistle to the *Romans*, Ch. II. v. 33. *O the depth of the Riches both of the Wisdom and Knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his Judgments, and his Ways past finding out.* Ver. 34. *For who hath known the Mind of the Lord, or who hath been his Counsellor?*

§ IV. (2.) We ought to remember, that the Descriptions which we frame to our selves of God, or of the divine Attributes, are not taken from any direct or immediate Perceptions that we have of him or them; but from some Observations we have made of his Works, and from the Consideration of those

those Qualifications, that we conceive would enable us to perform the like. Thus observing great Order, Conveniency, and Harmony in all the several Parts of the World, and perceiving that every thing is adapted and tends to the preservation and advantage of the Whole; we are apt to consider that we could not contrive and settle things in so excellent and proper a manner without great Wisdom; and thence conclude that God who has thus concerted and settled Matters must have *Wisdom*: And having then ascrib'd to him Wisdom, because we see the effects and result of it in his Works, we proceed and conclude that he has likewise *Fore-sight* and *Understanding*, because we cannot conceive Wisdom without these, and because if we were to do what we see he has done, we could not expect to perform it without the exercise of these Faculties.

And it doth truly follow from hence, that God must either have these, or other Faculties and Powers equivalent to them, and adequate to these mighty Effects which proceed from them. And because we do not know what his Faculties are in themselves, we give them the Names of those Powers, that we find would be necessary to us in order to produce such Effects, and call them Wisdom, Understanding, and Fore-knowledge: But at the same time we cannot but be sensible that they are of a nature altogether different from ours, and that we have no direct and proper Notion or Conception of them. Only we are sure that they have Effects like unto those that do proceed from Wisdom, Understanding, and Fore-knowledge in us: And that when our Works fail to resemble them in any particular, as to Perfection, it is by reason of some want or defect in these Qualifications.

Thus our Reason teaches us to ascribe these Attributes to God, by way of resemblance and analogy

to such Qualities or Powers as we find most valuable and perfect in our selves.

§ V. (3) If we look into the holy Scriptures, and consider the Representations given us there of God or his Attributes, we shall find them generally of the same nature, and plainly borrow'd from some resemblance to things with which we are acquainted by our Senses. Thus when the holy Scriptures speak of God, they ascribe Hands, and Eyes, and Feet to him: Not that it is designed we should believe that he has any of these Members according to the literal Signification; but the meaning is, that he has a Power to execute all those Acts, to the effecting of which these Parts in us are instrumental: That is, he can converse with Men as well as if he had a Tongue and Mouth; he can discern all that we do or say as perfectly as if he had Eyes and Ears; he can reach us as well as if he had Hands and Feet; he has as true and substantial a Being as if he had a Body; and he is as truly present every where as if that Body were infinitely extended. And in truth, if all these things which are thus ascrib'd to him, did really and literally belong to him, he could not do what he does near so effectually as we conceive and are sure he doth them by the Faculties and Properties which he really possesses, tho' what they are in themselves be unknown to us.

After the same manner, and for the same reason, we find him represented as affected with such Passions as we perceive to be in our selves, viz. as angry and pleas'd, as loving and hating, as repenting and changing his Resolutions, as full of Mercy and provok'd to Revenge. And yet on Reflection we cannot think that any of these Passions can literally affect the Divine Nature. But the meaning confessedly is, that he will as certainly punish the Wicked as if he were inflamed with the Passion of

Anger against them: That he will as infallibly reward the Good as we will those for whom we have a particular and affectionate Love; that when Men turn from their Wickedness, and do what is agreeable to the divine Commands, he will as surely change his Dispensations towards them, as if he really repented and had chang'd his Mind.

And as the Nature and Passions of Men are thus by analogy and comparison ascrib'd to God, because these would in us be the Principles of such outward Actions, as we see he has perform'd, if we were the Authors of them; so in the same manner, and by the same condescension to the weakness of our Capacities, we find the Powers and Operations of our Mind ascrib'd unto him.

As for example, it is the part of a wise Man to consider beforehand what is proper for him to do, to prescribe Means and Methods to obtain his Ends, to lay down some Scheme or Plan of his Work before he begins, and to keep resolutely to it in the Execution; for if he should be conceiv'd to deviate in any thing from his first purpose, it would argue some imperfection in laying the Design, or want of Power to execute it. And therefore 'tis after this manner the Scripture represents God, as purposing and contriving beforehand all his Works; and for this reason Wisdom and Understanding, and Counsel and Fore-knowledge are ascrib'd to him; because both Reason and Scripture assure us that we ought to conceive of God as having all the Perfection that we perceive to be in these Attributes, and that he has all the Advantages that these Powers or Faculties could give him.

The Advantages that Understanding and Knowledge give a Man in the use of them, are to enable him to order his Matters with conveniency to himself, and consistency in his Works, so that they may not hinder or embarrass one another: And inasmuch

asmuch as all the Works of God are so order'd that they have the greatest Congruity in themselves, and are most excellently adapted to their several Uses and Ends, we are sure there is a Power in God who orders them, equivalent to Knowledge and Understanding; and because we know not what it is in it self, we give it these Names.

§ VI. *Lastly*, The use of Fore-knowledge with us is to prevent any Surprize when Events happen, and that we may not be at a loss what to do by things coming upon us unawares. Now inasmuch as we are certain that nothing can surprize God, and that he can never be at a loss what to do in any Event, therefore we conclude that God has a Faculty to which our Fore-knowledge bears some analogy, and therefore we call it by that Name.

But it does not follow from hence that any of these are more properly and literally in God, after the manner that they are in us, than Hands or Eyes, than Mercy, Love, or Hatred are; but on the contrary we must acknowledge that those things, which we call by these Names, when attributed to God, are of so very different a nature from what they are in us, and so superior to all that we can conceive, that in reality there is no more likeness between them, than between our Hand and God's Power: nor can we draw Consequences from the real Nature of one to that of the other with more justness of Reason, than we can conclude, because our Hand consists of Fingers and Joints, that therefore the Power of God is distinguish'd by such Parts.

And therefore to argue because Fore-knowledge, as it is in us, if supposed infallible, cannot consist with the Contingency of Events, that therefore what we call so in God cannot, is as far from Reason, as it would be to conclude, because our Eyes cannot see in the dark, that therefore, when God

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is said to see all things, his Eyes must be enlighten'd with a perpetual Sunshine ; or because we can't love or hate without Passion, that therefore when the Scripture ascribe these to God, they teach us that he is liable to these Affections as we are.

We ought therefore to interpret all these things, when attributed to God, as thus express'd only by way of condescension to our Capacities, in order to help us to conceive what we are to expect from him, and what Duty we are to pay him ; and particularly, that the terms of Fore-knowledge, Predestination, nay, of Understanding and Will, when ascribed to him, are not to be taken strictly or properly, nor are we to think that they are in him after the same manner or in the same sense that we find them in our selves ; but on the contrary, we are to interpret them only by way of Analogy and Comparison.

That is to say, when we ascribe Fore-knowledge to him, we mean that he can no more be surpriz'd with any thing that happens, than a wise Man, that foresees an Event, can be surpriz'd when it comes to pass ; nor can he any more be at a loss what he is to do in such a case, than a wise Man can, who is most perfectly acquainted with all Accidents which may obstruct his Design, and has provided against them.

§ VII. So when God is said to predetermine and foreordain all things according to the Counsel of his Will, the importance of this Expression is, that all things depend as much on God, as if he had settled them according to a certain Scheme and design, which he had voluntarily fram'd in his own Mind, without regard had to any other consideration besides that of his own meer Will and Pleasure.

If then we understand Predetermination and Predestination in this analogous Sense, to give us a Notion of the irresistible Power of God, and of that supreme Dominion he may exercise over his Creatures,

tures, it will help us to understand what the Sovereignty is that God has over us, the Submission that we ought to pay him, and the Dependence we have upon him.

But it no ways follows from hence that this is inconsistent with the Contingency of Events, or Free-Will. And from hence it appears what it is that makes us apt to think so; which is only this, that we find in our selves when we determine to do a thing, and are able to do what we have resolv'd on, that thing can't be contingent to us: And if God's Fore-knowledge and Predetermination were of the same nature with ours, the same Inconsistency would be justly infer'd. But I have already shew'd that they are not of the same kind, and that they are only ascrib'd to him by way of Analogy and Comparison, as Love and Mercy, and other Passions are; that they are quite of another nature, and that we have no proper Notion of them, any more than a Man born blind has of Sight and Colours; and therefore that we ought no more to pretend to determine what is consistent or not consistent with them, than a blind Man ought to determine, from what he hears or feels, to what Objects the sense of Seeing reaches: for this were to reason from things that are only comparatively and improperly ascrib'd to God, and by way of analogy and accommodation to our Capacities, as if they were properly and univocally the same in him and in us.

If we would speak the Truth, those Powers, Properties and Operations, the Names of which we transfer to God, are but faint Shadows and Resemblances, or rather indeed Emblems and parabolical Figures of the divine Attributes, which they are design'd to signify; whereas his Attributes are the Originals, the true real Things, of a Nature so infinitely superior and different from any thing

thing we discern in his Creatures, or that can be conceiv'd by finite Understandings, that we can't with reason pretend to make any other Deductions from the Natures of one to that of the others, than those he has allow'd us to make, or extend the Parallel any farther than that very Instance, which the resemblance was design'd to teach us.

Thus Fore-knowledge and Predestination, when attributed to God, are design'd to teach us the Obligations which we owe to him for our Salvation and the Dependance we have on his Favour, and so far we may use and press them: but to conclude from thence that these are inconsistent with Free-Will, is to suppose that they are the same in him and us; and just as reasonable as to infer, because Wisdom is compar'd in Scripture to a Tree of Life, that therefore it grows in the Earth, hath its Spring and Fall, is warm'd by the Sun and fed by the Rain.

§ VIII. And this brings me to the second Head which I propos'd to my self in this Discourse, which was to shew you, *Why God and heavenly things are after this manner represented to us in holy Scripture.* And the first Reason I shall offer is that we must either be content to know them this way, or not at all. I have already told you, and I believe every considering Man is convinc'd, that the Nature and Perfections of God, as he is in himself, are such that it is impossible we should comprehend them, especially in the present State of Imperfection, Ignorance, and Corruption in which this World lies. He is the Object of none of our Senses, by which we receive all our direct and immediate Perception of things; and therefore if we know any thing of him at all, it must be by deductions of Reason, by Analogy and Comparison, by resembling him to something that we do know and are acquainted with.

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'Tis by this way we arrive at the most noble and useful Notions we have, and by this Method we teach and instruct others. Thus when we would help a Man to some Conception of any thing that has not fallen within the reach of his Senses, we do it by comparing it to something that already has, by offering him some Similitude, Resemblance, or Analogy, to help his Conception. As for example, to give a Man a Notion of a Country to which he is a Stranger, and to make him apprehend its Bounds and Situation, we produce a Map to him; and by that he obtains as much knowledge of it as serves him for his present purpose. Now a Map is only Paper and Ink, diversify'd with several Strokes and Lines, which in themselves have very little likeness to Earth, Mountains, Valleys, Lakes and Rivers. Yet none can deny but by Proportion and Analogy they are very Instructive; and if any should imagine that those Countries are really Paper, because the Maps that represent them are made of it, and should seriously draw Conclusions from that Supposition, he would expose his Understanding, and make himself ridiculous: And yet such as argue from the faint Resemblances that either Scripture or Reason give of the divine Attributes and Operations, and proceed in their Reasonings as if these must in all respects answer one another, fall into the same Absurdities that those would be guilty of, who should think Countries must be of Paper, because the Maps that represent them are so.

To apply this more particularly to the Case before us: We ascribe Decrees and Predestination to God; because the things signify'd by these words bear some resemblance to certain Perfections that we believe to be in him. But if we remember that they are only Similitudes and Representations
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of them, and that there is as little likeness between the one and the other, as between the Countries and Maps which represent them; and that the likeness lies not in the Nature of them, but in some particular Effect or Circumstance that is in some Measure common to both; we must acknowledge it very unreasonable to expect that they should answer one another in all things: or because the different Representations of the same thing can't be exactly adjusted in every particular, that therefore the thing represented is inconsistent in it self.

Fore-knowledge and Decrees are only assign'd to God to give us a Notion of the Steadiness and Certainty of the divine Actions; and if so, for us to conclude that what is represented by them is inconsistent with the Contingency of Events or Free-Will, because the things representing (I mean our Fore-knowledge and Decrees) are so, is the same Absurdity, as it is to conclude, that *China* is no bigger than a Sheet of Paper, because the Map, that represents it, is contained in that compass.

§ IX. This seems to me a material Point; and therefore I will endeavour to illustrate it with an Instance or two more. Every body is satisfy'd that Time, Motion, and Velocity, are Subjects of very useful Knowledge; and that adjusting and discovering the Proportions that these bear to one another, is perhaps all that is profitable in natural Philosophy. How is it then, that we proceed in our Demonstrations concerning these? Is it not by representing Time by a Line, the Degrees of Velocity by another, and the Motion that results from both, by a Superficies or a Solid? And from these we draw Conclusions, which are not only very true, but also of great moment to Arts and Sciences; and never fail in our Deductions, while we keep justly to the Analogy and Proportion they bear to one another in the Production of natural Effects;

Effects ; neither is it easy, nor perhaps possible, to come at such Knowledge any other way.

Yet in the nature of the thing, there is no great Similitude between a Line and Time ; and it will not be obvious to a Person, who is not acquainted with the Method of the skilful in such Matters, to conceive how a Solid should answer the compounded Effect of Time and Motion. But if any, instead of endeavouring to understand the Method and Proportions used by the Learned in such Cases, in order to discover to them these useful Truths, should reject the whole as a thing impossible ; alledging that we make Time a permanent thing, and existing altogether, because a Line which represents it in this Scheme is so ; we should think that he hardly deserv'd an Answer to such a foolish Objection.

And yet of this nature are most, if not all, the Objections that are commonly made against the Representations that the Scripture gives us of the divine Nature, and of the Mysteries of our Religion.

§ X. Thus the holy Scriptures represent to us that Distinction which we are obliged to believe to be in the Unity of God, by that of Three Persons, and the Relation they bear to one another, by that of a Father to his Son, and of a Man to his Spirit : And those that object against this, and infer that these must be three Substances, because three Persons among Men are so, do plainly forget that these are but Representations and Resemblances ; and fall into the same absurd way of reasoning that the former do, who conclude, that we make Time a permanent thing, because a Line is so, by which we represent it.

§ XI. Again, if we were to describe to an ignorant *American* what was meant by Writing, and told him that it is a way of making words visible
and

and permanent, so that Persons at any distance of Time and Place, may be able to see and understand them: The Description would seem very strange to him, and he might object that the thing must be impossible, for Words are not to be seen but heard; they pass in the Speaking, and it is impossible they should affect the Absent, much less those that live in distant Ages. To which there needed no other answer, than to inform him that there are other sort of Words, beside those he knows, that are truly called so, because equivalent to such as are spoken; that they have both the same use, and serve equally to communicate our Thoughts to one another; and that if he will but have patience, and apply himself to learn, he will soon understand, and be convinc'd of the Possibility and Usefulness of the thing: And none can doubt but he were much to blame, and acted an unwise part, if he refus'd to believe the Person that offer'd to instruct him, or neglected to make the Experiment.

And sure, when any one objects against the Possibility of the Three Persons of the Trinity in one God, it is every whit as good an Answer to tell such an Objector that there are other sort of Persons besides those we see among Men, whose Personality is as truly different from what we call so, as a Word written is different from a Word spoken, and yet equivalent to it. And tho' three Persons, such as Men are, can't be in one human Nature, as a Word spoken can't be visible and permanent; yet what we call three Persons by Comparison and Analogy, may consist in the Unity of the Godhead.

And after the same manner we ought to answer those who object against the Fore-knowledge and Decrees of God, as inconsistent with the Freedom of Choice, by telling them that tho' such Fore-
knowledge

knowledge and Decrees as are in our Understandings and Wills, cannot consist with Contingency, if we suppose them certain; yet what we call so in God may, being quite of a different Nature, and only called by those Names, by reason of some Analogy and Proportion which is between them.

And if Men will but have patience, and wait the proper time, when Faith shall be perfected into Vision, and we shall know even as we are known; they may then see and be as well satisfy'd that there is no Absurdity in the Trinity of Persons, or Fore-knowledge of Contingency, as the *Indian* is, when he has learn'd to read and write, that there is no impossibility in visible and permanent Words.

§ XII. *Lastly*, It is observable, that no Care, Industry, or Instruction, can ever give a Person born, and continuing blind, any Notion of Light; nor can he ever have any Conception how Men who have Eyes discern the Shape and Figure of a thing at a distance, nor imagine what Colours mean: And yet he would, I believe, readily (on the account he receives from others, of the Advantage of knowing these things) endure Labour and Pain, and submit to the most difficult and tormenting Operations of Physick or Chirurgery, in order to obtain the use of his Eyes, if any reasonable hope could be given him of the Success of such an Undertaking. And why then should not we as willingly submit to those easy Methods which God has prescrib'd to us, in order to obtain that Knowledge of his Nature and Attributes, in which our eternal Satisfaction and Happiness hereafter is in a very great measure to consist? And 'tis certain we now know as much of them as the blind Man, in the Case suppos'd, does of Lights or Colours; and have better reason to seek, and more certain hope of attaining in the next Life to

a fuller and a more compleat Knowledge, than such a Man can have with relation to the use of his Eyes, and the advantage of seeing. And then will not he rise up in Judgment against us, and condemn us? Since he endures so much, to obtain Sight on the imperfect Representations of it made to him by other Men, whilst we will not believe and endure as much for eternal Happiness, on the Testimony of God.

§ XIII. If it be ask'd, Why these things are not made clearer to us? I answer, for the same Reason that Light and Colours are not clear to one that is born blind, even because in this imperfect State we want Faculties to discern them: And we cannot expect to reach the Knowledge of them whilst here, for the same reason that a Child, whilst he is so, cannot speak and discourse as he doth when a grown Man; there is a Time and Season for every thing, and we must wait for that Season. There is another State and Life for the clear discerning of these Matters; but in the mean time we ought to take the Steps and Methods which are proper for our present Condition: And if we will not do so, we can no more expect to arrive to the Knowledge of these necessary Truths, or that State which will make them plain to us, than a Child can hope he shall ever be able to read and write, who will not be persuaded to go to School, or obey his Master.

This analogical Knowledge of God's Nature and Attributes, is all of which we are capable at present; and we must either be contented to know him thus, or sit down with an intire Ignorance and Neglect of God, and finally despair of future Happiness. But it concerns us frequently to call to mind the Apostle's Observation, 1 Cor. 13. 12. *For now we see thro' a Glass darkly, but then face to face; now I know in part, but then I shall know even as I am*

am known. Tho' our present knowledge of divine Things be very imperfect, yet it is enough to awaken our desire of more; and tho' we do not understand the Enjoyments of the Blessed, yet the Description we have of them is sufficient to engage us to seek after them, and to prosecute the Methods prescrib'd in Scripture for attaining them.

§ XIV. And therefore let me offer it as a second Reason why God and divine Things are thus represented to us in Scripture, *viz.* That such Knowledge is sufficient to all the Intents and Purposes of Religion; the Design whereof is to lead us in the way to eternal Happiness, and in order thereunto, to teach and oblige us to live reasonably, to perform our Duty to God, our Neighbours, and our selves, to conquer and mortify our Passions and Lusts, to make us beneficent and charitable to Men, and to oblige us to love, obey, and depend upon God.

Now it is easy to shew, that such a Knowledge, as I have describ'd, is sufficient to obtain all these Ends: For tho' I know not what God is in himself, yet if I believe he is able to hurt or help me, to make me happy or miserable, this Belief is sufficient to convince me, that 'tis my Duty to fear him. If I be assur'd that all his Works are done with Regularity, Order, and Fitness; that nothing can surprize or disappoint him, that he can never be in any doubt, or at a loss what is proper for him to do; tho' I do not comprehend the Faculties by which he performs so many admirable and amazing things, yet I know enough to make me adore and admire his Conduct. If I be satisfy'd that I can no more expect to escape free, when I break the Laws and Rules he has prescrib'd me, than a Subject can who assaults his Prince in the midst of all his Guards; this is enough to make me cautious about every Word I speak, and every

Action I perform, and to put me out of all hope of escaping when I offend him.

If I am convinc'd that God will be as steady to the Rules he has prescrib'd for my Deportment as a wise and just Prince will be to his Laws; this alone will oblige me to a strict Observation of the divine Commands, and assure me that I must be judg'd according as I have kept or transgress'd them.

If a Man be convinc'd that by his Sins he has forfeited all Right and Title to Happiness, and that God is under no Obligation to grant him pardon for them; that only the free Mercy of God can put him into the way of Salvation; and that he may as well without Imputation of Injustice, pardon one, and pass by another, as a Prince may, of many equal Malefactors, reprieve one for an instance of his Mercy and Power, and suffer the rest to be carry'd to Execution: If a Man, I say, finds himself under these Circumstances, he will have the same Obligations of Gratitude to his God, that the pardon'd Offender owes to his Prince, and impute his Escape intirely to the peculiar Favour of God, that made the Distinction between him and others without any regard to their Merits.

If we believe that there is a Distinction in the manner of the subsisting of the divine Nature, that requires such particular Applications from us to God as we pay to three distinct Persons here; and that he has such distinct and really different Relations to himself and to us on this account, as three Men have to one another; this is enough to oblige us to pay our Addresses to him as thus distinguish'd, and to expect as different Benefits and Blessings from him under this Distinction, as we expect from different Persons here: And it can be no hindrance to our Duty, that we are ignorant of the nature and manner of that Distinction.

Let

Let us consider how many honour and obey their Prince, who never saw him, who never had any personal Knowledge of him, and could not distinguish him from another Man if they should meet him. This will shew us, that it is not necessary that we should personally know our Governor, to oblige us to perform our Duty to him: And if many perform their Duty to their Prince without knowing him, why should it seem strange that we should be oblig'd to do our Duty to God, tho' we do not know any more of his Person or Nature but that he is our Creator and Governor?

Lastly, To shew that this kind of Knowledge is sufficient for Salvation, let us suppose one who takes all the Descriptions we have of God literally, who imagines him to be a mighty King that sits in Heaven, and has the Earth for his Footstool; that at the same time hath all things in his view which can happen; that has thousands and thousands of Ministers to attend him, all ready to obey and execute his Commands; that has a great Love and Favour for such as diligently obey his Orders, and is in a Rage and Fury against the Disobedient: Could any one doubt but he, who in the simplicity of his Heart should believe these things, as literally represented, would be saved by virtue of that Belief, or that he would not have Motives strong enough to oblige him to love, honour, and obey God.

If it should be objected that such Representations do not exactly answer the Nature of Things, I confess this is true; but I would desire you to consider, that the best Representations we can make of God are infinitely short of the Truth, and that the imperfections of such Representations will never be imputed to us as a Fault, provided we do not wilfully dishonour him by unworthy Notions, and our Conceptions of him be such as may suffi-

ciently oblige us to perform the Duties he requires at our hands.

And if any one farther alledge that he who takes these Representations literally, will be involv'd in many Difficulties, and that it will be easy to shew that there are great Inconsistences in them, if we understand them according to the Letter.

I answer, He is to be look'd upon as very officious and impertinent, that will raise such Objections, and put them in the Heads of plain, honest People, who by the force of such common, tho' figurative Knowledge (as it may be term'd) practice the substantial and real Duties of Religion, that lead them to eternal Happiness.

'Tis true, when curious and busy Persons, by the unseasonable abuse of their Knowledge, have rais'd such Objections, they must be answer'd: and it is then necessary to shew in what Sense these Representations ought to be taken; and that they are to be understood by way of Comparison, as Condescensions to our Weakness.

But tho' these Objections are easily answer'd, yet he who makes them unnecessarily is by no means to be excus'd, because they often occasion disturbance to weak People. Many that may be shock'd by the Difficulty, may not be capable of readily understanding the Answers: and therefore thus to raise such Scruples, is to lay a Stumbling-Block in the way of our weak Brethren, and perplex them with Notions and Curiosities, the Knowledge of which is no way necessary to Salvation.

We ought therefore to consider that it was in great Mercy and Compassion to the Ignorance and Infirmary of Men, that the holy Spirit vouchsaf'd to give us such Representations of the divine Nature and Attributes. He knew what Knowledge was most proper for us, and what would most effectually

fectually work on us to perform our Duty: and if we take things as the Scripture represents them, it can't be deny'd but they are well adapted to our Capacities, and must have a mighty Influence on all that sincerely believe them, in truth greater than all those nice Speculations that we endeavour to substitute in their Place.

§ XV. But thirdly, If we consider seriously the Knowledge that we have of the Creatures, and even of those things in this World with which we are most familiarly acquainted, it will appear that the Conceptions we have of them, are much of the same sort as those are, which Religion gives us of God, and that they neither represent the Nature or essential Properties of the things as they are in themselves, but only the Effects they have in relation to us. For in most Cases we know no more of them but only how they affect us, and what Sensations they produce in us.

Thus for example, Light and the Sun are the most familiar and useful things in nature: we have the comfortable Perception of them by our Senses of Seeing and Feeling, and enjoy the Benefit and Advantage of them; but what they are in themselves, we are intirely ignorant.

I think it is agreed by most that write of Natural Philosophy, that Light and Colours are nothing but the Effects of certain Bodies and Motions on our Sense of Seeing, and that there are no such things at all in Nature, but only in our Minds: and of this at least we may be sure, that Light in the Son or Air, are very different things from what they are in our Sensations of them; yet we call both by the same Names, and term that which is only perhaps a motion in the Air, Light, because it begets in us that Conception which is truly Light. But it would seem very strange to the generality of Men, if we should tell them, that there is no Light

in the Sun, or Colours in the Rainbow: and yet strictly speaking, it is certain, that which in the Sun cause, the Conception of Light in us, is as truly different in nature from the Representation we have of it in our Mind, as our Fore-Knowledge is from what we call so in God.

§ XVI. The same may be observ'd concerning the Objects of our other Senses, such as Heat and Cold, Sweet, and Bitter, and which we ascribe to the things that affect our Touch and Taste. Whereas it is manifest, that these are only the Sensations that the Actions of outward things produce in us. For the Fire that burns us, has no such Pain in it as we feel, when we complain of its heat, nor Ice, such as we call Cold.

Nevertheless we call the Things, whose Actions on our Senses cause these Sensations in us, by the same Name we give to our Conceptions of them, and treat and speak of them, as if they were the same. We say the Fire is hot, because it produceth heat in us; and that the Sun is light, because it affects our Eyes in such manner, as enables us to frame that Thought which we then perceive in our selves. But in the mean time we are altogether ignorant, what it is particularly in the Fire and the Sun, that has these Effects on us, or how it comes thus to affect us. And yet this Ignorance of ours doth not hinder us from the Use or Advantage that Nature design'd us in these Sensations; nor does our transferring to the Objects themselves the Names that we give our own Perceptions of them, draw any evil Consequences after it: on the contrary, they serve the Uses of Life, as well as if we knew the very things themselves. The Sun by giving me the Sensation of Light, directs and refreshes me, as much as if I knew what its Nature and true Substance are. For in truth, Men are no farther concern'd to know the nature of any thing, than

than as it relates to them, and has some effect on them. And if they know the Effects of outward things, and how far they are to use or avoid them, it is sufficient.

If then such Knowledge of natural things, as only shews the effects they have on us, be sufficient to all the Uses of Life, tho' we do not know what they are in themselves; why should not the like Representation of God and his Attributes be sufficient for the Ends of Religion, tho' we be ignorant of his and their Nature?

Every one knows that Steadiness, Regularity, and Order, do always proceed from Wisdom. When therefore we observe these in the highest degree in all the Works of God, shall we not say that God is infinitely wise, because we are ignorant what that really is in it self which produces such stupendous Effects? tho' after all Wisdom, as in us, be as different from what we call so in God, as *Light* in our Conception is different from the *Motion* in the Air that causes it.

§ XVII. We all of us feel a tendency to the Earth, which we call *Gravity*; but none ever yet was able to give any satisfactory account of its Nature or Cause; but inasmuch as we know that falling down a Precipice will crush us to pieces, the Sense we have of this Effect of it, is sufficient to make us careful to avoid such a Fall. And in like manner, if we know that breaking God's Commands will provoke him to destroy us, will not this be sufficient to oblige us to Obedience, tho' we be ignorant what it is we call *Anger* in him?

§ XVIII. I might go thro' all the Notices we have of natural Things, and shew that we only know and distinguish them by the Effects they produce on our Senses, and make you sensible that such Knowledge sufficiently serves the Purposes of Life. And no Reason can be given why the Representations

presentations given us in Scripture of God and divine Things, tho' they do only shew us the Effects that proceed from them, should not be sufficient to answer the Purposes of Religion.

Particularly we ascribe Fore-knowledge to God, because we are certain that he can't be surpriz'd by any Event, nor be at any loss what he is to do when it happens. And thereby we give him all the Perfection we can, and assure our selves that we cannot deceive him.

After the same manner we ascribe Predestination to him, and conceive him as predetermining every thing that comes to pass, because all his Works are as steady and certain, as if he had predetermin'd them after the same manner that wise Men do theirs.

We farther represent him as absolutely free, and all his Actions as arising only from himself, without any other Consideration but that of his own Will; because we are sure, the Obligations we owe to him are as great as if he acted in this wise. We are as much oblig'd to magnify his free Mercy and Favour to us, to humble our Minds before him, and return our tribute of Gratitude to him, as if our Salvation intirely proceeded from his mere good Will and Pleasure, without any thing being requir'd on our part in order to it.

§ XIX. Let me in the fourth Place observe, that as we transfer the Actions of our own Minds, our Powers, and Virtues, by analogy to God, and speak of him as if he had the like; so we proceed the same way in the Representations we make to one another of the Actions of our Minds, and ascribe the Powers and Faculties of Bodies to the Transactions that pass in them. Thus to weigh things, to penetrate, to reflect, are proper Actions of Bodies, which we transfer to our Understandings, and commonly say, that the Mind weighs or penetrates things, that it reflects on it self, or

Actions;

Actions; thus to embrace or reject, to retain or let slip, are corporeal Performances, and yet we ascribe the first to the Will, and the last to the Memory. And it is manifest that this does not cause any Confusion in our Notions: tho' none will deny but there is a vast difference between weighing a piece of Money in a Scale, and considering a thing in our Minds; between one Body's passing thro' another, which is properly penetrating, and the Understanding's obtaining a clear Notion of a thing hard to be comprehended. And so in all the rest, there is indeed a resemblance and analogy between them, which makes us give the same Names to each: but to compare them in all particulars, and expect they should exactly answer, would run us into great Absurdities. As for example, it would be ridiculous to think, that weighing a thing in our Minds should have all the Effects, and be accompany'd with all the Circumstances that are observable in weighing a Body.

§ XX. Now to apply this, let us consider that Love, Hatred, Wisdom, Knowledge, and Foreknowledge, are properly Faculties or Actions of our Minds; and we ascribe them to God after the same manner that we do Reflection, Penetrating, Discovering, Embracing, or Rejecting, to our intellectual Actions and Faculties, because there is some analogy and proportion between them. But then we ought to remember that there is as great a difference between these, when attributed to God, and as they are in us, as between weighing in a Balance and Thinking, in truth infinitely greater; and that we ought no more to expect that the one should in all Respects and Circumstances answer the other, than that Thinking in all things should correspond to Weighing. Wou'd you not be surpriz'd to hear a Man deny, and obstinately persist in it, that his Mind can reflect upon it self, because
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it is impossible that a Body, from whence the Notion is originally taken, should move or act on it self? And is it not equally absurd to argue that what we call Fore-knowledge in God, cannot consist with the Contingency or Freedom of Events, because our Prescience, from whence we transfer the Notion to the divine Understanding, could not, if it were certain? And is it not equally a sufficient answer to both, when we say that the Reflection of Bodies, tho' in many Circumstances it resembles that Action of the Mind which we call so, yet in other Particulars they are mighty unlike? And tho' the Fore-knowledge that we have in some things, resembles what we term so in God, yet the Properties and Effects of these in other particulars, are infinitely different.

Nor can we think, that whatever is impossible in the one, must be likewise so in the other. 'Tis impossible Motion should be in a Body, except it be mov'd by another, or by some other external Agent; and it requires a Space in which it is perform'd, and we can measure it by Feet and Yards; but we should look on him as a very weak Reasoner, that would deny any Motion to be in the Mind, because he could find none of those there. And we should think that we had sufficiently answer'd this Objection, by telling him that these two Motions are of very different Natures, tho' there be some analogy and proportion between them. And shall not the same Answer satisfy those that argue against the divine Fore-knowledge, Predestination, and other Actions attributed to God, because many things are supposed possible to them, which are impossible to us.

§ XXI. It may be objected against this Doctrine that if it be true, all our Descriptions of God, and Discourses concerning him, will be only Figures and Metaphors; that he will be only figuratively

merciful, just, intelligent, and fore-knowing: and perhaps in time, Religion and all the Mysteries thereof, will be lost in mere Figures.

But I answer, that there is great difference between the analogical Representations of God, and that which we commonly call Figurative. The common use of Figures is to represent things that are otherwise very well known, in such a manner as may magnifie or lessen, heighten or adorn the Ideas we have of them. And the design of putting them in this foreign Drefs, as we may call it, is to move our Passions, and ingage our Fancies more effectually than the true and naked view of them is apt to do, or perhaps ought. And from hence it too often happens, that these Figures are employ'd to deceive us, and make us think better or worse of things, than they really deserve.

But the Analogies and Similitudes that the holy Scriptures or our own Reason frame of divine Things, are of another nature; the use of them is to give us some Notion of things whereof we have no direct Knowledge, and by that means lead us to Perception of the Nature, or at least of some of the Properties and Effects of what our Understandings cannot directly reach, and in this Case to teach us how we are to behave our selves towards God, and what we are to do, in order to obtain a more perfect Knowledge of his Attributes.

§ XXII. And whereas in ordinary figurative Representations, the thing express'd by the Figure is commonly of much less moment than that to which it is compar'd; in these Analogies the Case is otherwise, and the things represented by them, have much more Reality and Perfection in them, than the things by which we represent them. Thus weighing a thing in our Minds, is a much more noble and perfect Action, than examining the Gravity of a Body by Sale and Balance, which is the
original

original Notion from whence it is borrow'd, and Reflection as in our Understandings is much more considerable, than the rebounding of one hard Body from another, which yet is the literal Sense of Reflection. And after the same manner, what we call Knowledge and Fore-Knowledge in God, have infinitely more reality in them, and are of greater moment than our Understanding or Prescience, from whence they are transferr'd to him; and in truth, these as in Man are but faint Communications, of the divine Perfections, which are the true Originals, and which our Powers and Faculties more imperfectly imitate, than a Picture does a Man: and yet if we reason from them by Analogy and Proportion, they are sufficient to give us such a Notion of God's Attributes, as will oblige us to fear, love, obey, and adore him.

If we lay these things together, I suppose, they will furnish us with sufficient Reasons to satisfy us why the holy Scriptures represent Divine things to us by Types and Similitudes, by Comparisons and Analogies, and by transferring to God the Notions of such Perfections as we observe in our selves, or other Creatures: since it appears that we are not capable of better; that such Knowledge answers all the Designs of Religion; and that when the Matter is duly examin'd, we hardly know any thing without our selves in a more perfect manner.

I shall therefore proceed to the third and last thing I propos'd, which was to shew the Uses we ought to make of what has been said, particularly of God's fore-knowing and predestinating his Elect to Holiness and Salvation.

§ XXIII. And first, from the whole it appears that we ought not to be surpriz'd, when we find the Scriptures giving different and seemingly contradictory Schemes of Divine things.

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It is manifest that several such are to be found in holy Writ. Thus God is frequently said in Scripture, to *repent and turn* from the Evil that he purpos'd against Sinners; and yet in other places we are told, that *God is not a Man that he should lye, neither the Son of Man that he should repent: So Numb. 23. 19. Thus Psal. 18. 11. God is represented as dwelling in thick Darkness: He made Darkness his secret place; his Pavilion round about him, were dark Waters, and thick Clouds of the Sky. And yet 1 Tim. 6. 16. he is describ'd as dwelling in the Light which no Man can approach unto, whom no Man hath seen, nor can see: And 1 John 1. 5. God is Light, and in him is no Darkness at all. Thus in the second Commandment, God is represented as visiting the Iniquity of the Fathers upon the Children, unto the third and fourth Generation of them that hate him: and yet, Ezek. 18. 20. The Son shall not bear the Iniquity of the Father, neither shall the Father bear the Iniquity of the Son; and Ver. 4. The Soul that sinneth, it shall die.*

After the same manner, we are forbid by our Saviour, *Matt. 6. 7. to use vain Repetitions as the Heathen do; or to think that we shall be heard for our much speaking; because, Ver. 8. Your Father knows what things ye have need of, before ye ask him. And yet Luke 18. 1. we are encourag'd always to pray, and not to faint: And this is recommended to us by the Parable of an importunate Widow, who thro' her incessant Applications became uneasy to the Judge, and by her continual Cries and Petitions so troubled him, that to procure his own Ease he did her Justice: Ver. 5. Because this Widow troubleth me, I will avenge her, lest by her continual coming she weary me.*

Thus it is said, *Exod. 33. 11. The Lord spake unto Moses face to face, as a Man speaketh to his Friend. And yet in Ver. 20. he declares to the same*

same Moses, *Thou canst not see my Face: for there shall no Man see me, and live.* There are multitudes of other Instances of the like nature, that seem to carry some appearance of a Contradiction in them, but are purposely design'd to make us understand, that these are only ascrib'd to God by way of resemblance and analogy, and to correct our Imaginations, that we may not mistake them for perfect Representations, or think that they are in God, in the same manner that the Similitudes represent them, and to teach us not to stretch those to all Cases, or farther than they are intended.

§ XXIV. We ought to remember, that two things may be very like one another in some respects, and quite contrary in others; and yet to argue against the Likeness in one respect, from the Contrariety in the other, is as if one should dispute against the Likeness of a Picture, because that is made of Canvas, Oil, and Colours, whereas the Original is Flesh and Blood.

Thus in the present Case, God is represented as an absolute Lord over his Creatures, of infinite Knowledge and Power, that doth all things for his mere Pleasure, and is accountable to none; as one that *will have Mercy on whom he will have Mercy, and whom he will he hardens; that foresees, predestinates, calls, justifies, and glorifies* whom he will, without any regard to the Creatures whom he thus deals with. This gives us a mighty Notion of his Sovereignty, at once stops our Mouths, and silences our Objections, obliges us to an absolute Submission, and dependance on him, and withal to acknowledge the good things we enjoy to be intirely due to his pleasure. This is plainly the Design and Effect of this terrible Representation: and the meaning is, that we should understand that God is no way oblig'd to give us an account of his Actions; that we are no more to inquire
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into the Reasons of his dealing with his Creatures, than if he really treated them in this arbitrary Method. By the same we are taught to acknowledge, that our Salvation as intirely depends on him, and that we owe it as much to his pleasure, as if he had bestow'd it on us without any other Consideration, but his own Will to do so. Thus *Jam. 1. 18. Of his own Will begat he us with the Word of Truth, that we should be a kind of First-fruits of his Creatures.* And that we might not think there could be any thing in our best Works, the prospect whereof could move God to shew kindness to us, the Scriptures give us to understand that those good Works are due to his Grace and Favour, and the Effects, not Causes of them. So *Eph. 2. 10. For we are his Workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good Works, which God hath before ordain'd, that we should walk in them.*

§ XXV. All which Representations are design'd as a Scheme, to make us conceive the Obligations we owe to God, and how little we can contribute to our own Happiness. And to make us apprehend this to be his meaning, he has on other occasions given us an account of his dealing with Men, not only different, but seemingly contradictory to this. Thus he frequently represents himself, as proposing nothing for his own pleasure or advantage in his Transactions with his Creatures, as having no other Design in them, but to do those Creatures good, as earnestly desiring and prosecuting that End only. Nay, he represents himself to us, as if he were as uneasy and troubled when we fail'd to answer his Expectations; as we may conceive a good, merciful, and beneficent Prince, that had only his Subjects Happiness in view, would be, when they refus'd to join with him for promoting their own Interest. And God, farther to express his tenderness towards us, and

how far he is from imposing any thing on us, lets us know that he has left us to our own Freedom and Choice: and to convince us of his impartiality, declares that he acts as a just and equal Judge; that he hath no respect of Persons, and favours none; but rewards and punishes all Men, not according to his own pleasure, but according to their deserts; and in every Nation he that fears him, and works Righteousness, is accepted with him, Acts 10. 25.

§ XXVI. Whoever is acquainted with the holy Scriptures, will find all these things plainly deliver'd in them. Thus to shew us that God proposes no advantages to himself in his Dealings with us, he is described as a Person wholly disinterested: Job 22. 2, 3. *Can a Man be profitable unto God, as he that is wise may be profitable unto himself? Is it any pleasure to the Almighty that thou art righteous? or is it gain to him that thou makest thy ways perfect?* And Chap. 35. 6, 7. *If thou sinnest, what dost thou against him? or if thy Transgressions be multiplied, what dost thou unto him? If thou be righteous, what givest thou him, or what receiveth he of thine hand?*

And as to his leaving us to the liberty of our own Choice, observe how he is represented, Deut. 30. 19. *I call Heaven and Earth this day to record against you, that I have set before you Life and Death, Blessing and Cursing; therefore choose Life.*

And as to his earnest Concern for our Salvation, he orders the Prophet Ezekiel to deliver this Message from him: Chap. 33. 11. *Say unto them, As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the Wicked, but that the Wicked turn from his way and live. Turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways; and why will ye die, O House of Israel?* And Hosea 11. 8. *How shall I give thee up, Ephraim? How shall I deliver thee, Israel? How shall I make thee as Admah? How shall I set thee as Ze-*
boim;

boim? *Mine Heart is turned within me, my Repentings are kindled together.*

Every one may see how distant this view of God, and of his Dealings with his Creatures, is from the former; and yet if we consider it as a Scheme fram'd to make us conceive how graciously, mercifully, and justly God treats us, notwithstanding the supreme and absolute Dominion he has over us, there will be no inconsistency between the two. You see here, that tho' the Creatures be in his hand, as Clay in the Potter's, of which he may make Vessels of Honour or Dishonour, without any injury, or being accountable; yet he uses that Power, with all the passionate Love and Concern that Parents shew towards their Children: and therefore we are to conceive of him as having all the tendernefs of Affection, that Parents feel in their Heart towards their young ones; and that if he had been so affected, he could not (considering our Circumstances) have gone farther than he has done to save us; that our Destruction is as intirely due to our selves, as if we were out of God's Power, and absolutely in the hand of our own counsel.

§ XXVII. If we take these as Schemes design'd to give us different Views of God, and his Transactions with Men, in order to oblige us to distinct Duties which we owe him, and stretch them no farther, they are very reconcilable: And to go about to clash the one against the other, and argue, as many do, that if the one be true, the other cannot, is full as absurd as to object against that Article of our Belief, that Christ sits on the right hand of God, because Scripture in other places, and plain Reason assures us, that God hath neither Hand nor Parts.

And whilst a thing may in one respect be like another, and in other respects be like the contrary; and whilst we know that thing only by resemblance,

blance, similitude, or proportion; we ought not to be surpriz'd, that the Representations are contrary, and taken from things that seem irreconcilable, or that the different Views of the same thing should give occasion to different, nay contrary Schemes.

§ XXVIII. We ought farther to consider, that these are not so much design'd to give us Notions of God as he is in himself, as to make us sensible of our Duty to him, and to oblige us to perform it. As for Example, when the Scriptures represent God as an absolute Lord, that has his Creatures entirely in his Power, and treats them according to his pleasure; as one that is not oblig'd to consider their Advantage at all, or any thing but his own Will; that may elect one to eternal Salvation, and pass over another, or condemn him to eternal Misery, without any other reason but because he will do so: When we read this, I say, in the holy Scriptures, we ought not to dispute whether God really acts thus or no, or how it will suit with his other Attributes of *Wisdom* and *Justice* to do so; but the use we ought to make of it, is to call to mind what Duty and Submission we ought to pay to one who may thus deal with us if he please, and what Gratitude we ought to return him, for electing and decreeing us to Salvation, when he lay under no manner of Obligation to vouchsafe us that Favour.

Again, when we find him represented as a gracious and merciful Father, that treats us as Children, that is solicitous for our welfare, that would not our Death or Destruction; that has done all things for our eternal Happiness, which could be done without violating the Laws of our Creation, and putting a force upon our Natures; that has given us *Free-Will*, that we might be capable of Rewards at his hands, and have the pleasure of

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choosing for our selves; which only can make us happy, and like unto himself in the most noble Operations of which a Being is capable: that has given us all the Invitations and Encouragements to choose well, that Mercy could prompt him to, or that the Justice which is due to himself and Creatures would allow; and that never punishes us, but when the Necessity and Support of his Government requires he should: When we hear these things, we are not so much to inquire whether this Representation exactly suits with what really passes in his Mind, as how we ought to behave our selves in such a Case towards him that has dealt so graciously with us.

§ XXIX. And tho' these Representations be but Descriptions fitted to our Capacities, thro' God's great Condescension towards us; yet it is certain, that there is as much Mercy, Tenderneſs, and Justice in the Conduct of God, as this Scheme represents; And on the other hand, that we owe as much Fear, Submission, and Gratitude to him, as if the first were the Method he took with us.

We make no scruple to acknowledge, that Love and Hatred, Mercy and Anger, with other Passions, are ascrib'd to God; not that they are in him, as we conceive them, but to teach us how we are to behave our selves toward him, and what Treatment we may expect at his hands. And if so, why should we make any difficulty to think that *Fore-knowledge*, *Purposes*, *Elections*, and *Decrees* are attributed to him, after the same way, and to the same intent?

§ XXX. The second Use that I shall make of this Doctrine, is to put you in mind, how cautious we ought to be in our Reasonings and Deductions concerning things, of whose nature we are not fully appriz'd. 'Tis true, that in Matters we fully comprehend, all is clear and easy to us, and we readily

readily perceive the Connection and Consistency of all the Parts: but it is not so in things to which we are in a great measure strangers, and of which we have only an imperfect and partial view; for in these we are very apt to fancy Contradictions, and to think the accounts we receive of them absurd.

The truth of this is manifest from innumerable Instances; as for example, from the Opinion of the *Antipodes*, whilst the matter was imperfectly known: How many Objections were made against it? How many thought they had prov'd to a Demonstration the Impossibility and Contradiction of the thing? And how far did they prevail with the generality of the World to believe them? And yet how weak, and in truth foolish, do all their Arguments appear to Men that know, and by experience understand the matter?

Others will say the same concerning the Motion of the Earth, notwithstanding the great Confidence with which many have undertaken to demonstrate it to be impossible; the reason of which is only the imperfect Knowledge we have of the thing: And as our understanding of it is more and more enlarg'd and clear'd, the Contradictions vanish.

Ought we not then to think all the Contradictions we fancy between the *Fore-knowledge* of God and *Contingency* of Events, between *Predestination* and *Free-Will*, to be the Effects of our Ignorance and partial Knowledge? May it not be in this, as in the Matter of the *Antipodes*, and Motion of the Earth? May not the Inconsistencies that we find in the one, be as ill-grounded as those that have been urg'd against the others? And have we not reason to suspect, nay believe that this to be the Case; since we are sure that we know much less of God and his Attributes, than of the Earth and heavenly Motions.

§ XXXI. Even in the Sciences that are most common and certain, there are some things, which amongst those that are unacquainted with such Matters, would pass for Contradictions. As for example, let us suppose one should happen to mention *Negative Quantities* among Persons strangers to the Mathematicks; and being ask'd what is meant by those Words, should answer, That he understands by them *Quantities* that are conceived to be less than *Nothing*; and that one of their *Properties* is that being multiply'd by a Number less than *Nothing*, the Product may be a Magnitude greater than any assign'd. This might justly appear a Riddle, and full of Contradictions, and perhaps will do so to a great part of my Auditors. *Something* less than *Nothing*, in appearance is a Contradiction; a *Number* less than *Nothing*, has the same face: That these should be multipliable on one another, sounds very oddly; and that the Product of less than *Nothing* upon less than *Nothing*, should be positive, and greater than any assign'd Quantity, seems inconceivable. And yet if the most ignorant will but have patience, and apply themselves for Instruction to the skilful in these Matters, they will soon find all the seeming Contradictions vanish, and that the Assertions are not only certain, but plain and easy Truths, that may be conceiv'd without any great difficulty.

Ought we not then to suspect our own Ignorance, when we fancy Contradictions in the Descriptions given us of the Mysteries of our Faith and Religion? And ought we not to wait with Patience, till we come to Heaven, the proper School where these things are to be learned? And in the mean time, acquiesce in that Light the holy Spirit has given us in the Scriptures; which, as I have shew'd, is sufficient to direct us in our present Circumstances.

§ XXXII. The third use I shall make of this Doctrine, is to teach us what answer we are to give that Argument that has so puzzled Mankind, and done so much mischief in the World. It runs thus :
 “ If God foresee or predestinate that I shall be saved, I shall infallibly be so ; and if he foresee
 “ or have predestinated that I shall be damned, it
 “ is unavoidable. And therefore it is no matter
 “ what I do, or how I behave myself in this Life.”
 Many Answers have been given to this, which I shall not at present examine : I shall only add, that if God’s *Fore-knowledge* were exactly conformable to ours, the consequence would seem just ; but inasmuch as they are of as different a nature as any two Faculties of our Souls, it doth not follow (because our foresight of Events, if we suppose it infallible, must presuppose a Necessity in them) that therefore the divine Prescience must require the same Necessity in order to its being certain. It is true, we call God’s *Fore-knowledge* and our own by the same Name ; but this is not from any real likeness in the nature of the Faculties, but from some proportion observable in the Effects of them : Both having this advantage, that they prevent any surprize on the Person endow’d with them.

Now as it is true, that no Contingency or Freedom in the Creatures, can any way deceive or surprize God, put him to a loss, or oblige him to alter his Measures : So on the other hand it is likewise true, that the divine Prescience doth not hinder Freedom ; and a thing may either be or not be, notwithstanding that Foresight of it which we ascribe to God. When therefore it is alledged, that if God foresees I shall be saved, my Salvation is infallible, this doth not follow ; because the Foreknowledge of God is not like Man’s, which requires Necessity in the Event, in order to its being certain, but of another Nature consistent with Contingency :

tingency : And our inability to comprehend this arises from our ignorance of the true Nature of what we call Fore-knowledge in God. And it is as impossible we should comprehend the Power thereof, or the Manner of its Operation, as that the Eye should see a Sound, or the Ear hear Light and Colours.

Only of this we are sure, that in this it differs from ours, that it may consist either with the being or not being of what is said to be foreseen or predestinated. Thus St. Paul was a chosen Vessel, and he reckons himself in the number of the predestinated, *Ephes. 1. 5. Having predestinated us to the adoption of Children by Jesus Christ to himself.* And yet he supposes it possible for him to miss of Salvation; And therefore he look'd on himself as oblig'd to use Mortification, and exercise all other Graces, in order to make his Calling and Election sure; lest, as he tells us, *1 Cor. 9. 27. That by any means when I have preach'd to others, I my self should be a Cast-away, or a Reprobate,* as the word is translated in other places.

§ XXXIII. The fourth use I shall make of this Doctrine, is to enable us to discover what Judgment we are to pass on those that have manag'd this Controversy: And for mine own part I must profess, that they seem to me to have taken Shadows for Substances, Resemblances for the Things they represent; and by confounding these, have embroil'd themselves and Readers in inextricable Difficulties.

Whoever will look into the Books writ on either side, will find this to be true: But because that is a Task too difficult for the generality of Men, let them consider the two Schemes of the *Predestinarians* and *Free-Willers*, in the present Bishop of Sarum's Exposition of the XVIIth Article of our Church; where they will (as I think) find the Opinions

pinions of both Parties briefly, fully, and fairly represented, and withal perceive this Error runs thro' both.

As for example, the great Foundation of the one Scheme is, that God acts for himself and his Glory, and therefore he can only consider the Manifestation of his own Attributes and Perfections in every Action; and hence they conclude that he must only damn or save Men, as his doing of one or other may most promote his Glory.

But here it is manifest that they who reason thus are of opinion, that the desire of Glory doth really move the Will of God; whereas Glory, and the Desire of it, are only ascrib'd to God in an analogical Sense, after the same manner as Hands and Feet, Love and Hatred are: And when God is said to do all things for his own Glory, it is not meant that the Desire of Glory is the real End of his Actions, but that he has order'd all things in such an excellent Method, that if he had design'd them for no other End, they could not have set it forth more effectually. Now to make this figurative Expression the Foundation of so many harsh Conclusions, and the Occasion of so many Contentions and Divisions in the Church, seems to me the same kind of Mistake, that the Church of *Rome* commits in taking the words of Scripture, *This is my Body*, literally; from whence so many Absurdities and Contradictions to our Senses and Reason are inferr'd.

§ XXXIV. *Secondly*, If you look diligently into these Schemes, you will find a great part of the Dispute arises on this Question, What is first or second in the Mind of God? whether he first foresees and then determines, or first determines, and by virtue of that foresees? This Question seems the more strange, because both Parties are agreed, that there is neither first nor last in the Divine Understanding,

derstanding, but all is one single Act in him, and continues the same from all Eternity. What then can be the meaning of the Dispute? Sure it can be no more than this, whether it be more honourable for God, that we should conceive him as acting this way or that, since it is confess'd that neither reaches what really passes in his Mind. So that the Question is not concerning the Operations of God as they are in themselves, but concerning our way of conceiving them, whether it be more for his Honour to represent them according to the first or second Scheme: And certainly the right Method is to use both on occasion, so far as they may help us to conceive honourably of the divine Majesty; and to deal ingenuously with the World, and tell them, that where these Schemes have not that effect, or where thro' our stretching them too far, they induce us to entertain dishonourable Thoughts of him, or encourage Disobedience, they are not applicable to him. In short, that God is as absolute as the first represents him, and Man as free as the last would have him to be; and that these different and seemingly contradictory Schemes are brought in to supply the Defects of one another.

§ XXXV. And therefore, *Thirdly*, The Managers of this Controversy ought to have look'd on these different Schemes as chiefly design'd to inculcate some Duties to us; and to have press'd them no farther than as they tended to move and oblige us to perform those Duties. But they, on the contrary, have stretch'd these Representations beyond the Scripture's design, and set them up in opposition to one another; and have endeavour'd to persuade the World that they are inconsistent: inasmuch that some, to establish Contingency and Free-Will, have deny'd God's Prescience; and others, to set up Predestination, have brought in a fatal necessity of all Events.

And

And not content therewith, they have accus'd one another of Impiety and Blasphemy, and mutually charg'd each the other's Opinion with all the absurd Consequences they fancy'd were deducible from it. Thus the Maintainers of Free-Will charge the Predestinarians as guilty of ascribing Injustice, Tyranny, and Cruelty to God, as making him the Author of all the Sin and Misery that is in the World: And on the other hand, the Asserters of Predestination have accus'd the others, as destroying the Independency and Dominion of God, and subjecting him to the Will and Humours of his Creatures. And if either of the Schemes were to be taken literally and properly the Maintainers of them would find difficulty enough to rid themselves of the Consequences charg'd on them: But if we take them only as analogical Representations, as I have explain'd them, there will be no ground or reason for these Inferences.

§ XXXVI. And it were to be wish'd, that those who make them would consider, that if they would prosecute the same Method in treating the other Representations that the Scriptures give us of God's Attributes and Operations, no less Absurdities would follow: As for example, when God is said to be merciful, loving, and pitiful, all-seeing, jealous, patient, or angry; if these were taken literally, and understood the same way as we find them in us, what absurd and intolerable Consequences would follow; and how dishonourable must they be suppos'd to think of God, who ascribe such Passions to him? Yet no body is shock'd at them, because they understand them in an analogical Sense. And if they would but allow Predestination, Election, Decrees, Purposes, and Fore-knowledge, to belong to God, with the same difference, they would no more think themselves oblig'd to charge those that ascribe them to him, with

with Blasphemy in the one Case, than in the other.

'Tis therefore incumbent on us to forbear all such Deductions, and we should endeavour to reconcile these several Representations together, by teaching the People, that God's Knowledge is of another Nature than ours; and that tho' we cannot, in our way of thinking, certainly foresee what is free and contingent, yet God may do it by that Power which answers to Prescience in him, or rather in truth, supplies the place of it. Nor is it any wonder that we cannot conceive how this is done, since we have no direct or proper Notion of God's Knowledge; nor can we ever in this Life expect to comprehend it, any more than a Man who never saw can expect to discern the Shape and Figure of Bodies at a distance, whilst he continues blind.

§ XXXVII. The fifth use we are to make of what has been said, is to teach us how we are to behave ourselves in a Church, where either of these Schemes is settled and taught as a Doctrine: and here I think the Resolution is easy. We ought to be quiet, and not unseasonably to disturb the Peace of the Church; much less should we endeavour to expose what she professes, by alledging Absurdities and Inconsistencies in it. On the contrary, we are oblig'd to take pains, to shew that the pretended Consequences do not follow, as in truth they do not; and to discourage all that make them, as Enemies of Peace, and false Accusers of their Brethren, by charging them with Consequences they disown, and that have no other Foundation but the Maker's Ignorance.

For in truth, as has been already shew'd, if such Inferences be allow'd, hardly any one Attribute or Operation of God, as describ'd in Scripture, will be free from the Cavils of perverse Men.

'Tis

'Tis observable, that by the same way of reasoning, and by the same sort of Arguments, by which some endeavour to destroy the divine Prescience, and render his Decrees odious, *Cotta* long ago in *Cicero* attack'd the other Attributes, and undertook to prove, that God can neither have Reason nor Understanding, Wisdom nor Prudence, nor any other Virtue. And if we understand these literally and properly, so as to signify the same when apply'd to God and to Men, it will not be easy to answer his Arguments: but if we conceive them to be ascrib'd to him by Proportion and Analogy, that is, if we mean no more when we apply them to God, than that he has some Powers and Faculties, tho' not of the same nature, which are analogous to these, and which yield him all the Advantages which these could give him if he had them, enabling him to produce all the good Effects which we see consequent to them, when in the greatest Perfection; then the Arguments used by * *Cotta* against them have no manner of force: since we do not plead for such an Understanding, Reason, Justice, and Virtue, as he objects against, but for more valuable Perfections that are more

* Qualem autem Deum intelligere nos possumus nulla virtute præditum? Quid enim? prudentiamne Deo tribuimus? Quæ constat ex scientia rerum bonarum & malarum, & nec bonarum nec malarum? Cui mali nihil est, nec esse potest, quid huic opus est delectu bonorum & malorum? Quid autem ratione? quid intelligentia? quibus utimur ad eam, ut apertis obscura assequamur. At obscurum Deo nihil potest esse, nam Justitia quæ suum cuique distribuit, quid pertinet ad Deos? hominum enim societas, & communitas, ut vos dicitis, Justitiam, procreavit: temperantia autem constat ex prætermittendis voluptatibus corporis: cui si locus in cælo est, est etiam voluptatibus. Nam fortis Deus intelligi qui potest? in dolore, an in labore, an in periculo? quorum Deum nihil attingit. Nec ratione igitur utentem, nec virtute ulla præditum Deum intelligere qui possumus? *Cic. de Nat. Deor. Sect. 15. Ed. Lond.*

than

than equivalent, and in truth infinitely superior to them, tho' call'd by the same Names; because we do not know what they are in themselves, but only see their Effects in the World, which are such as might be expected from the most consummate Reason, Understanding, and Virtue.

And after the same manner, when perverse Men reason against the Prescience, Predestination, and the Decrees of God, by drawing the like absurd Consequences, as *Cotta* doth against the possibility of his being endow'd with Reason and Understanding, &c. our Answer is the same as before mention'd. If these be suppos'd the very same in all respects when attributed to God, as we find them in ourselves, there would be some colour, from the Absurdities that would follow, to deny that they belong to God; but when we only ascribe them to him by analogy, and mean no more than that there are some things answerable to them, from whence, as Principles, the divine Operations proceed, it is plain, that all such Arguments not only lose their force, but are absolutely impertinent.

It is therefore sufficient for the Ministers of the Church to shew that the established Doctrine is agreeable to Scripture, and teach their People what use ought to be made of it, and to caution them against the Abuse; which if they do with Prudence, they will avoid Contentions and Divisions, and prevent the Mischiefs which are apt to follow the mistaken Representations of it.

§ XXXVIII. This is the Method taken by our Church in her XVIIth Article, where we are taught, that *Predestination to Life is the everlasting Purpose of God, whereby before the Foundations of the World were laid, he hath constantly decreed by his Counsel, secret to us, to deliver from Curse and Damnation those whom he hath chosen in Christ out of Mankind,*

kind; and to bring them by Christ to everlasting Salvation. — And that the godly Consideration of Predestination, and our Election in Christ, is full of sweet, pleasant, and unspeakable Comfort to godly Persons, — as well because it doth greatly establish their Faith of eternal Salvation, to be enjoy'd thro' Christ, as because it doth fervently kindle their Love toward God. — And yet we must receive God's Promises, as they be generally set forth to us in holy Scripture. Here you see the two Schemes join'd together : And we are allow'd all the Comfort that the Consideration of our being predestinated can afford us ; and at the same time we are given to understand that the Promises of God are generally conditional ; and that notwithstanding our belief of Predestination, we can have no hope of obtaining the benefit of them, but by fulfilling the Conditions. And I hope I have explain'd them in such a way, as shews them to be consistent in themselves, and of great use towards making us holy here, and happy hereafter.

Gen. 2, Ver. 16, 17.

And the Lord God commanded the Man, saying, of every Tree of the Garden thou mayest freely eat:

But of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil thou shalt not eat of it: For in the Day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die.

DAily Experience shews us that there is much Ignorance, Folly and Misery amongst Men; that we have a prospect of these as soon as we begin to think; and that nothing more im-bitters Life than that View. The Beasts are sick, and want and die as well as Men; but yet are not so miserable, because they see no farther than the present, and therefore are not tormented with the remembrance of what is past, or the fear of what is to come. Whereas Men are appriz'd that Pains and Diseases, Disappointments and Death are before them, and have not the like certainty of one single Act of Pleasure to ballance the dismal Consideration. This should make us sensible that we are not in the State in which Nature placed us, since a Good God can hardly be supposed to have made a Creature with less Views of Happiness than of Misery. From whence we may conclude that our present Estate is not that wherein God created us, but that we are some way or other fallen from it. The Text gives us the occasion of that Fall, and there is no other Account to be given of our present Condition, but what we receive here from the Holy Scriptures: for altho' all considering Men have seen and bemoan'd our Misery, yet none could ever discover any other rational ground

for it, or give any tolerable Reason how it came to be so.

'Tis surely of great moment to us to be acquainted with it, because it is one Step to the Cure to discover the Disease. 'Tis a Subject not commonly handled and requires Attention in You, as well as Diligence and Care in Me to inform you in the following Particulars.

1st, Of the State and Circumstances of Man, when this Command in the Text was given.

2dly, The Command itself forbidding *Adam* to eat of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil.

3dly, How Man was seduced to break this Command.

4thly, The Consequences of this Disobedience.

As to the State and Circumstances of Man when this Command was given.

1st, It is manifest, that he was then immediately created, and being just come out of the hands of God, he was in a state proper to his Nature, pure and innocent, without any Stain or Corruption. He had no Law but that of his Mind, or what he received by immediate Revelation from God; nor any defect, but that which is unavoidably incident to every thing created, which may be perfect in its kind, but cannot be absolutely so; that being proper to God. For to say a thing was created is to confess that it depends on the Will and Power of him that made it; and therefore it cannot be self-sufficient but needs the continual support of its Creator, and the assistance of such of its fellow-Creatures as God has been pleas'd to appoint as necessary helpers for its subsistence. All the Perfection therefore to which Creatures can pretend, is to answer the design for which they were created. This is that Goodness God saw in them, This undoubtedly Man had, and in this sense he was *very*

good.

good. If therefore God did not design that Man should be self-sufficient, but have a Communion with the bodies that are about him, and as a portion of the Universe depend on their Assistance and Influence as to his Material part ; it will be no Imperfection in him that he owes his Food to the Earth, his Warmth to the Sun, and his Breath to the Air. For since God has made all these necessary to his Subsistence, he answers the design of Providence, whilst he uses them to the purposes, to which God has appointed them.

2dly, We must remember that if Man's Understanding at first was never so clear, and his senses and faculties never so strong, yet having made no Observations, and being absolutely without Experience, he could know no more of any thing, than what was revealed by God to him. And there was no necessity that God should reveal more Knowledge to him than was at present to be used by him. You may observe in the 19th Verse of this Chapter, that *out of the Ground the Lord God form'd every Beast of the Field, and every Fowl of the Air, and brought them to Adam, to see what he would call them, and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof.* This was the way by which God taught him Language, and you see it went no farther than the Names of the Beasts of the Earth, and Fowls of the Air amongst whom he lived, and over whom he was to exercise Dominion.

Nor was it any Imperfection in the first Man, that he was ignorant of the nature of things, if we suppose that he had a certain way to come to that Knowledge, when he had occasion for it. For the design of Knowledge is not to amuse us or fill our heads with Notions, but to serve and direct us in the Affairs of Life. 'Tis only this sort of Knowledge that is truly valuable : And he that has most

of it and best applies it, is to be accounted most wise. If therefore *Adam* had a certain way of knowing the nature of every Thing, when he was to employ that Knowledge; tho' he was actually without it, yet he was in a better State than any of his Posterity, who have made many Observations and are furnish'd with many actual Notions, but have no certain way of coming to such Knowledge as upon every Occasion is necessary for their Directions.

3dly, Therefore we must conceive that *Adam* was under the immediate Conduct and direction of God, and was not to judge for himself, but was to leave himself entirely to be guided and directed by his Maker. You see he was not left to determine for himself what he should eat: But God by Revelation assign'd him his Food and provided it for him. So Ch. i. v. 29. *And God said, Behold I have given you every herb bearing seed which is upon the face of all the Earth. And every Tree in which is the fruit of a Tree yielding seed, to you it shall be for Meat. And in the Text, of every Tree in the Garden thou mayst freely eat.* This seems added, because these Trees of Paradise were not planted when God made the Revelation of the 1st Chapter, And therefore it might be doubted whether they were intended for the Food of Man, or given him by the former Revelation, if God had not expressly declared it.

Now if Man was not to feed himself before he had God's Direction for it, which saved him the trouble and hazard of finding out by Trials what was fit for him; It is reasonable to believe that in every Affair of Life he was to depend on the same Direction; that he was not to assume to himself that Knowledge of Good and Evil, that is, of what was profitable or hurtful to him, but entirely to depend on God for the Determination thereof, and

whilst

whilst he did so, he could never know Evil, because God would always direct him to what was Good, and to that only.

'Tis to be consider'd that Man by his Constitution was Mortal, and subject to the Impressions of the Bodies that surrounded him; for being composed of the Elements as to his material Part, in which he resembled other living Creatures, those might be separated and dissolv'd, and the Separation of the Parts of our Body infers Death. And therefore Man in his natural Composition was subject to it; but yet was capable of Immortality, to which he could not be intitl'd but from a supernatural Principle, and the peculiar Care of God. For it was impossible that a Man's Understanding how great soever should be so perfect as to enable him of himself to know and avoid all those things that might occasion a Decay and Dissolution of his Body. Only God's Knowledge could reach this; and therefore it is manifest he must depend on that; and on all occasions have recourse to it, if he expected to continue Immortal.

Nor 4thly, Was his being oblig'd to such dependance to be look'd on as a Defect, but rather a most signal Favour. I observ'd before, that he depended on the Air for Breath, on the Sun for Warmth, and on the Earth for Food; And yet none of these could be reckon'd an Imperfection; How much less could his Dependance on his Creator for the inlightning and informing his Understanding for the Discovery of what was Good and Evil, either in his Moral or Natural Actions, be look'd on as derogatory to his Nature. On the contrary nothing could be a greater Honour to him, than that God should vouchsafe to become his Guide; nothing could be a greater Security or Advantage. This must and only could take away all Doubt and Solicitousness out of his Mind and render him perfectly easy and secure. By this he
had

had the Benefit of all Knowledge, and was freed from the trouble of acquiring it.

'Tis true that we now have an unmeasurable Thirst of improving our Understanding and penetrating into the Nature of Things, we reckon a great part of our Happiness to consist in it, and value our selves on it; but we are not to imagine that it was so from the beginning. The reason of our Eagerness for Knowledge now arises from our depending on our own Conduct. Hence on all occasions we find great Use for it, and having nothing else to trust to, that can lead us thro' the Difficulties of Life, we endeavour to know as much as we can, and are glad when we can attain to any new Notion; because we find ourselves often at a loss and can't tell how soon it may be useful to us. But whilst Man was not to judge for himself, whilst he depended on the Omniscieny of God to direct him, he had no such occasion for knowing the Nature of Things, nor need be much concern'd about them. For to what purpose should *Adam* have desired to acquire Knowledge, when he could have recourse to the infinite Wisdom of God on all occasions to inform and guide him. Whilst Children are supply'd by their Parents, can call for any thing they want, they are little covetous of Money, and can hardly be prevail'd with to apply their Heads to the Methods of acquiring it; nor are they fond of it when they have it: But a Stock being once put into their Hands, and they finding that they must want, if they do not provide and manage industriously, They do by degrees grow Thirsty of Gain and Parsimonious; lay projects and eagerly pursue the means of enriching themselves. We may conceive it was thus with Man in his Innocency; And that he was little solicitous about acquiring Knowledge, whilst he could recur to the inexhaustible Stock of God his Parent, and be supply'd by a free Communica-

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tion from thence on all Occasions. But when by Sin he cut himself off from that, and became his own Master to judge what was good and evil for himself, he then found himself under continual doubts and Difficulties; he is become sensible of his Ignorance and Disability how to determine in the Affairs of Life, and has no other Assistance than his own Understanding: This makes him diligent to improve it, and as covetous of Knowledge as of Money; and so searches for the treasure of the one with as much Industry and Pains as of the other. Whereas whilst he depended on God only for his Direction, he was freed from all that Labour, Thirst and Anxiety wherewith he now prosecutes Knowledge, and was content with the inexhaustible Treasure of Divine Wisdom to which he had an easy and ready Access on all Occasions: and till we have the like again we can never be happy or secure. God is the Father of Spirits and as a Father he is ready to make Provision for them, if they will have recourse to him and depend on him. He is the Light of Souls, and has the same proportion to them, that the Sun and his Beams have to the Eye. Whilst we have the use of these, we know our way and can see about us; But when these are absent, we are forc'd to use artificial Lights, that can never perfectly supply the want of them. All our acquir'd Knowledge is but like these artificial Lights that can never supply the Communication of Wisdom, which God was pleas'd to impart to our first Parents in that State of Innocency, and of which he depriv'd them for their Sin. This I suppose may be sufficient to teach us the Condition and Circumstances of Man when that Command in the Text was given him.

As to the Command it self, which was the 2d Head of my Discourse, *But of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, thou shalt not eat of it, for*

in the Day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die; We are to consider, 1st. the Tree here mention'd, 2dly. the Congruity of God's applying it to the present use, and 3dly. the reasonableness of God's making it an Instance of our Obedience.

Concerning the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil here mention'd, Let us observe 1st, that it was a true literal Tree, and that we are not to be put off with a meer Figure. For it is said, v. 9. of the Chapter. *And out of the Ground made the Lord God to grow every Tree that is pleasant to the Sight, and good for Food, the Tree of Life also in the midst of the Garden, and the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil.* If the Trees for sight and food were true literal Trees, then so likewise were the Trees of Life and Knowledge, for both are equally said to grow out of the Ground. And when God in the Text allows Man to eat of the other Trees, he forbids him on pain of Death to eat of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil. Now to understand *eating* and *Trees* literally in one part of the Text, and figuratively in the other, when there is no intimation or ground for a different Sense, is incongruous to reason. No! it will be plain to any one that considers the design of *Moses*, that he is giving us here the literal History of the Creation of the World, of the Making and Fall of Man, and not an *Allegory*. But because this does not suit with the Notions of some Men, to whom the Scripture in the literal Sense seems not sufficiently spiritual, therefore they endeavour to allegorize the History of Man's Fall, but might with equal reason turn his Creation and that of the World into a Figure. And 'tis observable that the same Persons that put a figurative Sense on the Tree of Knowledge of good and evil, and on the manner of Man's becoming liable to Death, as the Scriptures deliver it; do the same with the Methods God has appointed for our Recovery, and

and deny not only the literal Sacraments, but likewise the Resurrection of the same Body, the Power of the literal Death of Christ and the Satisfaction purchas'd by it. But we must not separate the literal from the mystical Sense; as we must not deny the Baptism of Water, because we acknowledge that of the Spirit, nor the Resurrection of our Bodies because we own another of our Souls; so neither must we deny a literal Tree of Knowledge because it had a mystical Sense and Importance.

And this brings me to the second thing concerning this Tree, the congruity of God's applying it to the use mention'd in the Text: For the Understanding of which we must remember that God in all his Intercourses with Men has constantly made use of some visible or outward Means; and that it is reasonable it should be so. For since a Man has a Body as well as a Soul; Senses as well as Understanding: And that the Soul does make use of the Organs of the Body and of the Senses for its Information; and that this is the natural course of our acquiring Knowledge; it were a violence to the Nature of Man to invert the Method or separate the one from the other. And therefore God in his Communications with us seems industriously to have avoided it; especially where the joyning them together may contribute to the certainty and effectualness of the Revelation, and to secure us from being imposed on by pretenders. Whenever therefore God has shew'd any Miracle, he has made use of some outward Action to prepare the minds of Men for it, and ascertain them of his presence. Thus *Moses* did all his Miracles with his Rod. Thus *Elisha* order'd *Naaman* to wash seven times in the river *Jordan* to cure his Leprosie. And altho' God industriously avoided assuming any shape, when he gave the Law; yet he assured the People of *Is-*
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rael that he was present by Thunder, Smoke and Fire at Mount *Sinai*, and by a burning Bush at his first appearance to *Moses*. Nor did our Saviour go about the publick execution of his Office, 'till anointed by the *Spirit* and visibly commission'd to it by the *Holy Ghost* descending on him in a bodily shape: And thus he still communicates to us the Principles of our new Birth by Water, and his Body and Blood by Bread and Wine. Now this being the manner of God's entertaining an Intercourse with Man thro' the whole Scripture, it is very evident that the two remarkable Trees of Paradise, that of Life, and this of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, were design'd for these mystical purposes, and intended as settled and visible means to supply Man with God's Influence and Assistance in those cases in which he cou'd want them.

For 1st, Man might be at a loss how to preserve his Body from Decays, to which (as was observ'd before) it was naturally subject. And 2dly, how to direct his Actions. For the 1st of these God appointed the Tree of Life. Not that any Tree by any natural Virtue could preserve us Immortal: But since God commanded Man to eat of it as often as he needed to be restor'd in his Body, he surely was ready and able to convey his supernatural Assistance to him by it, and make it effectual to the design for which it was appointed. Man's eating therefore of it with Faith and in Obedience to God, was the Signal upon which the Divine Power was pleas'd to exert it self for the Restauration of him to his primitive Vigour. And there is no more difficulty to conceive how this should be done, than how the *Israelites* in the Wilderness should be cured of the Bitings of the venomous Creatures by looking on the brazen Serpent. Every faithful Christian expects God should answer his Prayers, and grant him some things, which he could not have

have without asking ; and if God exert his Power on our speaking a word or offering a desire, which have no Natural Virtue to procure the Effect ; he may do the same upon our giving a Signal by some Action appointed by him to that purpose. If he gives his *Holy Spirit* to them that ask it according to his Promise, why not to those likewise who in Obedience to his Command are baptised in his Name ? And if he give Life and Immortality now to those that believe and are baptised, why might he not give and preserve Life by means of that Tree, to the use of which he had promis'd it, when they in Faith should eat of it ? Now that Life was annex'd to the use of that Tree is plain from Chap. 3. ver. 22. *And now lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the Tree of Life, and eat and live for ever ; therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the Garden of Eden.* This shews that the restoring of Strength and preservation of Life was annex'd to that Tree by an irrevocable Decree : for the Words plainly intimate that if Man after his fall, could have continued the use of it, he had been Immortal.

And as God provided for the preservation of his Body by the tree of Life, so he likewise provided for his Soul, and taught him how to govern it by the tree of the knowledge of Good and Evil, of this he was not to eat nor to touch it. By which was signified unto him that he was not to pretend or any way to judge what was good or Evil for him : But on all occasions to have recourse to God, and intirely to resign and trust himself to the Divine Conduct. That as it was by the Declaration of God certain Death to eat of this Tree on account of its being a Symbol of his immediate dependance on his Maker, for the distinguishing of what was good or Evil for him ; so he was not to trust to his own Understanding for the deter-

determining of these ; but to have recourse to God without further concerning himself about them.

And this sufficiently shews how congruous it was for God to make use of this Tree for this purpose, and is a Step to discover to us the reasonableness of God's making Man's abstinence from it an Instance of Obedience ; which was the 3d thing to be shew'd concerning it. For the understanding of which, you must observe, 1st, That the whole Duty of Man lay in obedience to this Command, as the whole means of Immortality was in eating of the Tree of Life. Whilst Man refrain'd from eating of this Tree, he could have no other Temptation, he could neither feel nor know any Evil, for he was under the immediate care and protection of God ; and those were sufficient to preserve him from all hurt or mischief ; which his own Understanding could never do. Man's whole Duty therefore and Safety were comprehended in this one Command : and as the use of the Tree of Life was an infallible and the only means of preserving his Body, so the eating of this, and thereby violating the Divine Command, was the only way to hurt his Soul. This was the only Door by which Evil could come in upon him, and if he had kept that shut, it could never have enter'd.

2dly, We must consider that Man was fallible in his Understanding, peccable in his Will, and mortal in his Body ; and therefore the preserving him from Deceit, Sin and Death must be due to some supernatural Grace of God ; and that in order to confer that Grace there ought to be some obvious means, easy to be known and ready to be used. And perhaps it will be hard to think of any other way so suitable as this which God chose. For if some outward means ought to be used, this restraining him from the use of one of the Trees seems the most proper : some such Symbol seems

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not only reasonable but necessary ; and food being the only thing he needed, and that provided for him out of the fruits of the Earth, the Instance could not be so proper in any other matter.

3dly, We must remember that Man was created a free Agent, and it is the Nature of such to be pleas'd with nothing that is not agreeable to their choice. The best and most pleasing thing in the World if it be forced on us against our choice, is uneasy to us. There must be something of choice in what makes us happy ; and could there be a more easy thing to be left to that, than not to eat of one Tree where there were so many ? We may imagine that God in effect said to Man, Your Nature requires that you should choose those things the enjoyment whereof will make you happy. I will make your Duty easy unto you ; abstain from this one Tree, and whilst you do so, I will take care that you shall not choose amiss in any thing else. Your obedience in this shall be an infallible means to secure you from choosing wrong in any other thing. Whilst you use your Free-Will right in this, I will take care that you shall not abuse it on any other occasion. Some Instance of your free Obedience is necessary : And this is the most easy that could be provided for you. But by your wrong use of Free-Will here, you will open a Gate for Sin and Death to enter.

Surely this account makes this Command very reasonable, very agreeable for God to give, and Man to receive. And from this it appears that it was not given meerly as an arbitrary tryal of submission to the Will of God ; but rather as a means to facilitate and secure the Obedience we owe him. When *Christ* sent the blind Man to the Waters of *Siloam* for opening his Eyes, no-body will say that that Command was a meer tryal of his Obedience ; but rather a means to restore his Sight. And so when God command-

ed Man here not to eat of the *Tree of Knowledge*, &c. That Abstinence was not imposed upon him so much by the way of tryal, as to be a means to assure him of the Grace and Assistance of God. This gave him an Interest in his own Happiness, because it made it in some measure depend on his Free-Will, without which it could not have been Happiness, as has been shew'd before ; and yet it made it so easy to him, that nothing but the Goodness of God could have found out so very feasible and so effectual a means. Thus you see a fair meaning and reason of this Command, and that there is no necessity of forsaking the Letter of Scripture to justify God's imposing it.

Let us now in the 3d place consider by what means Man was seduced to break this Command. Of this we have an Account, Ch. 3. When God asks the Question of the Woman, she answers, v. 13. *The Serpent beguiled me and I did eat*. Now it will be necessary, 1st, to consider the Seducer, and 2dly, the Argument by which he prevailed on her. As to the Seducer, 'twas a Serpent, Ch. 3. v. 1. *Now the Serpent was more subtle than any Beast of the Field, which the Lord God had made ; and he said unto the Woman, yea, hath God said ye shall not eat of every Tree of the Garden ?* From which you are to observe, 1st, that this was a literal Serpent ; the same Serpent that is now curs'd, that goes on his Belly, and eats Dust, that is hated and abhorred by Man, that is so poisonous and pernicious to him, between whom and Man there is a natural Enmity to this Day, is literally meant in this place, and is not to be allegorised away, as some would have it.

2dly, The Serpent was then the most subtle and cunning of Beasts, we must not understand this of him, as now stupify'd by the Curse of God, but as created at first in perfection. The tradition of

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whose cunning was so constant and universal that it became proverbial among all the Antients, with whom to be wise as Serpents (meaning the first of the kind) denotes the perfection of Subtlety; which shews a general belief that he had at first a Sagacity more than ordinary.

3dly, We are not to wonder that *Eve* was not surpris'd or frighten'd at the Serpent's speaking to her; for as I observ'd before, she had yet no experience of things, was ignorant of the nature of Beasts, and for ought she knew, all of them might speak as well as *Adam* did. This Ignorance could be no hurt to her, for if she had desir'd to know, she had no more to do but to apply herself to God, who was her immediate Director, and would have discover'd it to her, if she had ask'd it; and we are not to doubt but it was as easy for her to have had recourse to him, as it is for us to open our Eyes in order to see; and therefore she was as inexcusable as a Man would be that should fall into a Pit, because he would not look before him.

But 4thly, Tho' this was a true literal Serpent, yet there was more in it, the Devil made use of it to compass his Ends: And he was the Person that spake through it. This, as I take it, is confess'd by all; for no Brute could ever reason or speak of itself: And it ought to be observ'd that when the worship of the Devil was settled in the World, a Serpent was the Sign and Symbol of whatever was sacred to him; he was worshipped under that form, and seem'd to take a peculiar Pleasure to appear and receive homage in that Shape in which he deceived Man. Add to this, that a Serpent was the Beast by which he vented his Oracles in many Places, and the very Word by which his Divinations are signified in several Languages is taken from this Animal; as if the Devil were still acting his Deceits in the Serpent.

As to the Argument that he used to seduce our first Parents, we shall find it a very plausible one. 'Tis in Ch. 3. v. 4. *And the Serpent said unto the Woman, ye shall not surely die; for God doth know, that in the Day ye eat thereof, then your Eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as Gods knowing Good and Evil.* The Meaning of this seems to be as if he had said, God doth but mock you, when he threatens you with Death; that is not the reason why he forbids you the Use of this Tree: the true design is to keep you in Ignorance, to blindfold you, and hinder you from judging for yourselves by your own Eyes and Reason. By this means you are kept altogether in a dependance on him, and obliged in all cases to have recourse to him, and not suffer'd to enquire by the strength of your own Faculties, what may hurt or help you. You have not the use of the Senses and Understanding you possess by Nature, but are kept in a blind unreasonable subjection to his Will. But he knows if you eat of this Tree, you will be freed from this pupilage of Slavery. That you will of yourselves, as well as he, understand what is good or evil for you, and so need not be beholding to him: He judges what is good for himself, and that Privilege makes him God: and therefore you may be sure it is a pleasant thing to do so. And for this reason he keeps it to himself, and will not allow it you. But if you will venture and eat, you will then be like him, and be competent Judges of your own Advantages, as well as he is. Thus our first Parent was prevail'd on to suspect God, and make a tryal by Disobedience whether her own Eyes and Understanding might not be sufficient to direct her. Nor is it any wonder she was deceiv'd, if we consider her want of Experience and innocent Simplicity. Not that she was excusable, since she had no more to take care of but this one thing, and she ought

ought to have had recourse to God or her Husband before she made the experiment. But the Argument was so framed as to prevent that recourse, and therefore it only was capable to deceive her. The Serpent suggested to her, that God imposed on her, and therefore it seemed improper to consult with him, when she desired to discover whether it was so or no. This is so powerful a Method of deceiving that it is observable it seldom fails to be effectual, and that an Argument almost like this corrupts the generality of Mankind. Either ill Company, or our own Heads suggest to us, when we are Children and ignorant of our Interest, that our Parents Guardians and Tutors debar us of the pleasures of Life, out of envy. We argue with our selves and one another, that these old Fellows keep us to our Books and to our Work, debar us of our pleasures and recreations, bring us under Rules and admonish us to be aware of Lust, and Excesses, that they may engross those to themselves and keep us in a dependance on them; that therefore they will not suffer us to try these Enjoyments, and that the design of all is to make us slaves. Whereas we are apt to think, that we have Understanding enough to manage our selves, and therefore why may we not be left to be our own guides and to choose for our selves? Hence we conclude, let us make the Experiment and throw off the Restraints our conductors would put on us. And thus thousands have been and daily are deceived. And few young People are able to resist the force of this Temptation; which shews the power of it: especially when it comes as it did on *Eve*, cloathed with all outward advantage of Allurement; as in the 6th v. *The Tree was good for food, pleasant to the Eyes, and a Tree to be desired to make one wise.* So wise that they needed no more to consult God to teach them what was Good or

Evil for them. These were Charms she could not easily resist; by these she was then seduc'd, and deceived her Husband, and by the like Temptations her Posterity daily fall. Whoever knows the humour of Youth, and how it was with himself when Young, doth also know of this Curiosity of trying the pleasures of Sense; this Itch of being our own Masters and choosing for our selves, together with the charming face of Sins, and our ignorance and inexperience of the consequences of them, are generally the first means of our being corrupted against the good Maxims and Principles we receive from our Parents and Teachers: As the fairness of the Fruit, the seeming properness of it for food, and the desire of being judge for herself of what might be good and evil, of being under her own Management and Government, were the Inducements that prevailed with our first Parent to throw off the conduct of God.

There remains now the 4th and last part of what I propos'd, the consequences of this Disobedience. They are so dismal and numerous, that I can only hint at some of the principal of them. The first of them was the opening these Sinners Eyes, Ch. 3. 7. *And the Eyes of them both were opened.* A Man's Eyes are said to be opened when he perceives or discovers something relating to his State and Condition which he did not observe before. Now before this Transgression Man had not discovered any want or defect in himself: He was directed by the Wisdom of God, and supply'd by his All-sufficiency, and therefore wanted nothing for his Conduct and Support. But when he put himself out of the Divine Protection, and was to manage and support himself; he soon saw and felt his Imperfections and Wants. Whilst young Children are under their Parents Government and Care; they are solicitous about nothing; They

They are not concern'd about their Meat, Drink or Safety, any farther than to call to their Parents for them when they want them ; nor are they afraid while they are near them : but if they should withdraw themselves, and leave their Children in the dark, or in a Wilderness, their Eyes would soon be open'd, they would soon see and feel their Impotence to help or defend themselves ; Concern and Terror would seize them, and take away the use of the little Reason they have. We may imagine this to be the Condition of our first Parents, when God withdrew his Influence and Protection from them upon their deserting him. Their Eyes were opened as soon as they were left to themselves. They found their Necessities and Wants. They found the shortness of their own Power to help them, and insufficiency of their own Understanding to direct them. They found themselves incompetent Judges of what was good or evil for them, and they then in earnest, to their cost, knew *Evil*, that is, felt it. This was a natural Consequence of their setting up to be their own Masters, and to judge for themselves : no finite Understanding being sufficient to foresee or know what in the infinite variety of our Circumstances may hurt us ; and tho' it did foresee them, yet nothing less than an Almighty Power is able to prevent the Mischief. The opening therefore of our first Parents Eyes to see their impendent Miseries, and their Impotency to help themselves, was the first effect of their Sin.

The 2d was their sense of their being naked, and shame that they were so. Shame proceeds from a Consciousness of Weakness, or of Guilt, and from a secret Pride that makes us unwilling to own it, lest we should be despised for it. Man could not be conscious of either before his Fall, because he was innocent from Guilt, and was covered by the Power

of God against all the defects of his natural Weakness ; but being now left to himself, he felt both. He had offended God, and had no defence against his fellow-Creatures : the Sun scorch'd him, the Rain wet him, and the Cold pierc'd him. He found an Inconveniency in exposing his Body, and was asham'd of the Effects of it. He found himself mov'd with Lust and other irregular Passions, and his Reason unable to curb them. Whereas the Power of God whilst he was under the Divine Government, had kept all his Faculties in perfect order. He saw therefore now great hurt in Nakedness, which no way incommoded him whilst cover'd in Innocency.

The 3d Effect of this Transgression of our first Parents was Aversion to God. Ch. 3. v. 8. *And Adam and his Wife hid themselves from the Presence of the Lord God amongst the Trees of the Garden:* ver. 10. *I was afraid, because I was naked, and I hid myself.* This was a very natural Effect ; for since they were concern'd to see their Nakedness, since they were asham'd of it, and it now displeas'd their Eyes, they could not think it could be pleasing to God. There was a visible Presence of God in Eden, and Man no doubt was taught to come before him with Decency and Reverence : And being now blotted and stain'd with Sin in his Soul, and naked in his Body, he must needs be afraid to appear in such Circumstances before his Maker. When he was asham'd to see himself, he might well be afraid to be seen of God. A Child that has dirty'd and hurt himself in disobeying his Parent's Command, will naturally fly his Presence. Thus it far'd with Man in Paradise, and thus it continues with us his Posterity to this Day. We are afraid of that Commerce, and flee that Communion with God that was the great Comfort and Security of Man in his Innocency.

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The 4th Consequence of Man's Transgression was God's pronouncing Sentence on each of the Transgressors; on the Serpent, on the Woman, and lastly on Adam.

First on the Serpent, *And the Lord God said unto the Serpent, Thou art cursed above all Cattle, and above every Beast of the Field; upon thy Belly shalt thou go, and Dust shalt thou eat all the Days of thy Life; and I will put Enmity between thee and the Woman, between thy Seed and her Seed, it shall bruise thy Head, and thou shalt bruise his Heel.* To be cursed is to become abominable and miserable; to be designed and devoted to Destruction; to be under the Displeasure of God and the Execration of Men. The Serpent carries still the Marks of this Curse, and is forced to cover and hide its Head on all occasions, as being offensive to the Eye, and obnoxious to the revenge of any that can surprise it. We kill other Creatures for Food or Diversion, but Serpents are declar'd Enemies; we equally hate and fear them, and therefore destroy them with Pleasure and Eagerness.

The 2d Part of the Serpent's Punishment is to go on his Belly and feed on Dust. How he was framed at first we know not, but see now that he crawls on the Ground, and can't lift up his Head. This was a just Punishment for his high Attempt in opposing himself to God, and teaching Man to question the Goodness and Veracity of his Maker. As to his Food which God has here decreed to be Dust, it was very congruous that the Serpent who had tempted our first Parents by the loveliness of the Fruit of the Tree of Good and Evil, should be condemn'd to the vilest of Meat, and be obliged to feed on Filth and Dirt; that his Fault might in some measure be seen in his Punishment.

The 3d part of the Sentence pass'd on the Serpent, is Enmity between him and Man his Lord, which conti-

nues to this Day, their very Natures being contrary and destructive to one another. There is a perpetual War between them, and tho' he sometimes hurts or wounds his Master by surprise in his more ignoble Parts; yet he has the worst of it: for Man bruises his Head and effectually destroys him. All this is literally true, and without an Allegory. But if it be enquired why the Serpent was thus sentenced, when he committed no Fault, but was acted by the Devil? It must be answer'd, that he was the only visible Tempter that appear'd to Man, and therefore the Punishment was first to fall on him, for Example sake, and to beget in us an abhorrence of the Guilt. The Serpent of himself was no more capable of being punished than of sinning; but these Marks of God's Displeasure were left on him for our sake, that we might have a visible Remembrancer of what Sin deserves. If the Instruments of the Temptation were thus used, we may be sure the principal Actor did not escape the Vengeance of God.

But 2dly, If we suppose the Devil possessed the Serpent, and was as it were incarnate in it; we may have leave to think that the Power of God could unite them as closely as our Souls and Bodies are joined, and cause the Punishment inflicted on the literal Serpent to affect Satan in it, as well as the Injuries done our Bodies do reach our Souls; at least while that very Serpent was in being.

3dly, Inasmuch as the Literal Sense does not exclude the Mystical, the Cursing of the Serpent is a Symbol to us, and a visible pledge of the Malediction with which the Devil is struck by God, and whereby he is become the most abominable and miserable of Creatures. The Serpent's being confin'd to go on his Belly, points out to us the wretchedness of that Condition to which the Devil is reduced; his eating Dust, the blasting of all his

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Enjoyments, and debarring him from all those Pleasures that flow from the Right-hand of God ; being thrown below the Feet of all other Creatures, to be trampled by them ; that is to be confin'd to the lowest, vilest and most miserable, as well as most contemptible Estate. As to the Serpent's Enmity with Man, it needs no great pains to apply it to the Devil. It is plain he is continually laying Snares for us ; he lies in Ambush and surprises us ; he wounds us in our Passions and lower Faculties, and by these sometimes reaches our Souls : tho' that can never be, if we don't consent to it, and by that make it our own Act. But Man by the help of the *Seed of the Woman*, that is by our Saviour, shall bruise his head, wound him in the place that is most mortal, and finally confound and destroy him with eternal ruin. In the mean time the enmity and abhorrence we have of the Serpent is a continual warning to us of the danger we are in from the Devil, and how heartily we ought to hate and abhor him and all his works.

2dly, As to the Woman, her Punishment consists of two Parts, 1st, in the Pains of Child-bearing. v. 16 of Ch. 3. *And to the Woman he said, I will greatly multiply thy Sorrow and thy Conception. In Sorrow thou shalt bring forth Children.* This was a very just and proper Punishment. She had brought Sorrow and Death on all her Posterity, and in bringing them forth it was but reasonable she should suffer something of what they were to suffer all their Lives : And it is continued on all those that descend from her, as an Item and Memorandum of the Mischief brought on Mankind by Sin. By this she and her Descendants may learn how much God abhors Disobedience, and it is a Pledge to them of God's Anger against the Guilty.

The 2d part of her Punishment is in these Words in the same Verse, *Thy Desire shall be to thy Husband, and*

he shall rule over thee. This too was a most reasonable Sentence, and proportionable to her Sin. Her Offence was an Attempt to be judge of Good and Evil for herself, to be her own Mistress and depend no more on God for her Government. Instead of attaining her Design, God makes her subject to her Husband; places those Desires and Inclinations on him which she had withdrawn from God, and constitutes him her Ruler and Head. By this she and her whole Sex became Subjects, and depend on the froward Will of those Husbands she had corrupted; being oblig'd to endure not only the Miseries of her own choice, but likewise a Share in those of her Husband's. This is a Demonstration to us of the Folly of an Attempt to judge of Good and Evil for ourselves, and the great Abhorrence God has of Sin, since he avenges it not only on the Person immediately guilty, but extends the Punishment to the whole Sex.

As to the Man, his Punishment consists in the following Particulars, 1st, v. 17. *Because thou hast bearkened unto the Voice of thy Wife, and hast eaten of the Tree of which I commanded thee saying, Thou shalt not eat of it; Cursed is the Ground for thy sake. In sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the Days of thy Life.* This Punishment is rightly adapted to Man's Sin. He would not be content with the Meat God had provided for him, which the Earth of itself furnish'd him by God's Appointment, therefore God decreed that it should do so no more, but Man should be put to force his Food out of it, and provide for himself with Labour and Toil, with the Sweat of his Brows and the Anguish of his Heart. By this we may understand how much better it had been to have left the provision of Sustenance for us to God, and to depend on him for it, as well as for the Government of our Actions. Since we would

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would not do the latter, God has refused to do the former for us.

The 2d part of God's Sentence against Man, is the Condemnation of him to temporal Death, v. 19 of Ch. 3. *For Dust thou art, and unto Dust thou shalt return.* 'Twas observ'd before that Man by his natural Constitution was Mortal, and that it was only by the especial Favour of God, that he was to be preserv'd from Death. Since therefore he had forfeited that Favour, he must of course sink into his native mortality. It was not necessary that God should alter his Nature or Constitution to make him Mortal, there needed no more but taking away the means of Immortality, the use of the Tree of Life, to subject him to Death; and the use of it was no ways due to his Nature: God therefore did him no Injustice by depriving him and his Posterity of Paradise and the use of the Tree of Life, these being matters of Favour, and we entitl'd to them only on this condition, that our first Parents should continue in Obedience to God. This withdrawing of God's Favour is a great and dreadful Punishment, but far from Injustice, because it takes nothing from us that was due to our Nature, and leaves us still in a condition preferable to not being at all, which is as much as God in strictness of Justice is oblig'd to do for any Creature. Thus we find ourselves subjected to the Displeasure and Wrath of God by our descent from *Adam*, so far as to prevail with God to withdraw from us his peculiar Favours that he design'd for us, if our first Parents had continued in their Obedience, the consequence of which is that we become subject to Pains and Miseries, to Sickness and temporal Death.

But 2dly, The Souls of Men are immortal, and capable of Misery or Happiness after this Life, and the Transgression of *Adam* does like-

likewise affect them, and they become liable to Damnation on account thereof. It seems indeed hard that God's Anger should reach so far as to deprive all Mankind of eternal Happiness for the Sin of one, but if we consider Man as a free Agent, we shall find that eternal Happiness is not absolutely due to him, but only the possibility thereof: and if God has not deprived us of that possibility, he has done us no Injustice. And it appears from the very History of Man's Fall, that God has not done that: for he has enter'd into new Terms of Salvation with us, and has intimated them, tho' obscurely, in the 3d Ch. and 15th ver. when he declares that *the Seed of the Woman should bruise the Head of the Serpent*. Signifying thereby that Mankind should not despair. For notwithstanding the Devil had got an Advantage over them, yet by the means of Christ they should finally conquer and vanquish him. And the World was so far possessed with the belief of the possibility of a Reconciliation with God, that they still applied to him with Prayers and Sacrifices; and he gave them sufficient Proof, that his Mercy towards them was not quite extinct, and that he still continued his Goodness to the wicked Posterity of wicked Parents. Hence St. Paul observes, *Acts 14. 16. That tho' God in Times past suffer'd all Nations to walk in their own ways, yet he left not himself without Witness in that he did Good, and gave us Rain from Heaven, and fruitful Seasons, filling our Hearts with Food and Gladness.*

But 3dly, We may conceive a double Happiness, first, that which is absolute and perfect, according to the utmost Capacity of the Creature that enjoys it. 2dly, That which is better than not to be, but yet is mix'd with Sufferings, and may come as much short of perfect Blessedness as our present State is distant from perfect Ease and Pleasure.

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sure. The latter of these is due in Justice to every Being that God has made, if they have not forfeited their Title by Sin. But the first of these is a Favour that God may bestow on whom he pleases, or with-hold from them upon other Considerations besides guilt. The Sin of our first Parents is such a Motive as has induced God to deny it to all the Posterity of *Adam*, however actually Innocent. And this is a great Indication of his Displeasure toward them. Upon this Account the most innocent Children are eternally banished Heaven, and deprived of the Presence of God, which may justly be reckon'd an eternal spiritual Death, when compared with the Pleasures and Happiness that otherwise they would have enjoyed. For tho' we cannot say of them, that it had been better for them never to have been, yet their Life may truly be reckon'd a Hell comparatively to what they might have expected if their first Parents had not offended, and brought this Punishment upon their Descendants. Tho' this may seem to be very hard on Infants that never actually sinned, yet it cannot be called unjust, because they are not deprived of any thing that was absolutely due to their Nature, but only of those Favours that God might have denied them on other Considerations besides that of their personal guilt. Neither doth this infer any 3d State for Souls after Death, but only a Difference among such as are condemned to Hell. There is such a Difference acknowledged in the State of the Blessed, where all are happy according to their several Capacities, and so it is in Hell, where all are miserable if compared with the Condition of the Blessed, but in different degrees; and as in this Life some are so unfortunate that it were better for them not to be at all, than to continue always in the State in which they are; so in Hell there may be some

some whose Condition is preferable to not being; tho' for Judas and such Sinners it had been better they had never been.

The 3d part of Man's Punishment was that withdrawing of the extraordinary Grace of God from him, that was ready to guide and direct him in all his Actions, and leaving him to his own Power and Faculties to conduct and support him. So I understand the 22d v. of the 3d ch. *And the Lord God said, Behold the Man is become as one of us to know Good and Evil. And now least he put forth his Hand and take also of the Tree of Life and eat and live for ever. Therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the Garden of Eden.* Some take this for an Ironical Speech, whereby God mocked and upbraided Man for his Folly: But I rather think it, a declaration of the Divine Will: for since Man had taken on him to choose for himself and to judge what was good and evil for him without consulting his Maker, therefore God resolv'd to deprive him of the supernatural Assistance he design'd to afford him, and leave him to his natural Faculties to guide and direct him; let him be as it were his own God, and enjoy the fruit of his choice. To this purpose he deprived him of the use of the Tree of Life, drove him out of the Garden where it was, and fenced it against him.

The effects of Man's being left to his own Powers and Faculties for his direction and support are many and fatal. 'Tis easy to shew that from hence come all the Errors and Follies of our lives. For our Understandings being finite, we are every moment at a loss, we are forced in most things to guess, and being unable to find Truth, are frequently mistaken. From the same come all the Sins, Corruptions and Crimes that overwhelm the World. For being left to our choice, we not only

only mistake, but choose amiss. One Error or Sin makes way for another; we proceed daily in Corruption, and the Infection spreads as the World grows older, Custom, Education and Company do all contribute to make us worse and worse; And in nothing of this God is to be blamed: we bring them all on our selves, and they are not to be prevented without a Miracle, which none can say, God is obliged to work for us. We may accuse our selves and one another for our temporal and eternal Evils, but must acquit God who has done us no Injustice. He has allowed us a possibility of Happiness, as has been observ'd before, and we by our Sins make our selves incapable of it. And as to Children that die before they come to choose, we may be sure God will deal justly with them, and put a great difference between them and actual Sinners. It is Misery and Hell enough for them to be depriv'd of those Felicities to which they could not pretend but by the Favour of God, and to be subjected to those Sufferings that ballance their *Being* and hinder their Lives from being a blessing to them. They are the seed of Rebels and Traytors and cannot expect any special Favour from God.

Thus I have gone thro' the History of the Fall of Man, and shewed you the Consistency and Reasonableness of the account the Scripture gives of it. Nor ought we to depart from the Letter thereof; since the matter of fact is plain, that Man is corrupted, that the literal Understanding of the Scripture accounts for it, and no other Book or Record gives any tolerable reason for it.

I might draw many useful Observations from what I have said, but I shall content my self with two.

1st, You may see from this that God did not think it fit that Man should be absolutely happy in the State

of Innocency without *Revealed Religion*, and the use of *Sacraments*. For the discovery of what was Good and Evil was to proceed from a continued Communication of Divine Wisdom, which would have been equivalent to a Revelation; and the Trees of Knowledge and of Life were truly Sacramental; they were outward and visible Signs, and means of Grace, which is the true notion of a Sacrament. And then judge with your selves what Pride and Folly it is for any in this corrupted Estate to pretend that they are too spiritual for such, or that they need them not in order to Communion with God. Man in his State of Perfection needed them, how much more must we in our present condition of Corruption and Aversion from God? Let us not therefore despise or abuse them. Death was the Consequence of the violation of the sacramental Tree in my Text, and the same is threatned as the Punishment of our abusing the Christian Sacraments, *1 Cor. 11. 29. He that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh Damnation to himself, not discerning the Lord's Body. For this cause many are weak and sickly among you, and many sleep.* The neglecting of them is no less penal, *Job. 3. 5. Except a Man be born of Water and of the Spirit, he can't enter into the Kingdom of Heaven.* And *Job. 6. 53. Except ye eat the Flesh of the Son of Man and drink his Blood, ye have no Life in you.* These are expressly offer'd to us in the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, and we are sure in that the faithful feed on them. And tho' their feeding may not be confined to the use of the outward Elements yet whoever rejects them, debars himself of the spiritual Food communicated by them, for when God has appointed Means to obtain a Blessing, it is reasonable to believe, that he will never grant it to those who neglect or contemn them. But 2dly, as it is a great Folly to despise the Sacraments, so it is much greater madness to think

think of Happiness without revealed Religion. It is plain we have a prospect and eager desire of a future Life, and in many Circumstances there is nothing but that hope can make the present tolerable to us. But natural Religion can neither give us any certain clear Security of it, nor means to attain it. Revealed gives both, and the view is so comfortable to a good Man, and so useful to the World, that it seems to be an Imitation of the Devil's Spite and Malice to go about to deprive us of it. 'Tis this hope only can make all Men equally happy, and send the Poor, the unfortunate as to the Circumstances of this World, and the oppressed, to bed as contented as the greatest Prince. 'Tis this only that can make us cheerfully dispense with the Miseries and Hardships of Life, and think of Death with Comfort. Except therefore these Patrons of natural Religion can shew as sure and effectual means to comfort us on these Occasions as Revealed Religion affords us, they are spiteful and unreasonable; for they go about to take from us that which gives us patience in our Sickness, relief in our Distresses, and hope in our Death; and offer us nothing in lieu of it. If a Man be oppressed by his Enemies, if he be in Sickness, Pain or Anguish, if the Agonies and Terrors of Death approach him, what Comfort or Support can he have without Religion? What a dismal thing must it be to tell a Man that there is no Help, no Hope for him, to bid him despair and die, and there is an end of him. Such Reflections may make a Man sullen, mad, curse himself and nature; but can never give him any Satisfaction without a well-grounded hope of a blessed Immortality. Now only Revelation can give the generality of Mankind, especially the unphilosophical part of it, who are not capable
of

of long or subtle Reasoning, such a clear and well-grounded hope. For we may add to this that if we take natural Religion with all the Advantages that Reason can give it; yet the Rewards and Punishments discoverable by it are not so clear or determined as to be a sufficient Encouragement to such as are good, or discouragement to the Evil. Revealed Religion serves all these ends, and therefore we ought firmly to adhere to it, and not hearken to wicked and unreasonable Men, or suffer them to wrest it out of our Hands. It is our Joy, our Comfort and our Life; it carries us beyond Death and secures our eternal Felicity. Justice, and Charity, and Peace are the Fruits of it here, and Glory hereafter.



P. S.

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P. S.

There has lately appear'd a Pamphlet entitled *a Defence of Dr. Clarke, &c.* which professes to be an Answer to some part of the Notes on ABp King's Essay, and which may seem to deserve some notice on account of its great Candor and Civility; I shall therefore take this opportunity to declare my Sentiments of it so far as relates to the foregoing Book, and will handle it as tenderly as is possible.

Of Space and Duration.

He begins to prove that *Space* must be some-
 thing more than the Absence of Matter, otherwise
 the walls of an empty Room wou'd touch. The force
 of his Argument seems to be this. When two things
 touch one another there's nothing between them,
Ergo when there's nothing between two things
 they must touch. This Consequence is a very
 lame one. The reason why they do not touch
 is because they are really *distant*, but is *Distance*
 therefore in the Abstract any thing real? We two
 differ, or there's a Difference between us, but is
Difference it self any thing existing? Things are
 long, broad, thick, heavy, &c. but are *Length*,
Breadth, *Density*, *Weight*, &c. properly any
 thing? Have they any real *Archetypes* or external
Ideata? Or can they exist any where but in their
 Concretes? We are apt indeed to conceive them
 by way of *Substance*, or to clap an imaginary *Sub-*
stratum to them, as we do to every thing, Quality
 or Mode which we abstract, and often impose up-
 on our selves so far as to take these for so many
 realities existing in that precise manner wherein

we have been used to consider them: But a little Examination into the Original of these Notions and our way of acquiring them detects the Fallacy. A small consideration of the Nature of *abstract Ideas* wou'd I think have prevented this and the following Arguments, and discover'd *Space*, *Duration* and *Necessity* to be nothing more.

p. 3.

" *Whiteness*, says he, is widely different from " *Space*; for ist all Bodies are not white, " &c. *Whiteness* is an abstract Idea, which can have no Substance of itself, and so far it agrees with pure *Extension*, which was all the agreement between them that was ever intended.

p. 4. 5. 6.
7. 8.

I had maintain'd that to assign positive Properties to *Space* was as bad Sense as to apply positive Properties to *Darkness*, *Silence*, *Absence* or mere *Nothing*: or in other words, that the three first, which are confessedly *privations*, might with equal propriety be said to have the properties of receiving *Light*, *Sound*, &c. as *Space* is affirm'd to have penetrability or the Capacity of receiving *Body*. He answers by affirming that *Space* has and must have the Property of receiving *Body*, and then proceeds to prove at large that *Darkness* is not properly a Capacity of receiving *Light*; (which I was so far from asserting that I proposed it as a parallel piece of nonsense with the former.) The sum of his Argument is this. *All Darkness* is not capable of receiving *Light*; he instances in that *Darkness* which is included within the Pores of the Particles of *Light itself*, which must be smaller than a whole Ray of *Light*, and consequently no *Light* at all can get into it. Were this extraordinary Argument true it wou'd not prove his point, *viz.* that the *Darkness as such* is incapable of receiving *Light*, because it assigns an external accidental impediment in the Case, *viz.* the interposition of the parts of *Matter*, or (which

(which comes to the same) minuteness of the Pore: But what is still worse, if matter does not consist of certain primogeneal parts, but, as he says, of such as are "so very small, that were we to suppose them *never so small*, yet we may yet suppose them *smaller*," p. 6. Then will there be no cavity so minute but that we may suppose a particle of Light commensurable to it. Lastly this Argument wou'd prove equally against Space itself; and were I disposed to be pleasant, I might argue that the Space supposed to be within these same Cavities is no Space, because it has not the property of receiving Body, *i. e.* 'tis too small to admit any kind of Body.

But I shall readily be excused for dropping this Point.

He argues that "Infinity is not in *itself*" p. 9.
 "actual addition of finite Spaces, tho' all the
 "Idea we can get concerning it arises from an
 "endless addition of finite Spaces, without ever
 "being able to reach to any *End*:" And then introduces Mr. Locke's Distinction between the infinity of Space and Space infinite B. 2. C. 17. § 7.

But if all the Idea we can get concerning this *infinity of Space* arise purely from an addition of finite Spaces, then must it also consist or be composed of such Portions of that same Space, or else 'tis something of which we have actually no Idea at all. Something beyond and beside all our Ideas, and inconsistent with the method of acquiring them: The *Idea* of it must be one thing, and *itself* quite different. Mr. Locke's Distinction might one wou'd think convince us that this Infinite of his is not a real *Metaphysical* one, but only a mere Negation or *Non-ens*, a bare impossibility of stopping any where; which has nothing to do with that other absolute Infinity, or rather *Perfection*, which belongs to the Divine

Attributes, and all such Qualities as are mensurable not by *Parts*, but *Degrees*: which the same Author alludes to B. 2 C. 17. § 1. and in the Sect. immediately preceeding his Quotation.

p. 11.

" Space is the *thing containing* and Body is that " which is *contained* in it: I wou'd not be understood by *thing* to mean a *Substance*, which seems " to be the meaning of all those, if they have any " meaning at all, who call Space nothing."

But you must determine this same *thing containing* to be either a Substance or a Property, or find out a new Distinction for it. Till one of these be done, we are obliged to take it for a mere *Entia rationis* or a fiction of the Mind, conceiv'd indeed (as we said) by way of Substance; but which cannot be perfectly reconciled to that or any other *Category*, nor proved to have a real proper Existence *ad extra* under any Name or Notion whatsoever. By and by we shall hear of its having a *Substratum* and some *Properties* too, as well as being *its own Substratum*.

Ibid.

" How absurd is it to conclude from our being " continually able to *add* to Space, that Space " is really not infinite? Whereas for this very " reason it must necessarily follow that it is infinite, &c." *i. e.* negatively so, or incapable of any assignable Bounds; which is a roving indeterminate, perpetually growing Idea and directly repugnant to our Notion of absolute Infinity or Perfection, which is something actual, positive and fix'd in all Qualities capable thereof: Something essentially and every way incapable of any Addition. This you allow (p. 20.) to be the true meaning of a *Metaphysical Infinite*, the only Question therefore is which of these two Infinities (which you see are very different ones) ought to be apply'd to Matter, Space and all *Quantity*, and which to the Divine Perfections.

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“ Were it true that Space cou’d never be so ^{p. 12.}
 “ big but that more Magnitude might be added
 “ to it, it would then follow that it cou’d not be
 “ positively infinite. But how does this appear?
 “ We can never have an Idea of it so large, but
 “ we may still add more to it; but our Idea of it
 “ is not the *Thing itself*.”

I shou’d be glad to find what we can know of the *thing*, otherwise than from our Idea of it, (tho’ in the present case I believe there is no *thing* at all, but barely an Idea) and if all the Ideas we can possibly frame of it include addibility, how shall we be able to exclude that same addibility from the thing itself? Can Knowledge reach beyond Ideas? or can we conceive any thing to exist in a manner quite different from all the possible ways we have of considering its Existence? This is such Knowledge, such a Salvo for mere Ignorance, as this Author wou’d, I dare say, disdain in other Cases, and be glad to quit in this, if he could find a better Hypothesis.

“ Infinity is indeed an individual Attribute of ^{p. 13.}
 “ the Deity, so that it is impossible that Infinity
 “ can be an Attribute of any thing else; yet were
 “ Matter infinite, it would not follow from thence
 “ that Infinity was an Attribute of this *infinite Mat-*
 “ *ter*, any more than that Extension is an Attri-
 “ bute of all finite Beings throughout the whole
 “ Universe.” Infinity is an Attribute of any *in-*
 “ *finite thing*, as well as Extension is of every thing
 “ *extended*, if there be any meaning in words. If
 “ these can be so predicated of *Matter* they must be so
 “ far Attributes or Properties of it, at least while
 “ they can be predicated, in like manner as Know-
 “ ledge is a Property of every finite Being that *pos-*
 “ *sesses* it, tho’ not an absolutely necessary, essential
 “ or immutable one, (which is nothing to the case)
 “ and in what other Sense the Author could affirm
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the contrary below (p. 14.) I do not apprehend. To make Extension, Knowledge, &c. Properties of God only, seems to me the same as making every thing God; since finite things do as really, tho' in a less Degree, partake of them, (and consequently they are equally affections of their several Natures while these Natures continue what they are, or so long as they continue to *possess* them, as he words it) as the Deity himself can be supposed to do. In the very same sense and for the very same reason that the Deity is said to occupy the whole, must these be allowed to occupy some part or share.

Ibid.

" If Extension was an Attribute of finite Beings, if we suppose all finite Beings away-- it self ought to cease." When all finite things are away, all *real* Extension goes with them: *Ideal* Extension (or the abstract Ideas of Height, Depth, &c.) may probably remain, *i. e.* in your Head, and it may be hard to get them out: but till you prove a connection between such Ideas and reality, your Argument will be inconclusive. I think it ought to be consider'd here that Knowledge is not the perceiving an agreement or connection of Ideas and Objects, (as some seem to imagine) but of Ideas to one another: it lies between our Thoughts themselves, not between Thoughts and Things.

p. 15.

" As for an infinite Being, that I think is in the Power of God to create, for it does not make the created Being either necessarily existent or powerful, or even give to him freedom of Will." But it makes him equal to his Creator in some one respect, which is as bad as to suppose him equal in all. He that can suppose an *Effect* strictly and properly equal to its *Cause* in any respect, is, I think, incapable of confutation.

p. 16.

I had argued that it was *improper* to apply bounds and bounders to *Non-entity*, *i. e.* to *Space*, which was as far as yet appear'd nothing. He an-

swers,

swers, " In this he is entirely mistaken, for *Non-
entity* in that sense is a direct *Contradiction*." Which how it makes against the foregoing Assertion I know not. However he goes on proving that it is a direct Contradiction to say *Non-entity in general* (and at the same time makes use of these words, " When any Being is created it is a mutation from *Non-entity* to *Entity*, &c.") which is equally above my comprehension ; except he tacitly subjoins the Verb *is* or *exists* to make one ; a Quibble I would not willingly suppose him guilty of. Without this, pray where's the Absurdity (I mean *a priori*) in saying or supposing mere Nothing or absolutely *Non-entity*, or in other words, the absence, annihilation, non-existence of any thing in Nature ? To stile this non-existence, &c. *infinite* or *immense*, is indeed a flagrant Absurdity, because it is applying Properties to it, which at the same time imply it to be something, *i. e.* 'tis making it both *something* and *nothing*, which is all the Contradiction that I know of in the Supposition, and for which they only are accountable that make it. The Pamphlet Writer was not perhaps so absurd and childish (*ibid.*) here, as the Answerer may imagine.

" The Translator, by his Quotation from Dr. ^{p. 17.} *Cudworth*, seems to confound the Idea of Space " with that of *Number*, as if they were the same " thing." The Quotation is from a greater than Dr. *Cudworth*, and so far from implying Space and Number to be *the same thing*, that it is expressly introduced as *another parallel Case* (*Origin of E. p. 11.*) *i. e.* parallel to the former only in the reason of their being both *incapable of Bounds*, which was the Point in hand, and which was there shewn to arise from the nature of our own Faculties, not from these themselves, be they *Ideas* or *Things*. The

two following Pages are, I think, abundantly answered already in the same place.

p. 20.

“ A Positive or Metaphysical Infinite, as the
 “ Translator says, certainly means what is absolutely perfect, that to which nothing can be added, but then this must always mean in the
 “ *particular way* that it is infinite. For instance,
 “ an infinite *Line* cannot be made either longer
 “ or shorter, but it may be made *broader*, because it is not infinite in breadth, but finite, yet
 “ it will still be an infinite *Line* whatever breadth
 “ you suppose it. So also an infinite *Superficies* can
 “ never be made longer or wider, yet it may be
 “ made *thicker*, &c.” A positive or absolute infinite (in its proper subjects) is every way incapable of Addition, the other infinite is directly the reverse to whatever you apply it. You can never imagine a *Line* to be actually so long, but you may make it longer, *i. e.* increase it *as a Line*; a surface so broad, but it may be yet broader, *i. e.* enlarged *as a Surface*; a Body so great but it may still be augmented *as such*: and to suppose the contrary, *viz.* any one of these to be positively infinite, so that you cannot add to it, is to suppose what is false in fact.

Every one of these indeed is indefinitely encreasable (or what this Author is pleas'd to call *infinite*) only in some *particular way*, *viz.* each in its *own way*. 'Tis very true that adding to a *Line* does not make it *broad*, which would be to make it something else, *i. e.* a *surface*; enlarging a surface does not make it *thick*, *i. e.* more than a surface: But each of these may be made larger every way that we can possibly consider them, and I think that's enough. How an impossibility of enlarging (as also of considering) some things more than one way, proves the possibility of their being absolutely infinite or perfect in another, let the Reader judge.

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The same Reasoning runs thro' the ten following Pages, as applied to infinite *Duration*, and if I understand it right this is a sufficient Answer.

" It is true indeed that *Duration* is a perpetual *p. 21.*
 " Flux, yet it neither is, nor can possibly be in
 " the Power of any Being whatsoever to add to it,
 " to make it more slower or faster, or to stand
 " still." We can always add to or take from our
Idea of *Duration*, can consider it by *parts*, and
 add to or subtract from it as many of these as we
 please, either *a parte ante* or *a parte post* (*p. 28.*)
 and thereby demonstrate the absurdity of its being
 actually or positively *infinite* either way. 'Tis
 therefore but improperly and negatively so, " it
 " can only *mentiri infinitatem*, as *Cudworth* says,
 " in its having more and more added to it infi-
 " nitely, whereby notwithstanding it never reaches
 " or overtakes it." *p. 647, 648.* And if this
 be the nature of our *Idea*, I should be glad to
 know how it can be made appear that it is not
 likewise the nature of the *Ideatum* or *thing itself*,
 (if there were one in the present case) or indeed
 how it can ever be prov'd that here is any thing at
 all, beside an artificial or abstract *Idea*: An *Idea*
 of *Duration* in *general*, set up by the Mind as a
 common Measure and Receptacle for all things
 which exist in a successive manner, or do *endure*,
 and which is of great use to us in our way of con-
 sidering them: tho' when it is carried into abso-
 lute Infinity, and supposed to be placed beyond a
 possibility of Increase, it becomes an inconsistent
 self-contradictory *Idea*: as will be farther shewn
 when we come to an *infinite series*. *p. 110, &c.*

He argues that since God existed from all Eter-
 nity he could act from all Eternity, Creation is *p. 24.*
 an Act, *ergo* he could have created from all Eter-
 nity, otherwise he existed a *whole* Eternity *a parte*
ante

ante before he had the Power of creating, *i. e.* he was an impotent Being, *a whole Eternity.*

Ans. Power the Faculty, and the actual Exercise of that Power are two different things. God might always have the power, will and intention to create, yet not always exert his power and put that Will and Intent in execution; nay one of these must in the order of our Ideas be previous to the other: His Being and essential Attributes must be eternal, uncaus'd, or (as this Author says) beginningless; his Acts must be in time or have a beginning; every *Change, Act or Effect* is posterior in conception to the *Power changing, the Agent or Cause*, and to make them coeval, is to make them all the same, *i. e.* is no more the Object of any power than to make two things one and the same while they are two different ones. 'Tis no defect therefore in God's power not to be able to *exerce* it *ab æterno*, any more than not to be able to make a Change without beginning. Neither do these Acts or Exercises of the Divine Attributes make a Change in the Divine Nature or the *Attributes themselves*, as this Author supposes, (*p. 25, &c.*) any more than every motion produced or volition exerted by a free self-determining Principle, alters the Nature of this Principle itself, or every action of a Man alters his Constitution.

Lastly, If every act of Man as such is temporary and requires beginning, the case must be the same in God, especially in those Acts of his which relate to Man himself; otherwise, and indeed for the same reason, every Divine Act regarding Man or any thing else must be eternal: He made us all then from Eternity, and every act of Providence which concerns the preservation or the government of us is likewise eternal, and that also which is to be and will sometime hence concern our Posterity, is, and must necessarily be eternal, for otherwise there would

wou'd be a change in God. You see whither your Principle will lead us.

He says " how God cou'd create from Eternity *p. 26.*
 " appears to us very *absurd* and *almost impossible* "
 (tho' he had just before been labouring to prove that the Deity both cou'd and must do so) to which I add, therefore for any thing that we know, or as far as we can see, it is absurd and impossible, except we can be certain of any thing beyond the reach and against the representation of our own Ideas; a certainty which the Gentlemen in this way of thinking are often reduced to. *v. p. 12. 29.*
&c.

He objects that Dr. Bentley's Arguments against *Bid.*
infinite Generations are contrary to the Supposition; because they imply some *first* or *beginning*. Ans. they imply and shew the necessity for a beginning and therefore overthrow the Supposition. If whatever is now past was once present, and every assignable part in this same *Series* was and must be so, the Consequence is that it cannot but have a *first* and therefore is an absurd, inconsistent Supposition. Instead of confuting this and the like Arguments you answer " they are grounded on a wrong Basis, because they destroy the Supposition:" *i. e.* we must allow the possibility of the Supposition before we can shew it to be impossible and every argument which proves it to be absurd is false and foreign because 'tis contrary to the position, which is suppos'd already to be true. *i. e.* We argue wrong except we grant the Question. This is the Substance of most of his reasoning in the " Translator's " Demonstration examin'd " which may perhaps be re-examin'd in its proper place.

He urges that, " these Arguments will equally *p. 27.*
 " prove against the Existence of the Deity from
 " all Eternity," which is already obviated in
X. c.

p. 30.

His next Argument for the infinity of *Space* stands thus. " A Body in motion can never come to an end of Space, *Ergo* Space is positively " infinite ": rather the contrary, *Ergo* Space is incapable of positive Infinity, or if it is any thing at all, yet the Infinity of it cannot be consider'd in a positive absolute way ; 'tis something indeterminate and negative (as has been often repeated) and therefore to have a positive conception of it is a Contradiction. That we have a positive and adequate Idea of the true infinity in its proper Subjects has been shewn already.

p. 32.

Dr. Green had argued that a *Mathematical Solid*, or mere *Length*, *Breadth* and *Thicknes*, was the Definition of *Space*, but these were only *imaginary*, and therefore so was Space itself. He replies " This is rather a mental Consideration of real " Space." But if we can find nothing else to consider in it, nothing that leads us beyond these three abstract Notions abovemention'd, by what medium will you prove its reality? shew it to be something more than *mental*, to be attended with any consequence, or to exhibit any appearance which properly imply's or requires real Existence, and is not fully solvable by the Minds power of Abstraction and force of mere imagination." He " adds, for if there were no distance existing really the Sun and Moon must be in the same individual Place." This is the same Quibble we set out with, and it is sufficient here to observe that if there was nothing in the World beside these two and mere Distance or *Space*, they wou'd be properly in no Place at all (*i. e.* no absolute Place) nor cou'd they be said ever to change Places except in relation to each other.

'Tis to no purpose to answer what he says in the following pages concerning the Impossibility of defining Substance, till we are better agreed about

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about the meaning of the word. It may indeed be an impossibility with him who has something to define beyond his Ideas, who includes somewhat in the Substance of a thing above and beside all its constituent Properties. I have given my own Notion of it as clearly as I can in Note 1. 2d Ed. p. 36.

“ If a Spirit is unextended, it must exist in no place, and is therefore incapable of Motion. For if it can move, it must either move or go out of one place into another, or out of no Place into some Place or lastly out of no Place into no Place, &c.” And again, “ that a Spirit has the power of moving is very manifest, or else the Soul of a Man wou’d be very often a hundred Miles distant from his Body”. If matter be incapable of Thought (as I think *Cudworth* has sufficiently demonstrated in the passage cited below) the reason is because it has Parts; *i. e.* is extended, consequently a thinking Substance cannot be extended or made up of Parts, and if so, it has nothing to do with either *Place* or *Motion* any more than with a *Shape* or *Colour*. It may act on and influence a Body which exists in Place, but to apply *Place*, *where*, &c. (terms which peculiarly belong to Beings extended) to itself, is joining the most disparate, heterogeneous things in Nature. “ I wou’d not, says he, mean that the Soul is extended in the same manner as Matter is.” *ib.* But if all the notion we can possibly frame of Extension is derived from Matter and cannot reach beyond it, if the very Definition and Idea of it includes *partes extra partes* (real parts, when it is so, mental when it is only mental) as he might have learnt from *Bayle* cited above; it will be in vain to fly to the old refuge of a simple uncompounded Extension or what he calls *Continuum*, which is indeed extended, but yet in a different manner from all the Extension we know of; which has assignable Parts,

Parts, but not material, separable ones, *i. e.* properly no parts at all.---But this is not the first time we have been forced to go beyond our Ideas.

p. 37.

“ Tho’ we frame our Idea of a Being from the
 “ essential Properties of it, yet that is no reason
 “ why the Being shou’d not require something to
 “ its Existence which the essential *Property* (he
 “ shou’d have said *Properties*) does not, only by
 “ the Being’s requiring it.” By Being or *Sub-*
stance we mean only the Collection, Aggregate
 or Union of the Essential or constituent Properties,
 and how these when taken together can require some-
 thing which each of them did not require when
 separately consider’d; I don’t apprehend. The
 Properties of *Spirit*, *i. e.* *thinking*, *willing* and
 their *Modes*, have no relation to Space or Exten-
 sion, have nothing to do with a *Substratum*, con-
 sequently neither has a spiritual Being which con-
 sists only of these and the like Properties. He
 goes on supposing that all Beings must *as such* be
 commensurate to Space and occupy some portion
 of it; as well as every *Quality* be stuck in some
Substratum, which also must take up some room;
 all which has been consider’d in the place referr’d
 to above.

I shall trust the passage from *Cudworth* with the
 Reader, only observing that after the words
 “ least Extension that can possibly be ” *Cudworth*
 has “ if there be any such *least* and Body or Ex-
 “ tension be not infinitely divisible ” p. 825.
 which was omitted in the Quotation.

p. 46.

“ It necessarily follows that the Soul is extend-
 “ ed, because were it not, it wou’d as Dr. *Cud-*
worth says, perceive all Distances indistantly,
 “ and consequently wou’d have an Idea of In-
 “ finity.” He means, wou’d see to the End of all
 Distance, or perceive the end of what is *endless*,
 according to his Sense of the word *infinite*. He
 had

had argued p. 41. that an unextended Being must be so *small* as to perceive nothing, here from the same principle he urges that it will be so *great* as to be able to perceive every thing, and indeed both his Arguments are equally conclusive. The Limitation of our Sight in every case is, I think, owing to the Nature of *Body*, not of *Soul*.

“ To suppose any thing to be annihilated is
 “ not to suppose it to be taken away from *itself* p. 47.
 “ or from *being* or from *Existence*, but more properly
 “ Existence taken from that.” I wish he had shewn the difference of these Phrases. —

But we have enquired into the possibility of *annihilation* already, and he comes at last to allow it in every thing but *Space itself*, to which indeed it cannot be well apply'd, any more than to *nothing itself*.

“ That Dr. Clarke asserts Space to have real p. 49.
 “ Qualities is true; but then he does not consider
 “ it strictly as a *Property*, but as *its own Substratum* ” I will answer this when I understand it.
 If he means considering it as a *Substance*, Dr. Clarke and he consider it very differently at different times, See p. 11. and in p. 63, the Dr. is introduced affirming the *Deity* himself to be the *Substratum* of *Space*.

“ I do not see so much absurdity in supposing p. 50.
 “ Qualities inherent in one another, as the Translator wou'd make it, at least not in the Instance of *Space*. For why cannot *Penetrability*,
 “ *Indiscernibility* and *Infinity* be said to be Modes
 “ of *Space*? as well I think as all kinds of *Shapes*
 “ are Modes or Modifications of *Figure*.”

But *Figure* itself is nothing exclusive of every particular Shape, *Ergo* so is *Extension* setting aside every particular extended Being: unless we must have a *Substratum* likewise for *Figure* and *Form* in general, and by the same way of reasoning

ing we may seek one for *Weight* for *Sound*, &c. in general: in short for every abstract Idea we have. "Duration, says he immediately after, is only "enduring, and what can enduring be without "something to endure?" Answ. A mere *Ens rationis* or *Idea*, as well as your next Instance of *Existence* without something existing: Which one wou'd think might be enough to shew you that these neither require nor can properly admit of any real Substratum, nor infer the existence of any thing but our own Imagination. To what purpose therefore shou'd we spend time in enquiring whether *Duration* be a *punctum stans*, or "a continual regular flowing of itself" p. 51? When we already find that 'tis nothing more than a complex Idea got from observing the Succession of Ideas in our Minds? one who considers how he comes by his Ideas will never build such Arguments upon them.

p. 53.

"It is very evident that neither Extension nor "Duration can be modes of the Existence of any "created Beings." Extension and Duration in the Abstract can be modes of nothing at all; but our Ideas of them are entirely got from created Beings and applicable to no other, and to them they must be applicable so long as we can properly say these Beings are *extended* or *do endure*.

p. 55.

"Succession is not, says the Translator, necessarily join'd with Existence. Perhaps not, "that is not such a Succession as ours." Here we are got again to something *Supra nos*. I wou'd only ask, is not all the Succession the same as *such*? is not Succession without a Change the very same as no Succession? Neither Change indeed nor Succession are the very Idea of Duration (as this Author wou'd have me affirm) but yet they necessarily accompany it, and without them it is absolutely lost.

"What

“ What the meaning of *present in his simple Essence* to is, I confess I do not understand.” The *p. 57.*
Phrase is Dr. Clarke’s. 6th Prop. par. the last :
where he may find another full as hard to under-
stand, viz. that the Deity is equally present — *by the*
immediate and perfect Exercise of all his Attributes
to every Point of the boundless Immensity, as if it were
really all but one single Point. p. 74. 2d Edit.

He builds his *Proof* of the real Existence of *p. 61. &c.*
Space and Duration on the Ideas we have of them,
which, he says, are simple ones, and “ we can-
not by any means have a simple Idea but from
“ something actually existing in Nature.” First,
the Ideas of Space and Duration in the Abstract
are not simple Ideas, but complex Modes made
up of the least Portions of each, viz. a *sensible*
Point and Moment. See *Locke* B 2. C 15. S 9.
Secondly, if they were, they would not prove the
Existence of any external Object correspondent to
them, but only that there is something in Nature
which occasions them, whether that be positive or
a *privation* in the Subject does not always appear.
See *Locke* B 2. C 8. I gave you an Instance before
in *Darkness*, which is as able to produce a simple
Idea, as *Space*, and yet you have taken a deal of
pains to prove that it is really nothing : You might
as well have added Space and Duration to it, and
if you had a mind too, concluded them to be
three Nothings. p. 61.

But I shall need an Apology for dwelling so
long on this dry Subject.

Of Necessary Existence.

He begins his Account of necessary Existence *p. 66.*
with the following Observation. “ We may be
“ able to know and perceive in what Beings this
“ necessity of Nature inheres without knowing ei-
“ ther

“ther the Nature of this Necessity, or the Nature of the Beings and Substances in which it inheres. Thus we can see that two and two are necessarily equal to four, &c.” What! tho’ we don’t know the nature of two and two, or understand what these Words mean? as the Course of his Argument must require. What follows is, I think, mere quibbling on the two Words *Necessity* and *Contradiction*. The Case, in short, is this. Wherever there is an apparent Contradiction on one side of the Question (either *a priori* or *posteriori*) the opposite is necessarily true, or there’s a Necessity for our supposing it: But except this Contradiction be perceived *a priori*, *i. e.* prior to the existence of the thing or truth in Question, it does not *make* it to be what it is, it cannot be the *ground* of its Existence. Thus from the absurdity of an infinite Series of dependent Beings we find it necessary to suppose, or there’s a *Necessity* for our supposing one first Cause or independent Being: But is this same Necessity therefore something *by* which he exists? something which may be consider’d as an *antecedent ground* or *reason* of his being what he is, *i. e.* uncaus’d or independent? At this rate every Reason which reduces us to a necessity of believing the existence of any thing, must be the Cause, Ground or Reason of the Thing itself: which I think needs no Confutation.

p. 67.

He goes upon a distinction between Necessity *absolute* and *relative*: whereas every Notion we can possibly fix to the word *Necessity* implies *Relation*, and means nothing more than the connection we find between two or more Ideas, which is usually expressed by this Term, as was shewn of all the common Senses of it in Note 9. If therefore this word can only stand to denote the Habitude or Manner of our own Conceptions, ’twill be in vain to proceed with this Author in enquiring whether it

it is really *uniform* and *invariable* ; or whether its existence be confined to Time and Place. p. 68, &c.

He maintains that the Being which exists by Necessity can be but *one*, and attempts to answer a very reasonable Objection arising from his first Assertion aforecited, *viz.* that as Necessity of Existence is beyond our Comprehension, and the Being or Beings to whom we apply it are so too ; there may be a number of necessarily existent Beings, as well as different Necessities, for any thing that we know. “ If says he, in his reply to this, any Being whatever exists necessarily by a Necessity of Nature, it must be both impossible and contradictory *in itself*, (*v.* below, and p. 74.) independent of, and antecedent to all our Suppositions about it, that that Being should not exist. “ Whatever Number therefore of necessary Beings there is, there is necessarily such a Number, and “ neither more or less is possible, &c.” *i. e.* there can be no more than there really are. But how do we know by this what Number there are ? or where’s the Absurdity (*a priori*) of supposing more than one such ? Your Argument will serve as well for twenty : *viz.* provided we allow them all to be *in rerum naturâ* necessary, then none of them can be supposed away.

“ The Objection therefore in its full force cannot be urged any farther than this, that a thing may be in itself a perfect Contradiction, without appearing to us to be any Contradiction at all, but rather the quite contrary. In answer to this I must beg leave to say that then all our Understanding is useless, all our Knowledge and Reason, &c. *Ibid.*”

What this has to do with the former Objection, or who is capable of making such an one, I leave him to consider : We say there’s no Contradiction

to our Ideas in supposing more than one independent Being, and therefore the contrary cannot be demonstrated. The answerer is here got on the wrong side, and answering his own assertion in the last cited Passage. 'Tis he only, and the Gentlemen in the same way of thinking, that are obliged to find *Contradictions in themselves*, which yet are not such to any of *our Ideas*, and who alone therefore are chargeable with the Consequence he sets forth below. The true and proper Objection to his Demonstrations of the Unity is, that we have no *Data* to proceed upon in proving one side or t'other.

p. 75.

" Necessity of Existence---can only be where
 " there is no other Cause or Foundation of that
 " Existence." The true meaning of which is, that
 this kind of Necessity can never come in but where
 a Person has nothing else to say. That existence
 which has no prior, external Cause, is absolutely
 uncaus'd. I know no other distinction.

p. 76.

" An Objector may indeed say that a Being can
 " exist without any Cause, any ground or Founda-
 " tion at all. To which I must desire to answer
 " that nothing can be more absurd and contra-
 " dictory, and that it is---all owing merely to
 " Prejudice and Partiality; since to instance in
 " things which affect our senses daily, they will all
 " allow that if there's no reason why a thing (the
 " World suppose) is of this or that particular shape,
 " it might have been of some other shape than
 " what it now is."

The two Cases are very different, as was shewn
 sufficiently in Note 14. The World, which *we* sup-
 pose to have had beginning, might for that reason
 either have not been at all, or been of a different
 shape, &c. from what it is. That which never had
 beginning was never under a possibility of not be-
 ing, or of being any thing else but what it always
 actually

actually was. Here's no effect, nothing that wants support, consequently no room for any Cause or Ground.

" Here I must desire the Reader to take notice *p. 78.*
 " that when any thing is said to be *fit, right, reason-*
 " *able in itself*, it is only meant that the fitness of it
 " does not depend upon the will of any Being, but
 " is a necessary consequence of the existence of
 " that thing of which it is affirm'd." But *fitness*
 is evidently a relative term and must have reference
 to some *End*. Whatever is *fit* must necessarily be
 fit *for* something. *Fit in itself* is therefore both a
 solecism in Expression and a mistake of means for
 End.

" Thus it is absolutely right, right and fit in it- *ibid.*
 " self, antecedent to any Command that a Creature
 " shou'd reverence his Creator: where can be any
 " absurdity in this Proposition? Is not the Relati-
 " on between a Creature and Reverence to his
 " Creator suitable to the natures of each of them?"

It is suitable to the nature of the 1st as produc-
 tive of its *Happiness*, and to that of the 2d as agree-
 able to his *Will*, who originally design'd the Hap-
 piness of his Creatures, and therefore bound this
 and the like Duties on them. As therefore it nat-
 urally conduces to this end 'tis *fit*, &c. antecedent-
 ly to any positive Command about it: But what
 means *fit, right*, &c. without regard to any *End* at
 all? This is the absurdity we justly charge upon
 the Authors of that Language.

" Not having had a Beginning, or having exist- *p. 85.*
 " ed from all Eternity neither does, nor possibly
 " can make a Being necessarily existing." This
 Being does not want to be *made* so at all.

Not having had a beginning is no Reason indeed
a priori why a Being shou'd be necessarily existent,
 but it is a very good one drawn *a posteriori*, and im-
 plies it by necessary consequence, which is enough
 H for

for us. His instance of a Ballance hanging uneven from all Eternity, wou'd indeed be contrary to the present Laws of Nature; but except we presuppose the establishment of such Laws (which I imagine this Author does not believe absolutely necessary) there will be no reason why it shou'd not hang in that as well as any other position, and it wou'd be a sufficient account to say it always was so.

p. 86

" There is no Impossibility in supposing created Beings to have existed from Eternity, provided they have some *original Cause*." That is, as far as I can apprehend, provided they have some *beginning*. A Cause coeval with its Effect has been already consider'd.

ibid

" The Word Cause as he uses it, cannot possibly mean any thing but an *Efficient Cause*, and if so, I readily grant his Consequence to be true."

I shou'd be glad to know what other sort of Cause will serve your purpose, *i. e.* infer *Unity*, *Immensity*, &c. and perform those *operations* which Dr. Clarke so frequently ascribes to it. See his Answers to the 3d and 6th Letters.

ibid.

" To say that because such a Being cou'd not begin to exist, he must therefore always have existed, *i. e.* does necessarily exist, is as absurd as one can imagine. Where is the connection of the Propositions? No more I think than if a Person shou'd tell me that, because a Being will certainly exist from this time to all Eternity, that such a Being is therefore self-existent."

If he now is and *cou'd never begin* to be, is there any other possible Consequence but that he must have *always* been? And is not the contrary a Contradiction in Terms? Whether a Being which depends on the pleasure of some other *will certainly* exist for ever, is a very different Question. The Deity cou'd never derive his Being from any thing. *Ergo* he must be underived, *i. e.* independent, *i. e.* self

self-existent: I add and also *necessarily existent*, but of this below.

“ If there never had been any *Cause, Reason* or *Foundation*, why the thing was what it was, I shou’d be glad to know how it came to be what it was; and why it was not something else?” p. 87.

It never *came to be*: there never was any room for a *Cause*, &c. It was not something else because it always actually was what it is, and never under a possibility of being otherwise.

“ To affirm that the supreme Being has no *Ground* or *Foundation*, for his Existence is the most absurd thing in the World; for if he has no reason for his Existence really in Nature, it is impossible that it shou’d imply any Contradiction on not to suppose him ever to have existed. If it does imply a Contradiction not to suppose some one necessary self-existent Being, then is the ground or Cause of its being a Contradiction not to suppose such a one, the reason why he does exist rather than not exist.” It implies no Contradiction *a priori* (as was shewn before) to suppose the Deity not to have existed always: How the absurdity *a posteriori* (or the ground of its being an absurdity if it has any such ground) viz. that there never cou’d have been any thing, or that the Universe must have arose from nothing; how this, I say, can be the reason *why*, or *by* which God exists, I leave to this Gentleman to explain. Tho’ in truth he does not seem to have once consider’d the two different kinds of *Reasons* or *Contradictions*, touch’d on above. p. 88.

“ To say that he *necessarily exists* because he *always did exist*, is the same as to say that he *necessarily exists* because he *does exist*.” We don’t pretend to assign any Cause, or (which must always mean the same, if it answers any purpose in the present Question) *Reason* of his Existence; but ib. and 89

only the Cause or Reason why we believe, or by which we know that he must necessarily exist : and if he be the first of all Causes, underived from, and independent of any, *i. e.* (in our sense of the Word) *self-existent*, all which are Consequences of his *Eternity*, to suppose his Being at any time alter'd or destroy'd by, or without a Cause, is an absurdity, and by consequence affords sufficient ground for the contrary supposition. I hope you see the difference between this and the argument you have been pleas'd to make for us.

p. 89.

“ Never having begun to exist cannot make a Being incapable of *ceasing to exist*.”

It cannot, as we said before, *make* him so by direct *Efficiency*, or in any sense *a priori*, but it does by just *inference* and implication, or *a posteriori*, or at least makes the thing appear so to us in every case, which is as far as we need go.

p. 90.

“ Tho' it is true that it requires no *efficient Cause* to keep in the state it is, yet if there is no ground or reason why it shou'd go on to exist, that itself is a reason why it may *cease to exist*.”

The difference lies here; one of them is properly an *effect* or *Change* which *as such*, and *as such only*, requires a Reason; the other not. There can be no kind of antecedent Reason why an independent Being continues in the same state in which it always was, or as this Author phrases it, *goes on* to exist, any more than why he is independent, or *what he is*, and to want an antecedent Reason where there is nothing to be caus'd, is I think, the very same as wanting one where it has nothing to do, or where there's no occasion for it.

p. 92, 93.

“ Shou'd we suppose all Beings out of the Universe or not existing, save one, to suppose that one Being away implies a Contradiction : but why? Because to suppose that one away is to suppose

“suppose an *infinite Nothing*, which is a plain Contradiction.”

You might as well urge that it is a Contradiction to suppose any thing away if we leave nothing in the room of it. *Infinite* has no more to do with this same *Nothing*, than *finite penetrable*, &c. have. — But we have had this argument once before.

“If it is a Contradiction not to suppose some one Being to exist, that Being exists by some necessity in its own Nature, which necessity having no respect or relation to any thing external, must be a Necessity *absolute in itself*, that is a Necessity which has no dependance upon any thing whatever, but is in itself absolutely that which it is.”

If it be a Contradiction to suppose the absence of some one Being, does this give you the reason *why*, or the ground *by* which this Being exists? Nay, if in the present Case his Existence be founded, as you say, on a Necessity which has no dependance upon any thing whatever, I shou’d be glad to see how any thing will lead us to this Foundation, or how we can ever find it out. In truth, the best account of it will be to say, ‘tis something *sui generis*, or *absolutely that which it is*, and there I’m willing to leave it.

“That this ground of Existence shou’d be the Substance itself, no body was ever so weak as to imagine: but that therefore the Existence of the Being must be pre-supposed to the Existence of the Attribute, and that therefore it cannot be pre-supposed to the Existence of the Substance, is one of the greatest Difficulties our present Question labours under.”

“When therefore a Substance is pre-supposed to the existence of the essential Attribute, or when one of the essential Attributes is pre-supposed to the Existence of the Substance, the Word *before* is only meant in the order of our Idea,

" Ideas, and not in the order of the things themselves." But except you suppose it previous in the order of Nature too (which is indeed included in the former supposition) it cannot serve your purpose, *i. e.* be with any tolerable propriety the real foundation, and *a priori* infer the Existence, of the Substance and all its other Attributes: Which supposition you are indeed forced to make in the next Sentence.

ibid.

" So that when we suppose this Necessity to be the ground or foundation of the existence of the self-existent Being, we do indeed pre-suppose it (*i. e.* suppose it to be *really* and in order of nature previous, or this is not sense) to that existence, when in reality it is coeval." What other Consequence can be drawn from this, but that the Supposition is a false and groundless one, and all the Arguments founded thereon fallacious. The foregoing Passages, I think, explain themselves.

p. 101.

" To say that *this Necessity must be by way of Causality, or we can fix no manner of Idea to the Words* is mere trifling, as if there cou'd be no ground or Reason of existence in any Being unless that Ground or Reason were the actual producers of the Being, which is as absurd as is possible." There can be no kind of antecedent Reason for an Existence when there is nothing that can actually cause, produce or at all affect that Existence, (as in the present Case :) except you'll have an antecedent reason why it is uncaus'd, or why it needs no producer, which wou'd be trifling indeed.

ibid and
102.

" I ask why he cou'd not but always have existed? The answer should be, that it is and always was a Contradiction. I ask therefore once more, why it is a Contradiction to suppose him not to exist?" The proper Question I think, here should

be, *What* is that Contradiction? (Which has been often answer'd) not *why* it is one? However he goes on to prove that there must be a reason or ground for every contradiction. A cause why the same thing cannot be and not be at the same time (p. 100. 101.) Why 2 and 2 do not make 5: i. e. you must have a reason for the very first principles of all reason, or a Cause why some of your Ideas differ and others agree, or else he will tell you *they might not have been so*. He that can see the necessity for this may I suppose apprehend the necessity for a Cause or Ground of all Causes and Grounds whatsoever, and another for that, and will see no reason to stop any where.

" I ask again why God is that greatest and p. 104.
 " *most superior* Being which they suppose him?
 " What answer can they make to that? If they are
 " consistent with themselves, they must say, that
 " he is the greatest Being because he existed from
 " all Eternity. But then again why did he exist
 " from all Eternity?" I might as well ask why
 this Necessity of yours is that most wonderful
 thing which you suppose it to be, or why it is antecedent to the first Being. We know him to be the *greatest* from his Eternity, why he is eternal we know not, (*a priori*) but this we know that if there were any ground really and truly antecedent to his existence, he cou'd not be eternal; which is enough to overturn your Foundation. What this Author adds in pages 106, 107. about the Causes of the determination of the Divine *Will* has been consider'd in the latter part of Note 53. 2d Edit.

The Translator's Demonstration examin'd.

To consider minutely what he has advanced on this Head wou'd be to repeat every thing which went before concerning an *Infinite series, Eternity of the World, Cause and Effect coeval, Absolute Infinity without any end, &c.* He that has once thoroughly reflected on such principles will not require a 2d Confutation of them.

p. 110,
111.

He labours to maintain the possibility of an infinite series of successive Beings against all those arguments which shew that either some *one part* of it was not successive to others, or that *every part* of it was, both which destroy the supposition, “ and therefore, says “ he, they are nothing to the purpose. For in a series “ of Beings existing from Eternity down to this present Time, there could be no first, nor could there “ be a time when none of them did Exist, for then “ these wou'd not have Existed from Eternity”. But there is no one of them which was not once future, *Ergo* there must have been a time when none of them did exist, *Ergo* there was a first, and consequently the supposition contradicts itself. He goes on “ Let us then suppose a series of Beings to begin, “ to exist now, and that they will exist to all Eternity, would any person be so absurd as to suppose “ that there must be some one not *previous* to any “ other, (I suppose he means *subsequent* to all others,) “ that is, that there must be a *last*?” We may add, and would any person be so absurd as to call such a perpetually growing series *positively* or *absolutely infinite*? or conceive it as any *whole* or *entire thing really existing*? Tis an *indefinite* flux or aggregate of *parts* which are continually *added*, but never *make up* any thing at all, which is absurd, see Note 10 2d Ed. Below he attempts to bring this series off by asserting that it is infinite *one way*, but finite

nite another; which seems to me the same as affirming it to be partly infinite and partly finite: but we examin'd this before.

“ That other Beings besides the self-existent Being might have been eternal has been before proved, though they would not be in the same manner as He, because they would equally be dependent as if they had not existed from Eternity.” i. e. they would depend on the self-existent Being for their original or derive their Beings from something pre-existent and yet be all eternal, which appears to me something like a Contradiction. p. 118,
119.

Here the Defender of Dr. Clarke seems to be in some confusion. He begins ‘There’s no impossibility in an endless series of *dependent* Beings existing from Eternity. For, as Dr. Clarke says, “ If we consider such an infinite Progression as *one entire endless* series of *dependent* Beings it is plain this *whole* series can have no Cause from *without*, or from *within* &c.” and so produces the Dr’s Demonstration directly against himself, and when he has done, says ‘ this is a true, if not the only reason——why it is impossible, that there should have existed from Eternity such an infinite *independent* series;’ tho’ how he comes to allow this same series, whether it be *dependent* or *independent*, to be consider’d here by the Dr. as *one entire thing* or *whole*, which he had so frequently complain’d of in others, or why this does not destroy the supposition as much as a *first* and *last*, I cannot apprehend.

He endeavours to invalidate the old Maxim, p. 120: that a Cause is prior to its Effect, by a distinction between priority in the order of our Ideas and priority in nature “ For as Dr. Clarke says, Light would eternally proceed from the Sun, or an impression from an imposed Seal, were their Causes Eternal. In the same manner created Beings might

" might eternally spring from the workmanship of
 " the Almighty, as Light from the Sun. " Anf.
 Whatever is necessarily prior in the order of our Ideas, is for that reason prior also in the order of Nature, if we have any knowledge at all of Nature: or can prove any thing from our Ideas concerning it. Every *mover* must be previous to the *moved* as well in Nature as in Idea, tho it cou'd not be properly a mover till it produced some motion. In like manner as the Sun could not be what we now stile *Sun* till it emitted Light, but yet the matter of it as well as the motion excited in its parts must be previous (except you will suppose it self motive) both in Nature and Time to the actual Emission of these parts which cause the Idea of Light, and which require some time for every Motion: i.e. their Motion is not instantaneous, and consequently Light, which is the effect thereof, cannot be strictly coetaneous with the Sun. Your Father was no *Father* indeed till he had a son, but will you say that his son and he might possibly have been coeval? The contrary is intuitively certain, and he that will demand a proof of it or a reason why it is so, does not know when he ought to be convinc'd.

What he brings in the following pages concerning *Omnipotence* and the *Unity*, has been consider'd in R. g. 2d Ed.

A 124

He concludes " What the Translator says about
 " *Necessity of existence* is mere trifling and ought
 " not to be consider'd at all. As if uniformity excluded attributes of different kinds."

Absolute Necessity in the sense it is some Times used would destroy all variety or *diversity* of every kind, as Dr. *Clarke* endeavours to prove in the 6th. prop. p. 72 2d Ed. And it may exclude all diversity of perfections in the Divine Nature for the very same reason that it does exclude a difference
 of

Persons, which was the reason of its being first introduced. Tho in truth 'tis such a vague equivocal principle that it will be hard to affirm positively what it may or may not do.

These few cursory Remarks may suffice at present to point out the inconclusiveness of this Gentleman's chief arguments, so far as they concern the Notes on ABp. King. If any thing material have been omitted, it will be amply supply'd in a Controversy which is shortly expected on the same Subjects with a certain celebrated Writer, who has promis'd to consider them: (a) and who, 'tis hoped, will not think himself anticipated by this Gentleman's performance.

(a) Calumny no Conviction &c. p. the last.

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(a) Calumny no Conviction &c. p. the last.

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FINIS.

ERRATA.

In the Preface p. 18. l. 19 after *Copy* add *for*
ib. l. 20 instead of *for* r *from*.

Page 7. l. 25 remove part of the Parenthesis from
Answer to Letter.

p. 45. l. 14. add III and Contents.

p. 118. at beginning of l. 14. from bottom add (D.)

p. 125. l. 20, 21 include in a Parenthesis (to those
who allow such a Being, upon the belief of
which I am now arguing)

p. 128. bottom, for *none* r *Note*.

p. 278. l. 16. note for *words* r *word*.

p. 294. l. 10. note for *ordina* r *ordine*

p. 306. l. ult. for *Falton* r *Felton*

p. 358. l. 8. after *should* insert *choose*

p. 465. l. 7. from bottom add *who*

p. 491. l. 9. note, for *ratis* r *ratio*

p. 449. l. 7. for *repyd* r *repay'd*

p. 34. of ABp King's Sermons l. 4. from the bottom
for *and* r. *for*

p. 38. l. 3. from bottom *dele that*

p. 39. l. 4. from the bottom add *be*.

p. 44. l. 8. from the bottom for *able* r. *ably*

p. 45. l. 22. *dele to*

p. 46. l. 4. note, for ? r.

ibid l 6 add *rem*

ibid. l. 13. after *an dele* :

In Sheet G P. S. p. 5 l. 5. from bottom add *so*

